Mauritania is a vast country covering over a million square kilometers, where a relatively small population of 3.5 million people lives on just one-fifth of the country's total area. With extremely advanced desertification, the country is particularly vulnerable to the impact of climate change and other external shocks. The main sources of income in Mauritania are agriculture, which is either irrigated or rain-fed, and livestock. This is especially the case in the Senegal River Valley, where people make their living farming, raising livestock, and fishing, while mining is prevalent in the north. Arable land is therefore one of the country's main resources, but it is also a major source of contention due to increasing urbanization and the limited availability of arable land. This presentation relies on the key recommendations emphasized in the Land Governance Framework Report (LGAF), published by the World Bank in 2014. This report established a far-reaching and more inclusive national land policy that strengthens the security of land tenure for vulnerable groups, including women. This framework was the first to propose a national platform for all stakeholders, including women, to openly discuss and reach consensus around land issues. The inclusive workshops that were held by LGAF helped stimulate discussion at all levels, from civil society, both men and women, to senior officials, promoting a national debate on land issues with a strong gender perspective. The workshops were particularly beneficial for many female participants, as these women now have increased access to information about land issues in their own communities.
Supplementary material: Tierfutter von einheimischen Wiesen und Feldern - Recherchebericht Nr. 1 zum Forschungsprojekt «Schweizer Futtermittelimporte» https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.4572514 Tierfutter aus anderen Ländern (Importe) - Recherchebericht Nr. 2 zum Forschungsprojekt «Schweizer Futtermittelimporte» https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.4572534 Soja – das global wichtigste Eiweissfutter für die Tierproduktion - Recherchebericht Nr. 3 zum Forschungsprojekt «Schweizer Futtermittelimporte» https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.4572541 Brasilien – Sojaproduzent im Rampenlicht - Recherchebericht Nr. 4 zum Forschungsprojekt «Schweizer Futtermittelimporte» https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.4572547 Kalorienverluste durch die Tierproduktion - Recherchebericht Nr. 5 zum Forschungsprojekt «Schweizer Futtermittelimporte» https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.4572664 ; The aim of this research project is to demonstrate the many dimensions of importing feedstuff, to clarify the significance of imported feedstuff for animal production in Switzerland, as well as to assess the negative environmental impacts of such importation both within Switzerland and in the countries of origin. In particular, the importance of soy as an element in feedstuff is examined in depth. The analysis is centred around the misleading statement that 84% of the feedstuff in Switzerland comes from 'native meadows and fields'. This percentage is based on the combination of roughage and concentrated feed, two categories of feedstuff that must not be added because they have limited substitutability and are therefore not directly comparable. Roughage is eaten mainly by ruminants. Meat, however, comes primarily from pigs and poultry which are both dependent on concentrated feed. Roughage is almost 100% domestically sourced, while more than 50% of concentrated feed comes from abroad. Protein is particularly scarce: around 70% of the protein in concentrated feed comes from imports (mainly soy). Therefore, if today's feedstuff were not imported, livestock populations would decline significantly, particularly those that are dependent on concentrated feed. According to model calculations, it would be possible to keep 94% of sheep and goats, 85% of cattle, 39% of pigs and 17% of poultry on the basis of domestic feed alone. At 21 kg per capita per year, meat production would be halved in comparison to the present day. Pork would remain the most important type of meat, although it would be over 50% less compared to today. Poultry meat would virtually disappear. However, around 350 kg of milk could still be produced per capita annually. Swiss agriculture specialises in the production of livestock. About 90% of agricultural land is used for animal feed, in addition to the at least 200,000 hectares of arable areas abroad which are used for the cultivation of animal feedstuff for the Swiss market. Soybeans, wheat, corn, etc. grow on these areas. Since the mid-1990s, the importing of feedstuff has increased sharply, most of which is imported from Europe. The most important protein feed which is imported is soy, which, due to public criticism, now tends to increasingly come from Europe. Most of the imported feedstuffs are in direct competition with human foods. This is because they come from crops that we humans can eat directly, including not only all cereals such as wheat, corn, rice, oats and barley, but also soybeans. In intensive livestock farming, the calorie content present in plant-based foods that we humans are able eat directly is converted into a lot less in animal food products. In this process, the production of meat 'destroys' significantly more plant-derived calories than that of milk. This is because milk still contains a lot of grass that only cows and other ruminants can digest. Soy is the world's most important animal protein feedstuff. Originally, soybeans were cultivated in Asia for human consumption. Today, about 75% of global production is used to feed livestock, more than half of which is used for chicken fattening. While poultry consume by far the most soy protein feed on a global scale, in Switzerland it is cattle which rank first in this regard. This is the result of the central importance of milk production and the breeding of performance breeds that depend on protein-rich concentrated feed. Global soy production has grown steadily in recent years, and in Brazil even exponentially. Approximately half of all soy is used for feeding or consumption purposes in growing countries, while the other half is traded internationally. The main producing and exporting countries are the U.S. and Brazil while the main importing countries are China and the EU. Brazil is still the most important source region for Swiss soybean imports. The country grows soybeans for the global market: around 90% of production is exported. Only 5% of Brazil's farms cultivate soybeans and only 16% of soybean farms are family-owned. In the past 20 years production has expanded, especially in the ecologically valuable Cerrado and Amazon biomes. There, the average soybean acreage is 930 ha (Amazonas) and 550 ha (Cerrado). The supply chains for soy imported into Switzerland are not transparent. The description 'responsibly produced' glosses over soy production in Brazil and the soy trade. According to research, Swiss soy imports from Brazil come from specialised, large-scale farms with intensive soy cultivation, monotonous crop rotations and high pesticide use. Most of these farms are located in the state of Mato Grosso, i.e. in the Cerrado or Amazon biome, where most land has been cleared in recent decades. ProTerra-certified soy also comes from original rainforest (Amazon) or savanna (Cerrado) areas. 'Zero deforestation' refers only to the last decade. Animal food products constitutes a billion-dollar business in Switzerland. The supply chains show a high market concentration in inputs (feedstuff), in processing (meat, dairy milk) and in wholesale and retail trade. A few companies, especially the conglomerates Coop, Migros and fenaco, dominate the markets. The industrialisation of production in efficient international supply chains is most advanced in the production of eggs and chicken. Here, too, the supply chains are not very transparent. According to model calculations, more than 50% of the total greenhouse gas emissions due to Swiss agriculture are directly attributable to livestock farming, 20% to the rest of agriculture and about 30% occur in the countries where animal feedstuff is grown. If feedstuff were not imported, greenhouse gas emissions would be reduced by 40%. The nitrogen surpluses in Swiss agriculture are also largely a result of livestock farming. More than 90% of the surpluses occur in Switzerland. Without feedstuff imports, the nitrogen surpluses in Switzerland would be reduced by 26%. The results of the research and model calculations thus lead to five conclusions: I. The industry's advertising images and messages are misleading and gloss over livestock farming in Switzerland and its dependence on imports. They shape the perceptions of the population and increase the demand for animal food products "from Switzerland". II. Governmental agencies do little to educate the population about Swiss livestock farming. They support the misleading images and messages through official terminology and reporting. Political interests favour production and sales interests over the many other societal concerns (e.g. health, environment, animal welfare, transparency, economic costs, reliability of supply). III. It is not Swiss agriculture that benefits most from fedstuff imports. This is because agriculture does not depend solely on production for its income; it receives income-securing direct payments. Rather, imports are in the interest of upstream and downstream industries. They are the ones who mainly benefit from a high rate of livestock farming at discounted prices. IV. Swiss chicken production is a clear example: the doubling of production in the last 20 years has benefited a few upstream and downstream companies, a handful of global breeding companies and only a very small proportion of farms. The expansion of chicken fattening is a questionable development in Swiss livestock farming. It is further encouraged by the current debate concerning the environment and the climate as chicken is considered resource-efficient and 'climate friendly'. V. As a guiding principle for the future, it is proposed that Swiss livestock farming be adapted to the local ecosystem boundaries in Switzerland, and that the consumption by the Swiss population be adapted to global ecosystem boundaries. This would mean being able to halve meat consumption at the very least.
Background Noma, also known as cancrum oris, is a gangrenous infection of the oral cavity, which causes widespread orofacial destruction. If untreated, noma has a reported 90% mortality rate within weeks after the onset of first symptoms. Noma progresses through distinct stages defined by the World Health Organisation (WHO); Stage 0: simple gingivitis; Stage 1: acute necrotizing gingivitis; Stage 2: oedema; Stage 3: gangrene; Stage 4: scarring. Stage 5: sequelae. It is unclear how many patients with the early stages of noma will progress to the later stages of disease. Treatment in the early reversible stages with antibiotics, wound debridement and nutritional support greatly reduces morbidity and mortality. Acute noma is most often reported in children aged between two and five years. Many patients who survive the acute stages of the disease suffer into adulthood with disfigurement and disability of varying degrees. Noma is thought to be most prevalent in developing countries in Africa and Asia. Estimates for noma prevalence and incidence vary. In 1998, the WHO estimated an annual incidence of 140,000 cases of acute noma and 770,000 noma survivors living with sequelae. Two Nigerian studies estimated the burden of disease ranged from seven cases per 1,000 children aged between one and 16 years (2003) to 6.4 per 1,000 children (2003). A study from 2019 estimated the period prevalence of noma from 2010 to 2018 was 1.6 per 100,000 population at risk in Nigeria. These estimates are based on expert opinion, number of hospital admissions and retrospectively collected hospital-based data and it is unclear which stages of noma were included. Risk factors for the disease include poor oral hygiene, malnutrition, comorbidities and low socioeconomic status. Despite its ancient history (reported by Hippocrates (460 - 370 BC)), noma-related literature remains mainly confined to case reports and case series. By employing both qualitative and quantitative methods, we sought to examine the biopsychosocial features of noma, its epidemiology and treatment in northwest Nigeria in order to inform advocacy and prevention efforts. The three overarching objectives to fulfil this aim were to assess the distribution of noma among children in northwest Nigeria; identify factors associated with noma (including factors influencing health-seeking behaviour and risk factors for the development of noma) and gain an understanding of the biomedical and non-biomedical care provided to noma patients in this setting. The knowledge gained through this thesis will support the assessment of the need for advocacy around noma, effective resource allocation and the planning of intervention strategies. Methods We conducted a scoping literature review, three quantitative studies (risk factors, outcomes, prevalence) and two qualitative studies (language and beliefs and traditional healing practices) in northwest Nigeria. Data were collected from patient caretakers at the Noma Children's Hospital, hospital staff, children and traditional healers in villages within Sokoto and Kebbi States. Data collection methods included quantitative surveys, oral screenings, anthropometric measurements, quality of life questionnaires, qualitative in-depth interviews and focus group discussions. Consenting adult respondents answered questionnaires and participated in interviews, and where applicable, data was collected from assenting children. Quantitative analyses included descriptive statistics as well as univariable and multivariable risk factor analyses. Qualitative data was manually coded and analysed thematically. Findings We included 74 cases (noma patients presenting at the hospital in the year preceding data collection) and 222 controls (both median age of five years (inter-quartile range 3, 15 years)) in the risk factor study. Vaccination coverage for polio and measles was below 7% in both cases and controls. The multivariable analysis identified the child being fed pap every day (adjusted odds ratio (aOR) 9.8; 95% confidence interval (CI 1.5, 62.7) as a risk factor. The mother being the primary caretaker (aOR 0.08; CI 0.01, 0.5) and the caretaker being married (aOR 0.006; CI 0.0006, 0.5) were protective factors. Of the 37 patients with noma sequelae included in the outcomes study, 21 (56.8%) were male and 22 (62.9%) were aged six years or older. Fifteen patients (40.5%) had two to three surgeries. The most frequently used surgical procedure was a deltopectoral flap (n=16 patients; 43.2%). Trismus was released in 12 patients (32.4%), of these; none had a normal mouth opening at the follow-up visit. Despite this finding, all respondents reported that the surgery had improved their quality of life. In the cross-sectional study assessing the prevalence of all stages of noma, we included 3,499 households and 7,122 children aged <15 years; 4,239 (59.8%) were aged 0 to 5 years. Simple gingivitis was identified in 3.1% (n=181; CI 2.6-3.8), acute necrotizing gingivitis in 0.1% (n=10; CI 0.1-0.3), and oedema in 0.05% (n=3; CI 0.02-0.2). No cases of late-stage noma were detected. Naming of the disease differed between caretakers and healthcare workers in the language and beliefs study. Beliefs about the causes of noma were varied (spirits, animals, insects, previous infections). Noma patient caretakers spoke of the mental health strain due to stigmatization as a key issue. Difficulty in accessing care was evident. A lack of trust in the health system was mentioned as a barrier to care. Traditional healers offered specialised forms of care for specific conditions and referral guidance. They viewed the stages of noma as different conditions with individualised remedies and were willing to refer noma patients. Caretakers trusted traditional healers. Conclusion Social conditions and childhood feeding practices are associated with the occurrence of noma in northwest Nigeria. This thesis has shown that following their last surgical intervention, noma patients do experience some improvements in their quality of life, but continue to face functional challenges that inhibit their daily life. We found many, widely distributed, early-stage noma cases in northwest Nigeria indicating a large population at risk of progressing to the later stages of disease. Caretaker and practitioner perspectives may enlighten efforts to improve case finding, and to understand barriers to accessing health care. Differences in disease naming illustrated the difference in beliefs about the disease. Traditional healers could play a crucial role in the early detection of noma and the health-seeking decision-making process of patients. Intervention programmes should include traditional healers through training and referral partnerships. In conclusion, this thesis provides a unique view of the biopsychosocial features, epidemiology and treatment options for noma in northwest Nigeria. Noma is a disease, which is indicative of a weak health system and socio-economic environments of extreme deprivation. Intervention programmes should include widespread health system improvements that could address a host of risk factors for noma, and simultaneously other childhood diseases. These include increasing access to quality health care (including vaccinations), ensuring effective referral mechanisms, predominantly in rural areas, and the creation of a robust surveillance network. Health financing initiatives would need to be paired with these improvements. Nutritional programs aimed at caretakers of young children and community-based oral health initiatives could be effective mechanisms to curb the number of noma cases. Awareness-building initiatives targeting healthcare workers and community members are necessary to improve the detection and timely management of noma in endemic settings. The combined findings of this thesis highlight the neglected nature of noma and make a strong case for placing noma on the WHO neglected tropical diseases list. This initiative could foster awareness among policy-makers and governments and direct much needed funding to facilitate further research, surveillance and targeted health interventions that would contribute to the eradication of noma.
