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While the battle still rages over term limits
hitting the ballot in Bossier City this fall, momentum appears headed in the
direction that some form, if delayed and diluted, of these will come into being
sooner rather than later.Last month, the turmoil
kicked off when a group of citizens had certified a petition, as authorized
under the city charter, that invoked one of the two methods to amend
the charter to include term limits. The petition
process allows for the City Council to amend the charter directly through
ordinance, using the exact language of the ballot propositions, within 30 days
of receipt; if not done, then the Council is required to call an election
within the next 90 days after with the exact proposition language put upon the
ballot. The other process has the Council form a charter review commission whose
members it and the mayor appoint, which then formulates amendments that the
Council must put on the ballot.Prior to the Aug. 8 deadline, at the last Council meeting
prior to that Aug. 1 Republican Mayor Tommy Chandler tried to have the enabling
ordinance introduced, but he missed the deadline which required unanimous Council
approval for the addition. Instead, councilors Republicans David
Montgomery, Jeff
Free, and Vince Maggio,
plus Democrat Bubba Williams
and no party Jeff Darby,
vetoed that – an atypical move, as the Council historically hardly ever has denied
putting tardy submissions on the agenda.Undeterred, Chandler tried
again at the next regular meeting, Aug. 15. He also submitted a resolution to
call the election, apparently as a backup plan in case the same bloc that
prevented consideration of the ordinance to amend voted it down. These reflected
the petition: that anyone serving as mayor or councilor could serve only three
terms in their lifetimes. Darby, Free, Montgomery, and Williams would be unable
to run for reelection under this language.Throughout all of this, apparently that bloc had
utilized mayoral appointee City Attorney Charles Jacobs – who works for both
the mayor and Council – to find outside counsel to review an alleged problem with
the petition. That counsel, Katie Bell who doesn't hold out having expertise in
the area of local charters, was misrepresented by Jacobs as not having worked
on city legal matters in any capacity, when in fact she had.Jacobs also prior to the most recent Council
meeting had refused to release the contents of the rendered opinion, which
originally was said to have an indeterminate release date but subsequently was
said to have come out just after the Aug. 1 meeting. Instead of making it
public immediately thereafter, he waited until this meeting to do so and
revealed a possible point of contention exploiting the charter's technical
demand that the petition be in the form of ordinance for the Council to
consider amendment by ordinance, but also that the charter asked for the
petition's language to be exportable to a ballot proposition called by
resolution in the form of a question, as by state statute. The petition opted
for the latter approach.Yet if the bloc against had a legal out on passing
an ordinance to amend, it had no clear option to use legal niceties as an
excuse to vote against a resolution to call an election to amend. The charter
language does not yield as it maintains the Council "shall" call that.
Opponents therefore could use the excuse of legal infirmity only if you bought
the argument that potential invalidity of one option of the petition method
spilled over to make the other option also invalid even as it seemed in adherence
with the charter and state law. Only invoking his microscopically thin reed convincingly
would prevent exposure of those casting a vote against not only as opposing term
limits, but also as violating the charter.So, another ploy became necessary to prevent a
vote on term limits regardless of outcome that could be politically damaging to
the bloc, which, as the opinion mentioned, was in statute stating that any
petition delivered to a registrar of voters must contain, among other things,
the year of birth of a signatory that the petition didn't have. Some doubt
exists about whether absence of this truly invalidated the petition, as other identifying
information seemed more than adequate, so in response the Council resolved to
have the Attorney General's office render a decision. In turn, they also
deleted the agenda items involving the ordinance – which had a problem anyway
in that the 30-day window had expired – and resolution, with only Republican Councilor
Chris Smith
in opposition.This series of events prompted Republican Councilor
Brian
Hammons to complain he previously had suggested obtaining an AG opinion,
and that there had been no need to waste taxpayer dollars and time on a the matter
that, if these were the problems allegedly with the petition, the city's legal
department could not have discovered. Jacobs, backed by Montgomery, in response
provided stream-of-consciousness verbiage that said issue clarification was
required first, whiffing entirely on the fact that clarification comes before opinion
rendering and that just as easily occurs in house as in now asking the AG to
reinvent the wheel.Hammons' more subtle point is that this all was a
delaying tactic. With great uncertainty in the opposition bloc's mind that it
could find a way to invalidate the petition and election, the goal of the
opposition bloc is to delay that election as long as possible, certainly past
the Nov. 18 general election runoff this fall, which has an effective Sep. 25
deadline for Council action to have commenced.Further, regardless of what reason the bloc may
use to forgo any resolution prior to that date, citizens could sue on the basis
of the charter's election insistence, because by the charter's wording it received
a certified petition and it in that instance the Council didn't have the choice
not to call the election. Perhaps this is why rumors, bolstered by some of the
rhetoric surrounding the issue at the Council meeting, have gained currency
that some kind of compromise will be brokered involving a charter review
commission summoned later this fall.With this, the bloc may try to cut off at the pass
momentum behind the petition wording by promising to call a commission whose
members they chose would approve of another form of term limits, along the
lines of a three-term limit starting with the 2025 term. Since all bloc members
are in their sixties, they unlikely would want to serve beyond well into their
seventies. In exchange, if they refuse to call the election, by ponying up a commission
they say will have term limits supporters throughout it (their appointees would
represent five of the nine votes), they would count on this defusing term
limits supporters from challenging that in court failure to call the election and
from not reorganizing anytime soon to petition again with the same language in
the form of an ordinance and including birth years of signatories.The longer the controversy drags on, the more
attention the bloc brings to its anti-term limits position that would prove to be
a political liability. Its members continue a rearguard action that ultimately
may win the battle legally, but they're still losing the war politically.

The Bossier Parish Police Jury, and particularly
Parish Administrator Joe E. "Butch" Ford, are back in hot water because an
elected parish official, normally an establishment ally of theirs, carried out
his sworn duties.

Ford has been mired in controversy ever since, without
a formal search, he was named administrator at the start of 2022. State law
mandates that such officials register to vote in the parish that they helm, but
since the mid-1980s Ford had maintained a residence in Caddo Parish, had a
homestead exemption attached to it, and had registered to vote there.

In fact, Ford
didn't change his registration to a Bossier Parish address until ten months
into his contract, violating the law throughout. And when he did, he ran
into another problem: his
registration didn't match his exemption, which state law said had to happen
if a registrant declared a homestead. That took another three months to occur.

Thus, to serve legally, as Ford declared the
Bossier property his homestead – while retaining ownership of the Caddo one –
that property had to qualify as a homestead according to Art. VII Sec. 20 of the
Louisiana Constitution, which would be assessed during the normal spring
assessments by parish assessors, in Bossier's case Republican Bobby Edmiston. And
in May, public records show Edmiston's office voided Ford's homestead retroactively
to the time he declared it, meaning he owes thousands of dollars in taxes for
this year and last.

Ford protested, to no avail. In an appeal executed
as a legal document, he listed a plethora of reasons, mostly irrelevancies insofar
as the law goes in these matters. Edmiston pointed to the Constitution in both
his original reasoning and denied appeal, focusing on Sec. 20(A)(1) that states
"The bona fide homestead … owned and occupied by any person or persons owning
the property," because his assessors had good reason to believe the owners did
not occupy the property.

As proof, they went onto the property, which has a
heavily overgrown yard and to describe as ramshackle from the outside would do
it credit. Views through the windows revealed an enormous amount of clutter littering
habitable space and no sign that anybody resided there.

Ford tried to buttress his case by referring to
the Civil Code, Art. 42,
although he probably meant Art. 38 from the
verbiage he used. But this doesn't help his cause either, as that article
states unambiguously that "The
domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence."

Insofar as this appertains to his legal ability to
serve as parish administrator, it's not directly relevant. You don't have to
have a homestead in order, for the purposes of statute that defines
where you may register to vote, to register at a location if not having a
homestead anywhere. However, the law does define for registration purposes a
resident as "a citizen who resides in this state and in the parish,
municipality, if any, and precinct in which he offers to register and vote,
with an intention to reside there indefinitely."

Ford's problem is that the assessor in the parish
in which he is registered to vote does not consider him as occupying that
property. If he doesn't occupy it, he cannot reside there (except under unusual
circumstances such as pursuit of higher education, emergency displacement, or nursing
home residence elsewhere). That the assessor denied him an exemption doesn't
automatically disqualify him from registering to vote there, but it does challenge
his residency there as defined for registration purposes.

This puts the ball back into Registrar Stephanie
Agee's court, who at the end of last year faced
a similar situation under statute that states if
she had a reason to believe his registration was illegal she had to go through
a process soliciting the registrant to "show cause" as to why his registration
should remain on the rolls. Back then, at the beginning of the year Ford
attested he resided there although that now appears to have been fraudulent.

Yet that investigation came because late last year
Ford didn't have a mail receptacle at the address and mail bounced back to Agee
in the new registration confirmation process. There's no evidence that when the
information about his registration in Caddo, then his continued homestead
declaration there after the registration in Bossier, became public that Agree
acted for that reason.

If Agee doesn't know of Ford's loss of exemption already
– and word spreads quickly about these matters at the courthouse – and hasn't
launched the process to scrub Ford from the rolls, she knows now. That she
acted last time doesn't guarantee she will this time, and keep in mind her appointment
for life came from the very body insistent on having Ford as administrator.

Whether Agee can emulate Edmiston with enough fortitude
to do the job she swore to do, very much against the wishes of the remainder of
the courthouse crowd, won't be easy for the public to verify. Unlike other
public records law, in order to make such inquiries public a simple request won't
do but rather at least 25 registered parish voters must attest that they want
this information.

Any objective reading of the situation points to
Ford, unless he rushes to clean out the place and does some remodeling and ships
over some furniture denoting at least the illusion of habitation, being
illegally registered there and, thusly so, ineligible to serve as parish
administrator. Whether the processes of government confirm this or if the
matter heads to litigation and whether he retains his job, here and now after
the assessment one thing is certain: Bossier Parish has as its chief administrative
officer somebody who has engaged willfully in a pattern of deceit to have that
job. That's not exactly what citizens expect, or deserve, out of a public
servant, much less the highest-ranking administrator in the parish.

And this leads to another certainty: police jurors
have colluded in this deceit. It's impossible that, as their employee of almost
two decades, that jurors did not know where Ford lived when they appointed him
initially, and they certainly all knew about it when they reappointed him for 2023
on Jan.
18 – 12 days before he even attested, whether truthfully, to Agee's satisfaction
that he resided in Bossier.

It's all a part of the lawlessness that the
Bossier Parish Police Jury has exhibited for a number of years – contrary
to state law putting themselves on the parish's Library Board of Control, contrary
to state law appointing the executive director of the Cypress Black Bayou Water
Conservation and Recreation District as its representative to its Board of
Commissioners, and now winking and nodding at Ford's appointment. All along it
has taken the attitude that its members are above the law in that they can do
whatever is illegal as long as they don't get called on it, then judicially sanctioned
for it.

That's something to which every single incumbent
running for reelection this fall must answer. And it has to stop, whether voluntarily
or involuntarily with voters throwing out the bums who think the law doesn't
apply to them.

