Suchergebnisse

Aus jugoslawischer Sicht

[SPA] El objetivo principal de esta tesis es desarrollar una propuesta ética e interactiva de gobernanza que permita la sostenibilidad de las comunidades de pescadores. Mediante la revisión de la literatura se han detectado seis problemas principales: la salud de las poblaciones de peces, las pérdidas económicas de la pesca, la justicia social, el empleo y su calidad, la seguridad alimentaria y la calidad de la gestión. Estos problemas suponen un reto para todos los actores sociales involucrados en el sector pesquero (agentes de gobierno, pescadores, empresas, científicos, ONGs, consumidores y comunidad) cuyas actuaciones tienen un impacto relevante en la conservación y mejora del sistema social y natural que forman la pesca. Por esta razón, en los últimos años se está produciendo un cambio en la ordenación de la actividad con el objetivo de que la triada Estado-Mercado-Sociedad Civil participe de forma equilibrada en los procesos y decisiones de gobierno desarrollados para reducir su vulnerabilidad. Dicho cambio sigue el paradigma de la gobernanza, que sustituye a la gestión tecnócrata y economicista tradicional para avanzar hacia un modelo más inclusivo, sensible, flexible y prudente que aporte soluciones responsables a la crisis de la pesca y aceptando los altos niveles de incertidumbre que genera la diversidad, complejidad y dinamismo inherentes a la misma. No obstante, existen diferentes estudios que muestran un conjunto de debilidades que impiden la transición desde el modelo de gestión tradicional hacia la gobernanza. Con el propósito de avanzar hacia la sostenibilidad de las comunidades de pescadores, en este estudio se articulan la teoría de la gobernanza interactiva con la dimensión ética de la pesca. De acuerdo con la literatura, el marco sigue una estructura formada por tres niveles (u órdenes) de toma de decisiones. El primer orden se centra en un contexto donde las personas y las organizaciones interactúan con el fin de identificar y resolver los problemas diarios de las comunidades de pescadores y crear oportunidades sociales. El segundo orden está relacionado con el desarrollo de las instituciones, con el fin de crear procesos que resuelvan los problemas de sostenibilidad de las comunidades de pescadores y de la pesca. Para terminar, desde el tercer orden (o meta-gobernanza) se aporta un fundamento ético a los procesos y actuaciones que forman la pesca mediante el estudio de las imágenes, valores y principios de buena gobernanza. Una vez desarrollado el marco teórico, el estudio empírico se ha centrado en el primer orden. Para ello, se ha utilizado el caso de estudio de la pesca en la Comunidad Autónoma de la Región de Murcia (CARM) y, particularmente, de las comunidades de pescadores del litoral del Campo de Cartagena. Siguiendo distintas fuentes de información y técnicas de análisis, el estudio tiene como fin aportar un conocimiento valioso para resolver los problemas existentes y desarrollar oportunidades sociales en esta área mediante tres niveles de análisis. En primer lugar, se realiza un estudio a nivel autonómico sobre la sostenibilidad de las comunidades de pescadores y se establecen unas prioridades de gestión para solucionar la problemática existente en el sistema a gobernar y de gobierno de la pesca en la CARM, así como de las interacciones entre ambos. Los resultados muestran la necesidad de avanzar hacia el paradigma de la gobernanza para aportar soluciones viables, equitativas y soportables que garanticen la sostenibilidad de la pesca a largo plazo. En segundo lugar, se lleva a cabo un estudio a nivel local sobre el estado de las comunidades de pescadores de Cartagena y San Pedro del Pinatar. En ambos casos de estudio se muestra como existen actividades, activos y capacidades de los pescadores que son vulnerables a los cambios que se están produciendo en la pesca y que requieren de medidas urgentes para garantizar la sostenibilidad de los medios de vida de los pescadores. Asimismo, se destaca la importancia de conservar y mejorar el bienestar sociocultural de los pescadores para mantener la cohesión de la comunidad y la viabilidad de las estrategias de pesca en las dos áreas estudiadas. Finalmente, se desarrolla un análisis comparativo para identificar las similitudes y disparidades existentes entre ambos casos de estudio y las modalidades de pesca. Dicho análisis indica una mayor vulnerabilidad en el área de Cartagena, existiendo en esta área una diversidad, complejidad y dinamismo mayor que en el área de San Pedro del Pinatar. Por lo tanto, ambos casos de estudio requieren de soluciones distintas para resolver sus problemas de sostenibilidad, aunque existen riesgos y amenazas comunes que pueden abordarse conjuntamente mediante una mayor cooperación entre sus pescadores e instituciones. Para terminar, la tesis presenta las principales conclusiones teóricas y empíricas alcanzadas. Asimismo, se identifican las principales limitaciones del estudio y se definen las futuras líneas de investigación a emprender. [ENG] The main objective of this thesis is to develop an ethical and interactive governance proposal that allows the sustainability of fishing communities. Previously, the main obstacles and threats to the sustainable development of fisheries are studied. Six main problems have been identified through the review of the literature: Health of the fish populations, economic losses, social justice, quality of employment, food safety and the quality of management. These problems represent a challenge for all the social actors involved in fishing (government agents, fishers, companies, scientists, NGOs, customer and community) whose actions have a relevant impact on the conservation and improvement the social and natural fishery system. In the last years, there is a change in management of fisheries that aim of the State-Market-Civil Society triad participating in the processes and decisions oriented to reduce their vulnerability. This change follows the paradigm of governance, which replaces the traditional technocratic and economistic management to a more inclusive, sensitive, flexible and prudent model that provides sustainable solutions to the fishing crisis and manage responsibly their diversity, complexity and dynamism. However, there are different studies that show a set of weaknesses that impede the transition from the traditional management to governance paradigm. With the purpose of advancing towards the sustainability of fishing communities, this study articulates the theory of interactive governance with the ethical dimension of fishing. Following the interactive governance literature, the framework follows a structure formed by three levels (or orders) of decision-making. The first order is focused in identify and solve the daily problems of fishing communities and create social opportunities on a context where people and organizations interact. The second order is related to institutional arrangements to develop processes that solve the sustainability problems of fishing. Finally, from the third order (or meta-governance), an ethical basis is provided to the processes and actions of governance than involved to all social actors through the study of images, values and principles of good governance. Once the theoretical framework has been developed, the empirical study has focused on the first order. We use the case study of fisheries in the Autonomous Community of the Region of Murcia (CARM) and, particularly, the fishing communities of the coast of Campo de Cartagena. Following different sources of information and analysis techniques, the study provide valuable information to solve sustainability problems and develop social opportunities in this area through three levels of analysis. Firstly, an autonomous analysis to the sustainability about fishing communities is developed and management priorities are established to solve the existing problems in the system to govern and government system, as well as the interactions between both. The results show the need to move towards the paradigm of governance to provide viable, equitable and supportable solutions to stimulate the sustainability of fishing in the long term. Second, a study is focused at the local level and asses the state of the fishing communities of Cartagena and San Pedro del Pinatar. In both cases of study are identified vulnerable activities, assets and capacities to the changes in the activity and that require urgent measures to achieve the sustainability of fishers´ livelihoods. In addition, the study shows the importance of preserve and improve the sociocultural wellbeing to improve the sustainability of fishing communities. Finally, a comparative analysis is developed to identify the similarities and disparities between the two case studies. This analysis indicates a greater vulnerability in the area of Cartagena compared to San Pedro del Pinatar. Therefore, both case studies require different solutions to solve their sustainability problems, although there are common risks and threats that can be solved together through greater cooperation between fishers and institutions. In the last chapter, the thesis presents the main theoretical and empirical conclusions reached. Likewise, the limitations of the study and the future lines of research are defined. ; Escuela Internacional de Doctorado de la Universidad Politécnica de Cartagena ; Universidad Politécnica de Cartagena ; Programa de Doctorado Interuniversitario en Ciencias Económicas, Empresariales y Jurídicas

Die vorliegende Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit Edelmetallarbeiten, die aus skythischen Bestattungen des nördlichen Schwarzmeergebiets stammen. Ausgangspunkt für die Untersuchungen bilden die Funde aus dem Solocha-Kurgan, der in den Jahren 1912/13 von dem russischen Archäologen N.I. Veselovskij ausgegraben wurde. Nach einem einleitenden Kapitel zur allgemeinen Forschungsgeschichte der sogenannten graeco-skythischen Toreutik wird im zweiten Kapitel der Solocha-Kurgan vorgestellt. Von den beiden Katakombengräbern, die Veselovskij öffnete, datiert die zentrale Bestattung in die Zeit um 400 v. Chr., das Seitengrab um 370 v. Chr. Aufgrund der Beraubung der zentralen Bestattung steht vor allem die reiche Beigabenausstattung der ungestörten seitlichen Katakombe im Vordergrund der Betrachtung. In Einzeluntersuchungen werden die Edelmetallarbeiten – der berühmte Kamm, Gefäße und Prunkwaffen - zunächst im Kontext ihrer jeweiligen Gattung betrachtet. Hierfür werden die Stücke jeder Gattung vorgestellt und das jeweilige Objekt aus dem Solocha-Kurgan vor diesem Hintergrund diskutiert. Zur Veranschaulichung dienen tabellarische Zusammenstellungen von Gefäßausstattungen und Prunkwaffen in skythischen Bestattungen des 5. – 4. Jhs. v. Chr. Die Gesamtbetrachtung zeigt, dass sich einige der Edelmetallfunde aus dem Solocha-Kurgan gut in die allgemeine Entwicklung der Edelmetallbeigaben in skythischen Bestattungen einfügen. Dazu gehören die importierten Silbergefäße, die mit Appliken versehenen Holzschalen sowie das Trinkhorn aus der seitlichen Katakombe. Auch der dort gefundene Prunkakinakes besitzt Vorgänger im skythischen Material. Ein Novum hinsichtlich Form und Dekor stellen dagegen der berühmte Goldkamm, die kugeligen Silberflaschen, die Silberschalen mit den segmentförmigen Griffen sowie der großformatige Silberbeschlag des Goryts aus der Seitenbestattung dar. Obwohl sie teilweise an frühere Formen anknüpfen, stellen sie eigenständige Gestaltungen dar. Aufgrund figürlicher Darstellungen im Stil des sogenannten ethnographischen Realismus können einige Stücke enger zusammengeschlossen werden und sind wohl als Erzeugnisse einer einzelnen Auftragsarbeit zu deuten. Aufgrund der fehlenden Vorläufer ist es eher unwahrscheinlich, dass diese Arbeiten von einem Skythen in Auftrag gegeben werden konnten. Die anfangs noch geringe Anzahl derartiger Objekte spricht darüber hinaus auch gegen eine Interpretation als Handelsware. Da analog zur Verbreitung der späteren Erzeugnisse graeco-skythischer Toreutik von einer Fertigung im Bosporanischen Reich - am ehesten in Pantikapaion - ausgegangen werden kann, scheint folgende Erklärung am plausibelsten: Die Prunkobjekte aus dem Solocha-Kurgan stellen "politische" Geschenke dar, die der bosporanische Herrscher Leukon I. (389/88-349/48 v. Chr.) in Auftrag gab und an einen skythischen Verbündeten übermittelte. Dementsprechend wären die in den Darstellungen gegeneinander kämpfenden Skythen als Verbündete und Gegner des Bosporanischen Reiches zu erklären. Als Grundlage für die Bearbeitung der einzelnen toreutischen Werke dient ein ausführlich kommentierter Katalog der Fundkomplexe, aus denen die Objekte stammen. Hierbei gibt der Bestattungszeitraum einen ersten Anhaltspunkt für die Datierung der Edelmetallarbeiten, weiter können aus ihrer Lage innerhalb der Bestattung und der Vergesellschaftung mit anderen Fundstücken Rückschlüsse auf ihre Funktion gezogen werden. Daneben wurde für die einzelnen Gegenstände ein Objektkatalog getrennt nach Gattungen angelegt, in dem der Aufbewahrungsort sowie Maße, Datierung, Beschreibung und Literatur angegeben sind. ; Scythian Gold in greek style : Studies on northpontic toreutics based on the vessels and armament from the Solokha-Kurgan The thesis deals with gold and silver objects which were found in Scythian kurgans of the northern Black Sea region. In the focus stand the finds from the Solokha Kurgan which was excavated in 1912/13 by the Russian archaeologist N.I. Veselovskij. An introductory chapter deals with the history of research on the so called Graeco-Scythian toreutics, the Solokha Kurgan is presented in the second chapter. Under the burial mound Veselovskij opened two catacomb graves; the central burial is dated to the end of the 5 th century BC, the second grave in the south west part of the kurgan to about 370 BC. Because the central tomb was almost entirely robbed, the attention is directed particularly on the rich grave goods from the undisturbed lateral catacomb. In individual studies the different objects - the different vessels, the well known comb and the decorative weapons – are first seen in the context of their respective genres (chap. 2-4). For this purpose, the pieces for each genre are described in chronological order and the particular object from the Solokha Kurgan is discussed against this background. Tabular compilations illustrate the equipment of Scythian burials of the 5th and 4th century BC with vessels and weapons made of precious metals. The overall analysis shows that some of the finds from the Solokha Kurgan fit well into the general development of precious grave goods in Scythian burials. This refers to the imported silver vessels, the wooden bowls with gold appliques and the drinking horn from the side catacomb. Also the akinakes which was found there has predecessors in Scythian finds. However, a novelty in form and decoration represent the gold comb, the spherical silver bottles, the silver bowls with the segment-shaped handles and the large-sized silver overlay of the gorytos from the side funeral. Although these things are linked in part to earlier scythian forms, they represent new created designs. Some of the pieces can be grouped together because of their figural representations in the style of the so-called ethnographic realism; probably they have to be interpreted as the products of a single commission. Due to the lack of precursors, it is unlikely that these pieces were ordered by a Scythian noble. The initially small number of such objects also speaks against an interpretation as normal trade goods. By analogy with the spread of the somewhat later objects of Graeco-Scythian toreutics a production in the Bosporan kingdom - most likely in Pantikapaion - can be expected. So the following explanation seems to be most plausible: The precious metal objects from the Solokha-Kurgan probably were "political" gifts which Leukon I., the ruler of the Bosporan kingdom from 389/88 to 349/48 BC commissioned and gave to a Scythian ally. Accordingly, the fighting Scythians of the battle scenes of the comb and the gorytos overlay are to be interpreted as allies and opponents of the Bosporan Kingdom. As basis for the study serves a detailed annotated catalogue of scythian burial mounds from which the objects originated. The funeral date gives a first hint at the dating of the objects of precious metals; their position within the burials and the combination with other finds provide clues to their function. In a second catalogue the gold and silver objects are described with measurements, dating, and literature. (Translation: A. Wieland/G. Wahl) ; Or scythe dans un style grec : Recherches sur la toreutique des régions du Pont-Euxin septentrional: les offrandes funéraires du kourgane de Solokha Cette étude aborde les oeuvres en métal précieux provenant des sépultures scythes du littoral nord de la Mer Noire. Les trouvailles du kourgane de Solokha, qui fut fouillé en 1912-13 par l'archéologue russe N.I. Veselovskij, en constituent le point de départ. L'introduction dresse l'état de la recherche dans le domaine de la toreutique « gréco-scythe ». Elle est suivie d'un chapitre présentant le kourgane de Solokha dont deux tombes furent mises au jour par Veselovskij : la sépulture principale, située au milieu du kourgane et datée des environs de 400 av. J.- C., et la sépulture latérale, datée vers 370 av. J.-C. C'est le riche mobilier métallique de la seconde sépulture - trouvée intacte, contrairement à la première qui était violée- qui est ici présenté en détail. Les objets en métal précieux du kourgane de Solokha – le fameux peigne, la vaisselle et les armes d'apparat – sont étudiés au sein de leurs catégories typologiques. Confrontée aux pièces du même genre qui sont également discutées, chaque oeuvre est ainsi placée dans son contexte typologique. La présentation est complétée par des tableaux synthétiques regroupant les vases et les armes d'apparat accompagnant des sépultures scythes des Ve et IVe siècles av. J.-C. Cette vue d'ensemble montre que certains parmi les objets en métal précieux du kourgane de Solokha s'insèrent bien dans l'évolution générale des offrandes funéraires luxueuses trouvées dans des sépultures scythes : la vaisselle d'argent importée, les vases à boire en bois décorés d'appliques ainsi que le rhyton de la tombe latérale en font partie tout comme l'akinakès précieux de la même sépulture, qui a des antécédents au sein du matériel scythe. En revanche, le célèbre peigne d'or et les objets en argent, tels les vases à panse sphérique, les coupes à anses arrondies et le grand revêtement de goryte de la tombe latérale sont nouveaux autant pour leur forme que pour leur décor. Tout en restant en partie rattachées à des formes antérieures, ces oeuvres témoignent d'un caractère original. En raison de leurs compositions figurées dans un style connu sous le nom de « réalisme ethnographique », certaines oeuvres peuvent être regroupées dans un ensemble restreint et doivent être issues d'une seule commande. Cependant, l'absence d'antécédents rend leur association avec un commanditaire scythe peu probable. Par ailleurs, le nombre à l'origine limité de ce type d'objets empêche de les interpréter comme des produits de commerce. Au contraire, la large diffusion des plus récentes créations de la toreutique « gréco-scythe » laisse présumer une fabrication locale, dans le royaume du Bosphore – plus probablement à Pantikapaion. Ainsi, l'hypothèse suivante semble la plus plausible pour expliquer ce phénomène : les oeuvres luxueuses du kourgane de Solokha représenteraient des cadeaux diplomatiques que le roi du Bosphore Leukon Ier (389/88-349/48 av. J.-C.) aurait commandités afin de les offrir à un de ses alliés scythes. A cet égard, les Scythes en combat figurant dans les scènes représentées devraient être interprétés comme des alliés et des ennemis du royaume du Bosphore. Le recensement des sépultures et des ensembles funéraires sous forme de catalogue commenté est fourni à l'appui des arguments avancés au sujet du mobilier toreutique. Ainsi, les datations proposées pour une sépulture livrent un premier indice pour la datation des objets en métal précieux qui l'accompagnaient, tandis que leur emplacement à l'intérieur de la tombe tout comme leur relation aux autres offrandes permettent de mieux cerner leur fonction. Un second catalogue regroupe les objets classés par genre avec les informations sur le lieu de leur conservation, leurs dimensions, la datation, la description et la bibliographie. (Traduction : K. Charatzopoulou)