Neil Brownsword is an artist, researcher, and educator who holds professorial positions in ceramics at Staffordshire University and the University of Bergen. This essay is based on a lecture given on 5 December 2020 as part of the Centre's Public Lecture Course, Ceramics in Britain, 1750 to Now, which you can watch at: https://www.paul-mellon-centre.ac.uk/whats-on/forthcoming/obsolescence-and-renewal-reimagining-north-staffordshires-ceramic-heritage Obsolescence and Renewal The six towns that constitute Stoke-on-Trent have been famed for their industrial-scale pottery manufacture since the early eighteenth century. By the 1720s, growing consumer demand for finer ceramics led to skill specialisation, and the local population's integration into an economy led by the manufacture of pottery. Alongside pioneers of the industrial revolution such as Wedgwood and Spode, the Staffordshire potteries were driven by hundreds of smaller factories with more than 2,000 kilns firing millions of products a year. By 1938, half the workforce of Stoke-on-Trent worked in the 'Potteries', with employment peaking in 1948 at an estimated 79,000 people. During the last three decades, however, many North Staffordshire-based companies have struggled to compete in both domestic and export markets. In the 1990s, many factories were forced to outsource production to East Asia, where energy and direct labour costs were a fraction compared to those in North Staffordshire. This strategy, coupled with advances in production technology, has been significantly detrimental to traditional practices that once fashioned material objects in particular ways – many of which are now endangered as few apprenticeships exist to effectively transfer this knowledge. The displacement of much of Stoke-on-Trent's manufacturing capacity has accelerated regional decline, with cultural regeneration hailed by policymakers as a universal panacea to transform industrial ruin into aestheticised backdrops for artistic consumption. Yet within the regeneration agenda of place there is often an unseemly haste for local government and cultural organisations to circumvent the human fallout of industrial change, in favour of a more 'managed' account of the recent past. Thus, the psychological and emotional dimensions of industrial history – the first-hand recollections surrounding networks, social bonds, and pride forged by collective skill, can be all too easily side-lined. Since 2013, I have used my artistic profile to foreground the embodied knowledge of skilled personnel formerly employed in North Staffordshire's ceramic industry to challenge both this politicised amnesia, and charges of me being complicit in a 'retrospective idealisation' of the industrial past. Through collaborative performance, object installation, and filmed re-enactment, the work has sought to bring critical attention to people and traditional knowledge displaced by the effects of British economic policies that favour low regulation in global trade. I have staged site-specific performative interventions at numerous post-industrial spaces and high-profile cultural venues, to elucidate and rejuvenate skilled practices often considered outmoded or economically unviable for contemporary production. FACTORY, staged in 2017 at Icheon World Ceramic Center, South Korea, centred on six performances that addressed the cultural hierarchies and value systems of two distinct ceramic traditions. In Britain today, the regressive utopianism of John Ruskin and William Morris and Anglo-Oriental doctrines of the studio pottery movement continue to galvanise notions of spiritual and moral superiority associated with 'handcraft', and to relegate industrial know-how to a position of inferiority. Both Bernard Leach and Yanagi Soetsu, during a period of British and Japanese imperialist power in the early twentieth century, romantically venerated the 'humble beauty' of 'peasant' pottery from the Korean peninsula. As part of its processes of decolonisation at the end of World War II, South Korea adopted a nationalist discourse around its Joseon legacy, and subsequently introduced laws to protect its heritage and reinforce its cultural identity. At the forefront of UNESCO's 1993 campaign to preserve and promote "Living Human Treasures", South Korea now grants special status to individuals with exceptional cultural ability. In 2003, the UNESCO convention to safeguard 'intangible cultural heritage' further advocated support for the transmission of tacit knowledge, skills, and practices. A total of 178 countries have now ratified this convention, effectively making 'intangible heritage' part of their cultural policy – but unfortunately the UK is not one of them. In response to this, FACTORY collided the ceramic practices of two ex-industry personnel from Stoke-on-Trent – china flower-maker Rita Floyd and mould-maker James Adams – with the culturally revered dexterity of Korean master artisans. China flower-making remains one of the few methods of mass production that relies completely upon the dexterity of the hand. With changing fashion, this industry in Stoke-on-Trent has all but disappeared, with Rita Floyd being one of a handful of still-practising artisans who retain this knowledge. Floyd's performance provided an intimate space for audiences to witness her rhythmic intricacies of touch through predetermined patterns of repetition, efficiency, and uniformity. Yet to avoid staging a passive spectacle, typical of 'authorised heritage discourse', Floyd was instructed to continuously discard her manufacture onto a 6-metre production line built within the gallery. These symbolic gestures gave unprescribed form to each crafted component, with their distortion and random coalescence dictated by gravity and the material's plasticity. Floyd's intermittent performances and the linear deposits of waste that accumulated in the space were flanked by two film loops that meditated on industrial transition in Stoke-on-Trent. The films juxtaposed haptic knowledge, documented during the restructuring of the Wedgwood factory in 2004, against a 2016 survey of abandoned industrial sites reclaimed by the forces of nature. These intersecting modes of expression both signal the British government's disregard for intangible heritage and the human consequences of globalisation, and challenge notions that specialist knowledge becomes 'redundant' once the support networks of the factory cease to exist. Instead, they consider industrial heritage as a 'living process' and seek its rejuvenation and continuation for the future. Within the gallery space, production remnants salvaged from historic sites of ceramic manufacture were also stripped of their previously assigned use and presented inside vitrines. These artefacts had been marked by a particular point in time, as prior to the factories' closure they were deconstructed to deter their use in subsequent reproduction. To avoid their display becoming mere objectification, these items were performatively remoulded by Korean master Sinhyun Cho, and subsequently cast in porcelain and decorated by other master artisans – carver Yongjun Cho and painter Wonjeong Lee. Faced with these fragmentary reproductions of post-industrial discard, the artisans were given free rein to use traditional iconography, creating tension between culturally inherited notions of value and perfection. A further collaboration began with a series of partially formed moon jars, created by Living National Treasure Seo Kwang-su, who is renowned for continuing many archetypical forms of Korean ceramics. James Adams then took these casually assembled components into a less-revered craft – production mould-making – which was instrumental to ceramic manufacture in North Staffordshire, and paradoxically eradicated human touch through modes of standardisation. This use of human interaction lay counter to 'fixed in the past' demonstrations of skill and virtuosity, which heritage tourism deploys minus the complexities of social redundancy. FACTORY sought to counter such tropes, and practices of 'othering' more generally – whether experienced by marginalised groups in Britain or between British and South Korean artists – via collaborative modes of investigation that stimulated discourse, interactivity, and sensory understanding through the cultural exchange of tacit and explicit knowledge. Reactivating 'obsolescence' through non-commercial production created a space where people with marginalised immaterial heritage could speak for themselves and renegotiate their value, in a context where such embodiments of knowledge are culturally revered, renewed, and sustained for future generations.
There is great geographical overlap between key areas of natural resources, global biodiversity and regions of acute poverty. The world's poorest people, including 59% of the population of Asia, Africa and Latin America live in rural areas alongside great natural resources on which they heavily rely for food source and income generation. However, proximity does not imply free unlimited access and often involves a great deal of trade-offs and risk ranging from natural weather and catastrophic shocks affecting resource availability, productivity and even human lives, to changes in governance and resource use regulations. In this dissertation, I study the linkages between natural resources use, livelihoods, governance and the environment, using the case study of Madagascar, a low-income country with great biodiversity and natural resources endowment. In particular, I study how different types of regulations and restrictions affect household resource use and well-being. In Chapter 1, I evaluate the health and wealth trade-offs of the widely practiced fire use in agriculture in Madagascar, using high-frequency satellite data to model pollution exposure taking advantage of random variation in wind direction. In Chapter 2, I study how poor households cope with natural disasters using the quasi-experiment setting of high frequency cyclones in Madagascar. In Chapter 3, I take advantage of a unique dataset coupled with the staggered rollout of a biodiversity conservation policy to study the impacts of community-based conservation on bushmeat hunting in northeastern Madagascar.In the first chapter, I study the impacts of agricultural fires on local health and on agricultural productivity in Madagascar. Every year, despite agricultural fires being illegal, 25% to 50% of grasslands and 7% to 10% of forests are set on fire due to slash-and-burn agriculture and livestock farming. This leads to great pollution throughout the island, yet there is limited empirical evidence on the health impacts of fires in the island. I first estimate the health impacts of fires by using high frequency and high resolution satellite data on fire location and wind speed on the day of fire to model pollution exposure around population centers. Identification comes from the random variation in wind direction and the frequent change in pollution source. I find that agricultural fires greatly impact birth outcomes and respiratory health of infants and that fires are responsible for over 4,000 "missing infants", or 0.7% of all births across the island every year. To identify the agricultural impacts of fires, I use an instrumental variable strategy taking advantage of a rapid expansion of protected areas in Madagascar that led to tripling of protected areas and delimitation of numerous potential parks. I use proposed parks, areas that were physically delimited as potential official protected areas, as an instrument for fires. Delimitation of proposed parks led to reduced fire activity, however, since parks were not actually implemented, surrounding populations were unaffected by potential economic returns or changes in behavior that would raise concerns regarding the validity of the exclusion restriction. Grassland fires led to increased livestock production and yields for cassava and corn, whereas forest fires increased corn farming land and harvest, leading to decreased food prices. These quantity and price effects increased consumer surplus by USD1.884 billion per year, implying that, for the output gains to outweigh the mortality impacts, one would have to assume a value of statistical life of less than USD440,000, whereas typical values for VSL range from 4 million to 9 million USD. Therefore the mortality costs of fires alone, excluding hospitalization costs and morbidity, exceed the benefits from increased agricultural production. Given that land use rights are ambiguous and government resources in regulating forest fires are limited, a more cooperative and integrative approach such as payments for ecosystem services might be effective in incentivizing farmers to engage in less frequent more sustainable fire activity.In the second chapter, I use cyclone track data and hourly wind direction data to model cyclone exposure and study the impact of tropical storms in Madagascar. Madagascar is the second most exposed country to multi-disaster risks in Africa, and experiences multiple episodes of droughts, floods, locust invasions and cyclones every year. On average, the island yearly experiences three to five cyclones that claim 10% to 30% of annual GDP in post-disaster losses and damages. Indeed, 74% of total labor is employed in agriculture, furthermore, agricultural products including exports amount to 45% of GDP. Yet, there is little government effort in terms of risk mitigation, resilience building and even disaster relief. Looking at the impact of cyclones on household well-being along multiple dimensions, I find that both rural and urban households are negatively impacted by cyclones in Madagascar despite better infrastructure and less reliance on natural resources in urban areas. While rural areas experience more physical losses than urban areas as measured by cyclone e↵ects on housing and access to electricity, rural households are able to smooth consumption and are less prone to cyclone-driven poverty compared to their urban counterparts. In this latter group, average cyclones have no significant impact on physical assets, but lead to lower consumption and higher rates of transient poverty. I show that this is the result of a strong informal safety net between rural and urban families through informal insurance and relief in the form inter-household transfers. To provide relief to rural families, urban households reduce expenditure in non-food expenditure including education. This suggests that, while partially effective in managing risk and achieving consumption smoothing along some key dimensions, lack of formal insurance diverts resources away from potentially productive investments such as education and towards unequivocally necessary informal relief.In the third chapter, I use a unique household-level panel data to evaluate how community- based conservation impacts bushmeat or wildlife hunting and consumption in the northeastern rainforests of Madagascar, where lemurs, bats, carnivores, tenrecs and bush pigs are commonly consumed to satisfy nutritional needs. Taking advantage of the staggered rollout of the policy, I find that community-based conservation has decreased overall hunting in the study area by reducing opportunistic hunting and hunting by less reliant, richer house- holds. This effect was larger among relatively more educated households. Furthermore, community-based conservation successfully modified consumption patterns among poorer households such that illegal hunting (hunting of lemurs and bats) was reduced and substituted by hunting practices conforming with conservation practices (seasonal hunting of sustainable prey). While these results are encouraging given the increasing shift towards decentralization, it is important to note that, in my study setting, community-based conservation was found to have some limitations. First, effects did not persist and faded over time. Second, not all types of hunting were successfully reduced and the policy led to increased active hunting through weapons and traps as households respond by retaliating and over- extracting resources in fear of completely losing access in the future. The effectiveness of community-based conservation on opportunistic hunting and bushmeat purchase was found to be heterogeneous based on income and education. Better community integration and dissemination of community conservation design principles is therefore recommended as it has proven to effectively reduce illegal hunting and also has the potential of solving the retaliation and fear-based extraction behavior. Furthermore, given that biodiversity is a global public good, local users should not be the only bearers of conservation costs and alternative livelihood strategies need to be introduced for the long-run success of conservation efforts.
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If you have not been paying attention, our government has decided that all electric vehicles are the solution to the climate problem. At least as long as they are made in the US with union labor and benefits. California has committed to banning the sale of anything else. In today's post, a few tidbits from my daily WSJ reading on the subject. From Holman Jenkins on electric cars: If the goal were to reduce emissions, the world would impose a carbon tax. Then what kind of EVs would we get? Not Teslas but hybrids like Toyota's Prius. "A wheelbarrow full of rare earths and lithium can power either one [battery-powered car] or over 90 hybrids, but, uh, that fact seems to be lost on policymakers," a California dealer recently emailed me.[Note: that wheelbarrow of rare earths comes from multiple truckloads of actual rocks. Also see original for links.] ...The same battery minerals in one Tesla can theoretically supply 37 times as much emissions reduction when distributed over a fleet of Priuses.This is a shock only to those who weren't paying attention. It certainly isn't lost on government. Chris Atkinson, the Ohio State University sustainable transportation guru whose slogan I've cited before—"the best use of a battery is in a hybrid"—was a key official in the Obama Energy Department.Our policies don't exist to incentivize carbon reduction, they exist to lure affluent Americans to make space in their garages for oversized, luxurious EVs so Tesla can report a profit and so other automakers can rack up smaller losses on the "compliance" vehicles they create in obedience to government mandates.Actually, I vote GMC's 9,000 lb, 1,000 hp. 0-60 in 3 seconds $110,000 electric Hummer the prize for most conspicuous mis-use of Chinese lithium and its associated carbon emissions. Tesla's new "cyber truck" comes close. I can't wait to see those driving around Palo Alto. Mining the required minerals produces emissions. Keeping the battery charged produces emissions. Jenkins is a pretty good economist. There is supply and demand: Only if a great deal of gasoline-based driving is displaced would there be net reduction in CO2. But who says any gasoline-based driving is being displaced? When government ladles out tax breaks for EVs, when wealthy consumers splurge on a car that burns electrons instead of gasoline, they simply leave more gasoline available for someone else to consume at a lower price.Stop just a minute and digest this one, if you have not already. If you use less gas, someone else uses more. EV subsidies just shift who uses the gas. The same supply just goes somewhere else. One has to subsidize electrics so much that the price of gas goes down, permanently, so that it's not worth bringing out of the ground. And the price and demand are global. Lower prices encourage Indians and Africans to finally get cheap gas powered cars. This may be a secret to you, the public. It's not to economists.Well, some economists. Alas my beloved profession is as open to virtue signaling as everyone else so I don't see a loud "stop subsidizing battery only EVs and banning everything else" from economists. The problem here is the problem with any plan to subsidize our way to emissions reduction. Humans are perfectly capable of consuming both renewable and dirty energy in ever-growing quantities if the price is right. The emissions data prove as much....By incorporating carbon taxes into its tax systems, global society might at least slow the rate of CO2 emissions while simultaneously improving the efficiency of its tax codes. It still seemed unlikely, but it wasn't clear why. After all, politicians enact plenty of taxes. Governments have been advised for decades to adopt consumption taxes as a way to fund their welfare states without destroying the possibility of growth. Cramming a lot into one delicious column, Jenkins wonders at human nature: How to explain, along the way, the coevolution of the climate empty gesture with climate rhetoric that increasingly shouts the unfounded claim that climate change threatens human survival? I explain it this way: When it became clear nobody was going to do anything about climate change, it became safe to engage in hysterical rhetoric about climate change....As David Burge put it (thanks to an anonymous colleague for this delicious tidbit)"To help poor children, I am going to launch flaming accordions into the Grand Canyon.""That's stupid.""WHY DO YOU HATE POOR CHILDREN?"Climate change is real. Climate change matters. Addressing it is expensive. Other environmental problems clamor for resources too. Europe has stopped growing, and the US is headed the same way. We don't have trillions to waste. California as always leads the way on the beau geste: ... in California, ... drayage trucks, which carry containerized cargo to and from ports and rail centers, face a looming deadline. The state will require any new drayage trucks added to fleets starting next year to run on electric batteries or hydrogen fuel cells. California also plans to phase out sales of new gasoline-powered passenger cars, pickup trucks and SUVs by 2035 and require all new medium- and heavy-duty truck sales be zero-emissions by 2036. ... Trucks represent 6% of the vehicles on California's roads, but a quarter of the state's on-road greenhouse-gas emissions,.... California plans to spend $1.7 billion for medium- and heavy-duty infrastructure for zero-emission vehicles by 2026.$1.7 billion, for state-provided "infrastructure," on top of the costs to industries... for a benefit of...? The central problem: How are they going to recharge those trucks? [Truck operators] They position trucks near highways, rail or ports, not available power. As fleets add trucks they may need to draw an additional 6 to 8 megawatts of power or more. "That's about 1,000 homes," said Steve Powell, chief executive of utility Southern California Edison. "We may need a new substation or something like that and a line to be built." It has not been built, and the truck deadline is now. So what do operators do? A mobile charging system in California runs on natural gas. PHOTO: PROLOGIS MOBILITY, from Wall Street JournalSouthern California Edison has come across some fleets powering chargers using diesel generators...so that new EV trucks don't sit unused. Another solution: more batteries. [Pacific Drayage Services President] Gillis is installing a system of chargers paired with battery storage. It can discharge power to trucks even during times of grid stress. The battery storage itself can recharge at a time of day when electricity prices are the cheapest. There is an important point here on just how many batteries are needed for the "transition." Don't just count the batteries in the trucks. Count the batteries in the charging stations too. And the utility. Even California knows that it does no good to electrify and then power the grid with coal and natural gas. The plan is for solar and wind electricity, but that needs utility scale battery backup. A week or more of power. The sources of my last post only added up the batteries needed for the cars. That's too low by many multiples. He is also hedging—Gillis tripled his usual order of new diesel trucks from 30 to 100, which will arrive by year-end, just beating the deadline before California phases them out.I get the idea. Build it and they will come. Put the trucks in place now, so what if at huge cost, and so what if we burn coal to power them. Then when solar and wind and utility scale storage arrive, the users will be there. But trucks don't last that long. By 20 years when all that infrastructure finally has its permits, today's electric trucks will be long gone. Covering Kerry's trip to China, a reminder that climate is all about how China and India develop, not which car San Franciscans use to drive up to Tahoe. The Climate Action Tracker says that between 2015 and 2022 China's greenhouse gas emissions increased nearly 12%, while U.S. emissions declined some 5%. China's methane emissions rose about 3% from 2015 to 2021, the latest year with good data, while the U.S. cut them by 5%.... China's "coal production reached record levels in 2022 for the second year running," and "coal is set to remain the backbone" of China's energy system. No kidding: Between 2020 and 2022, China added some 113 gigawatts of new coal-fired power plants, according to S&P Global Commodity Insights. The entire world managed to retire some 187 gigawatts of coal plants between 2017 and 2022.As of January China had some 306 coal-fired power stations proposed, permitted or under construction, according to Global Energy Monitor, a nonprofit that tracks worldwide coal-fired power projects of 30 megawatts or more. When finished those plants would generate some 366 gigawatts, or about 68% of the world's total coal capacity under development.As of April China also had 180 new coal mines or mine expansions proposed, permitted or under construction, the nonprofit reported.In a lovely article Aatish Taseer reminds us there are 1.3 billion people in India (as well as 1.4 billion in China). It's hot, just like it is in Texas. When they reach middle income, they will want air conditioning, just like in Texas. This doesn't make the virtue-signaling tour because there is no easy answer. If China and India don't think they can grow based on solar, wind, and nuclear, just what can we do about it? Send more diplomats? It does not help that the US is now deciding to "disengage" and fight some sort of battle for economic supremacy via industrial policy trade restrictions and tariffs. Even Taiwan on a silver platter isn't going to get China to change. Even if the US shuts down, de-growths, and goes back to subsistence farming, China will spew CO2. I guess the argument is go first to establish a moral example. But if that moral example is obviously self-defeating, pointless, and just money down ratholes to entrenched interests, I doubt it will shame China to much action. A carbon tax, and a Manhattan project to drive down the cost of nuclear would make a whole lot more sense. (Half the Manhattan project is technical, the other half is to rewrite the regulatory rule book on a wartime schedule.) Think what you could do with the trillion or so dollars going to various subsidies and mandates. Update Read "Old Eagle Eye" excellent July 19 comment below. Boiling it all down to a nutshell, our policy path now is going to produce energy with a lot more materials -- rocks, steel, concrete, batteries, aluminum, carbon fibre -- and energy to produce those materials, relative to fossil fuels or nuclear. Producing those materials also produces more carbon now, with a hoped for savings later. That the 1970s environmental movement ends up with a huge increase in making stuff from rocks, rather than a service-oriented economy with small impact power, first natural gas and then nuclear, and a light touch upon the earth, is a bit of a paradox. Also, in addition to spending our trillion dollars and industrial policy wonks on making nuclear cheap and abundant, if a warming climate really is an economic and environmental problem, and given the current policy path is both ineffective and hugely expensive, why should we not even speak or research geoengineering? It's not ideal, but nothing is ideal.