Daniel Raisbeck


Less than a year ago, I wrote of the almost certain regret that awaited the prosperous, urban, multiple‐​degree‐​holding types who voted for Gustavo Petro, Colombia's Chavista president. They thought they had supported a Nordic‐​style social democrat—failing to notice that they had helped to elect a tropical socialist who, given his past as a guerrilla group member and Hugo Chávez supporter, was also a potential autocrat. Caveat emptor (or rather suffragator) indeed. But I never thought that voter's remorse would set in so quickly. Or so extremely.
According to poll data from June 1, 2023, only 26 percent of Colombian citizens approved of Petro's performance as president. And this was before the scandal that shook the country's political scene last Sunday evening, when Semana magazine released a series of WhatsApp audio files sent by Armando Benedetti, Petro's former ambassador in Caracas, to Laura Sarabia, the president's former chief of staff.
Among the least bombastic revelations is Benedetti's claim that Alfonso Prada, Petro's former interior minister, "stole the whole ministry with his wife." This implies massive levels of corruption around Petro, who came to power with an anti‐​corruption agenda (quite cynically given his disreputable political alliances). Prada proceeded to sue Benedetti for libel.
Petro's dwindling number of supporters may dismiss this as a politician's petty slander against a rival in the cabinet. Far more concerning for them—and for Petro—is Benedetti's matter‐​of‐​fact assertion to Sarabia that he himself obtained COP $15 billion (around USD $3.58 million at today's exchange rate) for Petro's 2022 presidential campaign, during which he served as the former candidate's right‐​hand‐​man and main political handler. Petro's campaign did not officially report any donation nearly as large. Its declared funds consisted mostly a series of bank loans, which were meant to be paid with the "reimbursement" sum that the Colombian state guarantees to candidates for each vote received in an election.
In many countries, an insider's admission of how millions of undeclared dollars flowed into the president's campaign coffers would bring down the government. Alas, Colombia is not one of them. This is not due to a lack of unashamedly corrupt presidents; as I wrote recently in The Wall Street Journal, the opposite has been the case. Rather, since the 1950's, the Colombian elite's idiosyncratic approach to presidential corruption has followed the maxim, attributed to journalist Hernando Santos (1922–1999), that the trouble with overthrowing a president is that he may fall upon those doing the toppling.
Already in Petro's case, the three‐​member House of Representatives commission created to investigate Benedetti's statements includes two members of the president's own party. The enquiry will be a charade, which is a pity since the source of the undeclared campaign money is as important as the sum itself. In an interview, Benedetti told Semana that the money "did not come from entrepreneurs," meaning the legal business community. Suspicion has fallen on the Marxist guerrilla groups and other drug trafficking organizations, but also on the Venezuelan regime of Nicolás Maduro. Anonymous, the hacker group, claims that Maduro financed "part of the campaign of the current president of Colombia," but has not published evidence hitherto.
What is certain is that, in regional terms, the Maduro regime has been the principal beneficiary of Petro's election. To begin with, Colombia recognized Maduro's presidency after a three‐​and‐​a‐​half‐​year hiatus, and Petro himself has met Maduro four times since his inauguration. His government, which opposes any future hydrocarbon exploration in Colombia despite dwindling reserves, has promoted the idea of importing Venezuelan natural gas.
While Petro wages a political war against Colombia's key petroleum industry—crude oil has been the country's main legal export for decades—he lobbied President Joe Biden to end American sanctions against the Maduro regime. This would imply renewed Venezuelan oil exports to the U.S. market (even if socialism devastated Venezuela's oil industry well beyond immediate or even medium term repair). Petro's "shoot yourself in the foot / prosper‐​thy‐​neighbor" policy is devoid of any rationality. Unless, of course, Colombia's increasingly authoritarian president is somehow subject to the Venezuelan tyrant.
Petro's eco‐​fanatical crusade against the hydrocarbon industry is but one example of how his government is bent on destroying the few areas of the Colombian economy that are functional. Other examples include his plans to put the state in charge of centralized funding for the healthcare and pension systems, both of which are efficient—although certainly not perfect—thanks to private sector involvement and some degree of consumer choice. Where things are already problematic, Petro's policies would make them worse. For instance, he wants to make a rigid, overregulated labor market even less flexible and more hostile to businesses.
Then there is the matter of rising insecurity, an old problem that, until recently, appeared mostly solved, only to resurface dangerously in the last year. Under Petro, illegal armed groups have expanded their power as they launch constant, deadly attacks against the armed forces and police. It all brings to mind the dark era of the late 1990's, when Colombia was on the verge of becoming a failed state as it came under siege from the FARC guerrillas, which are still up in arms despite the much‐​touted "peace" agreement of 2016.
Usually, a crisis in government breeds economic instability. Under Colombia's current government, however, the opposite has been the case. Since the Benedetti scandal broke, the peso rallied to reach its highest value against the dollar since mid‐​2022, when Petro was about to win the presidential election. In October, two months after he took office, the peso reached an all‐​time low against the dollar. Amid the current political turmoil, forward‐​looking markets are anticipating the failure of Petro's legislative initiatives in health care, pensions, and labor law. Which is to say, there is speculation that Colombia's institutional framework has already survived Petro's statist onslaught. The weaker his position, the thinking goes, the less likely it is that non‐​leftist parties will lend him their support, which he needs to obtain congressional majorities.
I fear, however, that markets may be getting ahead of themselves. The Colombian congress is minimally ideological and highly transactional. There is still a good chance that, issue by issue, Petro's government can negotiate just enough votes to have his "reforms" approved, in which case only the courts will stand in the way of his agenda.
Not that Petro is respectful of any check or balance. This week, he propounded the theory that, since he was elected, his government represents "the will of the people," meaning that any opposition to his political project—including from the news media—is part of an illegitimate, "soft coup." The onslaught, in other words, is far from over.
In my view, the worst part about Petro's election victory is that, at this time last year, Colombia was in need of radical reforms. Above all, a chronically sluggish economy required budget discipline, public spending cuts, drastic debt reduction, a strong currency (ideally through dollarization), far lower taxes, labor market deregulation, subsoil privatization, school choice, and an end to non‐​tariff barriers. By electing Petro, however, voters decided to do precisely the opposite on all fronts. As warned, most already regret it.

Michael F. Cannon


Pharmaceutical giant Merck is suing Medicare, claiming new drug‐​pricing reforms that Congress enacted in last year's Inflation Reduction Act coerce the company into selling its wares to the program at below‐​market prices. In the Wall Street Journal, attorney Daniel Troy opines that the new rules violate the First and Fifth Amendments. Big, if true.
What's really happening here is that Merck is making tons of money off the taxpayers and wants to keep the gravy train rolling. So the company is offering whatever bad arguments it can to prevent any reductions in its Medicare subsidies.
First, a few preliminaries.
The price Medicare should pay for all medical goods and services is $0.00. Anything that moves the actual price in that direction is a good thing. Some argue that is a recipe for failing to hit the market price. But that gets it exactly backward. Pushing the Medicare price toward $0.00 is the only way to get market prices.
Medicare's administrative prices are government price‐​setting. But they are not coercive price controls. Providers are always free to walk away.
Every single time providers—and especially pharmaceutical companies—complain about Medicare "price controls," it is meritless rent‐​seeking. Because they amount they should be getting from Medicare is $0.00.
Merck argues, to the contrary, that it is not free to walk away. It claims Congress is forcing the company to sell to Medicare at a price to which the company does not consent. If Medicare is truly coercing Merck, that's bad, mkay? But it isn't.
Here's how the IRA's new process for setting Medicare drug prices works.
If Medicare selects a Merck drug for price negotiation, Merck has until October 1 to enter into an "agreement" to negotiate a "maximum fair price." Medicare's opening bid must be at least 25 percent less than the current price.
If Merck does not enter into an "agreement" by October 1, "a noncompliance period would begin" that could result in "excise tax liability" for Merck.
If Merck enters into an "agreement," it must sell the drug to Medicare at whatever price Medicare negotiates/​dictates or pay an "excise tax."
Merck may terminate the "agreement" for any reason, but the termination does not take effect until 11–23 months after Merck announces it. In the meantime, Merck must continue to sell the drug to Medicare at the price Medicare negotiated/​dictated.
Is this actual coercion? Is it a takings in violation of the Fifth Amendment, as Merck alleges? No. Merck is rent-seeking—and hoping its use of the right shibboleths will trick conservative and libertarian legal scholars into rallying to the company's cause.
First, Both Merck and the government are wrong to describe those "excise taxes" as taxes. Merck's own lawyers admit, "the excise tax is suspended if the manufacturer has no relationship with Medicare or Medicaid." Taxes are compulsory; these "taxes" are optional. Ergo, it's not a tax. The correct way to think of those payments is that Merck would be rebating to the government a portion of the subsidies it receives from taxpayers through Medicare and Medicaid. In essence, those rebates are an across‐​the‐​board reduction in the prices Medicare and Medicaid pay for Merck's products. No one is taxing Merck, just reducing their government subsidies.
Since those "excise taxes" are not taxes, the government is not compelling Merck to enter an "agreement." Merck is free to decline. If the resulting rebates Merck must pay mean its government "book of business" is unprofitable, it can walk away from federal health programs.
Not even the 23‐​month period that Merck would have to continue selling the drug to Medicare at the Merck‐​unfriendly price is coercive. Merck has received plenty of notice of that condition. Merck was aware of that provision as Congress debated the law in 2021. And when Congress passed it. And when President Biden signed it in August 2022. And when Medicare announced in March 2023 how it would be implementing these provisions. Merck has had and will continue to have plenty of opportunities to avoid those conditions. It could have avoided them at any time from when Congress began debating them in 2021 until now. It could avoid them today. It could avoid them by refusing to enter into an "agreement." At any of these points, Merck could avoid these conditions of Medicare participation without coercion.
What about the argument that threatening Merck with exclusion from government programs is effectively coercion because Medicare and Medicaid represent a yuge part of Merck's business? We can firmly reject this argument, too.
Is it coercion when people don't want to buy what you're selling at the price you're selling it? Were all those employers who didn't hire you coercing you? Do patients coerce hospitals when they switch to lower‐​price competitors? Then neither is this. Losing business hurts. But it's not coercion.
The fact that people would even think to equate Merck losing government business to coercion shows just how much government dominates health care in the United States. The fact that some people—including many limited‐​government conservatives—would rather let the government overpay than threaten Merck's profit margins is an example of how all that government domination introduces moral hazard into these decisions.
Since no part of this process is coercive, Merck's other claims of coercion (compelled speech, etc.) are also inaccurate.
In case we needed more evidence that Merck is just rent-seeking—that is, attempting to gouge taxpayers—the company describes the prices it currently receives from Medicare as reflecting "fair market value" and Medicare's current drug‐​pricing rules as "a free‐​market approach based on market‐​driven prices." Troy describes what Medicare pays as a "market price."
These are major tells. There are no market prices in the U.S. health sector. What Sherry Glied says of health care prices in general is especially true of Medicare prices: "There is no reason to believe that current prices provide incentives that reflect either underlying costs or consumer preferences." A good rule of thumb is that if an industry claims the price it receives from government reflects fair market value, that price is too high.
It is conceivable, though inadvisable, that federal courts might disagree with me. They may decide to impose notice requirements more stringent than common sense requires. They may choose to define what Congress is doing in this case as coercive. If so, those decisions would mark breathtaking opportunities for special interests to follow in Merck's footsteps by taking advantage of taxpayers.

