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The article contains the authors' reflections on the formation and substantiation of many aspects in soil science, concerning its connections with social sciences. Arguments about the exceptional importance of soil resources in the modern world and the importance of scientific research in soil science, which can become an important instrument of solving social problems, are found. It is shown that soil resources, being the basis of agricultural development, are the long-term capital through which different nations exist and develop. In order to maintain the normal living conditions of the population and to improve them, it is important to use this global resource wisely. The attitude of people to the soil is recognized as fundamental for nation's sustainable development and, moreover, the life expectancy of a civilization may depend on the people attitude to soils. In order to maintain collective well-being of people, a long-term interest of the society in soil protection needs to be reoriented – this should become a priority task for our civilization. The current state of soils can be a characteristic of the development of society as well as a criterion for assessing the activity of government and social stability in the country.

This paper draws some bold conclusions from modest premises. My topic is an old one, the Neohumean view of practical rationality. First, I show that this view consists of two independent claims, instrumentalism and subjectivism. Most critics run these together. Instrumentalism is entailed by many theories beyond Neohumeanism, viz., by any theory that says rational actions maximize something. Second, I give a new argument against instrumentalism, using simple counterexamples. This argument systematically undermines consequentialism and rational choice theory, I show, using detailed examples of their many social science applications. There is no obvious fix.

This volume offers selected papers exploring issues arising from scientific discovery in the social sciences. It features a range of disciplines including behavioural sciences, computer science, finance, and statistics with an emphasis on philosophy. The first of the three parts examines methods of social scientific discovery. Chapters investigate the nature of causal analysis, philosophical issues around scale development in behavioural science research, imagination in social scientific practice, and relationships between paradigms of inquiry and scientific fraud. The next part considers the practice of social science discovery. Chapters discuss the lack of genuine scientific discovery in finance where hypotheses concern the cheapness of securities, the logic of scientific discovery in macroeconomics, and the nature of that what discovery with the Solidarity movement as a case study. The final part covers formalising theories in social science. Chapters analyse the abstract model theory of institutions as a way of representing the structure of scientific theories, the semi-automatic generation of cognitive science theories, and computational process models in the social sciences. The volume offers a unique perspective on scientific discovery in the social sciences. It will engage scholars and students with a multidisciplinary interest in the philosophy of science and social science.

The extent to which modern social science continues to reflect the subjective traits of authors and the contexts in which they operate, rather than the objective facts or insights they claim to develop, remains one of the most striking features of social science research and writing. Kinloch and Mohan provide a multidisciplinary and worldwide examination of the ties between the subjective traits of social scientists, the contexts in which they affect research, and the kinds of knowledge they produce.||The essays fall into five general topic areas: major theoretical issues, research as ideology

Drawing on social identity theory and research on digital media and polarization, this study uses a quasi‐experimental design with a random sample (n = 3304) to provide causal evidence on perceptions of who is to blame for the initial spread of COVID‐19 in India. According blame to three different social and political entities—Tablighi Jamaat (a Muslim group), the Modi government, and migrant workers (a heterogeneous group)—are the dependent variables in three OLS regression models testing the effect of the no‐blame treatment, controlling for Facebook use, social identity (religion), vote in the 2019 national election, and other demographics. Results show respondents in the treatment group were more likely to allay blame, affective polarization (dislike for outgroup members) was social identity based, not partisan based, and Facebook/Instagram use was not significant. Congress and United Progressive Alliance voters in 2019 were less likely to blame the Modi government for the initial spread. Unlike extant research in western contexts, affective and political polarization appear to be distinct concepts in India where social identity complexity is important. This study of the first wave informs perceptions of blame in future waves, which are discussed in conclusion along with questions for future research.

It is argued that there can be no perceptible, continuous interchange between theory & practice, any more than there can be reduction of one to the other. Theory & practice are basically antithetical; one can lead to the other as a result of methodological dissociations that are just as frequently contrasting as complementary. These two autonomous poles are partly incommunicable & partly complementary; despite their conflicting relations, they are essential to each other, since theory not founded on practical experience would rapidly become ideological, & practice devoid of any theoretical basis would soon stagnate. The ways in which the human & practical sciences have contributed, over the last thirty years, to the prevailing domination supremacy of signs are delineated. Modified AA.