Engr. Luis L. León sends a letter to Gen. Plutarco Elías Calles giving news of his daily life, the sale of his house to settle the debts and the serious economic situation of the country. He analyzes the agricultural situation and states that productivity has decreased. He claims that farmers and "ejidatarios" need stability and guarantees from the government. He states it is necessary to enforce the law, respect small properties, stablish the legal bases to give and restitute "ejidos"and respect the property of harvests, buildings and tools. He claims that the government is moving to the extreme left, which is provoking chaos in agriculture. Memorandum signed by Juárez on March 31, 1938 in which he analyzes the economic situation since 1932. He states that commerce increased until 1937 and then it started to decrease. He also claims that agriculture is in crisis due to corruption and a disorganized structure. Regarding financial policies, he states there has been serious mistakes in the administration of public funds. The author analyzes the agricultural situation as well as the situation of the workers and worker unions. He states group interests are favored, which causes distrust, unproductiveness and discouragement. On the other hand, he states that the government is using funds of institutions such as Bank of Mexico and National Railroads for government programs, which in addition to the oil expropriation is creating a disturbing scenario. The author analyzes the situation of the Bank of Mexico, the monetary system, the National Railroads, industry, mining, and silver and oil production. Juárez obtained the information from the Bulletin of the National Bank Commission from November to December 1937. In October 1939, Gen. Plutarco Elías Calles sends a letter to Luis L. León discussing the report by Juárez. However, he refers to an analysis of the European conflict, which is not mentioned in the previous report. Therefore, he is probably refering to a different report presented by Juárez. Gen. Plutarco Elías Calles analyzes the European conflict and press articles published in London in which David Lloyd George; former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom talks about Chamberlain and Churchill. Gen. Plutarco Elías Calles also discusses a speech given by Hitler, which according to him, represents an important and clever political document. Gen. Plutarco Elías Calles states that Germany, after the victory in Poland, is not interested in war and that it is necessary to wait to know the position of England and France. He asserts it is likely that the U.S. will work as a mediator. Lastly, he mentions politics in Mexico. Reply by Luis L. León expressing that the perspective of Gen. Plutarco Elías Calles regarding the European conflict is realistic. Engr. Luis L. León sends a letter to Gen. Plutarco Elías Calles regarding the situation in Mexico with the administration of President Manuel Ávila Camacho. He asserts President Manuel Ávila Camacho will work to solve the issues with oil, railroads, agriculture, small property and entitlement of "ejidos". Memorandum related to rubber by Engr. Luis L. León, signed on February 1942 and sent to Mr. Jorge Henríquez in which he informs that due to the war in the Pacific, there is a shortage of rubber. He says it is urgent to establish plantations in intertropical zones to produce rubber. He makes a study of the viability to create a rubber company in Mexico, the investment needed, markets, etc. / El ingeniero Luis L. León escribe al general PEC, que vive en San Diego, Cal., en el exilio, comentando los problemas de su vida cotidiana, la venta de su casa para pagar deudas, lo grave de su situación económica que es reflejo de la del país, ya que no hay crédito y la moneda no tiene estabilidad, con lo que el clima de desconfianza es generalizado. En seguida analiza la situación de la agricultura, cuya productividad ha disminuido notablemente lo que está creando una corriente de opinión a favor del respeto a la pequeña propiedad porque algunos se dan cuenta de que el agrarismo es destructor y anárquico; la agricultura como actividad económica para ganarse la vida requiere seguridad y garantía por parte del estado más aún en un país tan individualista como el nuestro, donde el agricultor si no tiene certidumbre en la propiedad de su parcela no siembra. Lo mismo el pequeño propietario que el ejidatario si no hay garantía baja su producción. El remedio para estos males es hacer cumplir la ley, respetar la pequeña propiedad, y las bases legales para la tramitación de dotación y restitución de ejidos; respetar la propiedad de cosechas, aperos, edificaciones y herramientas. Que el campo y sus productos no sean botín de líderes, caciques y burócratas. Pero este programa no es el vigente para los altos mandos del gobierno que cada vez avanza más hacia la extrema izquierda sin que nadie oponga firme resistencia al agrarismo a ultranza que sólo ha provocado caos y anarquía en el campo. Memorándum firmado por Juárez y fechado el 31 de marzo de 1938 en el que analiza los diferentes rubros de la economía nacional desde el crecimiento y desarrollo que tuvo en 1932 cuando adquirió un impulso que se mantiene a pesar de la política social extremista que se ha ido poniendo en práctica. el comercio y la industria crecieron y se desarrollaron en forma sostenida hasta 1937 cuando, afirma, se inicia un descenso serio. La agricultura está en grave crisis provocada por una acción agraria demagógica, corrupta y desorganizada. En cuanto a las políticas financiera y económica del país se han cometido errores fundamentales en el manejo de los fondos públicos. El autor analiza la situación del campo, de los empresarios, de la industria, de la clase trabajadora, de los sindicatos, etc., que se manejan con demagogia, favoreciendo intereses de grupúsculos sobre los de los actores reales de la economía, lo que ha provocado desconfianza, improductividad y desánimo. Por otro lado el gobierno aumenta impuestos, echa mano de los fondos de instituciones que siempre habían sido respetadas como El Banco de México o Ferrocarriles para allegarse fondos que destina a proyectos populistas; y si a ello se agrega la expropiación petrolera con todo lo que conlleva: disminución de la producción, de los impuestos que pagaban las compañías, pago de nómina, etc., además del descrédito internacional, el panorama es desolador. De acuerdo con las estadísticas publicadas y los informes que tiene a la mano expone y analiza la situación del Banco de México, del Sistema Monetario, del crédito, de los Ferrocarriles, de la industria, la minería y de la producción de plata y de petróleo. Maneja números, datos, estadísticas, utilidades, pérdidas, pasivos y activos; Juárez obtiene la información del Boletín de la Comisión Nacional Bancaria, de noviembre y diciembre de 1937. En octubre de 1939 el general PEC escribe a Luis L. León comentando el informe de Juárez pero da a entender también que en el mismo se analiza el conflicto europeo, así como la situación económica nacional y el informe de Juárez que aparece en este expediente no menciona la situación europea, por lo que debe referirse a otro. El general PEC sí hace a Luis L. León un análisis del conflicto europeo; de artículos de prensa aparecidos en Londres en los que David Lloyd George, ex primer ministro inglés cuando la Primera Guerra Mundial, quien hace una requisitoria contra la política de Chamberlain y los exaltados estilos de Churchill; también comenta un discurso de Hitler que según el general PEC es el documento político más hábil, medular y de mayor importancia en los últimos tiempos en el que hace un llamado a la paz y propone un arreglo definitivo a todos los conflictos europeos. Afirma que Alemania ha demostrado, después de su conquista de Polonia, que no tiene interés en la matanza, por lo que la guerra se encuentra en estado de quietud, que hay que esperar las posturas de Inglaterra y Francia. Comenta la actitud de Rusia ante la toma de Polonia, cuya atracción por los Balcanes no es posible ignorar. Afirma que es posible que Estados Unidos entre como entidad mediadora, con lo que es posible se llegue a un arreglo que evite el cataclismo. Por último al comentar la política mexicana asegura que las perspectivas son halagadoras. Respuesta de Luis L. León afirmando que la percepción del general PEC sobre el conflicto europeo es realista y clara y sus apreciaciones apegadas a la verdad. El ingeniero Luis L. León escribe al general PEC con optimismo respecto a la situación del país con el nuevo gobierno del Presidente Ávila Camacho, quien corregirá los errores que han sumido al país en la bancarrota y la desorganización: que la Hacienda Pública enfrenta un terrible déficit; los ferrocarriles, petróleo, servicios, agricultura, etc., enfrentan grandes problemas, que tendrán que ir solucionándose. En cuanto a la producción agrícola, la política agraria demagógica y caótica ha provocado una disminución de la producción, todos estos problemas parece que don Manuel los enfrenta con serenidad y ponderación ya que no ha perseguido a nadie, sus acciones se han encaminado a sustraer al Ejército de la política; a liberar a los Ferrocarriles del caos; a dar un programa a las dependencias del gobierno; ha instaurado medidas de respeto a la pequeña propiedad y de transparencia al manejo de titulación de parcelas ejidales a fin de dar garantías al hombre del campo. Todas las medidas tienden a restablecer la confianza perdida después del gobierno cardenista que llevó al país al desorden y a la debilidad económica. "Memorándum sobre hule" elaborado por el ingeniero Luis L. León, firmado en México en febrero de 1942, y dirigido a la atención del señor Jorge Henríquez en el que expone que a causa de la guerra del Pacífico se presenta en América una terrible escasez de hule o caucho al grado que ya se anuncia el control y racionamiento de artículos fabricados con este material, que la crisis tiende a agudizarse por lo que es urgente establecer plantaciones de árboles productores de hule en regiones intertropicales para producir el hule que se consume en el continente y hace un estudio de la viabilidad y éxito de crear una industria del hule con plantaciones en México; la inversión necesaria, el plazo de recuperación de la misma, los mercados, etc. El estudio se divide en tres partes. La primera se refiere a la plantación de árboles de hule, qué países lo producen, cuáles lo consumen y qué cantidades y en qué condiciones está México a ese respecto. Concluye que el negocio es remunerativo en México siempre que se plantee sobre bases económicas y de técnica agrícola moderna. La segunda parte analiza las posibilidades de plantar hule en México de acuerdo con su clima y tierras; qué tipo de planta sería la más conveniente y cuál es el estado de las plantaciones de hule en México; y la posibilidad de cultivos alternos. Concluye que México es un país indicado para hacer plantaciones huleras, que tiene regiones propicias para ello y aconseja qué tipo de planta debe considerarse de acuerdo a su productividad y cómo debe ser el cultivo para alcanzar el mayor provecho posible. Por último en el tercer capítulo analiza cuáles son las bases sobre las que debe planearse una explotación hulera para atraerse la fuerte inversión de capitales que requiere. En las conclusiones hace una síntesis de sus propuestas y soluciones.