At the AEI fiscal theory event last Tuesday Tom Sargent and Eric Leeper made some key points about the current situation, with reference to lessons of history. Tom's comments updated his excellent paper with George Hall "Three World Wars" (at pnas,  summary essay in the Hoover Conference volume). Tom and George liken covid to a war: a large emergency requiring immense expenditure. We can quibble about "require" but not the expenditure. (2008 was a little war in this sense as well.) Since outlays are well ahead of receipts, these huge temporary expenditures are financed by issuing debt and printing money, as optimal tax theory says they should be. In all three cases, you see a ratcheting up of outlays after the war. That's happening now, and in 2008, just as in WWI and WWII. After WWI and WWII, there is a period of primary surpluses -- tax receipts greater than spending -- which helps to pay back the debt. This time is notable for the absence of that effect. We see that most clearly by plotting the primary deficits directly. The data update since Tom and George's original paper (dots) makes that clear. To a fiscal theorist, this is a worrisome difference. We are not following historical tradition of regular, full employment, peacetime surpluses. The two world wars were also financed by a considerable inflation. The important consequence of inflation is that it inflates away government debt. Essentially, we pay for part of the war by a default on debt, engineered via inflation. 1947 is an interesting case. As now, inflation broke out, the Fed left interest rates alone, and the inflation went away once it had inflated away enough debt. That too is an interesting episode in the debate whether the Fed must move rates more than one for one to keep inflation from spiraling away. The effect of inflation is clearer in the next graph, which plots the real return on government bonds: Yes, the inflation of 1920 did inflate away a lot of the WWI debt, though the deflation of 1921 brought a lot of that back. (This is an episode we would do well to remember more! The price level doubled from 1916 through 1920. It then retreated by a third in 1920-1921. There was a sharp recession, but the economy recovered very quickly with no stimulus or heroic measures. The conventional wisdom that wringing out WWI inflation caused the UK 1920s doldrums needs to consider this counterexample. But back to our point) This is also consistent with standard optimal tax theory, which says that in the event of a disaster that happens once every 50 years or so, it is right to execute a "state contingent default" (Lucas and Stokey), and inflation is a natural way to do it. But... "state contingent default" is supposed to happen at the beginning of a war. These inflations happened at the end of the war. How did governments sell bonds to people who should have expected them to be inflated away? Yes, there were some price controls and financial repression, but it's still an important puzzle to standard public finance theory.  My concern, of course, is that we've had two once in a hundred year events in a row (2008, 2020), I can think of lots more that might come soon, and you can only do this occasionally. Hit people over the head a few too many times and they start to duck. We will head to the next crisis with no history of steady surpluses in good times, 100% debt to GDP ratio, and a painful reminder of what happens if you lend to the US right in the rear view mirror. We start the H5N1/Taiwan war crisis with the same debt we had at the end of WWII. And who owns the debt leads to some fascinating speculation which I'll let you fill in with your chat GPT.  Tom closed by echoing my favorite bright idea for avoiding the debt limit: Since the limit applies to par value not market value, the Treasury can issue all the perpetuities it wants. That's far better than the trillion dollar coin, though I suspect the Supreme Court would take just as dim a view of it. Eric  brought up a great point from his super Recovery of 1933 paper with Margaret Jacobson and Bruce Preston. In 1933, we had a disastrous deflation. The gold standard is a lovely fiscal commitment device to try to contain inflation, but it has an Achilles heel. If there is a deflation, the government has to raise taxes to pay an unexpected real windfall to bondholders. In 1933, the Roosevelt Administration abrogated the gold standard. It was a default on the legal terms of the bonds. And look what happened to inflation! Eric also brought up a second central point of his 1933 paper: The Roosevelt Administration separated the budget into a "regular" budget, in which we should expect deficits to be paid back, and an "emergency" budget, unbacked (in our language) by expected surpluses. That cleverly allowed inflationary finance in 1933, but once the "emergency" was over in 1941, it preserved the US reputation for repaying wartime debts with subsequent surpluses, and allowed it to borrow for WWII. This loss of "back to normal," of expectations that we are now in "regular" not "emergency" finance is worrisome today. Finally, Eric brought some nice evidence to bear on the question, why 2020 but not 2008? Well, in part, we can look at statements of public officials. In 2008, they explicitly said, deficit now, repayment later. In 2020 they explicitly said the opposite. ("Offsets" is Washington-speak for "taxes" or later spending cuts.) Don't read a pejorative in this analysis. If you want to borrow, finance crisis expenditures and not create inflation, you "maintain the norm." If you want to create a "state contingent default" and pay for crisis expenditures by inflating away debt, you have to "violate the norm." That is darn hard -- ask the Japanese. How do you convince people you're not going to repay some part of the debt, despite a good reputation, but just some part, and if WWII comes along you're good for additional debts? Well, announcing your intentions helps!  And it worked. We very quickly inflated away the debt. Creating a state contingent default via inflation is not easy. Still to be seen though is whether we can return to "normal" "Hamilton norm" once it's over. Robert Barro also had great comments, but more directed at the book and with no great graphs to pass along. Thanks anyway!

Vuosien 2008−2014 Euroopan finanssi- ja talouskriisi nosti esille kysymyksiä yritysten yhteiskunnallisesta roolista. Tämä tutkimus tarkastelee Euroopan unionin oikeudellisia kriisitoimenpiteitä ja niiden vaikutuksia yrityksiin. Tutkimus pyrkii luomaan kokonaiskuvaa yrityksistä oikeushenkilöinä ja yritysten yhteiskunnallisesta roolista tarkastelemalla kriisiaikana tapahtuneita muutoksia. Eurooppalaisesta yhtiöoikeudellisesta tutkimuksesta puuttuu teoreettinen malli yrityksistä oikeushenkilöinä, malli, joka tunnistaisi yritysten vallan laajuuden ja sen rajat. Tämä tutkimus tarjoaa alustavan mallin yritysten oikeushenkilöllisyydestä jatkokeskustelua ja -kehitystä varten. Tavoitteena on kehittää EU-oikeuteen soveltuva malli yrityksistä oikeushenkilöinä, analysoida kriisitoimenpiteiden oikeudellisia vaikutuksia yritysten näkökulmasta, ja tunnistaa keskeiset yritysten oikeudellisen vallan määrittelyn kannalta keskeiset muuttujat. Tutkimus kehittää hybridimallin yritysten oikeushenkilöllisyydestä. Hybridimalli yhdistää kolmea aiemmin kirjallisuudessa käytettyö mallia. Tutkiakseen yritysten oikeudellista valtaa, oikeussuhteita ja niissä tapahtuneita muutoksia, tutkimus esittelee myös revisioidun version Hohfeldin typologiasta. Revisioitu typologia tunnistaa esimerkiksi horisontaalisten sopimussuhteiden kolmitahoiden luonteen, jossa valtio viime kädessä turvaa sopimusvelvoitteiden noudattamisen. Tutkimus tunnistaa yksityisten oikeushenkilöiden ja erityisesti yritysten oikeudellisen vallan perusteet systematisoimalla EU:n primaarioikeutta ja yleisiä oikeusperiaatteita. Tutkimus argumentoi, että tunnistamalla yritykset autonomiseksi oikeushenkilöiksi, luodaan oikeushenkilöllisyyden ylijäämä. Yritysten oikeudellinen valta rajautuu niihin vapauksiin ja oikeuksiin joita se tarvitsee yhteiskunnallisen tarkoituksensa toteuttamiseksi. Sen vapauksiin ja oikeuksiin autonomisena oikeushenkilönä voidaan puuttua teoriassa missä määrin tahansa EU:n tavoitteiden edistämiseksi, yleisen edun turvaamiseksi tai luonnollisten henkilöiden perusoikeuksien suojelemiseksi. Tutkimus analysoi havaintoja soveltaen revisioitua typologiaa tuottaen seitsemän eri oikeuksien kategoriaa, sekä kolme oikeudellisten velvoitteiden lähdettä. Tämän jälkeen tutkimus muotoilee ensin yksityisten oikeushenkilöiden oikeudellisen hallinnan yleiset oikeusperiaatteet ja sen jälkeen yritysten oikeudellisen hallinnan yleiset periaatteet. Se tunnistaa Euroopan unioin peruskirjoihin kirjoitetut staattiset ja dynaamiset periaatteet sekä niiden merkityksen yritysten oikeudellisessa hallinnalla, erityisesti Euroopan kilpailullisen sosiaalisen markkinatalouden periaatteiden keskeisen roolin. Tätä hallintaa hahmotellaan tarkastelemalla oikeudellisia kriisitoimenpiteitä. Tutkimus tarkastelee vuosien 2008–2014 aikana sekä alkuvuonna 2015 omaksuttuja oikeudellisia toimenpiteitä, lakiesityksiä ja lakeja, sekä niiden taustatöitä. Toimenpiteiden analysointi osoittaa, miten finanssi- ja pankkisektorin toiminnan turvaamiseksi omaksuttiin normeja ja niitä tukevia sanktioita. Samanaikaisesti, kriisin sosiaalisiin vaikutuksiin vastattiin pääasiassa markkinoiden tai markkinoiden kaltaisten mekanismien avulla. Näiden mekanismien kehittämiseksi omaksuttiin sääntelyä joka pyrki vahvistamaan liiketoiminnan läpinäkyvyyttä, heikompien osapuolien suojaa ja kilpailua. Toimenpiteiden tavoitteena oli varmistaa talouden toipuminen ja talouskasvu, sekä turvata julkisten varojen tehokas käyttö ja taloudellinen vakaus. Suurin osa muutoksista yritysten oikeudellisessa asemassa onkin johdettavissa muutoksista ulkoisissa muuttujissa, kuten taloudellisen tilanteen muutoksesta ja sen vaikutuksista yritystoiminnan tuottamiin yhteiskunnallisiin hyötyihin ja haittoihin. Lakien esitöissä ulkojuridisia muuttujia on tarkasteltu yksityiskohtaisesti ja lainsäädännön kustannuksia ja hyötyjä punnittu tarkkaan. Juridisten muuttujien tarkastelu on pääosin pinnallisempaa. Keskusteluluvussa tarkastellaan lähemmin EU-oikeuden dynaamista luonnetta, ja kytketään siinä havaitut heilurimaiset liikkeet Euroopan unionin toimenkuvaan ja tehtävään. Keskusteluluvussa tunnistetaan myös EU-lainsäätäjän ja tuomioistuimen paikoin hyvin erilaiset lähestymistavat joiden arvioidaan vaikuttavan kielteisesti oikeusjärjestelmän selkeyteen, yhtenäisyyteen ja johdonmukaisuuteen. Tutkimuksen ollessa teoreettisesti painottunut, se ei tuota suosituksia tilanteen ratkaisemiseksi. Tutkimuksen tuottama oikeudellinen terminologia mahdollistaa kuitenkin keskustelun käymisen siten, että peruskäsitteistä on olemassa yhteisymmärrys. ; The financial and economic crisis of 2008−2014 raised many questions about the role of corporations in European society. This research studies the European Union's response to the crisis and its impact on the legal powers and legal relations of corporate entities. It seeks to increase our understanding of the nature of corporations as legal entities and the development of their societal role during the crisis period. A model of corporate legal personhood recognising the extent and limits of corporate legal power has been lacking from the current EU legal debate. The research aims to elucidate the role and powers of corporations as legal entities and provide preliminary models for further discussion and development. The research formulates a hybrid model of corporate legal personhood. The hybrid model combines artificial, aggregate and real entity models. For the study of corporate legal relations, the research introduces a reviewed Hohfeldian typology of legal powers and legal relations. The typology reviewed recognises the trilateral nature of all formal relations recognised by the State, providing a more accurate description of also contractual relations between private law entities. The research systematises EU primary legislation and general principles. It systematises the legal powers of private law entities in general and corporate entities in particular in the framework of the European Union's primary legislation. It then analyses the legal powers applying the reviewed Hohfeldian typology. The systematisation produces yields seven categories of legal rights and liberties and three sources of legal duties recognised by the EU. It is argued that statutory legislation recognising the corporate entity as an autonomous entity adds a surplus of legal personhood. The liberties and rights of CEs are limited to those necessary for their economic function in society. The research then recognised key principles of legal governance of private law entities generally and corporate entities in particular. Together with the systematisation of corporate legal powers, these principles constitute the four principles of legal governance of CEs. The liberties and rights of CEs can be intervened to any efficient measures to achieve Union objectives or to protect general interests recognised by the Union or promote fundamental non-market liberties and rights of natural persons. To recognise the key variables that determine the legal status of corporate entities, the research studies the impact of crisis measures on the legal powers and legal relations of corporate entities. It covers relevant regulatory measures adopted between 2008 and 2014 and early 2015. The analysis of these measures demonstrates that ensuring the proper functioning of the financial and banking sector required entailed establishing a robust regulatory framework. At the same time, responses to the social challenges posed and perpetuated by the crisis were pursued primarily through markets or market-like mechanisms. To enhance the proper functioning of these mechanisms, the EU adopted regulation enhancing corporate transparency, protecting weaker contractual parties, and aiming at more efficient enforcement of competition. According to the research, the key objectives of the measures adopted were to ensure economic recovery and growth in the prevailing conditions while also ensuring efficient use of pubic resources and financial sustainability. The majority of changes in corporate legal power are traceable to changes in extrajudicial variables, such as changed economic conditions and their impact on the costs and benefits created by business activities. In contrast to judicial factors, extrajudicial variables have been carefully assessed and balanced, highlighting their significance in determining the legal powers and legal relations of corporate entities. The discussion recognises the dynamic nature of EU law. It connects this regulatory pendulum with the nature and function of the European Union as an intergovernmental organisation, aiming to create added value for Europeans. The discussion also recognises differences in approaches when comparing the EU legislator and the Court of Justice of the European Union. While the research at hand cannot solve policy issues, it provides a common terminology for future discussion.