The Situation In The Middle East Letter Dated 1 February 2018 From The Secretary-General Addressed To The President Of The Security Council (S/2018/84) ; United Nations S/PV.8174 Security Council Seventy-third year 8174th meeting Monday, 5 February 2018, 10 a.m. New York Provisional President: Mr. Alotaibi. . (Kuwait) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Llorentty Solíz China. . Mr. Wu Haitao Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue Equatorial Guinea. . Mr. Ndong Mba Ethiopia. . Mr. Alemu France. . Mr. Delattre Kazakhstan. . Mr. Umarov Netherlands. . Mr. Van Oosterom Peru. . Mr. Meza-Cuadra Poland. . Ms. Wronecka Russian Federation. . Mr. Nebenzia Sweden . Mr. Skoog United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Mr. Allen United States of America. . Mrs. Haley Agenda The situation in the Middle East Letter dated 1 February 2018 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/84) This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-03099 (E) *1803099* S/PV.8174 The situation in the Middle East 05/02/2018 2/17 18-03099 The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m. Expression of thanks to the outgoing President The President (spoke in Arabic): As this is the first public meeting of the Security Council for the month of February, I should like to take this opportunity to pay tribute, on behalf of the Council, to His Excellency Ambassador Kairat Umarov, Permanent Representative of Kazakhstan, for his service as President of the Council for the month of January. I am sure I speak for all members of the Council in expressing deep appreciation to Ambassador Umarov and his team for the great diplomatic skill with which they conducted the Council's business last month. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. The situation in the Middle East Letter dated 1 February 2018 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/84) The President (spoke in Arabic): In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, to participate in this meeting. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2018/84, which contains the text of a letter dated 1 February 2018 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council. I now give the floor to Ms. Nakamitsu. Ms. Nakamitsu: I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity to brief the Security Council once again on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013), on the elimination of the Syrian Arab Republic's chemical-weapons programme. I remain in regular contact with the Director- General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to discuss matters related to this issue; I spoke to him last week. In addition, I met with the Chargé d'affaires of the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations this past Friday. At the time of my previous briefing, planning was under way with regard to the destruction of the remaining two stationary above-ground facilities of the 27 declared by the Syrian Arab Republic. I am informed that the OPCW, working with the United Nations Office for Project Services, is currently at the stage of finalizing a contract with a private company to carry out the destruction, which I understand could be completed within two months. There have been some developments on the issues related to Syria's initial declaration and subsequent amendments. The translation and analysis of documents that were provided to the OPCW by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic in November have been completed. The OPCW has indicated that this information provided clarifications on some issues. However, the OPCW is continuing to follow up with the Government of Syria on the remaining gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies. The Director- General will submit a report in that regard to the next session of the OPCW Executive Council, which will take place in March. Further to its routine inspections in Syria, samples taken by the OPCW team during its second inspection at the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre are currently being analysed by two OPCW-designated laboratories. The Executive Council will be informed of the results of the inspection via a separate note from the Director-General to the next session of the Executive Council. The OPCW Fact-finding Mission continues to look into all allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Syria, the majority of which involve the use of toxic chemicals, such a chlorine, in areas not under the control of the Government. The Fact-finding Mission expects to submit a report on the allegations very soon. In addition, another Fact-finding Mission team has been looking into allegations of the use of chemical weapons brought to the attention of the OPCW by the Government of Syria. At the time of our previous briefing, a Fact-finding Mission team was in Damascus, at the invitation of the Government, to look into several of those allegations. I am informed that a report in that regard is also pending. 05/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8174 18-03099 3/17 There is still work to do before resolution 2118 (2013) can be considered to have been fully implemented, and for the international community to have shared confidence that the chemical-weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic has been fully eliminated. Moreover, allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Syria have continued, including just this past weekend in the town of Saraqeb. That makes abundantly clear our continuing and collective responsibility to ensure that those responsible are held to account. New reports by the Fact-finding Mission are pending. Should they conclude that there has been the use, or likely use, of chemical weapons in any of those alleged incidents, our obligation to enact a meaningful response will be further intensified. It is my hope, and the hope of the Secretary-General, that such a response will favour unity, not impunity. As always, the Office for Disarmament Affairs stands ready to provide whatever support and assistance it can. The President (spoke in Arabic): I thank Ms. Nakamitsu for her briefing. I shall now give the floor to those Council members who wish to make statements. Mrs. Haley (United States of America): The news out of Syria this morning is following a troubling pattern. There are reports of yet another chemical-weapon attack on Sunday. Victims of what appears to be chlorine gas are pouring into hospitals. Few things have horrified my country and the world as much as the Al-Assad regime's use of chemical weapons against its people. The Security Council has been outspoken on ending Syria's use of chemical weapons, and yet they continue. Under the Chemical Weapons Convention and resolution 2118 (2013), the Al-Assad regime's obligations are clear: it must immediately stop using all chemical weapons. It must address the gaps and inconsistencies in its Chemical Weapons Convention declaration. And it must destroy all of its remaining chemical weapons under the supervision of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). These are worthy goals. These are urgent goals. Yet we spent much of last year in the Council watching one country protect the Al-Assad regime's use of chemical weapons by refusing to hold them responsible. What do the American people see? What do people of all countries see? They see a Council that cannot agree to take action, even after the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, created by the Council, found that the Al-Assad regime used chemical weapons. Now we have reports that the Al-Assad regime has used chlorine gas against its people multiple times in recent weeks, including just yesterday. There is obvious evidence from dozens of victims, and therefore we proposed a draft press statement by the Security Council condemning these attacks. So far, Russia has delayed the adoption of the draft statement — a simple condemnation of Syrian children being suffocated by chlorine gas. I hope Russia takes the appropriate step to adopt the draft text, thus showing that the Council is unified in condemning chemical-weapon attacks. Accountability is a fundamental principle, but it is just the first step. Our goal must be to end the use of these evil, unjustifiable weapons. When actions have consequences — when perpetrators are identified and punished — we come closer to reaching our goal. But if we cannot even take the first step of establishing accountability for the use of chemical weapons, we have to seriously ask ourselves why we are here. The requirements for establishing accountability for the use of chemical weapons have not changed since the Council voted unanimously to create the Joint Investigative Mechanism, in 2015. They have not changed since Russia acted alone to kill the Mechanism last year. Such a mechanism must be independent and impartial. It must be free of politics. It must be controlled by experts, not politicians or diplomats. And it must be definitive. The latest Russian draft resolution does not meet any of those criteria. Russia's draft resolution completely ignores the findings of the Joint Investigative Mechanism, which was an investigation that Russia supported until the investigators found the Al-Assad regime to be responsible. That should already be enough to make us sceptical. However, there are other deep problems. For their new investigation, Russia wants to be able to cherry-pick the investigators. It wants to insert unnecessary and arbitrary investigative standards. And it wants the Security Council to be able to review all the findings of this investigation and decide what makes it into the final report. That is not an impartial mechanism; it is a way to whitewash the findings of the last investigation that Russia desperately wants to bury. No one should believe that the draft resolution is a good basis for discussion, when it is designed to undermine our core principles on chemical weapons. We cannot S/PV.8174 The situation in the Middle East 05/02/2018 4/17 18-03099 hope to end the use of chemical weapons if those who use them escape the consequences of their actions. Therefore, while we regret the need for its creation, we applaud the efforts of France to launch the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons. That is yet another way to hold accountable the Al-Assad regime and any group that uses chemical weapons. The United States has also announced that we will contribute to the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011. The United States strongly supports the Mechanism as a valuable tool to hold the Al-Assad regime accountable for its atrocities, including its repeated and ongoing use of chemical weapons. It is a true tragedy that Russia has sent us back to square one in the effort to end the use of chemical weapons in Syria. But we will not cease in our efforts to know the truth of the Al-Assad regime — and ensure that the truth is known and acted on by the international community. That is why we hosted all 15 members of the Council at the United States Holocaust Museum last week. The exhibit was called "Syria: Please Don't Forget Us". All of us saw undeniable evidence of the Al-Assad regime's atrocities and human rights violations. We cannot, and should not, forget the Syrian people. The United States will not forget them. While the Council has not yet been able to act to provide real accountability for the use of chemical weapons in Syria, the United States will not give up on the responsibility to do so. That is the sincere wish of the American people, and I know that it is shared by many on the Council. We are not motivated by score-settling, payback or power politics. We are motivated by the urgent need to end the unique and horrible suffering that chemical weapons have inflicted on innocent men, women and children in Syria. The Syrian people are counting on us. Mr. Allen (United Kingdom): I would like to thank High Representative Nakamitsu for her briefing. We are holding this meeting in the open Chamber today after reports of a series of chemical attacks in eastern Ghouta within the past month, as the Al-Assad regime continues its merciless bombing and killing of civilians. Over the weekend, there were further allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Idlib, as well as air strikes by pro-regime forces that reportedly hit three hospitals, leaving doctors scrambling to remove premature babies from their incubators in order to move them. I cannot say that they were moving them to safety, because the reality is that for the citizens of Idlib and eastern Ghouta, nowhere is safe. We are appalled by this violence and the reports of deliberate targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure, and we call on all parties to the conflict to uphold international humanitarian law and protect civilians. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is already investigating reports of the use of chemical weapons in recent weeks, but establishing who is responsible for that use will be much more difficult, because Russia has vetoed the continuation of the independent, expert OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) three times, in order to protect the Al-Assad regime. We would welcome any serious attempt to re-establish a properly independent investigative and attribution mechanism for continuing the JIM's meticulous work. Sadly, we do not yet see that in the Russian proposal. Any successor investigation must be empowered to investigate all use of chemical weapons, whoever the perpetrator may be. Yet the Russian proposal focuses only on non-State actors. We have repeatedly condemned Da'esh for its use of chemical weapons, which the JIM clearly reported. But given Al-Assad's track record of chemical-weapon use and its failure to comply with the Chemical Weapons Convention, it is imperative to ensure that any new mechanism also investigates the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime. A second objection is the proposal that experts would merely gather evidence, leaving the Council to decide what it meant. No other United Nations expert panel that I know of is specifically prohibited from reaching conclusions and reporting to the Council on its findings on what has happened. We are not specialists on chemical weapons around this table. We rely on independent, United Nations-selected expert panels. The entire purpose of the JIM was that an independent panel would reach conclusions on the basis of the evidence, taking the issue out of the hands of us, the Member States and Council members, because we have been unable to agree. Russia's proposal looks as if it is designed to avoid the political embarrassment of having to use its veto power to defend the indefensible when independent bodies report on what has truly happened. The underlying intent seems to be to ensure that there are no clear conclusions in future reports. 05/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8174 18-03099 5/17 Thirdly, we object to the proposal's demands that the standard of proof should be beyond reasonable doubt. That standard has not been used in any other comparable past or current United Nations investigation. It is used in relation to criminal prosecutions in courts of law, which have significantly greater investigative powers and independence than those envisaged in Russia's text. Finally, the proposal insists on site visits, despite the explicit provision in the Chemical Weapons Convention for other ways to gather relevant evidence, recognizing the difficulty of safe and timely visits. There is no scientific basis for this proposal. It is simply an attempt to hamstring future investigations and discredit the JIM. Of course, Russia made much of the lack of a site visit to Khan Shaykhun, despite the fact that the Al-Assad regime handed over to the United Nations samples from the site that contained chemical signatures unique to regime sarin, obviating the need for such a visit. It is for those reasons that the current text is unacceptable. The JIM set a high standard of impartiality and expertise. We expect that standard from any future mechanism. The Syrian regime, of course, claims not to have used chemical weapons. Yet over the years two separate reports from the JIM, under separate leadership panels, drawing on a broad range of respected independent international experts, concluded that the regime had used chlorine at least three times — in Talmenes in April 2014 and in Sarmin and Qmenas in March 2015 — and had used sarin to attack Khan Shaykhun in April 2017. We should also remember the infamous attack in eastern Ghouta in August 2013, when a separate United Nations investigation found that sarin was used to kill hundreds and injure thousands. That attack brought near-universal international condemnation, and following our concerted international pressure, Syria joined the Chemical Weapons Convention. Syria promised, as it was legally obliged to do, to destroy and abandon its chemical-weapon programme. Yet it has been unable to satisfy inspectors that it has done so. We have to ask ourselves why that is. In 2013 Russia promised to act as a guarantor for the Al-Assad regime's compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention. Yet month after month we all sit here and hear that Al-Assad has not done so. Why does Russia not compel the Syrian regime to comply with its obligations and make it impossible for it to use chemical weapons? Tragically, for the people of Syria, the regime continues to use chemical weapons with impunity. If it is confirmed that Al-Assad has again used chemical weapons on his own people, it would not only be another entry in the catalogue of his war crimes, it would also be another attack on us all, Members of the United Nations who have worked for decades — in the words of the Chemical Weapons Convention, for the sake of all mankind — to completely exclude the possibility of the use of chemical weapons. Throughout history, our peoples have said "never again" — among others, starting with the First World War battlefields, in Ethiopia, in Manchuria and in Saddam Hussein's attacks on Iran and on Iraqi Kurds. Let us, the members of the Council, stand up for the peoples of the United Nations, determined that such abhorrent chemical weapons should never be used. Let us stand up for the people of Syria and give them a real investigation into those responsible for the use of chemical weapons — an investigation that pursues justice for the horrific crimes committed against them. Let us signal our determination to pursue accountability by all means available, even if one member of the Security Council is currently preventing us from taking action here. Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): I would first like to congratulate Kuwait through you, Mr. President, on the start of its presidency of the Security Council. You can rely on France's support in the month to come. I would also like to thank Izumi Nakamitsu for her usual very informative briefing. This is the second time we have met in less than two weeks after reports of four new cases of the use of chlorine against Syria's civilian population, some of them in Idlib province, which is a de-escalation zone. We are examining the information that is available and waiting for the conclusions of the investigative mechanism, but the reality is that resorting to toxic substances as weapons has never ended in Syria. I would like to remind the Council that the Syrian regime has already been identified as the perpetrator in four such cases, one of which involved the use of sarin, in violation of international humanitarian law and the obligations that Syria assumed when it acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention. The challenges go beyond the Syrian issue. A century after the end of the First World War, in which mustard gas was used on a massive scale against civilians, what we are seeing is shocking. These weapons, which we had thought were a thing of the past, are once again being used methodically and systematically by the Syrian regime against its own people. Furthermore, there is a real threat of such S/PV.8174 The situation in the Middle East 05/02/2018 6/17 18-03099 weapons falling into the hands of terrorists. The threat is all the greater given the fact that the dismantling of the Syrian chemical-weapon programme remains at a deadlock. The cooperation of the Syrian regime with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has for months taken place in a piecemeal manner, and suspicions remain about the status of Syrian stockpiles. I would recall that OPCW expert teams have repeatedly found at Syrian sites indicators of undeclared substances, without any convincing explanation being provided by the country. Given that chemical weapons continue to be used, it seems that Syria has lied and maintained clandestine capacities. The situation is aggravating regional instability, undermining the non-proliferation regime and weakening the international security architecture, as well as jeopardizing the security of each of our States. It represents a violation of the law and flouts the most fundamental principles of humanity. The international community cannot downplay the situation and allow the perpetrators of these heinous crimes to remain unpunished. It is the responsibility of the Security Council to prevent this; it is our shared responsibility. The criminals who chose to design and use these barbaric weapons must be punished. At stake is the future of our collective security system; no one can be allowed to undermine its foundations without facing consequences. The hindrances and obstructions facing the international community's initiatives within existing bodies contribute to promoting impunity, and this we cannot accept. For that reason, France launched in Paris an open, pragmatic partnership that brings together States that reject impunity for individuals involved in chemical-weapon attacks or in the development of chemical-weapon programmes. It brings together all the States concerned about the threat of erosion of the non-proliferation regime and of strategic stability. It was designed to support