Doktorska disertacija Jugoslovenska politika prema zemljama narodne demokratije u susedstvu 1953 – 1958. godine zasnovana je na jugoslovenskim arhivskim izvorima iz Arhiva Srbije i Crne Gore, Diplomatskog arhiva Ministarstva spoljnih poslova Republike Srbije i Vojnog arhiva kao i na relevantnoj domaćoj i stranoj literaturi. Disertacija se bavi jugoslovenskom politikom prema Albaniji, Bugarskoj, Rumuniji i Mađarskoj u periodu normalizacije odnosa Jugoslavije sa ovim zemljama posle Staljinove smrti tj. posle petogodišnjeg perioda tokom koga su njihovi odnosi bili u gotovo potpunom prekidu. Ona predstavlja pokušaj da se sagleda odnos Jugoslavije prema neposrednom susedstvu u uslovima hladnog rata i sadejstva jugoslovenskih interesa sa jedne i spoljnih faktora poput uloge Sovjetskog Saveza u procesu normalizacije odnosa Jugoslavije sa pomenutim zemljama ili uloge vodećih zapadnih zemalja i njihovih interesa u Jugoslaviji i susednim zemljama "narodne demokratije" sa druge strane. U nekoliko faza kroz koje su od marta 1953. do aprila 1958. godine prošli odnosi Jugoslavije sa Albanijom, Bugarskom, Rumunijom i Mađarskom (od Staljinove smrti do potpisivanja Beogradske deklaracije, od potpisivanja Beogradske deklaracije do XX kongresa KPSS-a, od XX kongresa KPSS-a do izbijanja događaja u Mađarskoj 1956. godine i od događaja u Mađarskoj do kritike novog Programa SKJ) jugoslovenska politika se menjala u skladu sa okolnostima zadržavajući kao konstante izražen interes za normalizaciju odnosa i insistiranje na tome da sve susedne zemlje "narodne demokratije" javno osude svoju raniju politiku prema Jugoslaviji i rehabilituju sve koji su na montiranim sudskim procesima osuđeni zbog špijunske delatnost u korist Jugoslavije. Osnovni cilj rada na ovoj dioktorskoj disertaciji je bio da pruži nova znanja o ovoj temi, nove poglede na jugoslovensku spoljnu politiku i ponudi novi ugao gledanja na odnose Jugoslavije sa SSSR-om i Varšavskim paktom u celini. U vezi sa tim definisan je i drugi cilj ovog rada koji se odnosi na rekonstrukciju jugoslovenske politike prema ovim zemljama i na pokušaj da se uoče specifičnosti, metode i ciljevi te politike koji su se razlikovali u odnosu na jugoslovensku politiku prema ostalim istočnoevropskim zemljama. Treći cilj na temu jugoslovenske politike prema susednim zemljama "narodne demokratije" od 1953. do 1958. godine bio je i sistematizacija postojećih znanja o ovoj temi i njihova evaluacija s obzirom na veći stepen dostupnosti izvora nego što je to bio slučaj pre više decenija kada su nastali najznačajniji radovi koji su se delimično bavili pojedinim segmentima ove teme. Četvrti cilj istraživanja bio je utvrđivanje hronološki jasno određenih faza kroz koje su prolazili odnosi Jugoslavije sa Mađarskom, Rumunijom, Bugarskom i Albanijom u posmatranom periodu i identifikacija faktora koji su na to uticali. U trenutku Staljinove smrti, susedne zemlje "narodne demokratije" bile su daleko od centra pažnje jugoslovenske spoljne politike jer je , između ostalog, i njihov značaj za nju u uslovima prekida međudržavnih odnosa bio mali. Međutim, promene koje su ubrzo posle Staljinove smrti usledile u Sovjetskom Savezu omogućile su početak normalizacije odnosa Jugoslavije i "prve zemlje socijalizma" što je za sobom povuklo i mogućnost da Jugoslavija normalizuje svoje odnose i sa susednim zemljama "narodne demokratije". Kada su u pitanju bile te zemlje, primarni jugoslovenski interes nije se nalazio u sferi politike i ekonomije kao u slučaju Sovjetskog Saveza već u sferi praktičnih međudržavnih pitanja koja su teško opterećivala Jugoslaviju. Na prvom mestu to je bio interes da se što pre otkloni vojna pretnja na granicama i stanje na zajedničkoj "liniji razgraničenja" koje je u godinama posle 1948. iziskivalo velika materijalna i kadrovska ulaganja. Osim toga, Jugoslavija je jasan interes imala i po pitanju poboljšanja položaja pripadnika jugoslovenskih manjina u susednim zemljama "narodne demokratije" kao i po pitanju normalizacije saobraćaja. Razlog što Jugoslavija nije pokazivala izražen interes za političku i ekonomsku saradnju sa ovim zemljama ležao je u činjenici da je ona u međuvremenu, u vreme godina sukoba, uspela da pronađe alternativu kako u sferi spoljne politike tako i u sferi ekonomije i na taj način obesmisli blokadu kojoj je bila izložena sa Istoka. Međutim, cena iznalaženja te alternative bila je visoka i pretila je da ugrozi monopol vlasti Saveza komunista Jugoslavije što je za Tita i njegovo najbliže okruženje bilo neprihvatljivo. Iz tog razloga, mogućnost da se nađe zajednički jezik sa Moskvom predstavljao je za Tita priliku da uspostavi ravnotežu kada je u pitanju bio jugoslovenski položaj prema suprotstavljenim blokovima u zaoštrenoj hladnoratovskoj atmosferi. Odnos Jugoslavije prema SSSR-u, i obrnuto, može se smatrati jednim od najznačajnijih faktora koji su uticali na oblikovanje jugoslovenske politike prema susednim zemljama "narodne demokratije" sa jedne i na kreiranje politike koje su sve istočnoevropske zemlje vodile prema Jugoslaviji sa druge strane. Drugi značajan faktor koji je uticao na jugoslovensku politiku prema zemljama "narodne demokratije" u susedstvu od 1953. do 1958. godine bio je u tesnoj vezi sa jugoslovensko-sovjetskim odnosima a ticao se prevashodno ideologije i s tim u vezi destaljinizacije. Kreirajući u godinama sukoba sa Informbiroom sopstveni model "samoupravnog" socijalizma, Jugoslavija tokom procesa normalizacije odnosa nije pristajala na "jedinstvo lagera" i povratak u njega što je bio glavni kamen spoticanja u njenim odnosima kakao sa SSSR-om tako i sa drugim istočnoevropskim zemljama pa i susednim kao što su bile Albanija, Bugarska, Mađarska i Rumunija. S tim u vezi je i destaljinizacija, odnosno njen napredak i dubina u susednim "zemljama" narodne demokratije kao i njihova spremnost da se distanciraju od staljinističke ideologije, predstavljala jedan od glavnih faktora koji su uticali na oblikovanje jugoslovenske politike prema tim zemljama. Najzad, važan činilac koji je uticao na jugoslovensku spoljnu politiku uopšte pa i na njenu politiku prema delu ili celini Istočnog bloka bili su i njeni odnosi sa Zapadom, koji su iz pragmatičnih razloga tokom godina sukoba sa Informbiroom bili poboljšani do te mere da su Jugoslaviju, iako nevoljno, doveli na rub uključenja u zapadni vojni savez. Zapad je bio taj kome se nije dopadalo jugoslovensko približavanje SSSR-u i istočnoevropskim zemljama i u periodu normalizacije njihovih odnosa svaki korak koji je vodio približavanju dveju do tada suprotstavljenih strana izazivao je na Zapadu sumnje u iskrenost Jugoslavije i zebnju kada je u pitanju bila budućnost odnosa Zapada i Jugoslavije. Kao rezultat sadejstva nekoliko najvažnijih spoljnih faktora i jugoslovenskih interesa u neposrednom susedstvu iz okvira socijalističkog "lagera" nastajala je jugoslovenska politika prema Istoku uopšte pa i prema Albaniji, Bugarskoj, Rumuniji i Mađarskoj ponaosob, onakva kakva je bila. U periodu od 1953. do 1958. godine ta politika je bila aktivna i pozitivna ali ne i bez ograda. Tih godina, Jugoslavija je bez sumnje pokazivala interes da normalizuje svoje odnose sa susedima sa kojima je osim granice delila i ideologiju ali najčešće nije želela da ona bude ta koja će dati inicijativu za konkretne korake u tom procesu. Smatrajući da su međusobni odnosi narušeni ne njenom već krivicom suseda, ona je strogo poštovala načelo (koje je inače zastupala i kada je u pitanju bila njena politika prema SSSR-u) da prvi korak treba da učini onaj koji je odgovoran za prekid normalnih dobrosusedskih odnosa. Imajući u vidu sve interese, želje i aspiracije koje je Jugoslavija imala kada je u pitanju bio prostor neposredno uz njene granice kao i faktore koji su neminovno uticali na njenu politiku, može se reći da je Jugoslavija prema zemljama "narodne demokratije" u susedstvu u periodu normalizacije međusobnih odnosa od 1953. do 1958. godine vodila politiku mogućeg. Ta politika, međutim, iako osmišljena na isti način, nije uvek bila ista prema svakoj pojedinačnoj zemlji u susedstvu iz prostog razloga što u njima nije nailazila na istovetne uslove i mogućnosti. Tamo gde su mogućnosti bile veće, Jugoslavija je postizala više. Međutim, kako je vreme odmicalo i kako je Jugoslavija bivala sve uspešnija u pronalaženju svog sopstvenog "trećeg puta", čini se da joj je sve manje i manje bilo stalo do sadržajnije saradnje sa većinom suseda od kojih je (budući da su sve bile deo Istočnog bloka), u skladu sa svojom novom spoljnopolitičkom strategijom koja je ekvidistancu prema blokovima predviđala kao imperativ, trebalo da napravi određeni otklon. ; The Ph.D. thesis Yugoslav Policy Towards the Neighboring Countries of People's Democracy 1953-1958 is based on Yugoslav archival sources from the Archives of Yugoslavia, the Diplomatic Archives of the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Serbia and the Military Archives, as well as on the relevant domestic and foreign literature. The thesis deals with Yugoslav policy towards Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary during the period of normalization of relations between these countries and Yugoslavia after Stalin's death, i.e. after a five years' period of almost complete interruption in bilateral relations. It is an attempt at a study of the interplay of Yugoslavia's relations with immediate neighborhood during the Cold War and Yugoslav interests on the one hand, and interests of foreign factors, such as the Soviet Union and the leading Western nations in Yugoslavia and in the neighboring countries within the framework of the normalization of Yugoslavia's relations with the above mentioned countries. During the several phases the Yugoslav relations with Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary went through between March 1953 and April 1958 (from Stalin's death until the signing of the Belgrade Declaration, from then to the 20th congress of the CP of the USSSR, from then until the beginning of the events in Hungary in 1956 and from then until the critique of the new Program of the CP of Yugoslavia), the Yugoslav policy changed in accordance with the situation, preserving the interest in normalizing relations and insisting that all neighboring countries of "people's democracy" should condemn their former policy towards Yugoslavia and rehabilitate all those who had been sentenced as Yugoslav spies at show trials. The main goal of this Ph.D. thesis was to provide new knowledge of the topic, new views on Yugoslav foreign policy and to propose a new vantage point on the Yugoslav relations with the Soviet Union, and on relations with the Warsaw Pact as a whole. Connected with this was another goal of the thesis that concrens the reconstruction of Yugoslav policy toward these countries and the attempt to pinpoint the characteristics, methods and goals of that policy that were different from those of Yugoslav policy toward other east European countries. The third goal of the topic of Yugoslav policy toward the neighboring countries of "people's democracy" between 1953 and 1958 was also to systematize the existing knowledge on the subject in view of better accessability of sources as compared with the situation of several decades ago when the most important works touching upon some aspects of this topic were written. The fourth goal of the research was to determin chronologically clearly defined phases that the Yugoslav relations with Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania had gone through during the researched period and to identify the factors that influenced the process. At the time of Stalin's death the countries of "people's democracy" were far from the focus of the Yugoslav foreign policy, because, among other things, their importance was small due to the severed inter-state relations. However, the changes that set in the Soviet Union soon after Stalin's death made the beginning of normalization of relations with the "first country of socialism" possible. This entailed the possibility that Yugoslavia also normalizes its relations with neighboring countries of "people's democracy". When these countries were in question, Yugoslavia's primary interest didn't lie in political or economic spheres as in the case of the Soviet Union, but rather in the sphere of practical inter-state matters weighting heavily on Yugoslavia. Supreme was the interest to do away as soon as possible with the military threat on the borders and to change the situation on the "line of demarcation" that had required much material and human resources in the years after 1948. Furthermore, Yugoslavia had a clear interest in improving the situation of members of Yugoslav minorities in the neighboring countries of "people's democracy", as well as in normalization of trafic. The reason why Yugoslavia showed no great interest in political or economic cooperation with these countries lay in the fact that she had in the meantime, during the years of conflict, found alternative solutions in the spheres of foreign policy and economy, reducing thus to insignifficance the blocade imposed on her from the East. However, the price of that alternative solution was high and it threatened to endanger the power monopoly of the Union of the Communists of Yugoslavia, which was unacceptable for Tito and his innermost circle of collaborators. For that reason, the possibility of finding common grounds with Moscow was for Tito an oportunity to balance Yugoslavia's position between the two competing blocs in a worsened Cold War atmosphere. Yugoslavia's relation to the USSSR and vice versa, can be seen as one of the most important factors influencing Yugoslav policy toward the neighboring countries of "people's democracy" on the one hand, and on the other, one that was decisively shaping their policy towards Yugoslavia. Another important factor influencing Yugoslav policy toward the countries of "people's democracy" in the vicinity between 1953 and 1958 was closely connected with the Yugoslav-Soviet relations and it concerned primarily ideology and, in that context, destalinization. Having created her own model of "self-managing" socialism during the years of conflict with the Cominform, during the process of normalization Yugoslavia didn't accept the unity of the Eastern Bloc and the matter of her return to it was one of the main stumbling blocks both in her relations with the USSR and with the neighbors such as Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. In that context, destalinisation, i.e. its progress and depth in the neighboring countries of "people's democracy" and their willingnes to distance themselves from the Stalinist ideology was one of the major factors influencing Yugoslavia's policy toward those countries. Finally, the important factor influencing Yugoslav foreign policy in general, including part of the Eastern Block or it as a whole, were Yugoslavia's relations with the West that had been so improved during the years of conflict with the Cominform, that they led Yugoslavia, although unwillingly, to the brink of joining the western military alliance. The West was unhappy with Yugoslav rapprochement with the USSR and eastern European countries and every step that brought closer the two once confonted parties during the process of normalization of their relations, caused the West to doubt Yugoslavia's sincerety and cause fears for the future relations between the West and Yugoslavia. As a result of interplay of several major foreign political factors and Yugoslav interests in the imediate socialist block neighborhood, the Yugoslav policy toward the East in general and toward Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary individually, emerged in the given form. Between 1953 and 1958 that policy was active and positive, but not without restrains. During those years Yugoslavia clearly showed interest in normalizing her relations with the neighboring countries with whom she shared not only borders, but ideology too, but in most cases she was not willing to be the one to initiate concrete steps in that process. Deeming that it had not been her fault but that of her neighbors that the bilateral relations had been spoiled, she observed strictly the principle (that she also championed in her relations with the USSR) that the side that had been responsible for the interruption of normal good neighborly relations should also make the first move. Having in mind all the interests, wishes and aspirations that Yugoslavia had concerning the space imediatly bordering on her territory as well as the factors necessarily infuencing her policy, it can be said that Yugoslavia led the policy of what was possible toward the neighboring countries of "people's democracy" during tthe period of normalization of bilateral relations 1953-1958. However, that policy wasn't always the same toward all these neighboring countries, for simple reason that it didn't meet with the same conditions and possibilities in them. Where possibilities were greater, Yugoslavia acheived more. However, as the time went by and as Yugoslavia became increasingly more successful in finding her own "third way", it seems she was increasingly less interested in substantial cooperation with most of the neighbors from whom (since they were all members of the Eastern Block) certain distance should be kept – in keeping with the new foreign political strategy that foresaw equidistance towards both blocs as a must.