This dissertation is composed of three papers papers and explores different aspects of Venture Capital (VC) financing in developing Asia.The dissertation commences with the general introduction which of VC. The general introduction provides the definition, overview, and typologies of VC firms. MoreoverFurthermore, general introduction layouts the research design and structure of the dissertation.The general introduction is followed by Chapter 1 which . This chapter elaborates the conception, history, and evolution of VC, and subsequently, its transference and internationalization – with a particular focus on Asian developing countries. Chapter 1 also outlines the salient differences of the VC industry across countries based on the institutional framework in terms of screening and selection of projects, value addition, and exit mechanism of the portfolio companies.Chapter 2 investigates the exit performance of companies backed by government venture capital (GVC) compared with that of firms backed by independent venture capital (IVC) in Asia. Using a sample of 3,817 firms from 9 Asian developing countries over 26 years (1991-2017), we first show that GVC-backed firms are more likely to be financed in the early stage than IVC-backed firms. In doing so, GVC absorbs the higher probability of unsuccessful exit associated with firms financed in the early stage. In contrast, we find that in the expansion stage and later stage, GVC-backed firms perform better than IVC-backed ones. Overall, we show that GVC-backed firms outperform IVC-backed firms in terms of successful exits. We thus challenge the hypothesis of GVC underperformance tested in the existing literature on other geographical areas. Finally, we also provide evidence that mixed syndication (combination of GVC and IVC) improves the exit performance of ventures.Chapter 3 explores the investment behavior, exit performance and optimal exit route choice of Corporate Venture Capital (CVC) backed entrepreneurial companies in comparison with GVC-backed entrepreneurial firms in developing Asia. We studied a sample of 1198 companies that received their first investment either from a CVC firm or from a GVC firm, during the period 1999 to 2013, in five Asian countries. We first showed that CVC firms are more likely to invest in High-tech companies as compared with GVC firms. We further showed that CVC-backed firms are more likely to go successful and that CVC-backed firms are more likely to exit through Initial Public Offerings (IPO), as compared with GVC-backed companies, in developing Asia. We addressed the problems of endogeneity concerns and selection bias of observable and unobservable characteristics by employing the Bivariate Probit Model, Heckman two-step estimator, and Propensity Score Matching (PSM) techniques. Our results are robust to several checks.Chapter 4 investigates the impact of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) on the hosts country's domestic VC industry. We studied a sample of 7 Asian developing countries over the period 2000 to 2018. Employing Autoregressive Distributed Lags (ARDL) model (Mean Group (MG) and Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimators), we find that the FDI has no effect, in the short run, but significant and positive effect on domestic VC activity due to the positive externalities and spillover effects, in the long run. FDIs complement domestic VC investments and helps in the creation of new VC-backed companies.The last chapter concludes the dissertation. This chapter accentuates the contribution of the dissertationto current state of art and presents the implications of the dissertationin terms of policies. Furthermore, this chapter also highlights the limitation of the dissertationand suggest the avenues for the future research. ; Le Capital-Risque (CR) est la forme de financement par capitaux propres la plus admirée et la plus adaptée aux entreprises jeunes et innovantes pour lever des capitaux externes, et les capital-risqueurs participent activement à la gestion des entreprises dans lesquelles ils investissent. Les sociétés de capital-risque prennent des risques et croient en la notion bien connue de risque élevé/gain élevé. La National Venture Capital Association (NVCA) définit de manière plausible le capital-risque comme "l'argent fourni par des professionnels qui investissent, aux côtés de la direction, dans de jeunes entreprises à croissance rapide qui ont le potentiel de devenir des contributeurs économiques importants".Cependant, le capital-risque a une trajectoire d'évolution différente dans les pays asiatiques en développement. Ainsi, l'industrie du capital-risque en Asie est sensiblement différente de ses homologues dans les pays occidentaux - notamment aux États-Unis et en Europe. L'industrie du capital-risque en Asie est immature et sous-développée. En outre, les sociétés de capital-risque ne sont pas homogènes et diffèrent radicalement les unes des autres en termes de structure, de gouvernance et d'objectifs. En gardant à l'esprit les spécificités de l'industrie asiatique du capital-risque et l'hétérogénéité entre les sociétés de capital-risque, cette thèse tend à étudier la performance des différents types de sociétés de capital-risque et les principaux moteurs et déterminants de l'activité de capital-risque dans les pays asiatiques en développement. Cette thèse est un recueil de trois articles et se compose de cinq chapitres.L'introduction générale est suivie du chapitre 1.Le chapitre 2 étudie les performances de sortie des entreprises soutenues par le capital-risque gouvernemental (GVC) par rapport à celles des entreprises soutenues par le capital-risque indépendant (IVC) en Asie. À l'aide d'un échantillon de 3 817 entreprises de neuf pays en développement asiatiques sur une période de 26 ans (1991-2017), nous montrons d'abord que les entreprises soutenues par le GVC sont plus susceptibles d'être financées dans la phase initiale que les entreprises soutenues par le IVC. Ce faisant, la GVC absorbe la probabilité plus élevée de sortie infructueuse associée aux entreprises financées dans la phase initiale.Le chapitre 3 explore le comportement d'investissement, la performance de sortie et le choix de la voie de sortie optimale des entreprises soutenues par du capital-risque d'entreprise (CVC) par rapport aux entreprises soutenues par du capital-risque gouvernemental (GVC) dans les pays asiatiques en développement. Nous avons étudié un échantillon de 1198 entreprises qui ont reçu leur premier investissement soit d'une entreprise à capital-risque, soit d'une entreprise à capital-risque public, entre 1999 et 2013, dans cinq pays asiatiques. Nous avons d'abord montré que les entreprises CVC sont plus susceptibles d'investir dans des entreprises de haute technologie que les entreprises GVC.Le chapitre 4 étudie l'impact de l'investissement direct étranger sur l'industrie du capital-risque du pays hôte. Nous avons étudié un échantillon de 7 pays en développement asiatiques sur la période 2000 à 2018. En utilisant le modèle ARDL (Autoregressive Distributed Lags) - estimateurs Mean Group (MG) et Pooled Mean Group (PMG) - nous constatons que les IDE n'ont aucun effet, à court terme, mais un effet significatif et positif sur l'activité de capital-risque domestique en raison des externalités positives et des effets d'entraînement, à long terme. Les IDE attirent le capital-risque national en termes de montant investi et contribuent à la création de nouvelles entreprises soutenues par le capital-risque.

Il presente elaborato tratta il tema della vittima nei reati di violenza di genere e di violenza sessuale. In particolare, è stata posta l'attenzione sulla vulnerabilità di tale persona offesa, sulle cause che determinano la condizione di fragilità, sui meccanismi processuali di tutela e sulle critiche che possono essere mosse a questa presunzione di vulnerabilità, spesso attuata dal legislatore. Inizieremo dalle radici sociali, culturali e storiche che hanno provocato il dipanarsi della violenza contro le donne: la disparità tra uomo e donna, gli stereotipi, le gabbie di genere rappresentano tutt'oggi la miccia che innesca la violenza di genere e la violenza sessuale; conoscere le cause che provocano questi crimini appare di primaria importanza per poterli fronteggiare. La violenza contro le donne nasce con la società stessa; possiamo infatti dire che la civiltà greco-romana ha trasmesso alle generazioni future uno schema pre-impostato dei ruoli di genere, radici così ben salde e così profonde della subordinazione femminile sono la principale causa per cui oggi tale fenomeno sia difficile da debellare. Gli stereotipi e le gabbie di genere sono una caratteristica comune a tutte le società, non esiste infatti una cultura in cui la violenza contro le donne sia stata sradicata. La violenza di genere viene definita come un fenomeno giuridico complesso, perché causato da molteplici fattori volti a determinare variegate forme di violenza: sessuale, economica, psicologica, fisica, ma tutte accumunate da un unico fattore: la subordinazione della donna. Qual è oggi giorno il ruolo di tale vittima all'interno del processo penale? quali sono le sue facoltà e le sue tutele? Guardando alla vittima intesa in senso generale, la sua collocazione all'interno del processo è oggi molto discussa; la legislazione nazionale e sovrannazionale ha cercato di attribuirle un ruolo più definito all'interno dell'accertamento penale, escludendo però la sua connotazione come parte processuale. In particolare, il legislatore ha messo mano ai diritti partecipativi della persona offesa, ma accanto a diritti che riguardano la vittima tout court, alcune prerogative si riferiscono in modo esclusivo a determinate categorie di soggetti offesi dal reato, tra i quali le vittime di violenza di genere e di violenza sessuale. Oltre che a implementare la partecipazione di questi soggetti al processo penale, si è resa necessaria anche una maggiore tutela a causa degli alti rischi che possono sopraggiungere dalla partecipazione all'accertamento penale, infatti le vittime che espongono la violenza subita vanno incontro a due principali rischi: il rischio di reiterazione del reato e il rischio di vittimizzazione secondaria. Il diritto infatti, sia a livello nazionale che internazionale, non è rimasto indifferente ai suddetti crimini, andando a delineare meccanismi di protezione ad hoc per le donne, spesso definite come vittime vulnerabili. La Direttiva 2012/29/UE, preceduta dalla Decisione Quadro n. 2001/220/GAI, si occupa per la prima volta di una valutazione soggettiva della condizione di particolare vulnerabilità in cui può versare la vittima. Vengono presi in considerazione sia parametri soggettivi che oggettivi, per poter dichiarare la condizione di particolare vulnerabilità e applicare le conseguenti misure di tutela. Merito della direttiva è infatti quello di delineare un individual assessment per valutare lo stato di fragilità, respingendo ogni forma di presunzione. Al contrario, il legislatore italiano con l'art. 90 quater non è stato in grado di recepire la Direttiva. Non predisponendo un iter per l'accertamento delle condizioni di particolare vulnerabilità ha reso la disciplina sterile e indeterminata, rimandando alle disposizioni successive l'applicazione degli strumenti di tutela per le persone offese presunte vulnerabili. Già prima della Direttiva del 2012, la Convenzione del Consiglio d'Europa sulla prevenzione e la lotta contro la violenza nei confronti delle donne e la violenza domestica, si era occupata di prevedere specifici diritti e specifici meccanismi di tutela nei confronti della vittima di tali crimini. Il legislatore interno, sulla scia delle fonti internazionali e sulla scia di un sempre più acceso dibattito pubblico in tema di violenza contro le donne, è intervenuto in modo emergenziale e con la logica del doppio binario; prevedendo cioè meccanismi di tutela specifici che riguardano esclusivamente determinate vittime. Questo armamentario di cautele è stato ideato per tutelare la donna sia fuori dal processo, onde evitare una reiterazione del reato, che dentro di questo, onde evitare una vittimizzazione secondaria. La vittimizzazione secondaria è uno dei principali problemi collegato alla violenza di genere e alla violenza sessuale; il rischio di pregiudizi da parte delle autorità competenti e il rischio di subire nuovi traumi dal processo è, in questi reati, molto alto. Per questi motivi il legislatore ha adottato tutta una serie di meccanismi, soprattutto nella fase dell'escussione, al fine di limitare tale pericolo: gli artt. 351 comma 1-ter e 362 comma 1-bis c.p.p, artt. 392 comma 1-bis, art. 398 5-ter e 5-quater c.p.p. artt. 472 comma 3-bis e 498 4-quater c.p.p. e l'art. 134 comma 4 c.p.p., sono tutte disposizioni volte ad alleviare alla persona offesa il peso di dover rivivere il trauma del crimine all'interno di un'aula di tribunale, talvolta limitando le audizioni o le domande, talaltra rilasciando le dichiarazioni in una sede diversa rispetto a quella giudiziaria. Oltre a questo, soprattutto grazie alla Convenzione di Istanbul, si è reso necessario implementare la formazione degli operatori giuridici che entrano in contatto, a diverso titolo, con la persona offesa; il linguaggio utilizzato da questi soggetti e la metodologia di intervento impiegata sono di primaria importanza per realizzare un'azione efficiente e evulsa da pregiudizi. A tal proposito, si parlerà dalla recente sentenza della Corte di Strasburgo, del 27 maggio 2021, che ha condannato l'Italia per vittimizzazione secondaria a causa del linguaggio utilizzato dai giudici in un processo per presunta violenza sessuale. Il caso rappresenta chiaramente come certi danni cagionati dalle istituzioni risultano essere addirittura più dolorosi del fatto principale, e di come sia necessaria una formazione e un'educazione su questi temi per evitare stereotipi da parte delle Autorità competenti. La critica che può essere mossa agli interventi del legislatore italiano è quella di aver categorizzato le vittime in astratto, allontanandosi dalla prospettiva della valutazione case by case prevista dalla Direttiva 2012/29/UE. Questo assetto è ben evidente nella Sentenza 11 gennaio 2021, n.1 della Corte Costituzionale in cui viene affermato il principio per cui determinate vittime, tra cui le vittime di violenza contro le donne, abbiano diritto al patrocino gratuito indipendentemente dal reddito. Un'impostazione di questo tipo rischia, da una parte, di trattare diversamente le vittime sulla base di una valutazione astratta e, sempre sulla base di questa, trattare allo stesso modo chi subisce il medesimo reato, quando invece sarebbe più opportuna una valutazione soggettiva circa le condizioni in cui versa la vittima per poter applicare le specifiche misure di tutela. Trattare indistintamente le persone offese dai reati di violenza di genere e violenza sessuale come soggetti vulnerabili ex ante, rischia di sottolineare ancora una volta la fragilità della donna anche di fronte allo Stato e di replicare, anche in sede processuale, il binomio uomo-forte e donna-debole.