all international bodies and investigative mechanisms in their efforts. This universal partnership applies to all instances of the use of such weapons throughout the world by all perpetrators, be they State or non-State actors. The partnership is open, and States that embrace these principles are invited to join. Like everyone else here, we hope that a mechanism for the identification of those responsible will be recreated as soon as possible. However, any sincere and credible effort to that end must align with the basic standards of independence, impartiality and professionalism that underpinned the Joint Investigative Mechanism, as the very reason for the establishment of such a regime is to determine the truth. Within the Council, France will be very vigilant with respect to the principles listed and will not accept a lesser mechanism. Impunity in Syria is not an option. The perpetrators of all of the crimes committed in Syria will be held accountable, sooner or later. The International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism for Syria, which we support, is a part of that process. That is the only way to ensure lasting peace in Syria, and this can come about only in the framework of an inclusive political solution in Geneva, in line with resolution 2254 (2015), which more than ever before represents our shared compass. The repeated use of chemical weapons in Syria has been proved. We cannot turn a blind eye to this, for no one can now say that they did not know. Denial or hypocrisy, or a combination of of the two, cannot be presented as a strategy. The persistent use of chemical weapons in Syria represents a violation of the universal conscience as well as the most fundamental principles of international law. It also poses a potentially lethal threat to the sustainability of the international non-proliferation regime, which is the most comprehensive and successful of all of the international non-proliferation regimes. To allow it to be undermined without any response would be to accept the erosion of the entire international regime for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction that we have built together, stone by stone, over the course of decades and which constitutes the very backbone of the international security architecture as well as one of the paramount gains of multilateralism. On behalf of France, I call on all members of the Security Council to shift their attitudes and adjust their focus. The heavy responsibility that we all bear requires that we join together and take action. Mr. Llorenty Solíz (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): My delegation wishes to congratulate you once again, Sir, as well as the Permanent Mission of Kuwait, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of February. We are also grateful for the briefing provided by the Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu. We also 05/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8174 18-03099 7/17 wish to acknowledge the letter sent by the Secretary- General (S/2018/84) concerning the periodic report of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Bolivia believes that there can be no justification for the use of chemical weapons, regardless of circumstances and by whomsoever committed, as such use is a serious violation of international law and poses a grave threat to international peace and security. We therefore categorically condemn the use of chemical weapons or substances as weapons, as we deem this an unjustifiable and criminal act, wherever, whenever and by whomsoever committed. In that context, we express our grave concern about the ongoing reports of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, especially in eastern Ghouta. If that is confirmed, the Council should remain united in order to ensure that the perpetrators are held accountable and brought to justice, so that there is no impunity for their actions. We commend the coordination between the OPCW and the United Nations Office for Project Services in all of the arrangements aimed at making possible the destruction of the two remaining facilities as well as the preparedness of the Syrian Government to achieve this end. We call on the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to cooperate with the OPCW on this initiative, as well as during the second inspection of the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre. We encourage the Fact-finding Mission to continue its investigation so that, in accordance with its mandate, it can investigate, in the most objective, methodical and technical manner, reports of the use of chemicals weapons on Syrian territory. In that regard, we highlight the latest visit to the city of Damascus during January, and we will await the results thereof. We call on all parties involved to cooperate fully as well as to provide viable and reliable information, so that an effective investigation of all of the ongoing cases can be conducted as soon as possible. Concerned about the reports of the use of chemical weapons, we deem it essential to establish as soon as possible an independent, impartial and representative mechanism to carry out a full, reliable and conclusive investigation of the cases referred by the Fact-finding Mission that will make it possible to identify those responsible for such acts. Nevertheless, if we want to create a new, transparent accountability mechanism, we have the major challenge and the responsibility of not instrumentalizing the Security Council for political ends. In that vein, we view the Russian proposal as a new and positive opportunity to reach this goal. We therefore call on the members of the Council to commit themselves to a process of purposeful negotiation, and we echo the words of the Secretary-General in his letter transmitting the current report, calling on the Security Council to demonstrate unity on this issue, which is so vital for the international community. Finally, we reiterate that the only option for resolving the conflict in Syria and prevent more people from becoming victims is through an inclusive political transition led by and benefiting the Syrian people that respects their sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. Mr. Umarov (Kazakhstan): Since this is the first public meeting of the Security Council for the month of February, I would like to congratulate the delegation of Kuwait on the commencement of its presidency and wish it great success in implementing its ambitious programme of work. I am grateful to High Representative Nakamitsu for her informative briefing. Our position on this issue remains unchanged. We strongly condemn any use of chemical weapons and advocate that such threats must be eliminated in the future. We firmly believe that there must be accountability for perpetrators of such crimes. Today I would like to concentrate on three major points. First, we support the work of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), as reflected in its fifty-second report (S/2018/84, annex). The speedy destruction, probably in two months, of the remaining chemical-weapon production facilities and resolving all outstanding issues relating to the declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic are of the utmost importance. That would help to dispel all existing doubts on many principal issues and to comprehend the real situation in the country. It is commendable that, during the inspection of Barzah and Jamrayah, all samples were sealed, packaged and shipped to OPCW's laboratory and were received there in the presence of the representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic, observing all established rules. We look forward to the follow-up to the OPCW's work, and we will also await the results S/PV.8174 The situation in the Middle East 05/02/2018 8/17 18-03099 of a thorough analysis of the documents submitted by Syria by the Declaration Assessment Team. Secondly, the continuing reports on the alleged use of chemical weapons in Syria are extremely alarming. But the most alarming fact is that the Council has not yet restored its investigative potential to properly respond to such cases. I recall the words of the Secretary-General, who pointed to the serious gap that had arisen at the end of the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, which leaves one with the feeling that impunity will continue without any strict monitoring. Thirdly, and lastly, considering the current developments, it is also most critical that a new mechanism be established as soon as possible. We here in the Council are not experts on chemical weapons — neither to judge or blame anyone — but must act on the basis of credible evidence provided to us by an independent, impartial and representative investigative body we can all trust. In that regard, we support the ongoing consultations on creating a new investigative instrument, in order to prevent any further use of chemical weapons and to bring perpetrators to justice. We are ready to participate actively and contribute to the earliest revival and ultimate realization of our investigative potential. Mr. Meza-Cuadra (Peru) (spoke in Spanish): We join others in congratulating your delegation, Sir, on having assumed the presidency of the Security Council for the month of February. We support you in discharging your tasks, which we are sure you will do in full. We welcome the holding of this meeting and thank Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu for her valuable briefing on this topic. Peru condemns the use of chemical weapons by any actor, in any place and under any circumstance. Their use against the civilian population in Syria is a war crime and a flagrant violation of international law, international humanitarian law and the non-proliferation regimes. In that regard, Peru believes it is essential for the international community, and in particular the Security Council, to remain resolute and united in its support for the non-proliferation regime and in ensuring that those responsible for these atrocious crimes — which are also threats to international peace and security — be held accountable. We must continue to demand that the Syrian Government fulfil its commitment to cooperate with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the elimination of all of its chemical weapons. We take note of some recent progress, such as the imminent destruction of the last two declared chemical-weapon production facilities, as verified preliminarily by the OPCW last November, and the allocation of new financial resources to that end. Nevertheless, we are concerned that key points of the Syrian Government's declaration have yet to be verified, more than four years after its accession to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. We hope that the 19 recently translated documents that were provided to the OPCW will help rectify errors and omissions and clear up discrepancies. We reaffirm our commitment and support to the OPCW, whose Executive Council Peru is honoured to be a member of. In the face of new reports of chemical-weapon attacks in eastern Ghouta and Idlib, Peru expresses its solidarity with the victims and reiterates the urgent need to identify and bring to justice the perpetrators of such atrocities. Like a majority of Council members, we believe that accountability is essential to safeguarding the international non-proliferation regimes. Preventing this threat requires a credible deterrent. With that goal in mind, we believe it is urgent to establish an attributive mechanism with the highest standards of professionalism, objectivity, transparency and, primarily, independence in order to fill the gap left by the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism. My delegation will continue to work constructively to create a new mechanism that addresses the legitimate concerns of all Council members and of the international community. Mr. Skoog (Sweden): I also want to congratulate you, Mr. President, on assuming the presidency of the Security Council for the month of February. I also thank Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu for her briefing today. In recent weeks there have been new, alarming reports of alleged chemical-weapon attacks in Syria. The most recent allegation was this weekend in Idlib. These reported attacks must be immediately investigated by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Fact-finding Mission, to which we offer our full and unreserved support. We reiterate our strongest condemnation of the use of chemical weapons. It is a serious violation 05/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8174 18-03099 9/17 of international law and it constitutes a threat to international peace and security. Their use in armed conflict amounts to a war crime. Perpetrators of such crimes must be held accountable. We cannot accept impunity. That is why Sweden joined the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons, initiated by France. As a member of the Security Council and of the OPCW Executive Council, we support all international efforts to combat the use and proliferation of chemical weapons by State and non-State actors alike anywhere in the world. We count on this initiative to complement and support our collective work in multilateral forums, as well as the existing multilateral mechanisms to achieve unity around those important goals. That also includes the Human Rights Council's Commission of Inquiry and the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism, both of which have important mandates in collecting information. I again thank High Representative Nakamitsu for her briefing today. She reminded us that work remains on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013). The outstanding issues relating to Syria's initial declaration must be resolved without further delay. We again call upon the Syrian authorities to fully cooperate with the OPCW in that regard. As the Secretary-General has stated, the continuing allegations highlight yet again our shared obligation to identify and hold to account those responsible for the use chemical weapons on Syria. We need to heed his call, come together and act. That is why Sweden has engaged in the negotiations on establishing a new independent and impartial attributive mechanism. The Council has a responsibility to protect the international disarmament and non-proliferation regimes and for ensuring accountability. Negotiations need to be in good faith, but with the objective of establishing a truly independent, impartial and effective mechanism for accountability. Ms. Wronecka (Poland) (spoke in Arabic): I would like to take this opportunity to wish the delegation of Kuwait every success in implementing the programme of work for this month. (spoke in English) Let me thank High Representative Izumi Nakamitsu for her informative briefing. We appreciate the ongoing work of the Technical Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the Fact-finding Mission. We welcome the cooperation between the secretariat and the United Nations Office for Project Services, which facilitated the destruction of the two remaining chemical-weapon production facilities. We look forward to the results of the analysis by the Declaration Assessment Team of a set of documents and declarations submitted by Syria. Chemical weapons continue to pose a threat to the people of Syria. Repeated allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Syria, including the recent ones, serve to underline the fact that there is still a challenge to international peace and security, as well as to the credibility of the Chemical Weapons Convention regime. In that context, there is a genuine need for a clear message that impunity for perpetrators is not an option. We have clearly stated in various forums that the use of chemical weapons by anyone — State and non-State actors alike — anywhere and under any circumstances must be rigorously condemned and those responsible for such acts must be held accountable. We agree that the Security Council needs to take steps in order to establish a credible, professional and independent investigative mechanism. We have therefore engaged in the discussions to find the best solution for the future mechanism. I would like to focus on three points. First, Poland has supported the work of the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) and continues to support the establishment of an independent and credible investigative mechanism aimed at holding accountable the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. However, a future mechanism will not operate in a void. The instrument must build on the Joint Investigative Mechanism. Not only should it build on the significant achievements of the JIM, but its mandate must not deviate from resolution 2235 (2015). Secondly, the mandate of the mechanism should be balanced. There is a need to identify not only the individuals, entities and groups but also the Governments responsible for any use of chemicals as weapons. Thirdly, one of the most important elements of the mandate must be to ensure that the mechanism is independent in its proceedings and conclusions and S/PV.8174 The situation in the Middle East 05/02/2018 10/17 18-03099 free from the pressure of political verification of its conclusions by the Council. Mr. Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): Allow me once again to congratulate you, Mr. President, and the State of Kuwait on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of February. I wish you every success and assure you of our full support. Allow me also to express my congratulations and appreciation to Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, and her team for the presentation of the comprehensive and detailed briefing on the current political and humanitarian situation with regard to chemical weapons in Syria. The political — and in particular the humanitarian — crisis in Syria is reaching alarming proportions. The Republic of Equatorial Guinea expresses its solidarity with the families of the countless victims, as well as with the thousands of displaced people trapped by the hostilities and the more than 13 million people who currently need humanitarian assistance as a result of the continuing conflict. I would like to take this opportunity to condemn the loss of numerous civilian lives in this conflict, and I call on all parties to comply with international law on the protection of civilians and to distinguish between military and civilian objectives and refrain from firing rocket launchers into populated areas, as is being reported in eastern Ghouta. Equatorial Guinea can only express its satisfaction at the destruction of almost all the chemical-weapon production facilities declared by the Syrian Arab Republic thanks to the technical assistance of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). However, while we welcome the cooperation between the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the OPCW, it is necessary to be vigilant and to continue to condemn in the strongest terms any possible use, development, acquisition or manufacture of chemical weapons in the country or transfers of such weapons to other States or non-State actors. In that regard, we vigorously condemn the recent use of toxic chemical weapons by whomsoever. The perpetrators of such horrendous acts must be brought to justice and sentenced appropriately. For seven years already, Syria has been a war scenario that crystallizes internal, regional and, even, international divisions. The primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security bestowed upon the Security Council by the Charter of the United Nations should lead the 15 member countries of this principal organ of the United Nations to overcome their differences regarding the situation in Syria and to renounce their political and strategic interests in favour of the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people to achieve well-being and prosperity. In that regard, it is appropriate that, as Russia has already proposed, another mechanism be established to replace the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism so that it can carry out the necessary investigations on the use of chemical weapons in Syria and thereby arrive at a result that garners consensus among the members of the Council in order to again unify our criteria for an objective examination of the situation. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): At the outset, I would like to congratulate you, Mr. President, at the beginning of your presidency of the Security Council for the month of February. I wish you every success. We also thank Ms. Nakamitsu for her briefing. We trust that, with the assistance of the United Nations Office for Project Services and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the two remaining above-ground Syrian chemical-weapon facilities will be promptly destroyed. The Syrian side has repeatedly demonstrated its interest in that. The pending issues related to the initial declarations should be dealt with as part of the dialogue between the OPCW and the Syrian Government. We welcome such cooperation, by which Syria, as a conscientious party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, provides the necessary assistance, complies with its obligations and facilitates access to the relevant documents. Many people have raised false issues that should now be closed and put aside. Syria's chemical-weapon capacity was destroyed under the oversight of the OPCW. However, it seems that there are some who wish to contrive to fan the flames on the issue. The Syrians have provided exhaustive explanations. However, issues are being raised and questions are being asked in a endless cycle. The Syrian side consistently reports to the international community, including the Security Council, about the detection of toxic chemical substances in areas liberated from the terrorists. There 05/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8174 18-03099 11/17 are reports from Syria about possible provocations that may be used by representatives of foreign intelligence services. All such reports must be investigated immediately by the experts of the OPCW. However, we note that, in general, tremendous efforts are necessary for The Hague to duly respond to the important message. There are numerous pretexts being put forward not to travel there and decisions are being delayed. In the light of last year's story of Khan Shaykhun and the Shayrat air base, such conduct suggests deliberate sabotage. However, the statements today have left us with the impression that it is not Syria that some delegations are interested in. The United States and the United Kingdom have used today's meeting to slander Russia, and it is quite clear why that is happening. Someone cannot tolerate the success of the Syrian National Dialogue Congress in Sochi and the prospects it offers for injecting new momentum into the political process in Syria. That requires launching a major campaign of slander against Russia in order to try, not for the first time, to cast doubt on Russia's role in the Syrian political settlement. As always, the statements of these representatives contain a grain of truth mixed with mountains of lies. Russia has never contested the use of sarin in Khan Shaykhun. But who it was used by is still a mystery, because the absurd conclusions of the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) have not convinced us. In the past few days there has been general uproar about alleged incidents involving the use of chlorine in some Damascus suburbs. There has already been talk of the use of sarin. Where? When? By whom? The outlines of this propaganda campaign are not new. The terrorists, through the social associations that are closely linked to them, foremost among them the notorious White Helmets, spread rumours via social networks. These are instantly picked up by the Western press, and then we get representatives speechifying in the Security Council, making unproved accusations about the so-called Syrian regime and spreading slander about Russia. I have said it before and I will say it again: has anyone thought to ask the basic question as to why the Syrian Government needs to use chemical weapons? What do we suppose that could do for it? The first thing we should do, and various speakers today, particularly the representative of Sweden, have discussed this, is to send an OPCW fact-finding mission to those areas to investigate. Where is the presumption of innocence? The speakers are blaming the so-called regime for everything in advance, before any investigation. What do they want an independent investigative mechanism for? Surely at least they know that an investigation has to precede any conclusions. But apparently they do not need one. In my opinion, it should be completely clear to everyone that that the capitals that these representatives represent in the Council have absolutely no interest in any investigation. They do not need facts or precise evidence. They need to see a political order carried out. On 23 January, Russia announced the launch in the Security Council of expert efforts to draft a resolution establishing a new investigative entity for incidents involving the use of chemical weapons to replace the defunct OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, which was killed by the United States and its allies when they blocked the draft resolution (S/2017/968) that we proposed, together with China and Bolivia, designed to ensure that the Mechanism could be genuinely independent and professional. Not only do they not recall that episode, they have made strenuous attempts to convince the Security Council and the world community of the opposite. It has become clear that some of our partners are not prepared to consider this possibility. They want a second JIM that would continue to rubber-stamp the scientifically and technically ridiculous anti-Damascus conclusions on the basis of disinformation generously supplied by militant groups. They have long had a persistent allergy to the pressing need to pay close attention to the activities of terrorist groups, both in Syria and beyond its borders, in the context of manipulating toxic substances. In the realization that we will not allow the now entirely discredited JIM to be revived, Syria's opponents are now attempting to take alternative routes, cobbling together narrow groups of like-minded people. However, they are forgetting that in doing that they are undermining the authority of international bodies, particularly the United Nations and the OPCW, and destroying the international architecture on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Any initiatives in the context of the use of chemical weapons that circumvent the OPCW would be illegitimate. We certainly hope that the leadership of the United Nations Secretariat and the OPCW Technical Secretariat will make a firm show of will and distance themselves from such dubious projects. S/PV.8174 The situation in the Middle East 05/02/2018 12/17 18-03099 We are ready to accept a press statement on the Syrian chemical issue, but not the one proposed by its sponsors, because in its current form its purpose is quite clearly to blame the Government of Syria for what is so far the unproved use of chemical weapons. Somehow the draft statement does not say anything about the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, but the reference to Article 7 of the Charter of the United Nations leaves no doubt as to its essence. We cannot accept any still unconfirmed references to the use of chemical weapons without a credible investigation, nor can we accept any threats to a sovereign State for unproved actions. For some reason, eastern Ghouta has been dragged into the statement. I would like to remind the Council that last week we were prepared to accept an agreed-on draft presidential statement on the humanitarian situation in Syria. But our partners preferred to reject it. We are ready to accept a press statement, but not as it is proposed by our colleagues. We have proposed amendments to it that we are ready to circulate and agree on in that form. Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue (Côte d'Ivoire) (spoke in French): I would like to congratulate Kuwait through you, Mr. President, on its accession to the presidency of the Security Council for the month of February, to wish it every success and assure it of Côte d'Ivoire's cooperation. I would also like to thank Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, for her excellent briefing. My delegation commends the work of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons through its Fact-finding Mission with regard to the dismantling of Syria's chemical-weapon stocks. We encourage the Syrian Government to comply with decisions regarding the destruction of its chemical arsenal. My delegation is seriously concerned about the reports in the past week once again alleging the possible use of chemical weapons in the conflict in Syria, particularly in eastern Ghouta, where 21 cases of suffocation have been reported. They represent a significant reversal in our efforts to combat impunity with regard to the use of chemical weapons in Syria. The suffering inflicted on the Syrian people is intolerable and must be ended. In that regard, my country calls for continued efforts to implement resolution 2118 (2013), which provides for the complete dismantling of the Syrian chemical-weapons arsenal. These new allegations of the use of chemical weapons once again call into question the Council's responsibility, particularly in terms of putting an end to these acts as soon as possible and of clearly identifying the perpetrators of such criminal acts. In its latest statement on the issue of chemical weapons in Syria (see S/PV.8164), my delegation warned against the Council's failure to act, which could be interpreted by those involved in the use of such weapons in Syria as a weakness of this organ and licence to act with impunity. Clearly, those who commit these despicable acts will continue to do so as long as the Council remains divided about the need to set up a consensus-based framework capable of identifying perpetrators and bringing them to justice. My delegation therefore encourages all ongoing initiatives that support the establishment of an accountability mechanism acceptable to all. In conclusion, Côte d'Ivoire reiterates its strong condemnation of the use of chemical weapons in Syria and calls upon the relevant United Nations mechanisms to shed light on the new allegations of the use of such weapons. My delegation eagerly awaits the conclusions of the report that will be submitted after the second round of inspections conducted at the Scientific Studies and Research Centre in Syria. Mr. Wu Haitao (China) (spoke in Chinese): China congratulates Kuwait on assuming the presidency of the Security Council for the current month. We also commend Kazakhstan for its accomplishments during its presidency last month. I wish to thank the High Representative Nakamitsu for her briefing. China welcomes the progress achieved in the verification and destruction of the two remaining chemical-weapon facilities within Syria's borders. We support the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in continuing its coordination and cooperation with the Syrian Government so as to properly settle all the questions revolving around the initial declarations of chemical weapons by Syria through the OPCW platform. China expresses its deepest sympathy to the Syrian people for their suffering as the result of chemical weapons. No use of chemical weapons will be tolerated. Lately, there have been some media reports of suspected use of chlorine and other poisonous chemicals as weapons within Syria's borders, over which China wishes to register its deepest concern. It is hoped that 05/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8174 18-03099 13/17 the parties will carry out verification of the related incidents as soon as possible. When it comes to the question of chemical weapons, China's position is as clear cut as it is consistent. We stand firmly against the use of chemical weapons by any country, organization or individual for whatever purpose and under any circumstances. China supports conducting comprehensive, objective and impartial investigations into any alleged use of chemical weapons within Syrian borders so as to come up with results that withstand the test of time, square with the facts and help bring the perpetrators to justice. Establishing a new chemical-weapon investigative mechanism is critical to getting to the bottom of the chemical-weapon incidents as well as warding off any future recurrences in Syria. All Council parties should work together to that end. China supports the efforts on the part of Russia to promote the establishment of a new investigative mechanism into the use of chemical weapons in Syria. We hope that the members of the Council will continue to engage in constructive consultations so as to achieve consensus at an early date. The chemical-weapon issue in Syria is closely related to a political settlement to the Syrian situation. Major achievements have been made at the Syrian National Dialogue Congress, held recently in Sochi, which played a positive role in advancing the Syrian political process, while lending impetus to relaunching the Geneva talks. It is China's hope that relevant parties will support the Security Council and the OPCW in continuing to act as the main channel for tackling the Syrian chemical-weapon issue, adopt a constructive attitude, seek proper solutions through consultation, maintain the unity of the Council and work with the United Nations and with the relevant parties in advancing the political process in Syria. Mr. Van Oosterom (Netherlands): As this is the first time that I take the floor under the Kuwaiti presidency of the Security Council, I would like to congratulate and honour Kuwait's assumption of the presidency by trying to offer my thanks in Arabic: (spoke in Arabic) Thank you, Mr. President. (spoke in English) I would also like to thank Ms. Nakamitsu for her comprehensive and clear briefing. I will address three issues today: first, reports of the renewed use of chemical weapons in Syria; secondly, the need for accountability; and, thirdly, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) report at hand (S/2018/84, annex). With respect to the renewed use of chemical weapons in the past weeks, the Kingdom of the Netherlands is shocked at the recent reports of chemical attacks in Syria, including this weekend and last night. We are outraged. In Douma, in eastern Ghouta, and last night in Saraqeb, in Idlib, innocent civilians, including children, have become victims once again of horrible chemical-weapon attacks. Such attacks deserve the strongest condemnation of the Security Council as violations of international law. Furthermore, recent OPCW laboratory tests show that samples of the chemical attack on Ghouta in August 2013 correspond to the chemical-weapons arsenal declared by the Syrian regime in 2014 and the Khan Shaykun attack in 2017. This confirms once again that the Al-Assad regime uses chemical weapons against its own population. We pay tribute to the work of the White Helmets, who have saved more a 100,000 civilians from the rubble of the Syrian war. The use of chemical weapons should never go unpunished. Impunity erodes the important prohibition against the use of chemical weapons. It is inconceivable that impunity now reigns, which brings me to my second point, namely, the need for accountability. As others have said, we had a well-functioning and professional mechanism to ensure accountability for the use of chemical weapons in Syria, the Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM). The JIM repeatedly determined the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime and by Da'esh. It had a strong mandate to investigate and identify perpetrators independently from the politics of the Security Council. And it did so accordingly, but the renewal of its mandate fell victim to the repeated use of the veto. However, that does not mean that we now need to settle for less. The Kingdom of the Netherlands is prepared to work together on any proposal that strengthens accountability and the international rule of law. But let me emphasize that a weak accountability mechanism is not an option. For us, the fundamental characteristics of any accountability mechanism are the principles of impartiality, independence, comprehensiveness and effectiveness. S/PV.8174 The situation in the Middle East 05/02/2018 14/17 18-03099 In order to uphold those principles, a mechanism should at least meet the following requirements. First, it should operate independently from the Security Council, including when it comes to the attribution of guilt. It should be impartial. The separation of powers is necessary to prevent undue politicization. Secondly, the mechanism should be effective; it should independently decide how it will conduct its investigations, including when it comes to analysing facts and assessing the quality of evidence. Lastly, it should be comprehensive and investigate and identify perpetrators among all parties to the armed conflict — both State and non-State actors. The draft resolution that is currently being discussed has not yet met those important principles. That brings me to my third point, namely, the fifty-second OPCW report (S/2018/84, annex), which the High Representative presented very clearly in her briefing. The report points out that, unfortunately, too little progress has been made by the Syrian authorities in addressing the outstanding questions that the OPCW posed about the declaration of the Syrian authorities. It is essential that the Syrian authorities cooperate seriously with the OPCW. The Kingdom of the Netherlands supports the continuation of the work of OPCW Fact-finding Mission. We call on all States to ensure that the Fact-finding Mission can continue its work independently. In conclusion, we stand ready to adopt the draft press statement, as circulated before. We are convinced that the Security Council cannot allow the continued use of chemical weapons to go unpunished. Impunity is a curse; accountability is a must. The Council has to act. As long as the Council is blocked from achieving accountability by the use of the veto, we will also continue our efforts outside the Council. We therefore strongly support other accountability initiatives for Syria, such as the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism for the Syrian Arab Republic and the Human Rights Council's Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic. We also support the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons, which was just highlighted by our French colleague. However, let me repeat what I have said in the Chamber before, the Council should refer the situation in Syria, especially the mass atrocities committed in the conflict, to the International Criminal Court in The Hague. Mr. Alemu (Ethiopia): We are very pleased to see you, Mr. President, assuming responsibility for the presidency. I wish to thank High Representative Izumi Nakamitsu for her briefing, which, as always, we found to be balanced, and therefore useful. We are in need of that kind of approach. Frankly speaking, we need that very desperately. During times such as this, when we seem to be so deeply divided, the role of United Nations officials like her becomes all the more critical. We thank her. We remain deeply concerned by the continued reports on the use of chemical weapons in Syria. We strongly condemn the use of chemical weapons by any actor, State and non-State alike, in Syria or anywhere else. As we have stated repeatedly, the use of chemical weapons is totally unjustifiable under any circumstances. It constitutes a threat to international peace and security and undermines the international non-proliferation architecture. We cannot agree more with what the Secretary-General stated in the concluding paragraph of his letter of 1 February: "The fact of these continuing allegations again highlights the shared obligation to identify and hold to account those responsible for the use of chemical weapons." That is why the unity of the Council is absolutely important. Without it, the Council's ability to respond to grave threats to international peace and security, such as the use of chemicals as weapons, will be seriously hampered. In that regard, what High Representative Nakamitsu said a while ago is most relevant: "unity, not impunity". Let me say that we regret that the Council was not able to renew the mandate of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism. If we are not able to address this institutional gap by drawing lessons from last year and forge the necessary unity and compromise, we will be sending the wrong message and encouraging impunity. The fact that chemical-weapon attacks have continued as recently as yesterday worries us very much. That is why it is so critical that we seek an independent way of establishing accountability. We appreciate the initiative taken by the Russian Federation to propose a draft resolution on the establishment of a new mechanism, which has been the basis for discussion in recent days. This is a conversation that we welcome. As we continue to discuss this very important matter, our consultations should be constructive and forward-looking. Of course, 05/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8174 18-03099 15/17 we are not naive; we have no illusions about how matters are becoming more and more complicated by the day. However, we still hope that the Council will restore its unity to reach common ground and create an independent, impartial and professional mechanism that will be able to identify those responsible for the use of chemical weapons in Syria, based on robust evidence. We welcome that the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has continued to assist the Syrian Government in destroying the remaining stationary above-ground facilities. As the High Representative stated, we hope the facilities will be totally eliminated in the coming month. We have just heard a very encouraging statement from the High Representative. We note that the OPCW has translated and finalized its analysis of the 19 documents submitted by the Syrian Government. While we look forward to the final report, we encourage continued cooperation and meaningful communication between the Syrian Government and the OPCW that leads to tangible results to address the outstanding issues. We also note that its Fact-finding Mission has continued its