Coal seam gas (CSG) is an unconventional natural gas (UNG) that is extracted from wells via coal seams, and reserves are found in Australia, the USA and the UK. Other UNG include shale and tight gas, which are sourced from different geological formations and utilise similar processes to CSG mining, and are extracted in Canada, Europe, Asia, the Middle East and Australia. In recent decades, UNG extraction has grown exponentially, with hydraulic fracturing or 'fracking' occurring across regional and rural landscapes and in close proximity to communities. Whilst major development projects can facilitate employment and other opportunities in surrounding communities through population growth and increased demand for services, there is evidence that negative impacts on health and wellbeing can outweigh any benefits. Commonly referred to as the 'resource curse', when the costs of extraction and exporting natural resources outweigh the economic benefits, the expansion of CSG activity was often met with trepidation from local communities and the broader public. There was uncertainty around the impacts and consequences of rapid development, particularly in the USA and Australia, stemming from a lack of prior experience, mixed messages in the media, perceived lack of governmental support, and little empirical evidence. Presented with the opportunity to address the gap in the literature, this research explores the broader implications of mining activity on surrounding communities, with a focus on CSG and the social determinants of health and wellbeing. The level of community interaction throughout a project lifecycle is greater in CSG mine settings compared to traditional mining methods (like coal, for example) because of their proximity to communities, and so there is a greater expectation of the mining company to monitor and mitigate impacts on the communities in which they operate. There is emerging evidence that the extractives industry may play a more diverse role in regional communities than previously expected, but the pathways in which they do this in the health sector are not clear. Integral to the provision of health services in regional areas is the integration of services and partnerships – it is common for stakeholders external to the health sector, like transport, police or environmental departments to be involved in the planning and availability of health services. There is a dearth of scientific evidence of the ways in which the extractives industry interacts with the health system in the communities in which they operate; what the costs and benefits of this interaction might be and how the relationship might be optimized to enable long-lasting health improvements. This is particularly important in mining communities, where health outcomes could fluctuate with the various stages of mining activity, and more so in communities where mining activity is soon to cease, leading to uncertainty and economic downturn. Objectives This research was conducted in order to inform the regional and rural health sector, extractives industry, and communities who are undergoing a period of uncertainty with little peer reviewed evidence to provide objective direction. The research aims to: respond to the demand in understanding broader public health and wellbeing outcomes of mining beyond direct, physical and biological outcomes; contribute to the growing evidence base around CSG development and potential community-level impacts; and to comment on the interaction between stakeholders in the health system and the extractives industry at a local level. Methods This thesis has been organised in to three parts to meet the stated objectives: 1. Two systematic reviews to synthesise the evidence for broader, indirect health and wellbeing implications at community level associated with mining activity in low, middle and high income countries in order to provide a comprehensive account of how communities may be affected by mining; 2. Synthesis of qualitative data collected via a Health Needs Assessment (HNA) in Queensland, Australia to explore the determinants of health and wellbeing in communities living in proximity to CSG developments in order to strengthen understanding of how community and health services can prepare for fluctuations that might come with a mining boom or bust; and 3. Critically review regional health systems and the interaction between the extractives industry and key stakeholders at a local level in order to compile a set of recommendations that optimise health outcomes for local communities. Results Sixteen publications were included in the systematic review of high-income countries, and included studies that took place in the USA, Australia and Canada. Products mined included coal and mountain-top mining. There was evidence that mining activity can affect the social, physical and economic environment in which communities live, and these factors can in turn have adverse effects on health and wellbeing if not adequately measured and mitigated. Specific examples of self-reported health implications included increased risk of chronic disease and poor overall health, relationship breakdown, lack of social connectedness, and decreased access to health services. Twelve publications were included in the systematic review of low and middle-income countries, and included studies that took place in Ghana, Namibia, South Africa Tanzania, India, Brazil, Guatemala and French Guiana. Products mined included gold and silver, iron ore and platinum. Mining was perceived to influence health behaviours, employment conditions, livelihoods and socio-political factors, which were linked to poorer health outcomes. Family relationships, mental health and community cohesion were negatively associated with mining activity. High-risk health behaviours, population growth and changes in vector ecology from environmental modification was associated with increased infectious disease prevalence. The HNA was implemented in four towns in regional Queensland situated in proximity to CSG development. Eleven focus group discussions, nine in-depth interviews, and forty-five key informant interviews (KIIs) with health and community service providers and community members were conducted. Framework analysis was conducted following a recurrent theme that emerged from the qualitative data around health and wellbeing implications of the CSG industry. CSG mining was deemed a rapid development in the otherwise predominantly agricultural, rural communities. With this rapid development came fluctuations in the local economy, population, social structure and environmental conditions. There were perceived direct and indirect effects of CSG activity at an individual and community level, including impacts on alcohol and drug use; family relationships; social capital and mental health; and social connectedness, civic engagement and trust. Before examining the interaction between the health system and mining sector, it was important to describe the rural health system and its complementary parts. Systems theory underpinned analysis of qualitative data from KIIs to assist in describing the characteristics of the health system and unique influences on its functionality. Results showed that communities are closely interconnected with the health system, and that the rural health systems in the case study were defined by geography, climate and economic fluctuations. Understanding unique system pressures is important for recognising the impact that policy decisions may have on rural health. Decentralisation of decision making, greater flexibility and predictability of programs will assist in health system strengthening in rural areas. Another key theme emerged from the HNA: the mining sector played a diverse role in health and community service planning and delivery. Key informant transcripts were analysed again using phenomenology theory. Of these, 23 mentioned the presence of CSG or mining activity at least once during the interview without any specific reference to the extractives industry. Mining activity was perceived to influence the ability of service providers to meet demand, recruit and retain staff, and effectively plan and maintain programs. The level of interaction between mining companies with service providers and regulatory bodies varied and was commented on extensively. Several key informants identified pathways for the mining sector to engage with services more effectively, which included strengthening multi-sectoral engagement and enabling transparent, public consultation and evidence-based funding initiatives. Conclusion Unconventional natural gas extraction and the implications of mining activity on nearby communities is a subject of major concern internationally. Through the application of core public health theories and methodologies, including the Social Determinants of Health model, complex adaptive systems theory and health needs assessments; this thesis has significantly contributed to the discourse and demonstrated a significant association between mining activity and health. This thesis sought to strengthen the evidence base of the association between the extractives industry and the social determinants of health of surrounding communities, with a focus on the potential impacts of CSG developments. The hypothesis that there may be broader, direct and indirect impacts on health and wellbeing at an individual or community-level was tested and proven. The secondary aim was to examine the relationship of stakeholders in the local health system with the mining sector, with the intention to develop recommendations that improve measurement, monitoring and response to potential impacts of mining in surrounding communities. This research established that there are both common and unique health and wellbeing issues experienced by communities living in proximity to mining internationally. Our understanding of the ways in which CSG mining activity can influence the social determinants of health has been significantly strengthened. This thesis argues the importance of first examining how local health systems operate in order to maximise engagement with the mining sector - a potentially significant funding source – and sustain health services. There are pathways and opportunities for the mining sector to contribute to community development, and this requires engagement with the community and local service providers. This also highlights key characteristics of communities that might influence the magnitude of perceived CSG mining impacts, which serve to inform development of indicators and tools to strengthen measurement and response. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to present a comprehensive framework with standardised approach for monitoring broader health and wellbeing implications of UNG development, as this relies on first establishing multidisciplinary approach and considering the regulatory frameworks that shape corporate social responsibility and mining investments. However, this thesis presented a set of key recommendations and criteria that should be considered in the design of a standardised monitoring framework. Formalising, publicising and regulating this process is the next step along the road to mending and preventing fractured communities from the potential impacts of mining. ; Kohleflözgas (CSG) ist ein unkonventionelles Erdgas (UNG), das über Kohleflöze aus Bohrlöchern gefördert wird. Reserven befinden sich in Australien, den USA und Großbritannien. Andere UNG umfassen Schiefer und Gas, die aus verschiedenen geologischen Formationen stammen und ähnliche Verfahren wie der CSG-Abbau nutzen, und die in Kanada, Europa, Asien, dem Nahen Osten und Australien gefördert werden. In den letzten Jahrzehnten hat die UNG-Förderung exponentiell zugenommen, wobei hydraulisches Fracking in regionalen und ländlichen Gebieten und in unmittelbarer Nachbarschaft zu Gemeinden stattgefunden hat. Während grössere Entwicklungsprojekte durch Bevölkerungswachstum und erhöhte Nachfrage nach Dienstleistungen Beschäftigung und andere positive wirtschaftliche Folgen in den umliegenden Gemeinden ermöglichen können, gibt es Hinweise darauf, dass negative Auswirkungen auf Gesundheit und Wohlbefinden diese Vorteile überwiegen können. In Situationen in denen die Kosten für die Gewinnung und den Export natürlicher Ressourcen die wirtschaftlichen Vorteile überwiegen, der sogenannte "Ressourcenfluch", stieß die Ausweitung der CSG-Aktivitäten auf örtliche Gemeinden und die breite Öffentlichkeit. Die Auswirkungen und Folgen dieser rasanten Entwicklung, insbesondere in den USA und in Australien, waren nicht ausreichend bekannt. Dies lag zum einen an der mangelnden Vorerfahrung, zum anderen an gemischten Botschaften in den Medien, mangelnder staatlicher Unterstützung und wenig empirischen Beweisen über negative Auswirkungen dieser neuen Verfahren. Das vorliegende Forschungsprojekt bot die Gelegenheit, eine Lücke in der wissenschaftlichen Literatur zu schließen, und untersucht die umfassenderen Auswirkungen der Bergbautätigkeit auf die umliegenden Gemeinden, wobei der Schwerpunkt auf CSG und den sozialen Determinanten von Gesundheit und Wohlbefinden liegt. Die Interaktion der Gesellschaft während des gesamten Projektlebenszyklus ist in CSG-Minen-Umgebungen im Vergleich zu herkömmlichen Bergbaumethoden (wie z. B. Kohle) aufgrund ihrer Nähe zu den Gemeinden größer. Daher besteht eine höhere Erwartung des Bergwerks, die Auswirkungen auf die Gemeinden in denen sie tätig sind zu überwachen und zu mindern. Es gibt Anzeichen dafür, dass die Bergbauindustrie in den regionalen Gemeinden eine vielfältigere Rolle spielen könnte als bisher erwartet, aber die Wege, auf denen sie dies im Gesundheitssektor tun, sind noch unklar. Für die Bereitstellung von Gesundheitsdiensten in regionalen Gebieten ist die Integration von Diensten und Partnerschaften von grundlegender Bedeutung. Es ist üblich, dass Gesundheitswesen-externe Akteure wie Verkehr, Polizei oder Umweltabteilungen an der Planung und Verfügbarkeit von Gesundheitsdiensten beteiligt sind. Es gibt kaum wissenschaftliche Belege dafür, wie die Bergbauindustrie mit dem Gesundheitssystem in den Gemeinden, in denen sie tätig sind, interagiert. Wie können Kosten und Nutzen dieser Interaktion aussehen und wie können diese Beziehungen optimiert werden, um dauerhafte Verbesserungen der Gesundheit der lokalen Bevölkerung zu ermöglichen. Dies ist besonders wichtig in Bergbaugemeinden, in denen die Gesundheitsergebnisse mit den verschiedenen Stadien der Bergbaubetriebsaktivität schwanken könnten, insbesondere in Gemeinden, in denen die Bergbaubetriebstätigkeit bald eingestellt wird, was zu Unsicherheit und einem wirtschaftlichen Abschwung führt. Ziele Dieses Forschungsprojekt wurde durchgeführt, um den regionalen und ländlichen Gesundheitssektor, die Bergbauindustrie und Gemeinden zu informieren, die sich gegenwärtig in einer Phase der Unsicherheit befinden. Das Projekt zielt darauf ab, auf die Forderung nach einem besseren Verständnis der Auswirkungen des Bergbaus auf die öffentliche Gesundheit und das Wohlergehen über direkte, physische und biologische Ergebnisse zu reagieren; zur wachsenden Beweisgrundlage für die CSG-Entwicklung und potenziellen Auswirkungen auf Gemeinschaftsebene beizutragen; und auf lokaler Ebene die Interaktion zwischen den Akteuren des Gesundheitssystems und der Bergbauindustrie zu charakterisieren und beschreiben Methoden Diese Arbeit wurde in drei Teile gegliedert, um die angegebenen Ziele zu erreichen: 1. Zwei systematische Übersichtsarbeiten, um die Nachweise für umfassendere, indirekte Auswirkungen auf die Gesundheit und das Wohlergehen auf Gemeindeebene in Verbindung mit Bergbautätigkeiten in Ländern mit niedrigem, mittlerem und hohem Einkommen zusammenzufassen, mit dem Ziel einen umfassenden Bericht darüber zu liefern, wie Gemeinden durch den Bergbau beeinflusst werden können; 2. Eine Synthese von qualitativen Daten, die im Rahmen eines Gesundheitsberichts (Health Needs Assessment (HNA)) in Queensland, Australien, gesammelt wurden, um die Determinanten von Gesundheit und Wohlbefinden in Gemeinden, die sich in der Nähe von CSG-Entwicklungen befinden, zu erforschen und dadurch das Verständnis dafür zu verbessern, wie sich Gemeinde- und Gesundheitsdienste auf Schwankungen vorbereiten können die mit einem Bergbauboom oder -schwund einhergehen; und 3. Eine kritische Überprüfung der regionalen Gesundheitssysteme und der Interaktion zwischen der Bergbauindustrie und den wichtigsten Interessengruppen auf lokaler Ebene, um eine Reihe von Empfehlungen zu erarbeiten, die die Gesundheitsergebnisse für die lokale Bevölkerung optimieren. Ergebnisse 16 Publikationen wurden in die systematische Übersicht in Ländern mit hohem Einkommen aufgenommen, darunter Studien, die in den USA, Australien und Kanada durchgeführt wurden. Diese stammten überwiegend aus dem Kohlebergbau. Es gibt Belege dafür, dass die Bergbautätigkeit das soziale, physische und wirtschaftliche Umfeld der betroffenen Gemeinden beeinflussen kann. Diese Faktoren können wiederum negative Auswirkungen auf die Gesundheit und das Wohlbefinden haben, wenn sie nicht angemessen gemessen und abgeschwächt werden. Spezifische Beispiele für selbst berichtete Auswirkungen auf die Gesundheit waren ein erhöhtes Risiko für chronische Krankheiten und schlechte allgemeine Gesundheit, ein Zusammenbruch der Beziehungen, ein Mangel an sozialer Verbundenheit und ein verminderter Zugang zu Gesundheitsdiensten. Zwölf Publikationen wurden in die systematische Übersicht über Länder mit niedrigem und mittlerem Einkommen einbezogen, darunter Studien, die in Ghana, Namibia, Südafrika, Tansania, Indien, Brasilien, Guatemala und Französisch-Guayana durchgeführt wurden. Zu den gewonnenen Bergbauprodukten gehörten Gold und Silber, Eisenerz und Platin. Es schien, dass Bergbau das Gesundheitsverhalten, die Beschäftigungsbedingungen, den Lebensunterhalt und sozio-politische Faktoren beeinflusst, die mit einem schlechteren Gesundheitsergebnis zusammenhängen. Familienbeziehungen, psychische Gesundheit und sozialer Zusammenhalt waren negativ mit der Bergbautätigkeit verbunden. Gesundheitsgefahren mit hohem Risiko, Bevölkerungswachstum und Veränderungen in der Vektorökologie aufgrund von Umweltveränderungen waren mit einer erhöhten Prävalenz von Infektionskrankheiten verbunden. Der Gesundheitsbericht wurde in vier Städten im ländlichen Queensland in der Nähe der CSG-Bergbau durchgeführt. Es wurden elf Fokusgruppendiskussionen, neun ausführliche Interviews und fünfundvierzig wichtige Informanteninterviews (KIIs) mit Gesundheits- und Gemeindedienstleistern und Gemeindemitgliedern durchgeführt. Die Rahmenanalyse wurde nach einem wiederkehrenden Thema durchgeführt, das sich aus den qualitativen Daten zu den Auswirkungen auf die Gesundheit und das Wohlbefinden der CSG-Industrie ergab. Der CSG-Bergbau wurde in den sonst überwiegend landwirtschaftlich geprägten ländlichen Gemeinden als eine rasche Entwicklung betrachtet. Mit dieser rasanten Entwicklung kam es zu Schwankungen in der lokalen Wirtschaft, der Bevölkerung, der Sozialstruktur und den Umweltbedingungen. Es gab direkte und indirekte Auswirkungen der CSG-Aktivität auf Einzel- und Gemeinschaftsebene, einschließlich der Auswirkungen auf Alkohol- und Drogenkonsum. Familienbeziehungen; soziales Kapital und psychische Gesundheit; und soziale Verbundenheit, bürgerliches Engagement und Vertrauen. Bevor die Wechselwirkung zwischen dem Gesundheitssystem und dem Bergbausektor untersucht wurde, war es wichtig, das ländliche Gesundheitssystem und seine ergänzenden Teile zu beschreiben. Die Systemtheorie untermauerte die Analyse qualitativer Daten aus KII, um die Charakteristika des Gesundheitssystems und die einzigartigen Einflüsse auf seine Funktionalität zu beschreiben. Die Ergebnisse zeigten, dass die Gemeinden eng mit dem Gesundheitssystem verbunden sind und dass die ländlichen Gesundheitssysteme in der Fallstudie durch Geografie, Klima und wirtschaftliche Schwankungen definiert wurden. Das Verständnis des einzigartigen Systemdrucks ist wichtig, um die Auswirkungen politischer Entscheidungen auf die Gesundheit in ländlichen Gebieten zu erkennen. Die Dezentralisierung der Entscheidungsfindung, größere Flexibilität und Vorhersehbarkeit der Programme werden zur Stärkung des Gesundheitssystems in ländlichen Gebieten beitragen. Ein weiteres Schlüsselthema wurde aus dem HNA herausgearbeitet: Der Bergbausektor spielte eine vielfältige Rolle bei der Planung und Bereitstellung von Gesundheits- und Sozialdiensten. Wichtige Informantentranskripte wurden erneut mit der Theorie der Phänomenologie analysiert. Von diesen erwähnten 23 das Vorhandensein von CSG- oder Bergbautätigkeit während des Interviews mindestens einmal ohne besonderen Hinweis auf die Bergbauindustrie. Es wurde angenommen, dass Bergbautätigkeit die Fähigkeit der Dienstanbieter beeinflusst, die Nachfrage zu befriedigen, Personal einzustellen und zu binden sowie Programme effektiv zu planen und zu verwalten. Die Wechselwirkungen zwischen Bergbaugesellschaften mit Dienstleistern und Aufsichtsbehörden waren unterschiedlich und wurden ausführlich kommentiert. Mehrere wichtige Informanten identifizierten Wege, wie der Bergbausektor effektiver mit Dienstleistungen zusammenarbeiten könnte. Dazu gehörten die Stärkung des sektorübergreifenden Engagements und die Ermöglichung transparenter, öffentlicher Konsultationen und faktengestützter Finanzierungsinitiativen. Fazit Die unkonventionelle Erdgasförderung und die Auswirkungen der Bergbautätigkeit auf die umliegenden Gemeinden sind international ein großes Problem. Durch die Anwendung der wichtigsten Theorien und Methoden des öffentlichen Gesundheitswesens, einschließlich des Modells für soziale Determinanten von Gesundheit, der Theorie komplexer adaptiver Systeme und der Bewertung der Gesundheitsbedürfnisse; Diese Arbeit hat wesentlich zum Diskurs beigetragen und signifikante Zusammenhänge zwischen Bergbautätigkeit und Gesundheit in betroffenen Gemeinden gezeigt. Diese Dissertation versuchte die Evidenzbasis der Verbindung zwischen der Bergbauindustrie und den sozialen Determinanten der Gesundheit der umliegenden Gemeinden zu stärken, wobei die potenziellen Auswirkungen der CSG-Entwicklungen im Mittelpunkt standen. Die Hypothese, dass umfassendere, direkte und indirekte Auswirkungen auf Gesundheit und Wohlbefinden auf Einzel- oder Gemeinschaftsebene bestehen können, wurde getestet und nachgewiesen. Das sekundäre Ziel bestand darin, die Beziehung der Stakeholder untereinander zu untersuchen und zu beschreiben.