Keywords: intellectual property right, codification, legislation, The Civil Code ofUkraine This scientific article examines the issue of the need to create aspecial code of intellectual property in Ukraine. For a full-fledged and objective study,an analysis was made of the history of Ukrainian legislation in the field of intellectualproperty, foreign models of legal regulation of intellectual property rights, especiallyEuropean legal experience, were also investigated. The author supports the positionregarding the creation in Ukraine of the Intellectual Property Code, the analogueof which exists in Italy and France. Based on the study of Ukrainian and foreign legalsystems, the author defines the main criteria for creating an intellectual propertycode: Legal and organizational criteria are defined. The author points out the need toimplement the European legislative practice, the jurisprudence of the EuropeanCourt of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union on judicialcases in the field of intellectual property into the code. This vector of implementationwill have a positive meaning for the adaptation of the Ukrainian legislative system toEuropean democratic standards in the field of legal regulation, legal protection of intellectualproperty rights. The author pays special attention to the need to harmonizethe intellectual property code with the Civil Code of Ukraine and procedural legislationin order to level the negative legal consequences in legal practice in the field ofintellectual property; also in the IP Code shall contain the following provision or requirements,which contained universal definitions of legal concepts in the field of intellectualproperty. Based on the conducted scientific analysis, the author points outthe need for the existence of the Ukrainian code of intellectual property and speciallaws in the field of intellectual property. It follows from this that there is a need forlegal regulation of individual legal relations (objects of law) in the field of intellectualproperty law. The author points out that such a legal system corresponds to the modelof legal regulation of the field of intellectual property that exists in the EuropeanUnion. ; Ключові слова: право інтелектуальної власності, кодифікація, законодавство,Цивільний кодекс України Стаття присвячена дослідженню правових та організаційних аспектів кодифікаціїукраїнського законодавства у сфері інтелектуальної власності. На підставі аналізуісторичного розвитку українського права інтелектуальної власності з наукових пози-цій, аналізу зарубіжних, у тому числі європейських, моделей правового регулюванняінтелектуальної власності визначено основні критерії кодифікації національногозаконодавства у сфері інтелектуальної власності. Вказано на доцільність запровад-ження в українську правову систему спеціального кодексу з інтелектуальної власно-сті, завданням якого буде правове регулювання означеної сфери. Посилання 1. Петрухин И. Л. Правосудие: время реформ. Москва : Наука, 1991. С. 207. 208 с. 2. Конституція України. Офіційний сайт Верховної Ради України. URL https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/254%D0%BA/96-%D0%B2%D1%80. 3. Про авторське право і суміжні права : Закон України. Офіційний сайт Верховної Ради України. URL : https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3792-12/print. 4. Про охорону прав на знаки для товарів і послуг : Закон України. Офіційний сайт Верховної Ради України. URL : https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3689-12/print. 5. Цивільний кодекс України. Офіційний сайт Верховної Ради України. URL: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/435-15/print. 6. Іващенок В. А. Розвиток законодавства з інтелектуальної власності в Україні у 2000-х рр. (історико-правовий аспект). Право та державне управління. 2017. № 4 (29). Том 1. С. 19–24. URL : http://www.pdu-journal.kpu.zp.ua/archive/4_2017/tom_1/6.pdf. 7. Шабалін А. В. Актуальні питання захисту права інтелектуальної власності: навчально-практичний посібник. Київ : НДІ ІВ НАПрН України. Київ : Інтерсервіс, 2020. 160 с. 8. Орлюк О. Сфера інтелектуальної власності як предмет правового регулювання: проблема конкуренції законів. Теорія і практика інтелектуальної власності. 2009. № 6 (50). С. 25–33. 9. Угода про асоціацію між Україною, з однієї сторони, та Європейським Союзом, Європейським співтовариством з атомної енергії і їхніми державами-членами. Офіційний сайт Верховної Ради України. URL : http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/984_011 (дата звернення: 26.01.2021). 10. Стефанчук Р. О. До питання про кодифікацію законодавства у сфері інтелектуальної власності. Право України. № 11/2016. С. 86–91. 11. Крижна В. Варіанти кодифікації законодавства у сфері інтелектуальної власності. Теорія і практика інтелектуальної власності. № 1. 2010. - С. 110–114. 12. Shabalin, A.V. and all The establishment and development of a system of protection of intellectual property rights in Europe and the USA. Asia Life Sciences. 2020. Issue 1. Pp. 21-38. URL : https://www.scopus.com/record/display.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85087558844&origin=resultslist (Shabalin, Andrii V. The establishment and development of a system of protection of intellectual property rights in Europe and the USA. Asia Life Sciences, 2020, (1), стр. 21-38. URL : https://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=57217735889). 13. Тлумачний словник основних юридичних понять, визначень і термінів URL : http://pidruchniki.ws/19390825/pravo/tlumachniy_slovnik_-osnovnih_yuridichnih_ponyat_viznachen_terminiv. 14. Виборчий кодекс України. Офіційний сайт Верховної Ради України. URL : https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/396-20#Text; Земельний кодекс України. Офіційний сайт Верховної Ради України. URL : https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/card/2768-14. ================================================== 1. Petrukhyn Y. L. Pravosudye: vremia reform. Moskva : Nauka, 1991. S. 207. 208 s. 2. Konstytutsiia Ukrainy. Ofitsiinyi sait Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy. URL https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/254%D0%BA/96-%D0%B2%D1%80. 3. Pro avtorske pravo i sumizhni prava : Zakon Ukrainy. Ofitsiinyi sait Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy. URL : https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3792-12/print. 4. Pro okhoronu prav na znaky dlia tovariv i posluh : Zakon Ukrainy. Ofitsiinyi sait Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy. URL : https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3689-12/print. 5. Tsyvilnyi kodeks Ukrainy. Ofitsiinyi sait Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy. URL: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/435-15/print. 6. Ivashchenok V. A. Rozvytok zakonodavstva z intelektualnoi vlasnosti v Ukraini u 2000-kh rr. (istoryko-pravovyi aspekt). Pravo ta derzhavne upravlinnia. 2017. № 4 (29). Tom 1. S. 19–24. URL : http://www.pdu-journal.kpu.zp.ua/archive/4_2017/tom_1/6.pdf. 7. Shabalin A. V. Aktualni pytannia zakhystu prava intelektualnoi vlasnosti: navchalno-praktychnyi posibnyk. Kyiv : NDI IV NAPrN Ukrainy. Kyiv : Interservis, 2020. 160 s. 8. Orliuk O. Sfera intelektualnoi vlasnosti yak predmet pravovoho rehuliuvannia: problema konkurentsii zakoniv. Teoriia i praktyka intelektualnoi vlasnosti. 2009. № 6 (50). S. 25–33. 9. Uhoda pro asotsiatsiiu mizh Ukrainoiu, z odniiei storony, ta Yevropeiskym Soiuzom, Yevropeiskym spivtovarystvom z atomnoi enerhii i yikhnimy derzhavamy-chlenamy. Ofitsiinyi sait Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy. URL : http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/984_011 (data zvernennia: 26.01.2021). 10. Stefanchuk R. O. Do pytannia pro kodyfikatsiiu zakonodavstva u sferi intelektualnoi vlasnosti. Pravo Ukrainy. № 11/2016. S. 86–91. 11. Kryzhna V. Varianty kodyfikatsii zakonodavstva u sferi intelektualnoi vlasnosti. Teoriia i praktyka intelektualnoi vlasnosti. № 1. 2010. S. 110–114. 12. Shabalin, A.V. and all The establishment and development of a system of protection of intellectual property rights in Europe and the USA. Asia Life Sciences. 2020. Issue 1. Pp. 21-38. URL : https://www.scopus.com/record/display.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85087558844&origin=resultslist (Shabalin, Andrii V. The establishment and development of a system of protection of intellectual property rights in Europe and the USA. Asia Life Sciences, 2020, (1), str. 21-38. URL : https://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=57217735889). 13. Tlumachnyi slovnyk osnovnykh yurydychnykh poniat, vyznachen i terminiv URL: http://pidruchniki.ws/19390825/pravo/tlumachniy_slovnik_-osnovnih_yuridichnih_ponyat_viznachen_terminiv. 14. Vyborchyi kodeks Ukrainy. Ofitsiinyi sait Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy. URL : https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/396-20#Text; Zemelnyi kodeks Ukrainy. Ofitsiinyi sait Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy. URL : https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/card/2768-14.