investigation related to allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. We look forward to its reports. Let me conclude by again reiterating, at the risk of sounding naive, how the unity of the Council is vital to ensuring accountability and deterring and stopping the use of chemical weapons in Syria and elsewhere. We only hope that the challenge we face in this area is not a reflection of the growing lack of trust that characterizes international relations today, making joint action in most critical areas more complicated than it should be. The President (spoke in Arabic): I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of Kuwait. At the outset, I would like to thank the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, for the briefing she gave at the beginning of this meeting. We had hoped that the Security Council's unanimous adoption of resolution 2118 (2013), in September 2013 following the first incident involving the use of chemical weapons in Syria, would have resolved this matter, since the Council had demonstrated unity and determination in confronting that crime with a view to ensuring that it not be repeated and that its perpetrators be held accountable. Consequently, we regret the substantial regression in addressing the chemical-weapon issue in Syria, which is a result of the divisions among Council members after the Council was unable to extend the mandate of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism in Syria, which we feel carried out its tasks in a very professional, impartial and independent manner. We express our deep concern about the allegations of the continued use of chemical weapons in Syria, most recently during the attack in Douma, in eastern Ghouta, last week and during the attack that took place in Saraqeb, in Idlib, yesterday. This is the third such attack during the past few weeks, which means that the perpetrators of those crimes will go unpunished and that there is no guarantee that they, or anyone else, who commits such crimes in the future will be held accountable, after we lost the Joint Investigative Mechanism. The position of the State of Kuwait is a principled and steadfast one that strongly condemns any use of chemical weapons, wherever, whenever and by whomsoever, as this is considered a grave violation of international law. We reiterate the need to hold accountable those responsible for such use, be they individuals, entities, non-State groups or Governments. In that context, we condemn the use of heavy and destructive weapons as well as the targeting civilians and residential areas killing dozens of innocent victims. These weapons target health facilities and civilian locations in eastern Ghouta, Idlib and other areas. We therefore support the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism for Syria in its quest to gather evidence and investigate the crimes committed against civilians in order to hold the perpetrators accountable. The State of Kuwait will support any alternative or mechanism that enjoys the consensus of all members of the Security Council and ensures the independence, neutrality and professionalism of any new future mechanism. In that regard, we reaffirm that the primary responsibility of any mechanism must be to determine the identity of those using chemical weapons in Syria, provided that the Security Council would then play its role and hold the perpetrators accountable, in implementation of the principle of ending impunity and of resolution 2118 (2013), which undoubtedly stipulates the imperative need for, and importance of, holding accountable those responsible for the use of chemical S/PV.8174 The situation in the Middle East 05/02/2018 16/17 18-03099 weapons in Syria. We also look forward to receiving the report that will soon be submitted by the Fact-finding Mission, as mentioned by Ms. Nakamitsu in her earlier briefing on the most recent incidents, as well as her reports on the use of chlorine gas in Saraqib. In conclusion, we reiterate our full readiness to take part in any efforts that are aimed at reaching consensus among Security Council members and at holding accountable the perpetrators of such internationally prohibited crimes. We assert that a political solution in Syria is the only way to arrive at a comprehensive settlement of the crisis, in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions, especially resolution 2254 (2015) and the 2012 Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex). I now resume my functions as President of the Council. The representative of the United Kingdom has asked for the floor to make a further statement. Mr. Allen (United Kingdom): I disagree with a lot of what my Russian colleague said, but I will not stretch my colleagues' patience. But I do feel compelled briefly to respond to several of the points that he made. The first point is to say that this is not political for us. Preventing the use of these abhorrent weapons should transcend political disagreements. We do not oppose Russia's important role in Syria at all. We noted the outcomes of Sochi, and we look forward to the proposal for a constitutional committee returning to the next round of Geneva talks, with the full participation of Russia and the Syrian authorities, as was laid out in resolution 2254 (2015). The second point I would simply make is that the notion that it was anyone other than Russia that ended the Joint Investigative Mechanism is absurd. The voting records of the Council are clear and are available to all. Russia vetoed three different proposals for the extension of the Mechanism, the last of which simply extended it for a short period and requested the Secretary-General to make recommendations, but even that was unacceptable. Finally, on a note of agreement, I just want, like my Dutch colleague, to praise the incredible work of the White Helmets, who risk their own lives on a daily basis to save thousands of Syrians civilians. The President (spoke in Arabic): I now give the floor to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic. Mr. Mounzer (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): My country condemns and rejects in the strongest possible terms any use of chemical weapons or of any other weapon of mass destruction, as this constitutes a crime against humanity and an unethical and unjustifiable act, under any circumstances. The real target of such weapons is the Syrian people, who remain the primary victims of the crimes committed by armed terrorist groups, which have not hesitated to use chemical weapons against them. I reaffirm before the Security Council that my country has sought, and continues to seek, to identify the real perpetrators responsible for the use of chemical weapons in my country, Syria. Based on those steadfast principles, my Government joined the Chemical Weapons Convention and has honoured all of its commitments thereunder. My country achieved an unprecedented and definitive feat in the history of the Organization by ending the Syrian chemical-weapons programme in record time. That was corroborated in the report of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism to the Council in June 2014. My country is the party most desirous of uncovering the truth. We have always supported, and will continue to support, in principle any initiative by the Council whose aim is to establish the truth, identify those who are really trading in the blood of the Syrian people and using toxic chemical substances against Syrian civilians, including armed terrorist groups, as well as levelling false accusations against the Syrian Government. In that regard, on behalf of the Government of my country, I once again reiterate our condemnation of all American and Western allegations accusing us of committing chemical-weapon attacks in our country. I reaffirm that those accusations are groundless and cheap lies. International public opinion and the majority of United Nations Members now know that this is but standard procedure for the United States and its allies in the Council each and every time they learn that the armed terrorist groups that they finance, arm and support on the ground in Syria are at an impasse and losing ground to the advancing Syrian army and its allies. The latter are today waging a war, on behalf of the entire world, against terrorism, which, unfortunately, is being supported by certain Governments that have no interest 05/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8174 18-03099 17/17 in ensuring international peace and security and are solely seeking to advance their own political agendas. My Government reaffirms once again that the United States, the United Kingdom and France are fully responsible for the paralysis of international investigative mechanisms concerning the use of toxic chemical substances, as the Governments of those States are seeking to shield the armed terrorist groups that they support. We recall before all present here that it is Syria that originally called for an investigation into instances of the use of toxic gas by armed terrorist groups. False accusations against my Government of using toxic chemical substances are attempts to cover up its efforts to reveal to the world that certain armed terrorist groups and their sponsors have continued to perpetrate crimes against innocent civilians through the use, more than once, of toxic substances. The Syrian Government has provided the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) with evidence that proves that such groups possess banned toxic substances. We have repeatedly called for the carrying out of investigations to corroborate such evidence. However, our calls have been ignored. All of my colleagues here recall that the United States and its allies destroyed the JIM. Through their practices here in the Council, they put an end to the Mechanism. They brought pressure to bear on its Chair and its members by pressuring them to refuse to visit Khan Shaykhun. Rather than conduct a field visit to collect real evidence, they merely sought to level accusations and offered up evidence trumped up by Western countries to undermine Syria, to support terrorist groups and to cover up their responsibility for this incident. That occurred after the United States and its partners rejected the call by the Russian Federation to stop the politicization of the work of the JIM and to rectify its methodology by refraining from using false evidence and, instead, limiting itself to scientific and legally sound and reasonable proof. My country continues to honour all of its commitments — the ones we assumed when we joined the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. We shall persevere in our fight against terrorism — a war that we will wage despite any political or media blackmail or any exploitation of the blood of innocent civilians in Syria. The Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic will today circulate a letter of the National Committee for the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, in response to the United States allegations vis-à-vis the work of the JIM and the Fact-finding Mission of the OPCW. The letter proves with scientific and legal evidence that the accusations against my country are false and that Syria has never used such chemicals, and will we ever use them, because we do not possess them. Let us recall that those who level such false accusations against Syria are the Governments of the same States with a dark history of using such internationally prohibited weapons against millions of innocent people — in Viet Nam, Cambodia, Algeria and the list goes on. Finally, on behalf of my Government, I would like to extend our gratitude to the Russian Federation and to friendly countries in the Council, countries that seek to establish truth based on their awareness about the pernicious aims behind the false accusations. They have demonstrated their commitment to the supremacy of the principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations, as well as their conviction that such abnormal practices undermine the credibility of international actions and institutions and jeopardize international peace and security. The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.

We all are conscious that along the history important changes have happened in our company to political, economic, cultural, ideological level, etc., especially in the last 25 years. It is obvious, that these changes have not left of a side to the family and to the school. Family and school have suffered modifications and transformations, for example, the family is nuclearizado and urbanized, there has been a great increase of single-parent families, a women's great increase that has joined to the labor world, the family has increased the number of hours dedicated to the leisure, is incorporating his children before in the school, etc. In the same line, Mañani and Sanchez (1997) expose that the family has been always the first agent of socialization in the life of the child. Traditionally this had been like that up to the school age, 6 years, where the school, as institution, was the manager of provided a more wide social context simultaneously that was transmitting the cultural own guidelines of the social environment of the child. But for a few years there have taken place a series of phenomena that have modified the action socializadora: the familiar core every time is more limited, giving him a minor number of brothers, grandparents, uncles in the familiar bosom; they coexist in urban spaces separated from the familiar core, it has increased considerably the number of single-parent families, the ages of beginning of the not obligatory education every time it is going forward more, for trade and familiar names, and progressively, major conscience is had every time of what implies, from the educational point of view, the existence of a son. It seems that these changes that have been taking place in the familiar organization, for some would bring negative consequences on the socialization of the children. Because for example, a percentage every time major of the married women works out of the home, which remains time of presence of the parents in the domicile and forces to the families when keepers use of diverse average for the care of his children, as day-care centers, in the house or relatives. The work of the mother out of the home affects the children in school age in the measure that is more frequent that they eat in the college, which they see obliged to follow out-of-school activities, etc. In the same way the bows with the relatives who do not form a part of the familiar core have tended to weaken, which he leads that the familiar socialization of the children is an almost exclusive responsibility of the parents. Another structural significant change is the increase of the rates of divorce in all the western countries, which has led to a notable increase in the number of single-parent families. But we have to have present that though all the changes that we have been mentioning take place, the family continues constituting a human group in which there come together the whole set of relations, experiences and personal interactions of difficult quantification. And though our company, our model of life, has been modifying progressively the familiar morphology, well by means of the reduction of the generational conviviality or across the flexibilización of the expositions favoring a coexistence between parents and children more permissive and tolerant, the family constitutes one of the social cores where a powerful influence is exercised on the individual. This perspective has been replaced in the last years with the idea of that school and family have superposed influences and shared responsibilities, with what both institutions must cooperate in the education of the children. Parents and teachers have to re-define his relations replacing the conflict with the collaboration. All this makes us think that the families have evolved and therefore they have other gun-sights, needs, etc. And, at the same time, another type of interests and relations with the school. The life of every time major number of children unrolls from very early age in two worlds, the relative and the student, that they affect in the development of the personality, acting simultaneously in time and sometimes in space. Bearing in mind the above mentioned premises we justify the need to establish a major rooting in the relations family - school. This reality concerns the educational institutions as the Fiscal school Not. 15 Adolfo Álvarez Escobar, where the independence of the parents and the school that takes place for diverse motives, concerns directly in the performance of his children, being necessary a restructuring by means of the conviviality family - school and community. ; Todos somos conscientes de que a lo largo de la historia se han sucedido importantes cambios en nuestra sociedad a nivel político, económico, cultural, ideológico, etc., sobre todo en los últimos 25 años. Es obvio, que estos cambios no han dejado de un lado a la familia y a la escuela. Familia y escuela han sufrido modificaciones y transformaciones, por ejemplo, la familia se ha nuclearizado y urbanizado, ha habido un gran incremento de familias monoparentales, un gran aumento de mujeres que se ha incorporado al mundo laboral, la familia ha incrementado el número de horas dedicado al ocio, está incorporando a sus hijos antes en la escuela, etc. En la misma línea, se expone que la familia ha sido siempre el primer agente de socialización en la vida del niño. Tradicionalmente esto había sido así hasta la edad escolar, los 6 años, donde la escuela, como institución, era la encargada de proporcionar un contexto social más amplio a la vez que transmitía las pautas culturales propias del entorno social del niño. Pero desde hace unos pocos años se han producido una serie de fenómenos que han modificado la acción socializadora: el núcleo familiar cada vez es más reducido, dándose un menor número de hermanos, abuelos, tíos en el seno familiar; conviven en espacios urbanos separados del núcleo familiar, ha aumentado considerablemente el número de familias monoparentales, las edades de inicio de la escolaridad no obligatoria cada vez se está adelantando más, por razones sociales y familiares, y progresivamente, se tiene cada vez mayor conciencia de lo que implica, desde el punto de vista educativo, la existencia de un hijo. Parece que estos cambios que se han ido produciendo en la organización familiar, para algunos traerían consecuencias negativas sobre la socialización de los niños. Porque por ejemplo, un porcentaje cada vez mayor de las mujeres casadas trabaja fuera del hogar, lo que resta tiempo de presencia de los padres en el domicilio y obliga a las familias a hacer uso de diversos medios para el cuidado de sus hijos, como guarderías, cuidadores en la casa o parientes. El trabajo de la madre fuera del hogar afecta a los niños en edad escolar en la medida que es más frecuente que coman en la escuela, que se vean obligados a seguir actividades extraescolares, etc. Del mismo modo los lazos con los parientes que no forman parte del núcleo familiar han tendido a debilitarse, lo que conduce a que la socialización familiar de los niños sea casi responsabilidad exclusiva de los padres. Otro cambio estructural significativo es el aumento de las tasas de divorcio en todos los países occidentales, lo que ha llevado a un notable incremento en el número de familias monoparentales. Pero hemos de tener presente que aunque todos los cambios que hemos ido mencionando están teniendo lugar, la familia sigue constituyendo un grupo humano en el que confluyen todo un conjunto de relaciones, vivencias e interacciones personales de difícil cuantificación. Y aunque nuestra sociedad, nuestro modelo de vida, ha ido modificando progresivamente la morfología familiar, bien mediante la reducción de la convivencia generacional o a través de la flexibilización de los planteamientos favoreciendo una coexistencia entre padres e hijos más permisiva y tolerante, la familia constituye uno de los núcleos sociales donde se ejerce una poderosa influencia sobre el individuo. Esta perspectiva ha sido sustituida en los últimos años por la idea de que escuela y familia tienen influencias superpuestas y responsabilidades compartidas, por lo que ambas instituciones deben cooperar en la educación de los niños. Padres y profesores tienen que redefinir sus relaciones sustituyendo el conflicto por la colaboración. Todo ello nos hace pensar que las familias han evolucionado y por tanto tienen otras miras, necesidades, etc. y, al mismo tiempo, otro tipo de intereses y relaciones con la escuela. La vida de cada vez mayor número de niños se desenvuelve desde muy temprana edad en dos mundos, el familiar y el escolar, que inciden en el desarrollo de la personalidad, actuando simultáneamente en tiempo y a veces en espacio. Teniendo presente dichas premisas justificamos la necesidad de establecer un arraigo mayor en las relaciones familia-escuela. Esta realidad afecta a las instituciones educativas como la escuela Fiscal No. 15 Adolfo Álvarez Escobar, donde la independencia de los padres y la escuela que se produce por diversos motivos, afecta directamente en el rendimiento de sus hijos, siendo necesario una reestructuración mediante la convivencia familia – escuela y comunidad.