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Two years ago on Feb. 24, 2022, the world watched as Russian tanks rolled into the outskirts of Kyiv and missiles struck the capital city. Contrary to initial predictions, Kyiv never fell, but the country today remains embroiled in conflict. The front line holds in the southeastern region of the country, with contested areas largely focused on the Russian-speaking Donbas and port cities around the Black Sea.Russian President Vladimir Putin, having recognized the Russian-occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk as independent days before the invasion, has from the beginning declared the war a "special military operation" to "demilitarize and denazify" Ukraine. His goals have alternated, however, between existential — bringing all of Ukraine into the influence of Russia — and strategic — laying claim to only those Russian-speaking areas in the east and south of the country.It is in the latter that Russia has been much more successful. Yet after two winters of brutal fighting and hundreds of thousands of casualties on both sides, as of the end of 2023 Russia only laid claim to 18% of Ukraine's territory, as compared to 7% on the eve of the war and 27% in the weeks after the invasion. Meanwhile, the West's coffers have been opened — and, as some say, drained — to help Ukraine's government, led by President Volodymyr Zelensky, defend itself against Moscow. Regardless, Ukraine's military forces have been wholly depleted as they compete with a much more resourced and populous Russia. While Ukraine's military campaign was able to take advantage of Russian tactical mistakes in the first year, its much-heralded counteroffensive in 2023 failed to provide the boost needed not only to rid the country of the Russian occupation, but also to put Kyiv in the best position to call for terms.If anything, as Quincy Institute experts Anatol Lieven and George Beebe point out in their new brief, "there is now little realistic prospect of further Ukrainian territorial gains on the battlefield, and there is a significant risk that Ukraine might exhaust its manpower and munitions and lay itself open to a devastating Russian counterattack."The only and best solution, they say, is to drive all sides to the negotiating table before Ukraine is destroyed.The narrative of the war — how it began, where it is today — is well documented. On the second anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion, RS thought it might be instructive to look at the numbers — weapons, aid, polling, population, and more — that illustrate the cost and the contours of the conflict over 24 months, and counting.Money spentThe U.S. Congress has allocated a total of $113 billion in funding related to the war. The vast majority of this money went directly to defending Ukraine ($45.2 billion in military aid) and keeping its government and society functioning ($46 billion in economic and humanitarian aid). Other funds went to rearming allies ($4.7 billion) and expanding U.S. military operations in Europe ($15.2 billion).After two years of war, that funding has dried up. The Biden administration, which once shipped two or three new weapons packages each month, has not sent Ukraine a major arms shipment since Dec. 27, 2023. As Congress struggles to pass an additional $60 billion in Ukraine-related funding, observers increasingly believe that aid package may have been the last.WeaponsThe Pentagon has sent at least 3,097,000 rounds of artillery to Ukraine since Russia's invasion. Most of those (2,000,000) have been 155 mm shells, the standard size used by the U.S. and its NATO allies. For perspective, that's about 95,000 tons of 155 mm ammunition alone.Despite ramping up military manufacturing, the U.S. still only produces about 340,000 155 mm shells per year, meaning that Ukraine has been firing rounds at three times the rate of American production.Washington has also given Kyiv 76 tanks, including 31 Abrams tanks and 45 Soviet-era T-72Bs. Ukraine has received 3,631 American armored vehicles of various types, from infantry fighting vehicles to personnel carriers and medical trucks.Meanwhile, Ukraine has made use of 39 American-made HIMARS, a mobile rocket launcher that has become famous for its utility in the war. As for smaller arms, the U.S. has sent at least 400,000,000 grenades and bullets in the past 24 months.CasualtiesThe war has killed at least 10,378 civilians and injured an additional 19,632, according to the UN. More than three in four non-combatant casualties occurred in areas held by the Ukrainian government, indicating that Moscow is responsible for the lion's share of civilian harm.When it comes to military casualties, good data still remains hard to come by and estimates are sometimes wildly different. Neither Russia nor Ukraine have offered detailed, public indications of the war's impact on their soldiers.The U.S. estimated in August that 70,000 Ukrainian soldiers had died and an additional 100,000 to 120,000 had been injured, putting the number of total casualties at over 170,000. Russia, for its part, claimed in November that 383,000 Ukrainian soldiers had been killed or wounded.On the other side, the United Kingdom estimates that Russia has suffered at least 320,000 casualties, with 50,000 deaths among Russian soldiers and 20,000 deaths among Wagner Group mercenaries. Washington said in December that Moscow had suffered 315,000 casualties, though American officials did not provide a breakdown of deaths and injuries.Ukraine populationThe United Nations estimates that the Ukrainian population (the entire country within internationally recognized borders), which totaled 43.5 million people in 2021, dropped to 39.7 million in 2022 as war swept through the country's east. This trend continued into 2023, as the population dropped to 36.7 million — the lowest level since Ukraine became independent in 1990.As of January, 6.3 million Ukrainians have become refugees abroad, with another 3.7 million displaced internally. As the frontlines have settled, Ukraine's population has slowly started to grow again, reaching 37.9 million in early 2024. Meanwhile, demographer Elena Libanova estimates that only 28 million of those people live within areas currently under Ukrainian government control (outside of Crimea and the Donbas).U.S. pollingTwo new polls that came out within the last week illustrate the complexities of Americans' feelings toward the war in Ukraine and the U.S. role in it.First, a Pew poll published February 16 found that a large majority of Americans (74%) see the war between Russia and Ukraine as somewhat (30%) or very important (43%) to U.S. interests. And another survey, from the Harris Poll and the Quincy Institute, which publishes Responsible Statecraft, found that Americans broadly support a U.S.-led negotiated end to the conflict. But the past few months in Washington have been largely focused on U.S. aid to Ukraine, specifically whether Congress will pass President Biden's request for roughly $60 billion for Kyiv's fight against Russia. According to Pew, in March 2022, 74% of Americans said U.S. aid to Ukraine was "just right" or "not enough." In December 2023, that same survey found that just 47% said the same. The biggest change came from Republicans: 49% said in March, 2022 that U.S. aid was "not enough," while just 13% said the same in December.Meanwhile, Gallup found in August 2022 that 74% of Americans said U.S. aid to Ukraine was "about right" (36%) or "not enough" (38%). Those numbers came down slightly in Gallup's latest track on this question in October, 2023, with 58% saying U.S. aid was about right (33%) or not enough (25%).Peace summitsThere have been several attempts to bring nations together to outline talks to end the war. Russia and Ukraine engaged in five rounds of talks in Belarus and Turkey shortly after the invasion, but the talks collapsed amid allegations of Russian war crimes and Western pressure on Kyiv to keep fighting.Since then, the belligerents have spoken directly about secondary issues, like Black Sea shipping and prisoner swaps. Ukraine, meanwhile, laid out a "10-point peace plan" that has formed the basis for five international summits, none of which included Russia. These took place in Copenhagen, Denmark, in June 2023; in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in August 2023; in Malta in October, 2023; in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in December 2023; and Davos, Switzerland, in January of this year.CongressSince the start of the war, Congress has passed four aid packages for Ukraine, totaling $113 billion. While none of the four packages were identical and aid for Ukraine was sometimes bundled with other spending, the trends for support for Kyiv in Congress are similar to those we see in polling, particularly among congressional Republicans.The 2022 supplemental, which became law in May 2022 and provided Ukraine with $39.34 billion in aid passed the House 368-57 and the Senate by a vote of 86-11. By September 2023, when the House voted on the Ukraine Security Assistance and Oversight Supplemental Appropriations Act, which provided Kyiv with $300 million in security assistance, it passed by a vote of 311-117, with a majority of Republican members opposing the legislation.On February 12 of this year, the Senate voted 70-29 to pass a national security supplemental, which would provide approximately $60 billion in aid for Kyiv alongside money for Israel and partners in the Indo-Pacific. The bill has not yet been voted on in the House.Ben Armbruster, Blaise Malley, Connor Echols and Kelley Vlahos contributed reporting. Graphics by Khody Akhavi.
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Huu -- Hygiene, Public L -- v. 362. Hygiene, Public M -- Hyz. ; v. 291. G -- Gall L -- v. 292. Gall M -- Gandía E -- v. 293. Gandía F -- Gardiner G -- v. 294. Gardiner H -- Gases A -- v. 295. Gases B -- Gazs -- v. 296. Gazt -- General E -- v. 297. General F -- Geography As -- v. 298. Geography At -- Geology O -- v. 299. Geology P -- Geometry S -- v. 300. Geometry T -- Gerk -- v. 301. Gerl -- German Literature S -- v. 302. German Literature T -- Germany C -- v. 303. Germany D -- Germany-History 1847 -- v. 304. German-History 1848 -- Gerom -- v. 305. Geron -- Giac -- v. 306. Giad -- Gilds G -- v. 307. Gilds H -- Girk -- v. 308. Girl -- Glay -- v. 309. Glaz -- Godf -- v. 310. Godg -- Gold Mines and Mining-Al -- v. 311. Gold Mines and Mining-Am -- Gol [i.e. Golz] -- v. 312. Gom -- Gook -- v. 313. Gool -- Goula -- v. 314. Goulb -- Grad -- v. 315. Grae -- Grang -- v. 316. Granh -- Great Britain I -- v. 317. Great Britain J -- Great Britain-Description and Travel,1800-1850 -- v. 318. Great Britain-Description and Travel, 1850-1900 -- Great Britain-Govt. B -- v. 319. Great Britain-Govt. C -- Great Britain-Hist., 19th cent. F -- v. 320. Great Britain-Hist.,19th cent. G -- Great Britain-Politics, 1660-1714 R -- v. 321. Great Britain-Politics, 1660-1714 S -- Great Britain-Trade, Board of U -- v. 322. Great Britain-Trade, Board of V -- Greece (Modern)-History, 1830 M -- v. 323. Greece (Modern)-History, 1830 N -- Greene H -- v. 324. Greene I -- Grey N -- v. 325. Grey O -- Grog -- v. 326. Groh -- Grunds -- v. 327. Grundt S -- Gueu -- v. 328. Guev -- Gumo -- v. 329. Gump -- Gzow. ; v. 249. F -- Fairs F -- v. 250. Fairs G -- Fans -- v. 251. Fant -- Fascism-Germany B -- v. 252. Fascism-Germany C -- Fearh -- v. 253. Feari -- Felln -- v. 254. Fello -- Ferrari -- v. 255. Ferrarj -- Fev -- v. 256. Few -- Fiction, American Ham -- v. 257. Fiction, American Han -- Fiction, American Will -- v. 258. Fiction, American Wilm -- Fiction, Dutch A -- v. 259. Fiction, Dutch B -- Fiction, English Kim -- v. 260. Fiction, English Kin -- Fiction, Flemish L -- v. 261. Fiction, Flemish M -- Fiction, German A -- v. 262. Fiction, German B -- Fiction, Lettish J -- v. 263. Fiction, Lettish K -- Fiction, Swiss-German B -- v. 264. Fiction, Swiss-German C -- Filmr -- v. 265. Films -- Finance, U.S., 1813 -- v. 266. Finance, U.S., 1814 -- Finland R -- v. 267. Finland S -- Fischa -- v. 268. Fischb -- Fishing A -- v. 269. Fishing B -- Flanders G -- v. 270. Flanders H -- Flora F -- v. 271. Flora G -- Flya -- v. 272. Flyb -- Folklore N -- v. 273. Folklore O -- Fond -- v. 274. Fone -- Før N -- v. 275. For O -- Forestry-Germany S -- v. 276. Forestry-Germany T -- Forter -- v. 277. Fortes -- Fourm -- v. 278. Fourn -- France Ar -- v. 279. France As -- France-Foreign Relations R -- v. 280. France-Foreign Relations S -- France-History-Revolution O -- v. 281. France-History-Revolution P -- France-Statistics M -- v. 282. France-Statistics N -- Frank E -- v. 283. Frank F -- Frederick I, King of Prussia -- v. 284. Frederick II, King of Prussia -- Freemasons P -- v. 285. Freemasons Q -- French Language-Dictionaries D -- v. 286. French Language-Dictionaries E -- Fresco Paintings B -- v. 287. Fresco Paintings C -- Friends, Society of. L -- v. 288. Friends, Society of. M -- Früh [i.e. Fruh] -- v. 289. Frui -- Funck J -- v. 290. Funck K -- Fyz. ; v. 214. E -- Eastern Col -- v. 215. Eastern Com -- Ecole B -- v. 216. Ecole C -- Economic History-Chile F -- v. 217. Economic History-Chile G -- Economic History I -- v. 218. Economic History J -- Economic History-U.S.F -- v. 219. Economic History-U.S.G -- Economics, 1848-1889 E -- v. 220. Economics, 1848-1889 F -- Edel -- v. 221. Edem -- Education E -- v. 222. Education F -- Education O -- v. 223. Education P -- Education-U.S.-N.J.T -- v. 224. Education-U.S.-N.J.U -- Egypt C -- v. 225. Egypt D -- Eisenstein I -- v. 226. Eisenstein J -- Electric M -- v. 227. Electric N -- Electrons B -- v. 228. 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Drama, English Translations From . S -- Drama, French J -- v. 203. Drama, French K -- Drama, German Bas -- v. 204. Drama, German Bat -- Drama, German, Low German D -- v. 205. Drama, German, Low German E -- Drama, L -- v. 206. Drama, M -- Drama, Spanish Ger -- v. 207. Drama, Spanish Ges -- Drama, Walloon W -- v. 208. Drama, Walloon X -- Dreu -- v. 209. Drev -- Dublin U -- v. 210. Dublin V -- Duke O -- v. 211. Duke P -- Duper -- v. 212. Dupes -- Dutch Language D -- v. 213. Dutch Language E -- Dz. ; v. 107. C -- Cah -- v. 108. Cai -- Cale -- v. 109. Calf -- California V -- v. 110. California W -- Cameron, I -- v. 111. Cameron, J -- Canada B -- v. 112. Canada C -- Canada Statistics Bureau M -- v. 113. Canada Statistics Bureau N -- Canaq -- v. 114. Canar -- Capeh -- v. 115. Capei -- Cardif -- v. 116. Cardig -- Carm -- v. 117. Carn -- Carrik -- v. 118. Carril -- Case A -- v. 119. Case B -- Castles R -- v. 120. Castles S -- Cathedrals S -- v. 121. Cathedrals T -- Catholic Church Roman L -- v. 122. Catholic Church Roman M -- Cauch -- v. 123. Cauci -- Cement and Concrete M -- v. 124. Cement and Concrete P -- Ceo -- v. 125. Cep -- Chah -- v. 126. Chai -- Chand -- v. 127. Chane -- Charities I -- v. 128. Charities J -- Charz -- v. 129. Chas -- Chemical Industries I -- v. 130. Chemical Industries J -- Chemm -- v. 131. Chemn -- Chicago B -- v. 132. Chicago C -- Children AC -- v. 133. Children AD -- Chile T -- v. 134. Chile U -- Chinese A -- v. 135. Chinese B -- Christ L -- v. 136. Christ M -- Christianity E -- v. 137. Christianity F -- Church Al -- v. 138. Church Am -- Church I -- v. 139. Church J -- Chyz -- v. 140. Ci -- Cities-Plans-D -- v. 141. Cities-Plans-E -- Civil R -- v. 142. Civil S -- Claq -- v. 143. Clar -- Classification K -- v. 144. Classification L -- Clergy F -- v. 145. Clergy G -- Club T -- v. 146. Club U -- Cobb -- v. 147. Cobd -- Coi -- v. 148. Coj -- Collection K -- v. 149. Collection L -- Collim -- v. 150. Collin -- Colonies and Colonization A -- v. 151. Colonies and Colonization B -- Columbia University Q -- v. 152. Columbia University R -- Coml -- v. 153. Comm -- Commerce Am -- v. 154. Commerce An -- Commerce-New York -- v. 155. Commerce-New Zealand -- Commis -- v. 156. Commit -- Competition-Unfair F -- v. 157. Competition-Unfair G -- Cone -- v. 158. Conf -- Congres H -- v. 159. Congres I -- Conr -- v. 160. Cons -- Continuation L -- v. 161. Continuation M -- Cookery B -- v. 162. Cookery C -- Cooperation S -- v. 163. Cooperation T -- Copyright M -- v. 164. Copyright N -- Coronations G -- v. 165. Coronations H -- Cortazar C -- v. 166. Cortazar D -- Cotner T -- v. 167. Cotner U -- Country Life-United States -- v. 168. Country Life-Uruguay -- Cowper W -- v. 169. Cowper Family -- Creation-Biblical Account-H -- v. 170. Creation-Biblical Account-I -- Criminal H -- v. 171. Criminal I -- Crip -- v. 172. Criq -- Crosby G -- v. 173. Crosby H -- Cua -- v. 174. Cub -- Cunningham A -- v. 175. 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Bom -- Bon -- v. 86. Boo -- Bool -- v. 87. Boom -- Bor -- v. 88. Bos -- Botany-R -- v. 89. Botany-S -- Bouq -- v. 90. Bour -- Boyd -- v. 91. Boye -- Bram -- v. 92. Bran -- Brazil D -- v. 93. Brazil E -- Brer -- v. 94. Bres -- Brid -- v. 95. Brie -- British E -- v. 96. British F -- Brom -- v. 97. Bron -- Brov -- v. 98. Brow -- Brt -- v. 99. Bru -- Bryc -- v. 100. Bryd -- Budget-E -- v. 101. Budget F -- Building C -- v. 102. Building D -- Bulle -- v. 103. Bullf -- Burgf -- v. 104. Burgg -- Burrow, M -- v. 105. Burrow, N -- Buss -- v. 106. Bust -- Bz. ; v. 1. A -- Aben -- v. 2. Abeo -- Académie de F -- v. 3. Académie du G -- Achm -- v. 4. Achn -- Adams, D -- v. 5. Adams, E -- Ador -- v. 6. Adós -- Aeronautics-Ac -- v. 7. Aeronautics-Ad -- Aesoph -- v. 8. Aesopi -- Africa, So -- v. 9. Africa, Sp -- Agar -- v. 10. Agas -- Agriculture-Economics-F -- v. 11. Agriculture-Economics-G -- Agriculture-C [i.e. Agriculture (Place) C] -- v. 12. Agriculture-D [i.e. Agriculture (Place) D] -- Air-E -- v. 13. Air-F -- Alabam -- v. 14. Alaban -- Alcaraz, Em -- v. 15. Alcaraz, En -- Alexan, F -- v. 16. Alexan, G -- Aliens-H -- v. 17. Aliens-I -- Allied J -- v. 18. Allied K -- Alphabet, S -- v. 19. Alphabet, T -- Alz -- v. 20. Am -- America M -- v. 21. America-N -- American Fab -- v. 22. American Fac -- American Languages-Q -- v. 23. American Languages-R -- American Pio -- v. 24. American Pip -- Americans in L -- v. 25. Americans in M -- Amy -- v. 26. Amz -- Anderson, S -- v. 27. Anderson T -- Angle S -- v. 28. Angle T -- Annal -- v. 29. Annam -- Anthon -- v. 30. Anthoo -- Apar -- v. 31. Apas -- Aqueb -- v. 32. Aquec -- Arauco, C -- v. 33. Arauco D -- Architectural D -- v. 34. Architectural E -- Architecture, Ecclesiastical-F -- v. 35. Architecture, Ecclesiastical-G -- Arens -- v. 36. Arent -- Aristoc -- v. 37. Aristod -- Armitage, R -- v. 38. Armitage, S -- Army, R -- v. 39. Army, S -- Arres -- v. 40. Arret -- Art-Essays and Misc. G -- v. 41. Art-Essays and Misc. H -- Art Per [i.e. Art Pers]-- v. 42. Art, Peru -- Arz -- v. 43. As -- Assat -- v. 44. Assau -- Assz -- v. 45. Ast -- Athenaeum I -- v. 46. Athenaeum L -- Attention M -- v. 47. Attention N -- Auq -- v. 48. Aurauco D -- Austria B -- v. 49. Austria-C -- Authorship T -- v. 50. Authorship U -- Auy -- v. 51. Auz -- Az. ; Mode of access: Internet.