The purpose of the article is to study the roles of the prosecutor and the lawyer in reconciling between the victim and the suspect (accused) in Ukraine at the present time and to examine the possibility of increasing their participation in the reconciliation between the parties in the future. Reconciliation between victim and suspect (accused) in committing of a criminal offense as the centerpiece of the restorative justice in Ukraine today takes place outside of criminal proceedings, but it may have important substantive and procedural consequences in it. It can be considered as a mitigating circumstance in sentencing and even give rise to release the suspect (accused) from criminal liability. With the importance of reconciliation not only for the victim and the suspect, but also for the state, the question about scope of prosecutor`s powers as a procedural chief in criminal proceedings remains relevant. Such powers must be effective for facilitation such reconciliation, and at the same time they must prevent the unjustly avoidance of liability. It is also equally important to clarify the role of lawyers and the system of free secondary legal aid in restorative justice in Ukraine. The authors analyzed in the paper the normative regulation of the prosecutor's and the lawyer`s powers related to the reconciliation between the parties and the mechanism for the application of the restorative justice for its sufficiency and ability to provide the necessary mechanisms for implementing the provisions of the law. The authors found such gaps and differences in law regulation that hinder the development of conciliation practices in national criminal proceedings. The authors also examined the data of official state registers and revealed negative trends in the participation of the prosecutor in taking the procedural decisions based on the successful reconciliation between the victim and the suspect (accused). This gives reason to claim that the prosecutor's participation in reconciling between the victim and the suspect (accused) currently does not take into account neither the interests of the parties nor the state's interests in reducing the workload on the judicial and penitentiary systems and resolving other issues that accompany the existing punitive approach. In view of this, the authors proposes to make a number of changes to national legislation in order to eliminate those legal gaps that negatively affect the implementation of rules that guarantee the right to reconciliation and determine the admission of its positive results during making a final decision by court. In addition, the authors also emphasizes the necessity and practical feasibility of introducing a new model of the prosecutor`s participation in reconciling between the victim and suspect (accused) and giving him the right to initiate mediation with the consent of the parties. Such rules will also require the establishment of some additional provisions that will form a comprehensive implementation mechanism and serve as a guarantee of the interests of the victim and suspect (accused). As an example the authors used the rules of Criminal Procedure Act of the Republic of Slovenia. The authors also explored the main provisions and first results of The Pilot Project «Restorative Program for Juveniles Suspected of Committing a Criminal Offense». This project is the first attempt to expand the prosecutor's involvement in reconciling between the victim and the suspect (accused). The authors made conclusions about the real state of restorative justice in Ukraine at the present stage and the role of lawyers in it, taking into account the analysis of unique data collected from the Regional Centers for Free Secondary Legal Aid in Odesa, Mykolaiv and Kherson regions. ; Примирение потерпевшего и подозреваемого (обвиняемого) в совершении уголовного преступления как центральный элемент восстановительного правосудия в Украине сегодня происходит вне рамок уголовного производства, однако может иметь важные материально-правовые и процессуально-правовые последствия – от учитывания в качестве обстоятельства, которое смягчает наказание, до освобождения от уголовной ответственности. С учетом положительного значения примирения не только для потерпевшего и подозреваемого, но и для государства, важным вопросом остается то, какой объем полномочий прокурора как процессуального руководителя в уголовном производстве позволит эффективно способствовать достижению такого примирения, и, одновременно с этим, не будет представлять угрозу необоснованного избегания ответственности. Не менее важным является изучение вопроса о том, какую роль в восстановительном правосудии в Украине играют адвокаты и система оказания бесплатной вторичной пра- вовой помощи. Исходя из этого, целью работы является исследование ролей прокурора и адвоката в примирении потерпевшего с подозреваемым (обвиняемым) в Украине на современном этапе и определение возможности расширения границ их участия в примирении сторон в будущем. Анализ нормативного регулирования полномочий прокурора и адвоката, связанных с примирением сторон, механизма применения восстановительного правосудия, на предмет его достаточности и способности обеспечить необходимые механизмы реализации положений законодательства, свидетельствует о наличии таких пробелов и разногласий, которые сдерживают развитие практики проведения примирительных процедур в отечественном уголовном производстве. Авторами отмечается необходимость и практическая целесообразность внедрения новой модели участия прокурора в примирении потерпевшего и подозреваемого (обви- няемого) и наделении его правом инициировать проведение медиации с согласия сторон. В статье также рассматриваются основные положения и первые результаты Пилотного проекта «Программа восстановления для несовершеннолетних, которые являются подозреваемыми в совершении уголовного правонарушения», в рамках которого впервые была предпринята попытка расширить пределы участия прокурора в примирении потерпевшего с подозреваемым (обвиняемым). С учётом анализа уникальных данных, полученных от Региональных центров по оказанию бесплатной вторичной правовой помощи в Одесской, Николаевской и Херсонской областях, были сделаны выводы относительно реального состояния вос- становительного правосудия в Украине на современном этапе и роли адвокатов в нём. ; Примирення потерпілого та підозрюваного (обвинуваченого) у вчиненні кримінального правопорушення як центральний елемент відновного правосуддя на сьогодні в Україні відбувається поза межами кримінального провадження, проте може мати важливі матеріально-правові та процесуально-правові наслідки, – від врахування у якості обставини, яка пом'якшує покарання, до звільнення від кримінальної відповідальності. З урахуванням позитивного значення примирення не тільки для потерпілого та підозрюваного (обвинуваченого), але й для держави, важливим питанням лишається те, який обсяг повноважень прокурора як процесуального керівника у кримінальному провадженні дозволить ефективно сприяти досягненню такого примирення, та, одночасно із цим, не становитиме загрозу безпідставного уникнення відповідальності. Не менш важливим є з'ясування питання про те, яку роль у відновному правосудді в Україні відіграють адвокати та система надання безоплатної вторинної правової допомоги. З огляду на це, метою роботи є дослідження ролей прокурора та адвоката у примиренні потерпілого з підозрюваним (обвинуваченим) в Україні на сучасному етапі та визначення можливості розширення меж їх участі у примиренні сторін в майбутньому. Аналіз нормативного регулювання повноважень прокурора та адвоката, пов'язаних із примиренням сторін, механізму застосування відновного правосуддя, на предмет його достатності та здатності забезпечити необхідні механізми реалізації положень законодавства, свідчить про наявність таких прогалин та розбіжностей, які стримують розвиток практики проведення примирних процедур у вітчизняному кримінальному провадженні. Авторками наголошується на необхідності та практичній доцільності запровадження нової моделі участі прокурора у примиренні потерпілого та підозрюваного (обвинуваченого) та наділенні його правом ініціювати проведення медіації за згодою сторін. У статті також досліджуються основні положення та перші результати Пілотного проєкту «Програма відновлення для неповнолітніх, які є підозрюваними у вчиненні кримінального правопорушення», в якому вперше було вжито спробу розширити межі участі прокурора у примиренні потерпілого та підозрюваного (обвинуваченого). З урахуванням аналізу унікальних даних, зібраних від Регіональних центрів з надання безоплатної вторинної правової допомоги у Одеській, Миколаївській та Херсонській областях, зроблено висновки щодо реального стану відновного правосуддя в Україні на сучасному етапі та ролі адвокатів у ньому

Forest policy increasingly mobilizes the forest sector to address environmental concerns. Owing to the forest sector's complexity and time scales involved, simulation models are often used as research methods to explore the future. This thesis investigates the contributions of Forest Sector Models (FSM), bio-economic simulation models commonly used for prospective analysis, to this transition.We first adopt a conceptual perspective and, through a parallel exploration of the early literature in forest economics and the epistemology of model use, we show that forest policy has been, and still is, a strong driver of FSM research, influencing representation processes in models as well as narratives used to drive research. We also highlight that the nature of facts within the forest sector, the local context, data availability and past practices are other important determinants of model-based research. We subsequently review more recent literature to assess the extent to which environmental issues have been addressed. While originally focused on timber production and trade, a majority of the research now focuses on goals such as renewable energy production or the conservation of biodiversity. The treatment of such objectives has however been unequal, and those closer to the models' original target are treated more often and more deeply. On the contrary, modelling is hindered when economic values are hard to estimate or when models cannot handle spatialized data, hence objectives related to cultural and some regulation services are less commonly studied.The remainder of the thesis addresses two aspects of climate change, namely mitigation and adaptation, and brings methodological contributions by leveraging two ways of overcoming obstacles to the investigation of environmental objectives with large-scale bio-economic models: model couplings and the consideration of local environmental conditions. Both chapters focus on France, where the diversity of local contexts makes analyses focused on the upstream forest sector relevant, and use the French Forest Sector Model (FFSM).First, using the FFSM and Hartman's model for optimal rotations with non-timber amenities, we investigate consequences for forestry and landscapes of management practices aiming at both producing timber and sequestering carbon. We show that, while postponing harvests can increase carbon stocks in the short-term, changes in management regimes and species choice yield additional benefits in the long-term. Over time, these changes lead to more diverse forest landscapes in terms of composition and structure, with potential implications for policy and environmental co-benefits. However, trends show a high level of spatial variability across and within regions, highlighting the importance of considering the local context.In-situ carbon stocks are however exposed to risks of non-permanence. We assess implications for the forest sector of climate-induced changes in wildfire regimes, as well as implications for model projections of uncertainties related to these changes. To do so, we use a probabilistic model of wildfire activity, which we couple to the FFSM, and we carry out multiple simulations using various radiative forcing levels and different climate models. Although locally significant, wildfires' impacts remain limited at the sectoral scale. Fires affect a limited amount of the resource every year but in a cumulative manner, and the influence of climate change is mostly witnessed in the latter half of the century. Inter-annual fluctuations in fire activity only marginally propagate to the forest sector, and most uncertainty comes from the choice of climate models and scenarios. Stochasticity in the fire process, although never predominant, accounts for a significant share of uncertainty. These results stress the importance of considering multiple possible outcomes and the inherent variability in environmental processes in large-scale model projections. ; La politique forestière mobilise de manière croissante la filière forêt-bois pour contribuer à des objectifs d'ordre environnemental, et la modélisation est souvent utilisée comme moyen d'interroger le futur. Cette thèse explore la capacité des modèles de secteur forestier (MSF), des modèles de simulation bio-économiques, à accompagner cette transition.Sur le plan conceptuel, nous explorons la littérature à l'origine des MSF ainsi que celle sur l'épistémologie des modèles économiques. Nous montrons que la politique forestière a été un déterminant fort des pratiques de recherche, influençant les représentations du secteur dans les modèles et les discours mobilisés pour conduire les simulations. Nous illustrons également l'influence d'autres facteurs: la nature des faits forestiers, le contexte local, la disponibilité de données et les pratiques passées. Nous nous intéressons ensuite aux évolutions récentes et montrons qu'alors que la production et le commerce du bois constituent les thématiques de recherche d'origine, les enjeux environnementaux tels que la production d'énergie renouvelable ou la protection des habitats sont aujourd'hui centraux. Leur intégration reste cependant inégale, et ils sont d'autant plus traités qu'ils se rapprochent des sujets originels. A l'inverse, en raison de la difficulté d'estimer une valeur économique ou de la formulation d'outils à une échelle inadaptée, la modélisation de certains services culturels et de régulation est plus difficile et superficielle.Nous menons ensuite deux cas d'étude portant sur l'atténuation et l'adaptation au changement climatique et sur le secteur forestier Français, où la diversité des contextes locaux justifie de s'intéresser en détail à l'amont de la filière. Nous utilisons le French Forest Sector Model (FFSM) et cherchons à mettre en œuvre deux leviers méthodologiques susceptibles d'améliorer la prise en compte d'enjeux environnementaux: le couplage de modèles et la considération de l'hétérogénéité des conditions environnementales.Le FFSM est d'abord utilisé avec un modèle de rotations optimales incluant les aménités autres que le bois afin d'étudier les implications d'une gestion cherchant à séquestrer du carbone. Nous montrons que, sur le court terme, la séquestration est principalement améliorée en repoussant les récoltes. Sur le long terme, des bénéfices supplémentaires sont attendus en faisant évoluer la composition et la structure de la forêt, amenant à des paysages forestiers plus variés. Ces tendances présentent cependant une forte hétérogénéité spatiale entre et au sein des régions, soulignant l'importance de considérer le contexte local.Le carbone in situ est cependant exposé à des risques de non-permanence. Nous évaluons les conséquences pour la filière forêt-bois de l'évolution des régimes de feux en contexte de changement climatique et les implications pour les projections des incertitudes liées à cette évolution. Nous utilisons un modèle probabiliste d'activité des feux que nous couplons au FFSM, et réalisons de multiples simulations pour plusieurs niveaux de forçage radiatif et modèles climatiques. Bien que localement importants, l'impact des feux reste limité à l'échelle de la filière. Ces derniers touchent une faible proportion de la ressource chaque année mais d'une manière cumulative, et leurs conséquences projetées sont particulièrement visibles dans la deuxième moitié du 21e siècle. Les variations interannuelles de l'activité des feux se propagent peu aux dynamiques de filière, et l'incertitude dans les projections provient principalement du choix du modèle et des scénarios climatiques. L'incertitude due à la stochasticité du phénomène de feux ne prédomine jamais mais représente une part significative de l'incertitude totale. Ces résultats soulignent l'importance de considérer de multiples scénarios ainsi que la variabilité inhérente aux processus écologiques dans la prospective utilisant des modèles bio-économiques à grande échelle.