Pri analizi dvaju suprotstavljenih narativa povezanih s temom uspostave vojske Europske unije (EU) u europskom medijskom i političkom prostoru u ovome radu upotrebljava se teorija sekrutizacije te se temeljem analize diskursa i javnog mnijenja dokazuje da suprotstavljeni narativi ispunjavaju uvjete da ih prema definiciji Kopenhagenske škole svedemo pod pojam sekuritizacije. Prema autorima Kopenhagenske škole, sekuritizacija je govorni čin kojim provoditelj sekuritizacije do tada nepolitizirani odnosno politizirani predmet debate prikazuje kao egzistencijalnu prijetnju prema referentnom objektu koja zahtijeva hitne mjere. Prvi narativ koji rad analizira je neizvjesna sigurnosna situacija u Europi i oko nje koja bi mogla prerasti u egzistencijalnu prijetnju društvu Europske unije i europskom identitetu zbog nepostojanja vojske Unije. Drugi, tome oprečni narativ pak interpretira uspostavu vojske Europske unije kao egzistencijalnu prijetnju NATO savezu i suverenitetu država članica Unije. Rad postavlja pitanje je li sekuritizacija upotrebljiva poluga u nastojanju provođenja odnosno blokiranja čvršće intergracije EU na području obrane. Analizom diskursa glavnih aktera, provoditelja sekuritizacije i sigurnosnih strategija EU, Velike Britanije i Sjedinjenih Američkih Država te analizom prihvaćanja narativa od strane publike, rad zaključuje da su ti oba narativa činovi sekuritizacije. Prvi narativ, sekuritiziran od strane europskih federalista na čelu s predsjednikom Europske komisije Jean-Claudeom Junckerom, kao referentne objekte koji se pod hitno moraju zaštiti postavlja društvo EU i europski identitet. Egzistencijalna prijetnja referentnim objektima dolazi od ruske politike, ali i neizvjesne sigurnosne situacije u neposrednom susjedstvu EU-a. Ovaj narativ kao rješenje nameće uspostavu vojske EU-a. Drugi narativ, sekuritiziran od strane euroskeptika, NATO saveza te političkih elita Velike Britanije, SAD-a i Rusije, kao referentne objekte koji se pod hitno moraju zaštititi postavlja suverenitet država članica EU i opstanak NATO saveza koji se nalaze u egzistencijalnoj prijetnji od strane uspostave vojske Europske unije, čija bi uspostava oduzela nacionalne vojske tj. suverenitet država članica u području obrane, a postojanje NATO saveza učinilo izlišnim ; The thesis proves that around the establishment of the European Union army, we can infer two opposing narratives in European Union's media and political space and that both meet the conditions to be called a securitization. The first narrative (positive securitization) that the thesis analyses argues that the precarious the security situation in and around Europe could become an existential threat to the society of European Union (EU) and European identity because of the paucity of the EU army. The second narrative (negative securitization) that the thesis analyses interprets the establishment of the EU army as an existential threat to the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) and the sovereignty of EU member states. Securitization is defined through the Theory of Securitisation by the scientists belonging to Copenhagen School (Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde) as a speech act by which an actor (securitizing actor) presents a specific issue, until then only politicised in the political or public space, as an existential threat to the referent object that requires extraordinary measures. For a speech act to be an act of securitization and not just an attempt of securitisation, public (or a target group) needs to accept the speech as such. Thus, the Theory of Securitization affirms that the chosen narratives are acts of securitizations through discourse analysis and public opinion analysis. Elements of securitization are before mentioned securitization actor, referent object and public, as well as functional actors, which indirectly affect security decisions by lobbing or directing the securitization actors, and context, as a speech act cannot be an independent factor in the securitization process but is dependent on historical, political, societal, economic, geographic, and other variables. The principal difference between Theory of Securitisation and the mainstream security theories: Traditional Security Studies (TSS) and Critical Security Studies (CSS), is that Theory of Securitization is not concerned if the issue that a speech act wants to present as a security issue, really is a security issue, but how a speech act presents the issue as a security issue. Unlike the Theory of Securitisation, TSS is a realistic security theory that examines is the issue a real security threat while CSS is a constructive security theory that examines the reality of security threat. Both, TSS and CSS, analyze already present security threat, while Theory of Securitisation analyses the creation of the security threat. Positive securitisation, the precarious security situation in and around Europe that could become an existential threat to the society of the EU because of the paucity of the EU army, is securitised by European federalists headed by European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and HR/VP Federica Mogherini. Referent objects that are in urgent need of protection are the EU society and the European identity (values and principles) that are in the existential threat of Russia and uncertain security situation in the immediate neighbourhood of the EU. As a solution for the existential threat, securitising actors impose the establishment of the EU army. Functional actors of positive securitisation are stakeholders in the European defence industry who have a purely economic reason for the backing of positive securitisation, and European elite which advocates the federalisation of the European Union. The prime public, core target group, for the positive securitisation should be the Heads of 28 EU member states who make decisions concerning Common Security Defence Policy (CSDP). As the decisions concerning CSDP must be unanimous, and some member states, mostly United Kingdom (UK), steadily use the instrument of veto to block further development of the CSDP, the thesis assumes that the securitising actors of positive securitisation decided to expand the target group for their securitisation onto European Union society as a whole. Reasons behind the expansion of the target public, which thus makes the whole society of the European Union a the public is a pressure onto the Heads of EU member states since the citizens of the EU have a very favourable opinion about the further development of the CSDP and mostly positive opinion regarding the establishment of the EU army. Negative securitisation, which interprets the establishment of the EU army as an existential a threat to the NATO and the sovereignty of EU member states, is a complex form of securitisation. Instead of one securitising actor or one group of securitising actors with the same motive (European federalist with Juncker as champion in positive securitisation), negative securitisation is securitised by several securitising actors without the leading champion with sometimes the same and sometimes different motives: Eurosceptics, NATO, decision-makers in the United Kingdom, the United States (US) and Russia. Furthermore, negative securitisation accumulates the referent objects that are in urgent need of protection: the sovereignty of the EU member states and the survival of the NATO alliance. The only element of the negative securitisation that is unambiguous is the existential threat from the establishment of the EU army whose establishment would take away the national armies, i.e. the sovereignty of the EU member states and made the NATO alliance vulnerable. Hence, for the sake of simplicity of understanding the elements of negative securitisation and their synergy, the thesis uses the Classical Security Complex Theory (CSCT) for the proper consideration of the patterns of the security connections. Using discourse analysis of the speech acts and official documents the thesis shows how the decision-makers in the US (regardless of their political affiliation) securitise the establishment of the EU army as an existential threat to NATO and future of Atlantic security cooperation. Same is evident with the NATO as a securitising actor. The decision-makers in the UK (mostly conservatives) securitise the establishment of the EU army and further development of CSDP as an existential threat to the national sovereignty of EU member states. Russia too securitises the establishment of the EU army as an existential threat to the national sovereignty of EU member states but does the deed backstage financially supporting nationalist and Eurosceptic EU parties and via cyber-attacks and disinformation campaign. Functional actors of negative securitisation are stakeholders in the non-EU defence industry and other industries which prosper due to unstable global security situation, private military organisations, non-independent think thanks, etc. The public for the negative securitisation is the Eurosceptic part of the EU society, but the core target group are the citizens of the UK. Securitising actors of the negative securitisation narrowed the public of their securitisation for the same reason why the securitising actors of the positive securitisation broaden theirs – decisions concerning CSDP must be unanimous. Consequently, the securitising actors of the negative securitisation to be successful in their securitisation need to persuade only citizens of the UK that their narrative is correct. As already mentioned, the Theory of Securitisation analyses the creation of the security threat, so very important for the understanding of the results of discourse analysis is the context behind the construction of the securitisation. In the case of the securitisations analysed in the thesis, the contexts of both narratives have foundations in the conflict between neorealist and neoliberal doctrines in foreign politics, different security strategies of the countries, and change in a global security system, as well as historical, political, societal, economic, geographic and other variables. No EU member state can be a superpower on its own in today's world. This notion and aim to hinder the possibility of another armed conflict in Europe prompted the creation of the Union. After more than 60 years of enlargement and integration, the EU is an economic superpower. Nevertheless, to protect its economic superiority as well as to impose its doctrine in foreign politics and expand its multilateral security strategy, the EU needs to be and defence union. This idea is not a new one but exists and was attempted to be implemented from the beginning of the EU existence. The securitising actors of the positive securitisation believe that with the establishment of the EU army, the EU can keep the US hegemony in the global security system and the Russian renewal of bloc-system aspirations under control. Some securitising actors of the positive securitisation also believe that the further integration of the EU is necessary to prevent the disintegration. Above all, is the strong desire of the EU elite for the federation of the EU. Expectedly, not least because of the postulate of the security dilemma, the US and Russia are afraid of the military-strong EU which could change the current global security system, while the UK believes that with the strengthening of the EU its military and political strength will wane or disappear. As the UK is the EU member state and its citizens are the most Eurosceptic the public in the EU, both and the US and Russia focused most of their securitisation's efforts toward the UK's citizens. The US also uses the UK as a tool of disruption in the EU – it's right to veto decisions about the further development of CSDP, integration of the EU in the defence field and the establishment of the EU army. The thesis hypothesises that the two opposed narratives that the thesis considers to be securitisations have generated the status quo in the development of CSDP. Through the discourse analysis of speech acts and the official documents of securitising actors of both narratives as well as analysis of the acceptance of narratives by the audience (public opinion analysis), the thesis positively answers the research question: Is the securitisation theory usable the instrument in the effort to implement/block more effective EU integration?

Enrico Diecidue (" Dynamic Purchase Decisions Under Regret: Price and Availability ") is an associate professor of decision sciences at INSEAD (France) and holds a Ph.D. from the CentER (Center for Economic Research), Tilburg University, the Netherlands. Since 2001 he has been a resident faculty member at INSEAD, except for 2008-2009 when he was a visiting professor at Wharton and 2010-2011 when he was on sabbatical at the Erasmus School of Economics (the Netherlands). His main research interests are in individual decision making under uncertainty, health decisions, and experimental economics. He is interested in the role of regret, aspiration levels, and time in individual decisions. His current research is also addressing the role of groups in complex and ambiguous decisions. Enrico's research has appeared in leading journals in economics and management. He is an associate editor of Decision Analysis and on the editorial board of the Journal of Risk and Uncertainty. He teaches MBA, executive MBA, and executive participants on topics such as uncertainty, data and judgment; decision making under uncertainty, and management decision making. He has won teaching awards at INSEAD and Wharton. Address: INSEAD, Boulevard de Constance, 77305 Fontainebleau Cedex, France; email: enrico.diecidue@insead.edu . Seth Guikema (" Robust Adversarial Risk Analysis: A Level-k Approach ") is an assistant professor in the Department of Geography and Environmental Engineering at Johns Hopkins University, a professor II (adjunct) in the Department of Industrial Economics, Risk Management, and Planning at the University of Stavanger (Norway), and a senior analyst with Innovative Decisions Inc. He received his Ph.D. in risk and decision analysis from Stanford University and a B.S., M.S., and M.E. in civil and environmental engineering. Address: Department of Geography and Environmental Engineering, 205 Ames Hall, Johns Hopkins University, 3400 N. Charles Street, Baltimore, MD 21218; email: sguikema@jhu.edu . L. Robin Keller (" From the Editor: Decisions over Time (Exploding Offers or Purchase Regret), in Game Settings (Embedded Nash Bargaining or Adversarial Games), and in Influence Diagrams ") is a professor of operations and decision technologies in the Merage School of Business at the University of California, Irvine. She received her Ph.D. and M.B.A. in management science and her B.A. in mathematics from the University of California, Los Angeles. She has served as a program director for the Decision, Risk, and Management Science Program of the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF). Her research is on decision analysis and risk analysis for business and policy decisions and has been funded by NSF and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Her research interests cover multiple attribute decision making, riskiness, fairness, probability judgments, ambiguity of probabilities or outcomes, risk analysis (for terrorism, environmental, health, and safety risks), time preferences, problem structuring, cross-cultural decisions, and medical decision making. She is currently Editor-in-Chief of Decision Analysis, published by the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS). She is a Fellow of INFORMS and has held numerous roles in INFORMS, including board member and chair of the INFORMS Decision Analysis Society. She is a recipient of the George F. Kimball Medal from INFORMS. She has served as the decision analyst on three National Academy of Sciences committees. Address: Merage School of Business, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA 92697-3125; email: lrkeller@uci.edu . Yijing Li (" A Framework for Solving Hybrid Influence Diagrams Containing Deterministic Conditional Distributions ") is a doctoral student in decision sciences/supply chain management in the School of Business at the University of Kansas in Lawrence. Her research interests include inference in Bayesian networks and influence diagrams, and topics in supply chain management. She has taught courses such as introduction to supply chain management. She received her B.A. in economics and B.S. in mathematics from Wuhan University in China in 2005, and she completed her M.A. in economics from the University of Kansas in 2007. Address: School of Business, Summerfield Hall, University of Kansas, 1300 Sunnyside Avenue, Lawrence, KS 66045-7601; email: yjl@ku.edu . Steven A. Lippman (" Exploding Offers "; " Embedded Nash Bargaining: Risk Aversion and Impatience ") is Distinguished Professor and George Robbins Professor of Management at the Anderson School of Management at the University of California, Los Angeles. He received his B.A. in economics and statistics from the University of California, Berkeley and his Ph.D. in operations research from Stanford University. Professor Lippman has published more than 80 papers, some of which have appeared in Management Science, Operations Research, American Economic Review, the Bell Journal of Economics, and Econometrica. His research interests have included inventory theory, dynamic programming, queueing optimization, game theory, decision analysis, and microeconomics. He is best known for his work on the economics of search with John J. McCall as well as for his papers "On Dynamic Programming with Unbounded Rewards," "Uncertain Imitability: An Analysis of Interfirm Differences in Efficiency Under Competition" with Richard Rumelt, and "The Competitive Newsboy" with Kevin McCardle. He has taught negotiations analysis to M.B.A. students for the last 17 years. Address: Anderson School of Management, University of California, Los Angeles, 110 Westwood Plaza, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1481; email: slippman@anderson.ucla.edu . John W. Mamer (" Exploding Offers ") is a professor at the Anderson School of Management at the University of California, Los Angeles. He received a B.S. degree in mathematics and a B.A. degree in economics from the University of California, Davis, and M.S. and Ph.D. degrees from the Haas School at the University of California, Berkeley. His research interests include decision making under uncertainty, applied probability, game theory, and optimization. His work has appeared in Management Science, Journal of Economic Theory, Mathematics of Operations Research, Naval Research Logistics, and INFORMS Journal on Computing. His teaching responsibilities include probability and statistics, which he has taught to M.B.A. students for the past 12 years. Address: Anderson School of Management, University of California, Los Angeles, 110 Westwood Plaza, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1481; email: jmamer@anderson.ucla.edu . Kevin F. McCardle (" Embedded Nash Bargaining: Risk Aversion and Impatience ") is a professor of decisions, operations and technology management at the Anderson School of Management at the University of California, Los Angeles. His research interest is in mathematical models of decision making. He and Steven Lippman have had a long and productive collaboration: their first jointly authored paper was published in 1987. Professor McCardle served on the faculty at the Fuqua School of Business at Duke University from 1985 until 1999, when he joined the faculty at Anderson. His primary teaching responsibility has been to make the required course in probability and statistics palatable to M.B.A. students. For that effort he has won teaching awards at both Fuqua and Anderson. From 2007 to 2010 he was senior associate dean and director of the M.B.A. program at Anderson. He has been an associate editor at Operations Research, Management Science, and Decision Analysis, and he is currently area editor at Operations Research for decision analysis and on the editorial board of Decision Analysis. He serves as chair of the board of St. Joseph Center, a charitable social-service agency in west Los Angeles. Address: Anderson School of Management, University of California, Los Angeles, 110 Westwood Plaza, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1481; email: kevin.mccardle@anderson.ucla.edu . Laura McLay (" Robust Adversarial Risk Analysis: A Level-k Approach ") is an assistant professor of statistical sciences and operations research at Virginia Commonwealth University. She received her Ph.D. from the University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign. Her research interests are in the field of operations research, with a particular focus on discrete optimization and algorithm design with application to homeland security and emergency response problems. Dr. McLay's research has been supported by the National Science Foundation (NSF), the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of the Army. She has authored or coauthored more than 30 publications in archival journals and refereed proceedings. Dr. McLay is the recipient of the Outstanding IIE Publication Award and has received one best paper award for coauthored proceedings papers to the IIE Annual Conference and Expo. She has been named a fellow in the NSF-sponsored program Enabling the Next Generation of Hazards and Disaster Researchers. Address: Department of Statistical Sciences and Operations Research, 4111 Harris Hall, Virginia Commonwealth University, 1015 Floyd Avenue, P.O. Box 843083, Richmond, VA 23284; email: lamclay@vcu.edu . Casey Rothschild (" Robust Adversarial Risk Analysis: A Level-k Approach ") is an economic theorist who studies applications of game theory, risk and insurance, and public economics. His research interests include the government's role in regulating private insurance markets, the optimal design of income tax systems, the evolution of cooperation and conflict, and terrorism risk. His articles have appeared in a variety of outlets, including the Journal of Public Economics, the Journal of Economic Theory, the Journal of Financial Economics, the Journal of Risk and Insurance, the Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, and the Journal of Theoretical Biology. He received his Ph.D. in economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 2006, and has since taught at Middlebury College, MIT, Columbia, and Wellesley College. Address: Department of Economics, PNE 414, Wellesley College, 106 Central Street, Wellesley, MA 02481; email: crothsch@wellesley.edu . Nils Rudi (" Dynamic Purchase Decisions Under Regret: Price and Availability ") is an associate professor of technology and operations management at INSEAD. His research is in operations management with overlap to information systems, marketing, psychology, and finance. He has been focusing on supply chain management and how one can use different strategies (e.g., variety postponement, real options, flexibility, financial hedging, and incentive structures) to better handle demand uncertainty. After high school, Nils worked for three years as a computer programmer of ERP (Enterprise Resource Planning) systems at Movex. He then formed Minard, specializing in decision support systems for forecasting and inventory management. Minard did an initial public offering and went public on the Oslo Stock Exchange (Norway) in 1996. Before joining INSEAD, Nils worked at the University of Rochester for six years. He holds a Ph.D. in operations management from the University of Pennsylvania. Address: INSEAD, 1 Ayer Rajah Avenue, 138676 Singapore; email: nils.rudi@insead.edu . Prakash P. Shenoy (" A Framework for Solving Hybrid Influence Diagrams Containing Deterministic Conditional Distributions ") is the Ronald G. Harper Distinguished Professor of Artificial Intelligence in the School of Business, University of Kansas at Lawrence. His research interests are in the areas of uncertain reasoning and decision analysis. He is the inventor of "valuation-based systems," an abstract framework for knowledge representation and inference that includes Bayesian probabilities, Dempster–Shafer belief functions, Spohn's kappa calculus, Zadeh's possibility theory, propositional logic, optimization using dynamic programming, Bayesian decision making, solving systems of equations, database retrieval, and other domains. He is also a coauthor (with Glenn Shafer) of the "Shenoy–Shafer architecture" for computing marginals of joint distributions using local computation. He received a B.Tech. in mechanical engineering from the Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay, India, in 1973, and an M.S. and a Ph.D. in operations research from Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, in 1975 and 1977, respectively. Address: School of Business, Summerfield Hall, University of Kansas, 1300 Sunnyside Avenue, Lawrence, KS 66045-7601; email: pshenoy@ku.edu . Wenjie Tang (" Dynamic Purchase Decisions Under Regret: Price and Availability ") is assistant professor of quantitative methods at IE Business School and holds a Ph.D. from INSEAD. Her main research interests are individual decision making and supply chain management, both theoretically and experimentally. Professor Tang joined IE Business School in 2011, and has been teaching quantitative methods for the International M.B.A. program. Address: IE Business School, Calle de Maria de Molina, 13, 28002 Madrid, Spain; email: wenjie.tang@ie.edu .