The main subject of this thesis is a paradigm of instability and stabilization in coalition forming among countries as rational actors, presented through a Statistical Physics inspired model.This is an interdisciplinary work involving the fields of applied mathematics and sociophysics, as well as the political applications in the real cases from past and present. Applied to political,economic and social problems, the models can be used to analyze a wide variety of real cases -- international alliances, economic or business alliances, coalitions of political parties, socialnetworks, and organizational structures.In the first part of this thesis we present and analyze the coalition forming and the instability among rational actors coupled with pairwise static historical propensity bonds that have evolvedindependently. Such organization leads to discordant associations into coalitions and the instability as a consequence of decentralized maximization of the individual benefits gained fromjoining or leaving the coalitions. We define Natural Model of coalition forming and address the questions of instability and stabilization among actors possessing different levels of rationality. The framework presented here allows to analytically calculate the optimal and non-optimal stable configurations of actors' coalitions. We then investigate the coalition forming and the stabilization under the influence of externally-set opposing global alliances, which are represented in Global Alliance Model. The stabilization is produced through new cooperations based on the effect of polarization of several distinct interests shared by actors, which generates interest-based propensities and enables a planned coalition forming. We then investigate the effect of dissolution of a global alliancewhich, together with the competing alliance, has previously generated stable coalitions.A special section of the thesis is devoted to investigation and illustration of coalition forming in real historical cases. This part presents the analysis of unstable coalitions in Europe - cycling in the England-Spain-France conflicting triangle and creation of the Italian state, as well as of the remarkable historical cases of the Soviet global alliance collapse, of the recent internal conflict in Syria, and of the "paradoxical stability" in the Eurozone.In the second part of this thesis, we present a simulation of the coalition forming models. The simulation allows to follow graphically the coalition forming processes. We present the methodology used in the simulation, as well as its application in the illustration of coalition forming in the prototypes of real case systems. Given exact propensity values, which is fairly consideredto be the most difficult part of coalition forming modeling, the simulation tool can be used to predict optimal and non-optimal spontaneous stabilizations and globally motivated stabilities inreal cases.An independent part of the thesis is devoted to the subject of viability correction in dynamic network of actors. The model is a finite set of autonomous actors with states that evolveindependently and connected into a network via their connection operators, which evolve independently as well. The network is defined to be viable if a joint evolution satisfies the centralized scarcity constraints set by the environment. In order to restore the viability of these decentralized dynamics, we apply to the method of correction by viability multipliers used in Viability Theory, where the multipliers play the role of decentralizing prices. Standing apart from the main course of the thesis, the subject of viability correction in dynamic network of actors suggests an interesting theoretic dynamical generalization of coalition stabilization in our models inspired from Statistical Physics. ; 2Le sujet principal de cette thèse est la présentation d'un paradigme théorique inspiré de la Physique Statistique pour décrire les dynamiques d'instabilité ainsi que les processus de stabilisation dans la formation de coalitions entre pays considérés comme des acteurs rationnels. Ce travail s'inscrit dans une logique interdisciplinaire impliquant les mathématiques appliquées et la sociophysique avec des applications à des cas réels choisis dans le passé et le présent. Le modèle, par sa formulation générique peut être également appliqué à des problèmes politiques, économiques et sociales pour considérer des alliances internationales, économiques ou commerciales, coalitions de partis politiques, les réseaux sociaux et les structures organisationnelles.Dans la première partie, la formation de coalitions et l'instabilité des acteurs rationnels couplés avec des liaisons par paires, est analysée. Les liaisons résultent de propensions historiques qui ont évolués indépendamment et lentement dans le temps et sont considérés comme statiques. Il en résulte des associations contradictoires qui créent des instabilités irréductibles dues à la maximisation décentralisée des avantages individuels.Nous définissons ainsi le Modèle Naturel de la formation de coalitions et abordons les questions de l'instabilité et de la stabilisation des acteurs possédant différents niveaux de rationalité. Le cadre choisi permet de calculer analytiquement les configurations stables de coalitions d'acteurs, aussi bien optimales que non non-optimales. Nous étudions ensuite le Modèle de l'Alliance Globale qui considère la formation de coalitions et leur stabilisation par l'existence d'alliances mondiales opposées qui se situent au dessus des pays. Ce sont des alliances qui sont la conséquence de ralliements individuels à une alliance globale pré-existante. La stabilisation est produite par de nouvelles coopérations entre pays voisins produites sous l'effet de polarisation d'intérêts communs des acteurs générés directement par l'appartenance à l'alliance. Nous étudions ensuite l'effet de la dissolution d'une alliance globale lorsque l'alliance concurrente est préservée.Cette partie se termine une application du modèle à la formation de coalitions dans différents cas historiques tels que les conflits cycliques dans le triangle Angleterre-Espagne-France et la création de l'Etat d'Italie, l'effondrement de l'alliance Soviétique, le récent conflit interne en Syrie, et la "stabilité paradoxale" dans la Zone Euro.Dans la deuxième partie de cette thèse, nous présentons une simulation du modèle qui permet de suivre graphiquement les processus de la formation de coalitions. Nous présentons la méthodologie utilisée dans la simulation, ainsi qu'une application à des prototypes de systèmes de cas réels. Étant donné les valeurs de propension exactes, ce qui est la partie la plus difficile de la modélisation, la simulation peut être utilisée pour prédire des stabilisations spontanées, optimales et non-optimales, ainsi que des stabilités produites globalement.Une partie indépendante de la thèse est consacrée à la correction de la viabilité en réseau dynamique d'acteurs, ou le modèle est un ensemble fini d'acteurs autonomes. Les états évoluent indépendamment et sont connectés à un réseau via leurs opérateurs de connexion, qui évoluent eux-mêmes aussi indépendamment. Le réseau est défini comme étant viable si une évolution commune satisfait des contraintes centralisées de rareté imposées par l'environnement. Afin de rétablir la viabilité, nous appliquons la méthode de correction par des multiplicateurs de viabilité adoptée dans la Théorie de Viabilité, où les multiplicateurs jouent le rôle du prix de décentralisation. A l'écart du cours principal de la thèse, le sujet de correction de la viabilité en réseau dynamique d'acteurs suggère une généralisation dynamique théorique intéressante de stabilisation de coalitions dans nos modèles inspirés de Physique Statistique. 1 Le sujet principal de cette thèse est un paradigme de l'instabilité et de stabilisation dans la formation de coalitions entre les pays - des acteurs rationnelles, présenté par un modèle inspiré de Physique Statistique.Il s'agit d'un travail interdisciplinaire impliquant les domaines de mathématiques appliquées et sociophysics, ainsi que les applications politiques dans les cas réels du passé et du présent. Les modèles, appliquées à des problèmes politiques, économiques et sociales, peut être utilisé pour analyser une large variété de cas réels - alliances internationales, alliances économiques ou commerciales, coalitions de partis politiques, les réseaux sociaux et les structures organisationnelles.Dans la première partie, nous présentons et analysons la formation de coalitions et de l'instabilité des acteurs rationnels couplés avec des liaisons par paires de propensions historiques statiques, qui ont évolués indépendamment. Telle organisation provoque des associations discordants dans les coalitions et de l'instabilité qui est la suite de la maximisation décentralisée des avantages individuelles.Nous définissons le Modèle Naturel de la formation de coalitions et abordons les questions de l'instabilité et de la stabilisation des acteurs possédant différents niveaux de la rationalité. Le cadre présenté ici permet de calculer analytiquement les configurations stables de coalitions d'acteurs, optimales et non-optimales. Nous étudions ensuite la formation de coalitions et la stabilisation sous l'influence d'alliances mondiales extérieurs opposées, qui sont représentés dans le Modèle de l'Alliance Globale. La stabilisation est produit grace a des nouvelles coopérations produit sous l'effet de polarisation d' intérêts communs des acteurs, qui génère tendances fondées sur les intérêts et permet une formation prévu des coalitions. Nous étudions ensuite l'effet de la dissolution d'une alliance mondiale qui, ensemble avec l'alliance concurrente, a déjà généré des coalitions stables.Une section spéciale de la thèse est consacrée à l'étude et à l'illustration de la formation de coalitions dans des cas réels historiques. Cette partie présente l'analyse des coalitions instables en Europe – des conflits cycliques dans le triangle de Angleterre-Espagne-France et la création de l'Etat d'Italie, ainsi que les cas historiques remarquables de l'effondrement de l'alliance Soviétique, du conflit récent interne en Syrie, et de la "stabilité paradoxale" dans la Zone Euro.Dans la deuxième partie de cette thèse, nous présentons une simulation de notres modèles. La simulation permet de suivre graphiquement les processus de la formation de coalitions. Nous présentons la méthodologie utilisée dans la simulation, ainsi qu'une application à des prototypes de systèmes de cas réels. Étant donné les valeurs de propension exactes, ce qui est la partie la plus difficile de la modélisation, la simulation peut être utilisée pour prédire des stabilisations spontanées, optimales et non-optimales, et stabilité motivé globalement dans des cas réels.Une partie indépendante de la thèse est consacrée à la correction de la viabilité en réseau dynamique d'acteurs. Le modèle est un ensemble fini d'acteurs autonomes, les etats évoluent indépendamment sont connectés à un réseau via leur opérateurs de connexion, qui évoluent indépendamment aussi. Le réseau est défini comme étant viable si une évolution commune satisfait des contraintes centralisés de rareté imposées par l'environnement. Afin de rétablir la viabilité, nous appliquons la méthode de correction par des multiplicateurs de viabilité utilisés dans la Théorie de Viabilité, où les multiplicateurs jouent le rôle de la prix de décentralisation. A l'écart du cours principal de la thèse, le sujet de correction de la viabilité en réseau dynamique d'acteurs suggère une généralisation dynamique théorique intéressante de stabilisation de coalitions dans nos modèles inspirés de Physique Statistique.
[spa] El presente trabajo de investigación intitulado "Ordenamiento y Planificación Territorial en Perú. Una Aproximación Crítica a los Instrumentos de Zonificación Ecológica y Económica (ZEE)", es un acercamiento panorámico y cronológico, cuyos objetivos giran en torno a cuatro aspectos intrínsecamente relacionados: Planificación, Gestión Ambiental, Ordenamiento Territorial y Zonificación Ecológica y Económica. Con respecto a la Planificación, el objetivo fue caracterizar su evolución, las influencias externas y los tipos, etapas y escalas de intervención. En cuanto a la Gestión Ambiental se realizó un análisis de influencias, su evolución normativa y conceptual y las características que presenta en la actualidad. El análisis del Ordenamiento Territorial incluyó el estudio de las influencias externas, las instituciones comprometidas, evolución normativa, características y proceso de formulación. El objetivo en cuanto a la Zonificación fue averiguar las influencias, evolución normativa, características, instituciones y el proceso de formulación. Por último, se hizo un análisis de las características de los instrumentos de ZEE de trece regiones del Perú. La metodología empleada en esta investigación consistió en una extensa revisión de la bibliografía relacionada con cada temática. Sobre la Planificación se ha realizado un estudio histórico por medio de la revisión de documentos oficiales y académicos existentes en Perú y el extranjero. Para estudiar la Gestión Ambiental se han revisado documentos oficiales con el fin de determinar influencias en la producción legislativa y evolución normativa del proceso. Para el Ordenamiento Territorial y la Zonificación se han revisado documentos que han influenciado al proceso, como el cuerpo normativo, realizando la valoración correspondiente. Para el estudio de los instrumentos de Zonificación Ecológica y Económica (ZEE) se han utilizado dos fichas, la primera del tipo 'checklist' para verificar la existencia o no de variables concretas en estudio y la segunda, para hacer un análisis del contenido de las trece ZEE aprobadas por el Ministerio del Ambiente en las diferentes regiones del país. Los resultados del estudio arrojan las siguientes conclusiones. En cuanto a la Planificación, en el Perú se han sucedido hasta cuatro períodos denominados: incipiente, apogeo, crisis y reinicio, cada uno de los cuales está relacionado con acontecimientos socioeconómicos y políticos del país. Su característica principal es el predominio de la planificación sectorial y sus procesos de implementación evidencian carencias de articulación vertical y horizontal. Sobre la Gestión Ambiental, podemos decir que es una política transversal con debilidad institucional que presenta un elevado número de normas inconexas y ambiguas, que dan como resultado una gestión débil, como evidencian los permanentes daños al medio ambiente. El Ordenamiento Territorial se encuentra influenciado por el ámbito europeo y brasileño, no obstante, al momento de establecerlo como política pública ha sido incomprendida y la normativa que regula su proceso es imprecisa y está desarticulada, siendo su institucionalización muy frágil. La Zonificación es una política influenciada por la FAO y Brasil a través del tratado de Cooperación Amazónica (TCA-OTCA), que, en el contexto peruano representa la primera etapa del Ordenamiento Territorial. En consiguiente, ambos procesos se conducen indistintamente generando una gran confusión en su desarrollo. La Zonificación posee numerosas fases y etapas que demandan tiempo y recursos; pese los años de su implementación aún no se han logrado resultados. Finalmente, sobre el análisis y valoración de los instrumentos de Zonificación Ecológica y Económica aprobados en trece regiones del país, podemos concluir que estos presentan diferentes niveles de estudio y escala. Los instrumentos no cumplen el "Reglamento de Zonificación", no han logrado óptimos resultados, las escalas utilizadas no son las adecuadas, la participación ciudadana no es efectiva y el principio de descentralización sólo es retórico. En resumen, los resultados son desalentadores, la mayoría de los instrumentos regionales solo alcanzaron el 50% de los preceptos reglamentados, indicador que sugiere que el proceso ha encontrado una serie de dificultades a nivel político, técnico, presupuestal, tecnológico, social y conceptual, hasta la fecha insuperados. En la práctica, tienen escasa utilidad para los objetivos que se había planteado inicialmente el proceso. ; [cat] El present treball d'investigació titulat "Ordenamiento y Planificación Territorial en Perú. Una Aproximación Crítica a los Instrumentos de Zonificación Ecológica y Económica (ZEE)", és una aproximació panoràmica i cronològica, els objectius de la qual giren entorn de quatre aspectes intrínsecament relacionats: Planificació, Gestió Ambiental, Ordenació Territorial i Zonificació Econòmica Ecològica. Respecte a la Planificació, l'objectiu fou caracteritzar la seva evolució, les influències externes i els tipus, etapes i escales d'intervenció. Per la Gestió Ambiental, es realitzà una anàlisi d'influències, la seva evolució normativa i conceptual i les característiques que presenta en l'actualitat. L'anàlisi de l'Ordenació Territorial inclogué l'estudi de les influències externes, les institucions compromeses, i la seva evolució normativa, característiques i procés de formulació. L'objectiu per la Zonificació fou esbrinar les influències, evolució normativa, característiques, institucions i el procés de formulació. Per últim, es va realitzar una anàlisi de les característiques dels instruments de la ZEE de tretze regions del Perú. La metodologia emprada en aquesta investigació va consistir en una extensa revisió de la bibliografia relacionada amb cada temàtica. Sobre la Planificació s'ha realitzat un estudi històric per mitjà de la revisió de documents oficials i acadèmics existents en el Perú i a l'estranger. Per estudiar la Gestió Ambiental s'han revisat documents oficials amb la finalitat de determinar influències en la producció legislativa i evolució normativa del procés. Per l'Ordenació Territorial i la Zonificació, s'han revisat documents que han influenciat el procés, com és el cos normatiu, realitzant la valoració corresponent. Per l'estudi dels instruments de Zonificació Ecològica econòmica (ZEE) s'han usat dues fitxes, la primera del tipus checklist per verificar l'existència o no de variables concretes a l'estudi, i la segona, per analitzar el contingut de les tretze ZEE aprovades pel Ministerio del Ambiente a les diferents regions del país. Els resultats de l'estudi aporten les següents conclusions. Referent a la Planificació, en el Perú han succeït fins a quatre períodes denominats: incipient, apogeu, crisi i reinici, cada un dels quals està relacionat amb esdeveniments socioeconòmics i polítics del país. La seva característica principal és el predomini de la planificació sectorial i els seus processos d'implementació evidencien carències d'articulació vertical i horitzontal. Sobre la Gestió Ambiental, es pot dir que és una política transversal amb debilitat institucional que presenta un elevat nombre de normes inconnexes i ambigües, que donen com a resultat una gestió dèbil, com evidencien els danys permanents al medi ambient. L'Ordenació Territorial està influenciada per l'àmbit europeu i brasiler, no obstant això, en el moment d'establir-ho com a política pública ha estat incomprès i la normativa que regula el seu procés és imprecisa i està desarticulada, esdevenint la seva institucionalització molt fràgil. La Zonificació és una política influenciada per la FAO i el Brasil a través del tractat de Cooperació Amazònica (TCA-OTCA) que, en el context peruà, representa la primera etapa de l'Ordenació Territorial. Consegüentment, ambdós processos es condueixen indistintament generant una gran confusió en el seu desenvolupament. La Zonificació posseeix nombroses fases i etapes que demanen temps i recursos i, tot i els anys de la seva implementació, encara no s'han obtingut resultats. Finalment, sobre l'anàlisi i la valoració dels instruments de Zonificació Ecològica Econòmica aprovats en tretze regions del país, es pot concloure que aquests representen diferents nivells d'estudi i escala. Els instruments no compleixen el "Reglamento de Zonificación", no han aconseguit resultats òptims, les escales emprades no són les adequades, la participació ciutadana no és afectiva i el principi de descentralització és simplement retòric. En resum, els resultats són descoratjadors, la majoria dels instruments regionals només aconseguiren el 50% dels preceptes reglamentats, indicador que suggereix que el procés ha trobat una sèrie de dificultats en l'àmbit polític, tècnic, de pressupost, tecnològic, social i, sobretot, conceptual, fins avui en dia, insuperats. A la pràctica, tenen escassa utilitat pels objectius que s'havia planejat inicialment el procés. ; [eng] This research, titled "Spatial Planning and Territorial Organization in Peru: A Critical Approach to Economic and Ecological Zoning Instruments", is a panoramic and chronological study with objectives related to four aspects that are intrinsically related: spatial planning, environmental management, territorial organization, and economic and ecological zoning (EEZ). With regards to spatial planning, my objective is to characterize the external influences that affect it, how it has evolved, and the types, stages and scales of different interventions. In the field of environmental management, I analyze the different influences, its normative and conceptual evolution, and its current characteristics. My analysis of territorial organization includes a study of the external influences and institutions involved, together with their normative evolution, characteristics and the processes leading to their formulation. Finally, my objective when it comes to EEZ is to reveal the influences on this practice as well as its institutions, characteristics and normative evolution; furthermore, I study the processes leading to its formulation and I analyze the characteristics of EEZ instruments in 13 Peruvian regions. The methodology I adopt for the present study consists of an extensive review of the literature related to each topic. For the work on spatial planning, I carry out a historical study by reviewing the official and academic documents that exist both in Peru and in other countries. To study environmental management, I review official documents in order to determine the influences on the legal advances and the normative evolution of the practice. I approach territorial organization and zoning by reviewing documents that have influenced the process, such as the normative framework it exists in, and evaluating them. Lastly, I study EEZ instruments through the use of a checklist to establish the existence of specific variables under study (or lack thereof) and also a factsheet to analyze the content of the 13 zones approved by the Ministry of the Environment in the different regions of the country. The results of my research lead me to the following conclusions. Spatial planning in Peru has passed through 4 distinct periods: incipience, apogee, crisis and revival; each related with the prevailing socio-economic and political climate. The most striking characteristic is the predominance of sectorial planning, and the way it has been implemented makes it clear that there have been serious shortcomings it both vertical and horizontal spatial planning processes. Meanwhile, environmental management has experienced transversal policies with institutional weaknesses that lead to a large number of fragmented and ambiguous norms. The result of this is inadequate management, as reflected in the constant environmental damage. Territorial organization has been influenced by Europe and Brazil. However, when it has come to establishing public policy in this area, the entire concept seems to have been misunderstood. Consequently, the normative framework in this area is imprecise and disjointed, and there is only a very fragile institutionalization of the practices involved. Zoning policy has come under the influence of the FAO and Brazil via the Amazonian Cooperation Treaty (ACT-ACTO), which in the Peruvian context represents the first stage of territorial organization. As a result, both processes are carried out indistinctly, thus generating a considerable degree of confusion in terms of their development. Zoning is a process with many phases and stages that require time and resources; and despite the years of implementation, no results have yet been achieved. Finally, regarding my analysis and evaluation of the ZEE instruments approved in 13 Peruvian regions, I conclude that they present different levels of study and scale. The instruments fail to meet the corresponding Zoning Regulation, they have not achieved optimum results, the scales applied are not the appropriate ones, participation by citizens has not proved effective and the principle of decentralization has become empty rhetoric. To summarize, the results are disheartening with most of the regional instruments only meeting 50% of the established precepts. This suggests that the process has encountered a series of difficulties at the political, technical, budgetary, technological, social and above all conceptual levels, which to date have not been overcome. In practice, the instruments are of little use in terms of the objectives that were originally set out at the start of the process.