The aim of this doctoral thesis is to study the quality and evolution of the relations between the Duke of Ferrara, Alfonso II d'Este, and the French crown, from the restoration of peace in 1559 between the Valois and the Habsburgs with the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis (2-3 April 1559) and during the following twenty years, until 1580. However, this is not an analysis aimed at deepening the relations between the ducal power of Ferrara and the French monarchy from a strictly diplomatic point of view. I have preferred to study the links between the Duke of Ferrara and the Valois kingdom through the family network that the former had on the other side of the Alps, thanks to the matrimonial alliance signed between the Este and the Guise in 1548, and which in 1559 still existed and was fully functional. From the European framework of the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis, we would like to shed light on the hopes, the level of autonomy, the oscillations, and the modes of action that the House of Este implemented in the face of Spanish preponderance through its links with the Kingdom of France. In addition to an international approach, we study the effects on the system of equilibrium and competition between the Italian courts through the red thread of the dispute for precedence between Este and Medici. Through the relations of the Este with the French Crown, we try to analyse not only the relationship between these two entities and the real contractual power of the Duke of Ferrara, but also the balances and influences of other Italian dynasties, such as the Savoy and the Medici, in the same context. This is also reflected in the sources that constitute the documentary framework of my thesis, i.e. the correspondence of the Este agents in the kingdom of France in the first place, which has been cross-referenced with that of the Savoy and Medici envoys, and of the ambassadors of the Republic of Venice and the apostolic nuncios, as well as with the family correspondences. Finally, it is a question of determining the negotiating power and the margins of initiative of the Este lineage, a ducal house at the head of an independent Italian state but linked by feudal ties to the Empire and the Papacy, in the face of the indirect tutelage of Spain and the geopolitical disorder produced by the French Wars of Religion ; L'objectif de cette thèse de doctorat est d'étudier la qualité et l'évolution des relations entre le duc de Ferrare, Alphonse II d'Este, et la couronne de France, à partir du rétablissement de la paix en 1559 entre les Valois et les Habsbourg avec le traité de Cateau-Cambrésis (2-3 avril 1559) et au cours des vingt années suivantes, jusqu'en 1580. Cependant il ne s'agit pas d'une analyse visant à approfondir les relations entre le pouvoir ducal de Ferrare et la monarchie française d'un point de vue strictement diplomatique. J'ai plutôt préféré étudier les liens entre le duc de Ferrare et le royaume des Valois à travers le réseau familial dont le premier disposait de l'autre côté des Alpes, grâce à l'alliance matrimoniale signée entre les Este et les Guise en 1548, et qui en 1559 existait encore et fonctionnait pleinement. À partir du cadre européen issu du traité de Cateau-Cambrésis, nous voudrions éclairer les espoirs, le niveau d'autonomie, les oscillations et les modes d'action que la maison d'Este a mis en œuvre face à la prépondérance espagnole par ses liens avec le Royaume de France. À une approche à l'échelle internationale, nous joignons l'étude des effets sur le système d'équilibre et de la concurrence entre les Cours italiennes à travers le fil rouge de la querelle pour la préséance entre Este et Médicis. À travers les relations des Este avec la Couronne de France, nous essayons d'analyser non seulement la relation entre ces deux entités et le pouvoir contractuel réel du duc de Ferrare, mais aussi les équilibres et les influences d'autres dynasties italienne, telles que les Savoie et les Médicis, dans le même contexte. Cela se reflète également dans les sources qui constituent le cadre documentaire de ma thèse, c'est à dire les correspondances des agents des Este dans le royaume de France en premier lieu, qui ont été croisée avec celle des envoyés des Savoie et des Médicis, et des ambassadeurs de la République de Venise et des nonces apostoliques, et avec les correspondances familiales. Enfin, il s'agit de déterminer le pouvoir de négociation et les marges d'initiative de la ligné des Este, maison ducale à la tête d'un État italiens indépendants mais liés par des liens féodaux à l'Empire et à la Papauté, face à la tutelle indirecte de l'Espagne et au désordre géopolitique produit par les Guerres de Religion françaises. ; L'obiettivo di questa tesi di dottorato è quello di studiare la qualità e l'evoluzione delle relazioni che intercorsero tra il duca di Ferrara, Alfonso II d'Este, e la corona di Francia a partire dal ripristino della pace tra Valois e Asburgo con il trattato di Cateau-Cambrésis (2-3 aprile 1559) e nel corso dei vent'anni successivi, fino al 1580. Non si tratta, però, di un'analisi mirante ad approfondire le relazioni tra il ducato di Ferrara e la monarchia francese da un punto di vista strettamente diplomatico. Ho preferito, piuttosto, studiare i legami intercorrenti tra il duca di Ferrara e il regno dei Valois attraverso la rete familiare di cui il primo poteva disporre Oltralpe, grazie all'alleanza matrimoniale stretta tra gli Este e i Guise nel 1548, e che nel 1559 non solo esisteva ancora, ma era pienamente operativa. A partire dal quadro europeo sancito dal trattato di Cateau-Cambrésis, si sono tentante di chiarire le aspirazioni, il livello di autonomia, le oscillazioni e le modalità d'azione che caratterizzarono l'operato della casata degli Este alla luce dei suoi legami con il regno di Francia e dinanzi all'avanzare della preponderanza spagnola. A un approccio su scala internazionale, è stato incrociato uno studio degli effetti sul sistema di equilibrio e competizione esistente tra le corti principesche della penisola italiana, di cui la disputa per la precedenza tra Este e Medici, consumatasi anche alla corte dei Valois, fu uno dei più vividi esempi. Attraverso le relazioni degli Este con la corona di Francia, si è analizzata non solo le connessioni tra queste due entità e la consistenza del potere contrattuale reale del duca di Ferrara, ma anche gli equilibri e le influenze di altre dinastie italiane, come i Savoia e i Medici, nel medesimo conteso. Questo approccio si riflette anche sul corpus documentario su cui si è costruita la tesi, formato prevalentemente dalle corrispondenze degli agenti estensi nel regno di Francia, che sono state incrociate non solo con quelle degli ambasciatori sabaudi, medicei, veneziani e dei nunzi apostolici, ma anche con i carteggi familiari di origine estense e guisarda. Infine, si è trattato di determinare il potere di negoziazione e i margini di iniziativa della casata degli Este, lignaggio alla testa di uno Stato italiano indipendente ma legato da vincoli feudali tanto all'Impero quanto al Papato, dinanzi alla tutela indiretta esercitata dal regno di Spagna sulla penisola italiana e al disordine geopolitico prodotto dalle guerre di religione in Francia.

The purpose of the article is to study the roles of the prosecutor and the lawyer in reconciling between the victim and the suspect (accused) in Ukraine at the present time and to examine the possibility of increasing their participation in the reconciliation between the parties in the future. Reconciliation between victim and suspect (accused) in committing of a criminal offense as the centerpiece of the restorative justice in Ukraine today takes place outside of criminal proceedings, but it may have important substantive and procedural consequences in it. It can be considered as a mitigating circumstance in sentencing and even give rise to release the suspect (accused) from criminal liability. With the importance of reconciliation not only for the victim and the suspect, but also for the state, the question about scope of prosecutor`s powers as a procedural chief in criminal proceedings remains relevant. Such powers must be effective for facilitation such reconciliation, and at the same time they must prevent the unjustly avoidance of liability. It is also equally important to clarify the role of lawyers and the system of free secondary legal aid in restorative justice in Ukraine. The authors analyzed in the paper the normative regulation of the prosecutor's and the lawyer`s powers related to the reconciliation between the parties and the mechanism for the application of the restorative justice for its sufficiency and ability to provide the necessary mechanisms for implementing the provisions of the law. The authors found such gaps and differences in law regulation that hinder the development of conciliation practices in national criminal proceedings. The authors also examined the data of official state registers and revealed negative trends in the participation of the prosecutor in taking the procedural decisions based on the successful reconciliation between the victim and the suspect (accused). This gives reason to claim that the prosecutor's participation in reconciling between the victim and the suspect (accused) currently does not take into account neither the interests of the parties nor the state's interests in reducing the workload on the judicial and penitentiary systems and resolving other issues that accompany the existing punitive approach. In view of this, the authors proposes to make a number of changes to national legislation in order to eliminate those legal gaps that negatively affect the implementation of rules that guarantee the right to reconciliation and determine the admission of its positive results during making a final decision by court. In addition, the authors also emphasizes the necessity and practical feasibility of introducing a new model of the prosecutor`s participation in reconciling between the victim and suspect (accused) and giving him the right to initiate mediation with the consent of the parties. Such rules will also require the establishment of some additional provisions that will form a comprehensive implementation mechanism and serve as a guarantee of the interests of the victim and suspect (accused). As an example the authors used the rules of Criminal Procedure Act of the Republic of Slovenia. The authors also explored the main provisions and first results of The Pilot Project «Restorative Program for Juveniles Suspected of Committing a Criminal Offense». This project is the first attempt to expand the prosecutor's involvement in reconciling between the victim and the suspect (accused). The authors made conclusions about the real state of restorative justice in Ukraine at the present stage and the role of lawyers in it, taking into account the analysis of unique data collected from the Regional Centers for Free Secondary Legal Aid in Odesa, Mykolaiv and Kherson regions. ; Примирение потерпевшего и подозреваемого (обвиняемого) в совершении уголовного преступления как центральный элемент восстановительного правосудия в Украине сегодня происходит вне рамок уголовного производства, однако может иметь важные материально-правовые и процессуально-правовые последствия – от учитывания в качестве обстоятельства, которое смягчает наказание, до освобождения от уголовной ответственности. С учетом положительного значения примирения не только для потерпевшего и подозреваемого, но и для государства, важным вопросом остается то, какой объем полномочий прокурора как процессуального руководителя в уголовном производстве позволит эффективно способствовать достижению такого примирения, и, одновременно с этим, не будет представлять угрозу необоснованного избегания ответственности. Не менее важным является изучение вопроса о том, какую роль в восстановительном правосудии в Украине играют адвокаты и система оказания бесплатной вторичной пра- вовой помощи. Исходя из этого, целью работы является исследование ролей прокурора и адвоката в примирении потерпевшего с подозреваемым (обвиняемым) в Украине на современном этапе и определение возможности расширения границ их участия в примирении сторон в будущем. Анализ нормативного регулирования полномочий прокурора и адвоката, связанных с примирением сторон, механизма применения восстановительного правосудия, на предмет его достаточности и способности обеспечить необходимые механизмы реализации положений законодательства, свидетельствует о наличии таких пробелов и разногласий, которые сдерживают развитие практики проведения примирительных процедур в отечественном уголовном производстве. Авторами отмечается необходимость и практическая целесообразность внедрения новой модели участия прокурора в примирении потерпевшего и подозреваемого (обви- няемого) и наделении его правом инициировать проведение медиации с согласия сторон. В статье также рассматриваются основные положения и первые результаты Пилотного проекта «Программа восстановления для несовершеннолетних, которые являются подозреваемыми в совершении уголовного правонарушения», в рамках которого впервые была предпринята попытка расширить пределы участия прокурора в примирении потерпевшего с подозреваемым (обвиняемым). С учётом анализа уникальных данных, полученных от Региональных центров по оказанию бесплатной вторичной правовой помощи в Одесской, Николаевской и Херсонской областях, были сделаны выводы относительно реального состояния вос- становительного правосудия в Украине на современном этапе и роли адвокатов в нём. ; Примирення потерпілого та підозрюваного (обвинуваченого) у вчиненні кримінального правопорушення як центральний елемент відновного правосуддя на сьогодні в Україні відбувається поза межами кримінального провадження, проте може мати важливі матеріально-правові та процесуально-правові наслідки, – від врахування у якості обставини, яка пом'якшує покарання, до звільнення від кримінальної відповідальності. З урахуванням позитивного значення примирення не тільки для потерпілого та підозрюваного (обвинуваченого), але й для держави, важливим питанням лишається те, який обсяг повноважень прокурора як процесуального керівника у кримінальному провадженні дозволить ефективно сприяти досягненню такого примирення, та, одночасно із цим, не становитиме загрозу безпідставного уникнення відповідальності. Не менш важливим є з'ясування питання про те, яку роль у відновному правосудді в Україні відіграють адвокати та система надання безоплатної вторинної правової допомоги. З огляду на це, метою роботи є дослідження ролей прокурора та адвоката у примиренні потерпілого з підозрюваним (обвинуваченим) в Україні на сучасному етапі та визначення можливості розширення меж їх участі у примиренні сторін в майбутньому. Аналіз нормативного регулювання повноважень прокурора та адвоката, пов'язаних із примиренням сторін, механізму застосування відновного правосуддя, на предмет його достатності та здатності забезпечити необхідні механізми реалізації положень законодавства, свідчить про наявність таких прогалин та розбіжностей, які стримують розвиток практики проведення примирних процедур у вітчизняному кримінальному провадженні. Авторками наголошується на необхідності та практичній доцільності запровадження нової моделі участі прокурора у примиренні потерпілого та підозрюваного (обвинуваченого) та наділенні його правом ініціювати проведення медіації за згодою сторін. У статті також досліджуються основні положення та перші результати Пілотного проєкту «Програма відновлення для неповнолітніх, які є підозрюваними у вчиненні кримінального правопорушення», в якому вперше було вжито спробу розширити межі участі прокурора у примиренні потерпілого та підозрюваного (обвинуваченого). З урахуванням аналізу унікальних даних, зібраних від Регіональних центрів з надання безоплатної вторинної правової допомоги у Одеській, Миколаївській та Херсонській областях, зроблено висновки щодо реального стану відновного правосуддя в Україні на сучасному етапі та ролі адвокатів у ньому