This paper studies likely macroeconomic impacts and social consequences of devaluation of the Seychelles rupee. Analyzing potential welfare impacts of devaluation ex ante is crucial for policy making, since information obtained from such analyses would allow policy makers to design cost-effective, well-targeted policy measures, with the aim of mitigating negative social consequences of devaluation. Based on the estimated welfare impact of devaluation, the paper considers mitigation policy options, and discusses their effectiveness and associated budgetary costs. The focus of this study is the likely impacts of devaluation on the prices, economy and social welfare. The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. Section two first analyzes Seychelles' household expenditure survey data and presents the incidence of poverty and inequality in Seychelles. Section three then discusses how the Seychelles economy would adjust to an initial devaluation of the US dollar value of the rupee by 45 percent, followed by a gradual move to an equilibrium level. Projected macroeconomic variables and prices are applied to the household survey data to estimate possible impacts on the incidence of poverty. Section four discusses a variety of policy measures designed to alleviate the adverse impacts on the poor. Fiscal viability of these measures is also discussed in this section. Section five concludes the paper.

The theoretical case for industrial policy is a strong one. The market failures that industrial policies target in markets for credit, labor, products, and knowledge have long been at the core of what development economists study. The conventional case against industrial policy rests on practical difficulties with its implementation. Even though the issues could in principle be settled by empirical evidence, the evidence to date remains uninformative. Moreover, the conceptual difficulties involved in statistical inference in this area are so great that it is hard to see how statistical evidence could ever yield a convincing verdict. A review of industrial policy in three non-Asian settings El Salvador, Uruguay, and South Africa highlights the extensive amount of industrial policy that is already being carried out and frames the need for industrial policy in the specific circumstances of individual countries. The traditional informational and bureaucratic constraints on the exercise of industrial policy are not givens; they can be molded and rendered less binding through appropriate institutional design. Three key design attributes that industrial policy must possess are embeddedness, carrots-and-sticks, and accountability.

1 El "Derecho de Gentes""In structure, motivation, and detail, there is nothing quite like it. In my view, is destined to become a central text in the international political theory"Charles Beitz (1999)Vistos en la anterior entrega los aspectos centrales de la teoría que revolucionó el pensamiento liberal, es fácilmente apreciable un trasfondo universalista de inspiración kantiana explícitamente asumido por el propio Rawls. Sin embargo, las "variantes" que el autor introdujo a lo largo de su carrera significaron un lento pero marcado desprendimiento del universalismo moral. El intenso debate que mantuvo con los comunitaristas tras la aparición de A Theory of Justice dio como resultado una modificación sustancial del pensamiento del autor, que poco a poco internalizó algunas de las críticas realizadas desde esta corriente de pensamiento. No es objeto del presente trabajo las razones o la dimensión de tales cambios – que pueden verse plasmados en Political Liberalism – , aunque representan una referencia obligada, dado que, en cierta medida, son premonitorios de lo que sucederá en 1999 con la publicación de The Law of Peoples, donde esta "contaminación" comunitarista se traduce en un claro acercamiento al realismo político.Sin lugar a dudas, este "último"1 Rawls ha sido el más criticado y sus postulados han propiciado una interesante polémica. Sus obras anteriores habían generado particular expectativa en una posible aplicación de su teoría de la justicia en el ámbito internacional. Sin embargo, cuando la obra fue publicada, las reacciones fueron de decepción y confusión. Rawls sorprendió a sus lectores y defensores con una teoría más cercana al realismo político que a cualquier otra corriente política y filosófica, dejando de lado la inspiración distributiva e igualitaria que lo caracterizaba y la intención cosmopolita que algunos dedujeron (Martin & Reidy, 2006)2.A modo de breve definición, debemos decir que el Derecho de Gentes no es otra cosa que el intento de crear una teoría normativa de las relaciones internaciones, cuyo objetivo central es diseñar un sistema internacional justo y pacífico, del cual sean erradicados los peores males, causados, en su mayoría, por la injusticia política. En él, Rawls arguye que una vez que dichas injusticias sean eliminadas siguiendo políticas sociales justas, y estableciendo instituciones básicas igualmente justas, estos males finalmente desaparecerán.La preocupación de Rawls por la guerra – y también, por ende, por la paz – poco tiene de novedoso en la historia de las relaciones internacionales, teniendo en cuenta que desde siempre ha sido una herramienta de la política exterior de los Estados y constituido uno de los principales flagelos para la humanidad en su conjunto. Sin embargo, lo novedoso no es su preocupación por erradicar lo que llamará las "guerras injustas", sino la forma en que pretende hacerlo.Cuando en las primeras páginas del Derecho de Gentes, el autor declara que "the crucial fact for the problem of war is that constitutional democratic societies do no go to war with one another" (1999,8), no sólo nos está revelando su profunda convicción en favor de la democracia constitucional como promotora de un relacionamiento pacífico con sus pares, sino que establece, además, uno de los principales aspectos de su teoría. Con clara inspiración en el ideal kantiano de "La Paz Perpetua", y en consonancia con lo que llamará además la ley de Doyle, el autor se inscribe en lo que se conoce comúnmente como la "tesis de la paz democrática" y que es considerada como lo más cercano a una relación empírica en las relaciones internacionales3.Así, Rawls apela nuevamente al contrato social como forma de construir un nuevo Sistema Internacional, pero con una diferencia que pocos hubieran imaginado. Los individuos no serán ya (como tales) los integrantes de la posición original, sino que este lugar será ocupado ahora por representantes de los pueblos4.La concesión que realiza Rawls en este punto no es irrelevante. Mientras en su teoría de la justicia realiza una encendida argumentación en contra de la arbitrariedad moral, llegando a considerar que una sociedad justa debe tender a neutralizar en los individuos las consecuencias de circunstancias de las que no son moralmente responsables, ahora, el autor reconoce que para la consecución de la justicia en el ámbito internacional no es posible ni deseable la eliminación de las fronteras estatales a la hora de establecer los principios que regirán a la sociedad internacional. Dicho de otra forma, la arbitrariedad moral de nacer dentro de las fronteras de un Estado no democrático no es algo que una teoría de la justicia global deba tener en cuenta. Por el contario, el respeto por las fronteras políticas y su influencia en las relaciones de poder será un rasgo característico del Derecho de Gentes.1.1 El contractualismo en el Derecho de GentesLa estrategia contractualista que Rawls se plantea para diseñar su teoría presenta algunas dificultades adicionales, dado que es necesaria la existencia de tres posiciones originales diferenciadas. La primera es la que se produce dentro de las fronteras del Estado y los participantes son los ciudadanos que acuerdan los principios de justicia que regirán a dicha sociedad. La segunda, que plasma la inspiración kantiana antes mencionada, es protagonizada por representantes de los pueblos democráticos5 que negociarán las normas básicas para guiar su política exterior. En la tercera y última, los pueblos "decentes no liberales", como los llama Rawls, se sumarán a las democracias liberales en la búsqueda de normas que todos puedan respetar sin seguir ninguna concepción comprensiva del bien (Berenstein, 2011).Thomas Pogge es particularmente crítico de esta idea, teniendo en cuenta que Rawls deja afuera de la instancia contractual a una gran cantidad de Estados integrantes del sistema."La representación se garantiza selectivamente sólo a aquellos pueblos que están bien-ordenados por tener un orden institucional doméstico liberal o decente, mientras que los restantes ("Estados proscritos", "sociedades menos favorecidas", y "absolutismos benevolentes") no son aceptados como iguales y por lo tanto se les niega igual respeto y tolerancia" (2004, 28).Pero las diferencias no son apreciables únicamente en la posición original, sino también en el velo de ignorancia – sustancialmente más delgado – que Rawls le impone a las partes contratantes."They do not know, for example, the size of the territory, or the population, or the relative strength of the people whose fundamental interests they represent. Though they do know that reasonably favorable conditions obtain that make constitutional democracy possible – since they know they represent liberal societies – they do not know the extent of their natural resources or the level of their economic development, or other such information" (Rawls, 1999, 32-33).La misión de los representantes reunidos en la posición original internacional difiere radicalmente de la doméstica, como bien apunta nuevamente Pogge:"Su función no es, como se podría esperar, el lograr un acuerdo sobre los criterios públicos para la valoración, diseño y reforma del orden global institucional, sino acordar un conjunto de normas de buena conducta que los pueblos en cooperación deben obedecer (y esperar que sean recíprocamente obedecidos)" (2004, 29).Esta apreciación es, quizá, una de las más recurrentes críticas a la propuesta rawlsiana, que se conforma con establecer normas que encaucen el comportamiento de los Estados por un camino donde las guerras sean justas y su utilización estrictamente regulada y donde exista la posibilidad de sancionar a quienes incumplan un especie de código moral internacional que el autor diseñará a través del la creación de una particular doctrina de los derechos humanos.Así, quienes se inspiraron en Rawls para el diseño de impuestos redistributivos a nivel global, que neutralizaran la arbitrariedad moral y sus consecuencias, deberán ahora conformarse con la mera mención de un deber de ayuda que los Estados tienen con los menos favorecidos y que poco difiere con lo que hoy conocemos como cooperación internacional, ayuda para el desarrollo o ayuda humanitaria.Para Rawls, las normas que regirán al sistema internacional luego de la negociación de las partes en las sucesivas posiciones originales serían las siguientes:1) Los pueblos son libres e independientes y su libertad e independencia debe ser respetada por otros pueblos; 2) Los pueblos tienen que cumplir los tratados y las obligaciones a las que se comprometen; 3) Los pueblos son iguales y tienen que ser partes de aquellos acuerdos que los comprometen; 4) Los pueblos tienen que respetar una obligación de no-intervención; 5) Los pueblos tienen un derecho a autodefensa, pero ningún derecho a iniciar guerras por otra razón que la autodefensa; 6) Los pueblos tienen que respetar los derechos humanos; 7) Los pueblos tienen que cumplir ciertas restricciones especificadas en la conducta de guerra; 8) Los pueblos tienen una obligación de asistir a otros pueblos que viven bajo condiciones no-favorables que les impiden tener un orden político y social justo o decente (Rawls, 1999, 37).1.2 Del universalismo moral al realismo políticoPor otra parte, vale destacar que, a pesar incluso de no haber cubierto las expectativas igualitaristas puestas en el Derecho de Gentes, la obra de Rawls no perdió por ello su afán por generar una teoría totalizadora de las relaciones internacionales. La complejidad de su estructura, sin embargo, y el horizonte del alcance de su ideal de justicia, no pueden ser comparados con su predecesora Teoría de la Justicia. Mientras en esta última Rawls pretendía construir los cimientos de una sociedad "justa", capaz incluso de neutralizar aspectos morales tanto como las consecuencias de la lotería natural, el Derecho de Gentes pretende simplemente conseguir, mediante los principios antes mencionados, la escasa noción de "decencia" en el comportamiento de los Estados en su relacionamiento.Aquel Rawls que había rehuido a la herencia hobbesiana en su Teoría de la Justicia para refugiarse en el universalismo moral kantiano, desecha ahora la idea de libertad como autonomía individual y renuncia asimismo al imperativo categórico en pos de de la "decencia", concepto que se asemeja a la idea de "estabilidad" propuesta por Hobbes en su Leviatán, cuando éste exploraba mecanismos en su búsqueda de la paz dentro de las fronteras del Estado.Este peregrinaje de Rawls hacia el campo de juego "realista", desechando explícitamente objetivos más profundos en el relacionamiento interestatal e intentando adaptar su teoría a la complejidad de las relaciones de poder existentes, no significa sin embargo que el autor haya dejado de lado toda pretensión igualitarista. Por el contrario, encontramos en el Derecho de Gentes lo que podría calificarse como una concepción hobbesiana de la igualdad, según la cual los Estados no serán iguales en sus recursos, capacidad bélica, etc., sino en su condición de "insubordinados" frente un sistema incapaz de fijar normas de conducta igualmente válidas para todos, situación que los empuja a hacer uso de un cálculo estrictamente racional en el manejo de la política exterior. De hecho, es más importante para Rawls la erradicación de la guerra que las limitaciones a la libertad de conciencia que se puedan implementar en el seno de cualquier sociedad integrante del sistema6.En tal caso, si asumiéramos como nuestras las interpretaciones de la obra de Hobbes realizadas desde el campo internacional, podríamos decir que en la etapa pre contractual, los Estados estarían sometidos a una suerte de igualdad impuesta por la lógica anárquica del Sistema Internacional – entendida como ausencia de autoridad soberana –, mediante la cual todos y cada uno serían capaces de actuar según su parecer, teniendo incluso la libertad de emprender cualquier enfrentamiento bélico sea cual fuere su motivación. Más aun, la situación posterior al contrato iguala nuevamente a las partes mediante la aplicación de principios de comportamiento por lo que, en caso de no obedecerlos, los Estados se arriesgan a la imposición de sanciones preestablecidas.Finalmente, es pertinente realizar una última consideración con respecto a la idea de "decencia" manejada por Rawls y que constituye un factor central en su ideal de justicia en el ámbito internacional. Dejando de lado (momentáneamente) las complejidades que dicha noción encierra tanto como el cúmulo de consideraciones que sobre ellas se han hecho, podríamos decir que, para el autor, decencia es sinónimo de respeto por los derechos humanos. A grandes rasgos, su Sistema Internacional "ideal" se circunscribe a promover una determinada concepción de los derechos humanos que se desempeñe como un límite a la tolerancia de la pluralidad en las relaciones internacionales.Decimos por tanto, y en línea con lo antes expuesto, que la teoría contractualista de Rawls tiene como objetivo principal la búsqueda de estabilidad o, lo que es lo mismo, el encarrilamiento de las relaciones internacionales por un camino exento de excesos y que se desarrolle en un ámbito de tolerancia, sí, pero limitada por el estricto cumplimiento de unos principios que se erigen en torno a la ya mencionada concepción de los derechos humanos.Al considerar la decencia como piedra angular de su teoría, Rawls no hace más que confirmar que, a pesar de llamarle "ideal de justicia", la decencia no puede ser entendida más que como un mero llamado a la estabilidad, un llamado, de alguna forma, a la conformación de un mundo donde la guerra sea limitada y los excesos duramente penalizados. De ninguna manera, sin embargo, se encarga de cuestiones como el ingreso, la discriminación o la igualdad de oportunidades. 1 - Habitualmente se habla de un primer (A Theory of Justice) y un segundo (Political Liberalism en adelante) Rawls. Sin embargo, en The Law of Peoples podríamos hablar incluso de un tercer Rawls, por las diferencias sustanciales que esta obra marca en comparación con su producción anterior.2 -"The Law of Peoples has attracted so much attention is that it did not meet the already well-developed expectations or predictions of many careful readers of Rawls's earlier works. In the latter half of his seminal 1979 book, Political Theory and International Relations, Charles Beitz drew on Rawls's domestic theory of justice to develop what he regarded as a Rawlsian liberal cosmopolitanism, one with radical implications, especially with respect to global economic justice. Thomas Pogge's influential 1989 book, Realizing Rawls, unfolds in its final chapters in a similar spirit." (Martin & Reidy, 2006, 7).3 - En "La Paz Perpetua", publicada en 1795, el filósofo prusiano considera que la creación de una sociedad de Estados independientes, un "fedous pacificum", constituye una condición indispensable para la erradicación de la guerra como herramienta de la política exterior de los Estados. Para Kant, los Estados republicanos tienen en su constitución una razón de peso para evitar ir a la guerra, dado que esa decisión, según él, solo pueden tomarla gobernantes que no sufran sus consecuencias. El Gobernante de una República, por el contrario, debe legislar tomándose a sí mismo como objeto de las leyes que promulga, o sea, como un ciudadano más. Al respecto Rawls dice: "When that happens, as I believe, following Kant, it will, the society of these peoples will form a group of satisfied peoples. As I shall maintain, in view of their fundamental interests being satisfied, they will have no reason to go to war with one another"(Rawls, 1999, 19).4 - Nótese que Rawls no habla de Estados sino de "pueblos". Esto tiene su justificación en que, como mencionáramos anteriormente, el autor pretende desarrollar una nueva concepción de la soberanía. "Another reason I use term 'peoples' is to distinguish my thinking from that about political states as traditionally conceived, with their powers of sovereignty included in the (positive) international law for the three centuries after the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648)" (1999, 25).5 - Sin lugar a dudas, el término "pueblos democráticos" – o liberales, como también los llama Rawls – representa una forja terminológica un tanto problemática. Ya hemos hecho referencia a las razones que llevan al autor a hablar de pueblos en lugar de estados, pero es necesario advertir que a lo largo del Derecho de Gentes, la palabra "pueblos" no solo es una denominación sustituta para las entidades soberanas, sino también un estrategia para evitar las cuestiones que respectan a los individuos despojados de su traje de integrantes de un determinado grupo social.6 -Vale destacar que en su Teoría de la Justicia, Rawls rechaza justamente el aporte de Hobbes a la teoría del contrato social por su inclinación a pensar a los hombres (entendidos como las partes contratantes) como tendientes a la cooperación y mutuamente desinteresados o, lo que es lo mismo, perseguidores de su propio interés desconociendo el de los demás. *Este artículo fue presentado en la 4° sesión el Seminario Interno de Discusión Teórica 2014, organizado por el Departamento de Estudios Internacionales de la Universidad ORT Uruguay.Andrés Riva Casas es estudiante de la Licenciatura en Estudios Internacionales.