Conflicto, Consenso y diversidadLas sociedades políticas poseen distintos niveles de conflicto, consenso y disenso. El conflicto supone la abierta disputa entre dos o mas expresiones por una cuestión particular, debido a la existencia de visiones contrapuestas. El consenso supone el acuerdo entre dos o mas fuerzas políticas sobre una o un conjunto de medidas específicas. El disenso se encuentra a mitad de camino entre el conflicto y el consenso y supone una condición donde dos o mas fuerzas no han alcanzado un acuerdo pero no han transformado la disidencia en una puja abierta que se dirimirá eventualmente en un juego de suma cero.Sin embargo, el disenso puede dividirse en dos vertientes, que significan dos visiones analíticas distintas, en alguna medida opuestas. Por un lado, el disenso es la antesala del conflicto y supone que los actores involucrados se encuentran dispuestos a confrontar en el mediano plazo con la otra parte para lograr imponer su visión. Por otro lado, tenemos un disenso civilizado o diversidad. La diversidad no solo no genera un problema a la polis sino que la enriquece al brindarle visiones distintas sobre un mismo problema o cuestión.Si bien los niveles de consenso son importantes y los niveles de conflicto inevitables, debemos marcar la relevancia política y social que poseen los disensos civilizados o diversidad en la posibilidad de desarrollo de las naciones. En este sentido, es analíticamente relevante mencionar que el camino al desarrollo está compuesto tanto de altos niveles de consenso como de crecientes niveles de diversidad. ¿Cúal es una característica política y analítica central de la diversidad? La de actuar como un mecanismo de peso y contrapeso ante los poderes políticos constituidos. Siguiendo a Hayek, podemos pensar que la diversidad es aquella forma del disenso que supone un mecanismo espontáneo de control sobre el sistema político y económico imperante (1).La experiencia contemporánea mas significativa es la Unión Europea o la idea de Europa. Si bien en un principio ha sido pensada como un mecanismo político para lograr evitar futuros enfrentamientos entre países históricamente beligerantes, la Unión Europea ha devenido una construcción donde su principal significado y fortaleza descansa en la diversidad de las partes. Al devenir diversas, las partes (naciones y regiones) se complementan y controlan entre si. Este mecanismo de control no había sido pensado por ninguno de los constructores de la Unión, por lo que ha sido un mecanismo espontáneo generado por un devenir imposible de dirigir por ninguna persona o grupo de personas.La Unión Europea o idea de Europa ha construido su fortaleza en una comunidad política donde se suceden conflictos, consensos y disensos. Los disensos son las diversas expresiones que los distintos modus vivendi tienen para expresar su singularidad. Desde ese fortalecimiento de la singularidad es desde donde se ha consolidado la idea de Europa. Por ejemplo, la búsqueda de una Constitución común fue un intento de alcanzar un consenso sobre un conjunto amplio de valores y condiciones (2). Hasta el momento no ha prosperado. Esta imposibilidad o dificultad de consenso sirve como ejemplo para graficar que la fortaleza de la idea de Europa descansa no solo en el consenso sino, principalmente, en el disenso (crecientemente) civilizado que significa la diversidad. Desde esta perspectiva analítica, podemos pensar que mientras mayor sea la diversidad o disenso civilizado, mayor será la fortaleza de la experiencia europea.Por su parte, en la búsqueda del consenso y diversidad qua ha significado la idea de Europa, podemos citar una reflexión que el economista Dani Rodrik toma de Bob Kuttner: "Reading Adam Smith in Copenhagen -- the center of the small, open, and highly successful Danish economy -- is a kind of out-of-body experience. On the one hand, the Danes are passionate free traders. They score well in the ratings constructed by pro-market organizations. The World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Index ranks Denmark third (en el año 2008), just behind the United States and Switzerland. Denmark's financial markets are clean and transparent, its barriers to imports minimal, its labor markets the most flexible in Europe, its multinational corporations dynamic and largely unmolested by industrial policies, and its unemployment rate of 2.8 (2008) percent the second lowest in the OECD (the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development). On the other hand, Denmark spends about 50 percent of its GDP on public outlays and has the world's second-highest tax rate, after Sweden; strong trade unions; and one of the world's most equal income distributions. For the half of GDP that they pay in taxes, the Danes get not just universal health insurance but also generous child-care and family-leave arrangements, unemployment compensation that typically covers around 95 percent of lost wages, free higher education, secure pensions in old age, and the world's most creative system of worker retrainingDoes Denmark have some secret formula that combines the best of Adam Smith with the best of the welfare state? Is there something culturally unique about the open-minded Danes? Can a model like the Danish one survive as a social democratic island in a turbulent sea of globalization, where unregulated markets tend to swamp mixed economic systems? What does Denmark have to teach the rest of the industrial world? . The answers are complex and often counterintuitive." (2)La pregunta de Kuttner no solo involucra a Dinamarca sino a Escandinavia. La complementación entre una economía de mercado que asigna los recursos y un Estado de Bienestar que se ocupa de universalizar los beneficios de esa asignación en forma eficiente (4) revela que determinados mecanismos no solo no son incompatibles sino que potencian las distintas virtudes. Las cohesionadas sociedades escandinavas son eficientes porque presuponen universalidad y, en parte, aspiran a la universalidad porque son eficientes asignando recursos. Es un círculo virtuoso entre mercado y estado. Por su parte, no es transferible a otros arreglos institucionales porque, siguiendo a Hayek, en esa virtuosa complementación hay información tácita que solo poseen las partes involucradas y que no pueden transmitir aunque quisieran.Podemos detallar un ejemplo donde el mercado funciona asignando y el Estado funciona universalizando eficientemente. Suecia posee un sistema de salud con cobertura universal. Todas las personas tienen derecho a una atención medica de alta calidad. Sin embargo, después de la crisis de la moneda sueca en 1992 fue necesario reformar un Estado de Bienestar que había devenido anquilosado y burocrático. Paso seguido, dentro del sistema de salud se concilió la aspiración igualitaria y universal con la aparición del derecho de las personas a elegir donde atenderse. Las personas poseen un voucher que es igual para todos. Nadie puede decidir pagar mas para obtener una mejor atención y cada uno puede elegir donde atenderse. Mientras todas las personas son iguales ante el sistema de salud, ninguna institución médica o ministerio tiene el monopolio sobre un sector o grupo. La búsqueda de igualdad y la búsqueda de libertad se complementan aquí de manera virtuosa. Mas aún, el ejemplo es relevante porque la introducción de la libre elección ha sido un mecanismo que ha contribuido, después de una crisis, a fortalecer al Estado de Bienestar o Welfare State en lugar de debilitarlo (3).En plabras de Kuttner: "With appropriate caveats, Danish ideas can indeed be instructive for other nations grappling with the enduring dilemma of how to reconcile market dynamism with social and personal security. Yet Denmark's social compact is the result of a century of political conflict and accommodation that produced a consensual style of problem solving that is uniquely Danish. It cannot be understood merely as a technical policy fix to be swallowed whole in a different cultural or political context. Those who would learn from Denmark must first appreciate that social models have to grow in their own political soil." (5)Elogio de la socialdemocracia¿Desde dónde se puede elogiar y defender una ideología política? Por un lado, obviamente, desde esa misma ideología. Sin embargo, es posible hacerlo también desde otra concepción ideológica. Por ejemplo, podemos defender y elogiar las virtudes de la socialdemocracia desde el liberalismo. Una defensa de la socialdemocracia supone compartir determinados principios. Ello no solo supone que entre las dos corrientes políticas podamos encontrar puntos de acuerdo. Supone en cambio que cuando se rescata a la socialdemocracia desde el liberalismo (y, eventualmente, al liberalismo desde la socialdemocracia) estamos analíticamente preguntándonos si además de los puntos en común podemos construir o re-encontrar nuevas empatías.Si tenemos dos concepciones políticas A y B, podemos encontrar en C puntos en común. Sin embargo, un elogio de la socialdemocracia desde el liberalismo supondría el intento analítico de construir D. Mas aún, aspiraría analíticamente a construir sucesivos Ds. Primero, ¿Cómo definimos C? Como aquel ámbito o lugar político que es una mera concesión entre partes producto de una negociación entre actores con intereses diversos y opuestos. ¿Cómo definimos D? Como aquel espacio político y analítico que no responde a una negociación ni tácita ni explícita entre A y B sino que es la construcción (que puede o no comprender a C) de un ámbito anteriormente inexistente. Ex ante, no era posible prever su hipotética existencia. En este sentido, D podría pensarse como un ámbito producto de un orden espontaneo. Es decir, un elogio de A a B no solo contribuye a encontrar un punto C (o sucesivos Cs) sino es el camino para construir D y sucesivos Ds. En este sentido, el elogio de la socialdemocracia desde el liberalismo (o del liberalismo desde la socialdemocracia) supone la ventaja analítica de superar un statu quo que solo concibe la construcción de consensos alrededor de C.Es necesario marcar que la aparición de D solo es posible cuando el diálogo entre A y B no solo se hace desde los puntos en común de dos ideologías sino desde el elogio analítico de una a otra y, como mencionamos, de ésta a aquella. Es decir, mientras C es un lugar neutro donde distintas concepciones pueden coincidir episódicamente, D y sucesivos Ds son ámbitos comunes donde las partes no solo toleran la diferencia del otro sino donde comprenden y celebran esas diferencias. La celebración de las diferencias no es un romanticismo tardío de la filosofía política contemporánea. En cambio, refleja la parte principal de la idea de Europa.Para la mayoría, la vida política real supone una continua tensión entre intereses complejos, diversos y opuestos. Si bien aceptamos como válida esta premisa, podemos pensar un ámbito D donde la confrontación disminuye (sin desaparecer) porque su aparición corresponde a una forma inédita de dialogo entre concepciones políticas distintas. Como mencionamos, mientras el clásico diálogo político entre A y B se traduce en sucesivos Cs, un elogio de la socialdemocracia desde el liberalismo abre las puertas analíticas y políticas para la aparición de D y sucesivos Ds.Sin embargo, una concepción política que celebra las virtudes de otras concepciones no solo tiene que tener un respeto por la democracia sino un compromiso con alguna forma de la democracia liberal. El encuentro analítico clásico entre la socialdemocracia y el liberalismo se ha dado en los matices que contienen y definen a la libertad y a la igualdad. Las expresiones socialdemócratas y liberales contemporáneas europeas han encontrado una forma de convivencia en la construcción de los alcances y los limites al Estado de Bienestar o Welfare State. Esta convivencia es en momentos virtuosa y en otros momentos problemática. Este elogio de la socialdemocracia desde el liberalismo descansa en parte en el intento de rescatar una coincidencia analítica básica entre ambas tradiciones: la libertad y la igualdad como concepciones esencialmente complementarias y mutuamente necesarias.(1) Ver el clásico trabajo de Hayek, "The Constitution of Liberty", publicado por University of Chicago Press en 1960.(2) El filosofo alemán Jurgen Habermas reflexiona en una difundida entrevista sobre el proyecto y la identidad europea. Ver http://www.signandsight.com/features/1265.html. Por su parte, Habermas también ha escrito sobre la necesidad de una Constitución Europea en http://www.signandsight.com/features/1265.html(3) Rodrik, Dani, tomado de Tomado de Kuttner, Robert: "The Copenhagen Consensus. Reading Adam Smith in Denmark" Foreign Affairs, Marzo/abril 2008. A su vez, para una discusión sobre los beneficios del modelo nórdico para la Europa Continental, se pueden encontrar una variedad de papers en http://www.ces.fas.harvard.edu/conferences/nordic/nordic_papers.html(4) El economista chileno radicado en Suecia Maurico Rojas explica parte de esta dinámica en "Beyond the Welfare State: Sweden and the quest for a post-industrial welfare model". Timbro. 2001(5) Kuttner, Robert. Trabajo citado. *Profesor Depto. Estudios Internacionales, FACS - Universidad ORT Uruguay.Master en Filosofía Política, London School of Economics and Political Science.