Suchergebnisse

Diese Arbeit widmet sich der Einflussnahme internationaler Organisationen innerhalb des internationalen Bildungsregimes auf Bildung in Österreich und das Individuum als lernendes Subjekt. Es sollen bildungspolitische, sowie bildungspraktische Veränderungen auf mehreren Ebenen aufgezeigt werden, die sich durch die internationale Zusammenarbeit im Bildungsbereich entwickelten und auch bis in das Verhältnis von Bildung, Öffentlichkeit und Demokratie in Österreich hineinwirken. Dabei wird speziell auf die Rolle und die Möglichkeiten der wesentlichen internationalen Organisationen, im österreichischen Kontext vor allem auf die EU und OECD und weniger direkt auf die UNESCO und Weltbank, eingegangen. Mit den Beispielen "Bologna-Prozess", "PISA und PIAAC" sowie der "Strategie Lebenslanges Lernen" wird gezeigt welche Steuerungsformen den internationalen Organisationen zur Verfügung stehen und wie sie in Österreich wirken. Mit der Analyse des lernenden Subjektes und der Gouvernementalität nach Foucault wird beleuchtet, wie der Einfluss der internationalen Organisationen bis in die Individuen hineinreicht. Die Ausweitung des Ökonomischen auf den Bildungsbereich, das universalisierte Bild von Bildung als Lösung für gesellschaftliche- und vor allem wirtschaftliche Probleme, sowie die starke Ausrichtung der Programme auf die Individuen, wird im Sinne eines emanzipatorischen Bildungsbegriffes dabei kritisch betrachtet. ; This work focuses on the influence of international organizations, within the international education regime, on education in Austria, and the individual as a learning subject. It is intended to highlight changes in educational policy and practice at several levels, which have developed through international cooperation in the area of education and which also have a significant influence on the conditional relationship of education, the public, and democracy in Austria. Particular attention will be paid to the role and the possibilities of the main international organizations in the Austrian context, especially the EU, the OECD, and less directly on the UNESCO and the World Bank. The examples "Bologna process", "PISA and PIAAC", and the "Lifelong learning strategy" show, which forms of control are available to international organizations and how they work in Austria. The analysis of the learning subject and the governmentality of Foucault argues how the influence of international organizations extends into the individuals. The expansion of the economic to the education sector, the universalized picture of education as a solution to social- and above all, economic problems, as well as the strong orientation of the programs to the individuals, is critically considered in the sense of an emancipatory concept of education. ; vorgelegt von Sandra Kremser ; Zusammenfassungen in Deutsch und Englisch ; Abweichender Titel laut Übersetzung des Verfassers/der Verfasserin ; Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz, Masterarbeit, 2017 ; (VLID)2275889

Apart from an extensive survey of the literature on the economics of corporate bankruptcy law, this thesis contains three own contributions: First, a model is presented where a firm's manager acquires some private information about whether a firm should be liquidated or stay in business. Providing the manager with suitable incentives to act in the investors' interest may be socially efficient, but not individually rational for the investors themselves. A second-best arrangement will be specified, and it will be shown how investors can be induced to implement it by means of an optimal bankruptcy code in the case where only standard financial contracts are available. The theory explains why bankruptcy law should, in some states of nature, let shareholders and senior creditors decide jointly, and provides a rationale for the existence of junior debt, which never enjoys any power of decision. Secondly, the topic of private debt workouts is taken up. It has often been argued that the coercive character of bond exchange offers leads to an inefficient liquidation policy, and that legal regulations are called for. In contrast to this claim, it will be argued here that such bondholder coercion will be anticipated when contracts are written out, so that the second-best arrangement will be obtained under any of the legal settings considered in the literature. Finally, there is a theoretical analysis and an empirical study of the incentives associated with Indian bankruptcy law, the key feature of which is that poorly performing firms are declared 'sick' and thereafter are run under governmental control. It is argued that governors have strong incentives to induce firms to choose a higher leverage by providing subsidized loans, because higher leverage increases the probability of financial distress, in which case the governor can implement his own conceptions of running the firm more easily. The model is applied to a data-set of some 2500 Indian manufacturing firms, and the basic model implications are confirmed.

Apart from an extensive survey of the literature on the economics of corporate bankruptcy law, this thesis contains three own contributions: First, a model is presented where a firm's manager acquires some private information about whether a firm should be liquidated or stay in business. Providing the manager with suitable incentives to act in the investors' interest may be socially efficient, but not individually rational for the investors themselves. A second-best arrangement will be specified, and it will be shown how investors can be induced to implement it by means of an optimal bankruptcy code in the case where only standard financial contracts are available. The theory explains why bankruptcy law should, in some states of nature, let shareholders and senior creditors decide jointly, and provides a rationale for the existence of junior debt, which never enjoys any power of decision. Secondly, the topic of private debt workouts is taken up. It has often been argued that the coercive character of bond exchange offers leads to an inefficient liquidation policy, and that legal regulations are called for. In contrast to this claim, it will be argued here that such bondholder coercion will be anticipated when contracts are written out, so that the second-best arrangement will be obtained under any of the legal settings considered in the literature. Finally, there is a theoretical analysis and an empirical study of the incentives associated with Indian bankruptcy law, the key feature of which is that poorly performing firms are declared 'sick' and thereafter are run under governmental control. It is argued that governors have strong incentives to induce firms to choose a higher leverage by providing subsidized loans, because higher leverage increases the probability of financial distress, in which case the governor can implement his own conceptions of running the firm more easily. The model is applied to a data-set of some 2500 Indian manufacturing firms, and the basic model implications are confirmed.