Keywords: intellectual property right, codification, legislation, The Civil Code ofUkraine This scientific article examines the issue of the need to create aspecial code of intellectual property in Ukraine. For a full-fledged and objective study,an analysis was made of the history of Ukrainian legislation in the field of intellectualproperty, foreign models of legal regulation of intellectual property rights, especiallyEuropean legal experience, were also investigated. The author supports the positionregarding the creation in Ukraine of the Intellectual Property Code, the analogueof which exists in Italy and France. Based on the study of Ukrainian and foreign legalsystems, the author defines the main criteria for creating an intellectual propertycode: Legal and organizational criteria are defined. The author points out the need toimplement the European legislative practice, the jurisprudence of the EuropeanCourt of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union on judicialcases in the field of intellectual property into the code. This vector of implementationwill have a positive meaning for the adaptation of the Ukrainian legislative system toEuropean democratic standards in the field of legal regulation, legal protection of intellectualproperty rights. The author pays special attention to the need to harmonizethe intellectual property code with the Civil Code of Ukraine and procedural legislationin order to level the negative legal consequences in legal practice in the field ofintellectual property; also in the IP Code shall contain the following provision or requirements,which contained universal definitions of legal concepts in the field of intellectualproperty. Based on the conducted scientific analysis, the author points outthe need for the existence of the Ukrainian code of intellectual property and speciallaws in the field of intellectual property. It follows from this that there is a need forlegal regulation of individual legal relations (objects of law) in the field of intellectualproperty law. The author points out that such a legal system corresponds to the modelof legal regulation of the field of intellectual property that exists in the EuropeanUnion. ; Ключові слова: право інтелектуальної власності, кодифікація, законодавство,Цивільний кодекс України Стаття присвячена дослідженню правових та організаційних аспектів кодифікаціїукраїнського законодавства у сфері інтелектуальної власності. На підставі аналізуісторичного розвитку українського права інтелектуальної власності з наукових пози-цій, аналізу зарубіжних, у тому числі європейських, моделей правового регулюванняінтелектуальної власності визначено основні критерії кодифікації національногозаконодавства у сфері інтелектуальної власності. Вказано на доцільність запровад-ження в українську правову систему спеціального кодексу з інтелектуальної власно-сті, завданням якого буде правове регулювання означеної сфери. Посилання 1. Петрухин И. Л. Правосудие: время реформ. Москва : Наука, 1991. С. 207. 208 с. 2. Конституція України. Офіційний сайт Верховної Ради України. URL https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/254%D0%BA/96-%D0%B2%D1%80. 3. Про авторське право і суміжні права : Закон України. Офіційний сайт Верховної Ради України. URL : https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3792-12/print. 4. Про охорону прав на знаки для товарів і послуг : Закон України. Офіційний сайт Верховної Ради України. URL : https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3689-12/print. 5. Цивільний кодекс України. Офіційний сайт Верховної Ради України. URL: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/435-15/print. 6. Іващенок В. А. Розвиток законодавства з інтелектуальної власності в Україні у 2000-х рр. (історико-правовий аспект). Право та державне управління. 2017. № 4 (29). Том 1. С. 19–24. URL : http://www.pdu-journal.kpu.zp.ua/archive/4_2017/tom_1/6.pdf. 7. Шабалін А. В. Актуальні питання захисту права інтелектуальної власності: навчально-практичний посібник. Київ : НДІ ІВ НАПрН України. Київ : Інтерсервіс, 2020. 160 с. 8. Орлюк О. Сфера інтелектуальної власності як предмет правового регулювання: проблема конкуренції законів. Теорія і практика інтелектуальної власності. 2009. № 6 (50). С. 25–33. 9. Угода про асоціацію між Україною, з однієї сторони, та Європейським Союзом, Європейським співтовариством з атомної енергії і їхніми державами-членами. Офіційний сайт Верховної Ради України. URL : http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/984_011 (дата звернення: 26.01.2021). 10. Стефанчук Р. О. До питання про кодифікацію законодавства у сфері інтелектуальної власності. Право України. № 11/2016. С. 86–91. 11. Крижна В. Варіанти кодифікації законодавства у сфері інтелектуальної власності. Теорія і практика інтелектуальної власності. № 1. 2010. - С. 110–114. 12. Shabalin, A.V. and all The establishment and development of a system of protection of intellectual property rights in Europe and the USA. Asia Life Sciences. 2020. Issue 1. Pp. 21-38. URL : https://www.scopus.com/record/display.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85087558844&origin=resultslist (Shabalin, Andrii V. The establishment and development of a system of protection of intellectual property rights in Europe and the USA. Asia Life Sciences, 2020, (1), стр. 21-38. URL : https://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=57217735889). 13. 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La "crimmigration" nel sistema italiano: tra scelte di incriminazione e ricorso al trattenimento amministrativo. Il presente elaborato si pone l'obiettivo di studiare la criminalizzazione del fenomeno migratorio in Italia. In particolare, il lavoro verifica l'applicabilità al sistema giuridico italiano della cd. crimmigration, ossia di un fenomeno di sovrapposizione o intersezione tra diritto penale e diritto dell'immigrazione. Originariamente osservato e studiato negli Stati Uniti – dove, nel 2006, Juliet Stumpf ne ha coniato il nome – tale fenomeno si traduce, da un lato, in un inasprimento degli strumenti a disposizione degli Stati per la gestione dei flussi migratori irregolari e, dall'altro lato, in un progressivo orientarsi delle politiche migratorie in senso repressivo ed escludente. Seguendo le tre 'direttrici' in cui la dottrina in materia è solita articolare il fenomeno (ossia: l'uso della sanzione penale per punire condotte di violazione della normativa in tema di immigrazione, la previsione di conseguenze amministrative relative alla legittimità del soggiorno derivanti da condanne penali e il ricorso a misure privative o limitative della libertà personale di tipo) lo studio ricostruisce gli sviluppi normativi e giurisprudenziali in materia di contrasto all'immigrazione irregolare nel nostro Paese, constatando come l'approccio securitario delle politiche migratorie in cui si sostanzia la crimmigration sia ormai prevalente e costante nel tempo anche in Italia. Gli esiti della ricerca conducono a tre osservazioni. In primo luogo, a seguito della sentenza El Dridi della Corte di Giustizia del 2011 e delle stringenti indicazioni provenienti dal diritto dell'Unione europea, la criminalizzazione in senso stretto della migrazione irregolare risulta oggi una strada praticamente abbandonata dal legislatore. Alla previsione di reati ad hoc per lo straniero irregolare e all'uso della sanzione penale si stanno, infatti, sostituendo strumenti più agili ed efficaci come le misure amministrative tipiche della seconda direttrice. Accanto alle molteplici forme di espulsione, infatti, un numero sempre crescente e disomogeneo di reati, se commessi dallo straniero, incidono sulla sua permanenza in Italia o sul suo stesso ingresso, richiamando alla mente i contenuti della membership theory formulata oltreoceano. In secondo luogo, sembra invece affiorare una nuova direttrice di intervento repressivo (definita quale possibile 'quarta direttrice') che dispiega gli strumenti tipici dell'arsenale sanzionatorio penale nei confronti non più direttamente degli irregolari, ma di coloro che, anche a fini meramente solidaristici, ne supportano in qualsiasi modo il percorso migratorio. Rientrano in questa definizione, in particolare, le incriminazioni delle condotte di assistenza ai migranti contestate alle ONG attive nel Mediterraneo nelle forme del favoreggiamento ex art. 12 t.u.imm. nonché la recente (e poco longeva) incriminazione della violazione dei divieti di ingresso e sosta nel mare territoriale italiano, creati appositamente per contrastare l'attracco nei porti italiani delle navi delle ONG di ritorno da operazioni di salvataggio. In terzo luogo, in concomitanza con il progressivo abbandono della sanzione detentiva, hanno acquisito un ruolo sempre più centrale diverse forme di privazione amministrativa della libertà personale dei migranti irregolari (nei CPR, negli hotspot, nelle zone di transito degli aeroporti e, da ultimo, sulle navi-quarantena). Proprio dall'analisi della disciplina della detenzione amministrativa in Italia e delle molteplici criticità di questo strumento – che, come osservato dalla più autorevole dottrina in materia, con la pena detentiva presenta 'sinistre affinità' – emerge con chiarezza l'interferenza tra sostanza penale e forma amministrativa, confermando come oggi in Italia si stia facendo spazio un sistema ibrido, confinante con quello penale, che a questi si ispira nelle tecniche e negli strumenti senza al contempo importarne le garanzie, sacrificate in nome di esigenze di maggiore efficacia e speditezza nel contrasto all'immigrazione irregolare. ; The "crimmigration" in the Italian system: between choices of incrimination and the use of administrative detention. This paper aims to study the criminalization of the migratory phenomenon in Italy. In particular, the work verifies the applicability to the Italian legal system of the so-called crimmigration, i.e., a phenomenon of overlap or intersection between criminal law and immigration law. Originally observed and studied in the United States – where, in 2006, Juliet Stumpf coined the name – this phenomenon translates, on the one hand, into a tightening of the instruments available to States for the management of irregular migratory flows and, on the other hand, in a progressive orientation of migration policies in a repressive and excluding sense. Following the three 'guidelines' (direttrici) in which the doctrine on the subject usually articulates the phenomenon (i.e.: the use of criminal sanctions to punish conducts of violation of the legislation on immigration, the provision of administrative consequences relating to the legitimacy of the stay deriving from criminal convictions and the use of privative or restrictive measures of personal freedom) the study reconstructs the regulatory and jurisprudential developments in the field of contrasting irregular immigration in our country, noting how this securitarian approach is now prevalent also in Italy. The results of the research lead to three main observations. In the first place, following the El Dridi judgment of the European Court of Justice of 2011 and the stringent indications coming from European law, the criminalization 'in the strict sense' of irregular migration is today a path practically abandoned by the legislator. The provision of ad hoc crimes for irregular foreigners and the use of criminal sanctions are, in fact, being replaced by more agile and effective tools such as the administrative measures (typical of the second 'guideline'). Alongside the many forms of expulsion, in fact, an ever-increasing and uneven number of crimes, if committed by a foreigner, affect his stay in Italy or his own entry, recalling the contents of the 'membership theory' formulated overseas. Secondly, a new line of repressive intervention with the typical criminal tools seems to emerge (defined as a possible 'fourth guideline') against those who, even for pure solidarity purposes, support the aliens in their illegal migratory path. In particular, the definition includes the incrimination of the conduct of assistance of the NGOs active in the Mediterranean, both in the forms of aiding (pursuant to art. 12 t.u.imm.) as well as the recent (and short-lived) sanctions for violating the entry bans in the Italian territorial sea. Thirdly, in conjunction with the gradual abandonment of criminal detention, various forms of administrative deprivation of personal freedom of irregular migrants have acquired an increasingly central role (in the CPRs, in hotspots, in the transit areas of airports, and, lastly, on quarantine ships). Precisely from the analysis of the discipline of administrative detention in Italy and of the many criticalities of this instrument – which, as observed by the most authoritative doctrine on the subject, has 'sinister affinities' with the prison sentence – the paper shows the interference between criminal substance and administrative form, confirming how today in Italy a hybrid system is moving forward, next to the penal system and being inspired by its techniques and instruments but without importing its guarantees, sacrificed in the name of needs of greater effectiveness and speed in contrast to irregular immigration.