This chapter begins with a brief summary of the long history of national distortions to agricultural markets. It then outlines the methodology used to generate annual indicators of the extent of government interventions in markets, details of which are provided in Anderson and appendix A. A description of the economies under study and their economic growth and structural changes over recent decades is then briefly presented as a preface to the main section of the chapter, in which the nominal rates of assistance and consumer tax equivalents (NRA and CTE) estimates are summarized across regions and over the decades since the 1950s. These estimates are discussed in far more detail in the regional chapters that follow. A summary is also provided of an additional set of indicators of agricultural price distortions presented in chapter eleven that are based on the trade restrictiveness index first developed by Anderson and Neary (2005). In chapter twelve the focus shifts from countries to commodities, and all the various distortion indicators are used to provide a sense of how distorted are each of the key farm commodity markets globally. Then chapter thirteen uses the study's NRA and CTE estimates to provide a new set of results from a global economy-wide model that attempts to quantify the impacts on global markets, net farm incomes and welfare of the reforms since the early 1980s and of the policies still in place as of 2004. The chapter concludes by drawing on the lessons learned to speculate on the prospects for further reducing the disarray in world agricultural markets.

Background: Previous research on the perceived causes of poverty has been carried out in the field of sociology (Strapcová, 2005) as well as social psychology (Nasser & Abouchedid, 2001). This research has looked at individuals' perceptions of the causes of poverty and the effect of various sociodemographic variables such as social class (Kluegel & Smith, 1981), income (Lever & Trejo, 2004), subjective assessment of one's economic situation (Strapcová, 2005), gender (Bullock, 1999), age (Niemelä, 2008), education (Hunt, 1996) and employment (Strapcová, 2005). The majority of these studies have been conducted on people who have not directly experienced poverty such as university students (Cozzarelli et al., 2001), middle-class people (Kluegel & Smith, 1981) and social workers (Bullock, 2004). Therefore, there have only been a few studies done on how poor people perceive the causes of poverty (Bullock, 1999; Davids & Gouws, 2013; Morçöl, 1997). Research goal: The present study has two objectives. The first one was to determine whether there are statistically significant differences in the individualistic, structural and fatalistic perceived causes of poverty between the objectively poor and objectively non-poor as well as between the subjectively poor and subjectively non-poor. Secondly, it was to identify the predictors of the individualistic, structural and fatalistic perceived causes of poverty among selected variables including gender, age, marital status, employment status, education, objective poverty and subjective poverty. It was hypothesized that the objectively poor would prefer less individualistic and more structural as well as fatalistic perceived causes of poverty in comparison with the objectively non-poor. It was also hypothesized that the subjectively poor in comparison with the subjectively non-poor would prefer less individualistic and more structural as well as fatalistic perceived causes of poverty. In addition, it was assumed that sociodemographic variables such as objective poverty, subjective poverty, gender, age, marital status, employment status and education would be significant predictors of the structural, fatalistic and individualistic perceived causes of poverty. In particular, it was hypothesized that objective poverty, subjective poverty, gender, and age would be confirmed as positive predictors of structural and fatalistic perceived causes of poverty while marital status, employment status and education would be confirmed as negative predictors. Within the individualistic perceived causes of poverty, it was hypothesized that marital status, employment status and education would be significant positive predictors while objective poverty, subjective poverty, gender and age would be significant negative predictors. Method: The research sample consisted of 150 respondents (77 men and 73 women) aged between 19 and 64 years old (M = 36.67; SD = 13.23). In terms of education, 17 participants stated that primary school had been their highest level of education, 31 participants stated that they had left secondary school without A level exam, 46 participants had left with A level exam and 56 participants had a university degree (15 of them had a Bachelor's degree, 39 participants had a Master's and 2 participants had a PhD). In terms of marital status, 73 participants were single, 8 cohabitated, 49 were married, 13 were divorced and 7 widowed. With regards to employment status, 79 participants were full-time employed, 11 worked part-time, 27 were unemployed, 7 were retired, 6 were on sick/disability leave invalid retirees and 20 respondents reported their employment status as "other" (9 of them were self-employed, 9 were students and 2 were on maternity leave). The data were dichotomized into groups according to age (19-25, 26-45, and 46-64 years old), according to relationship status (those not in a relationship and those who are), groups with lower and higher educational attainment and groups of non-working and working participants. For the data collection, occasional sampling was conducted in seven charitable organizations in the regions of Prešov, Košice, and Banská Bystrica in Slovakia. In addition, voluntary response sampling was used through an online survey. In order to assess the perceived causes of poverty, the Attributions for Poverty questionnaire (Bullock et al., 2003) was used. The subjective assessment of poverty was measured by the question "In your economic situation, is it possible to make ends meet?" (Nygård et al., 2017). The equivalent disposable household income of each respondent was calculated as an indicator of objective poverty. The research data were analysed in the statistical program IBM SPSS Statistics. Both a Welch t-test and Mann-Whitney U test were used to verify the first goal of the study. For the second goal, a multiple hierarchical linear regression analysis stepwise method was used. Results: There were statistically significant differences found in the structural as well as fatalistic perceived causes of poverty between the objectively poor and objectively non-poor as well as between the subjectively poor and subjectively non-poor. The objectively poor and subjectively poor were found to have higher scores in both the structural and fatalistic perceived causes of poverty in comparison with the objectively non-poor and subjectively non-poor. There were no statistically significant differences found between the objectively poor and objectively non-poor nor between the subjectively poor and subjectively non-poor in the individualistic perceived causes of poverty. The results of the regression analysis showed that when the 9 predictors were inputted in three blocks (1. gender, age-3 groups, marital status, 2. education, employment status, 3. objective poverty, subjective poverty), none of them appeared to be significant in terms of the individualistic perceived causes of poverty. For the structural as well as fatalistic perceived causes of poverty only one of the input predictors was shown to be positively significant. Subjective poverty was found to explain 4.2% of the variance in structural and 8.3% in the fatalistic perceived causes of poverty. Conclusion: The findings provide insight into the widely up to now unexplored issue of perceived causes of poverty in Slovakia. Future research on the perceived causes of poverty among the poor could focus on self-assignment of the participant to either the group of the poor or non-poor, distinguish between one's own poverty and the poverty of others and include other variables such as ethnicity, religion, belief in a just world as well as life satisfaction.

Od 1990. godine, čitav region Istočne i Jugoistočne Evrope počeo je sa transformacijom svojih ekonomija iz centralno planskog sistema u tržišni, što se označava pojmom tranzicija. Postavka istraživačke studije je sagledavanje stanja sektora poljoprivrede Republike Srbije i Bosne i Hercegovine, koji su prošli kroz proces ekonomske tranzicije. Ideja tranzicije privrede, odnosno poljoprivrede je rast proizvodnje i BDP, povećanje efikasnosti i ostvarivanje boljih proizvodno-ekonomskih performansi. Cilj istraživanja je utvrditi da li je i u kojoj meri tranzicija poljoprivrede dovela do njenog razvoja, koji su propusti napravljeni i kakve mere agrarne politike kreirati u funkciji daljeg razvoja poljoprivrede i ruralnih područja. U izvođenju vrednosnih sudova i kritičkih zapažanja celokupnog procesa tranzicije agrosektora korišćene su određene naučne metode poput naučnog studiranja, indikatori, grafički metod, statistički metod, deskriptivna analiza i sinteza, komparatvini metod i drugi naučni metodi. Strategija poljoprivredne tranzicije u bivšim socijalističkim zemljama imala je za cilj poboljšanje efikasnosti i produktivnosti poljoprivrede zamenom institucionalnih i organizacionih karakteristika komandne ekonomije sa atributima pozajmljenim iz prakse tržišne ekonomije. Transformacija od kolektivne do efikasnije individualizovane poljoprivrede (privatizacija), koja će ostvarivati veći nivo prihoda je krajnji cilj. Tranziciju poljoprivrede prati nepovoljna vlasnička struktura i niska produktivnost, neefikasnost agrarne politike, spor razvoj institucija podrške, neadekvatan zakonodavni okvir i neuspešna privatizacija. Proces privatizacije obeležen je sa mnogo kontroverzi i zloupotreba, pa je i to imalo negativan odraz na ukupne efekte. Pored nabrojanog, efekti tranzicije poljoprivrede se ogledaju i u smanjenom obimu investicija, padu stočarske proizvodnje, spoljnotrgovinska razmena uglavnom sirovina i proizvoda niskog stepena finalizacije, depopulaciji sela, nepovoljnoj agrarnoj strukturi, malim pomacima na planu podiznja konkurentnosti i produktivnosti i nekonzistentnoj agrarnoj politici. Ni poljoprivredno zadrugarstvo nije revitalizovano, a kamoli ostvarilo neki značajan uspeh, tim pre, jer nije vraćeno poljuljano poverenje u zadružni oblik organizovanja, niti su zadružni principi usvojeni. Prelazak na tržišnu ekonomiju ostavio je Srbiju i Bosnu i Hercegovinu daleko iza najuspešnijih zemalja Centralne i Istočne Evrope. BiH zaostaje po mnogim pitanjima vezanim za strukturne reforme, koje su pratile ekonomsku tranziciju zemalja u regionu. U Republici Srbiji je stanje nešto bolje, ali svakako ispod očekivanja i s velikim kašnjenjima, pa su samim tim pozitivni efekti značajno slabiji. Stanje u BiH u posttranzicionom periodu je takvo da nedostaje institucionalna podrška i podsticajne mere agrarne politike na svim nivoima, počev od države preko kantona i opština, a tržišne reforme poljoprivrednog sektora nailaze na probleme i zastoje. Tranzicija poljoprivrede u BiH nije donela očekivane efekte, s obzirom da nije modernizovana, niti je zasnovana na efikasnosti, konkurentnosti, intenzivnosti i tržišnosti. Nešto bolja situacija je u Republici Srbiji, ali svakako nije razvijen sektor poljoprivrede, niti su u potpunosti ostvareni zacrtani ciljevi tranzicije. ; Since 1990, the entire region of Eastern and Southeastern Europe has begun to transform its economies from the central planning system to the marketplace, which is referred to as the concept of transition. The research study setting is to look at the state of the agriculture sector of the Republic of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which went through the process of economic transition. The idea of a transition of the economy, that is agriculture, is the growth of production and GDP, increasing efficiency and achieving better productioneconomic performance. The aim of the research is to determine whether and to what extent the transition of agriculture has led to its development, what omissions have been made and what measures of agrarian policy are to be created in the function of further development of agriculture and rural areas. Certain scientific methods such as scientific study, indicators, graphic method, statistical method, descriptive analysis and synthesis, comparative methods and other scientific methods have been used in performing value judgments and critical observations of the whole process of transition of agrosectors. The agricultural transition strategy in the former socialist countries aimed to improve the efficiency and productivity of agriculture by replacing the institutional and organizational characteristics of the command economy with attributes borrowed from the practice of a market economy. Transformation from collective to more efficient individualized agriculture (privatization), which will achieve higher level of income is the ultimate goal. The transition to agriculture is accompanied by an unfavorable ownership structure and low productivity, inefficiency of agrarian policy, slow development of support institutions, inadequate legislative framework and unsuccessful privatization. The privatization process was marked with a lot of controversy and abuse, which also had a negative impact on the overall effects. In addition to the above, the effects of agriculture transition are reflected in the reduced volume of investments, the decline in livestock production, the foreign trade of mostly raw materials and products of low level of finalization, depopulation of the village, unfavorable agrarian structure, small shifts in raising competitiveness and productivity and inconsistent agricultural policy. Even agricultural cooperatives were not revitalized, let alone achieved some significant success, the sooner because no shattered confidence in the cooperative form of organization was returned, nor cooperative principles were adopted. The transition to the market economy left Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina far behind the most successful countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Bosnia and Herzegovina lags behind many issues related to structural reforms, which have followed the economic transition of countries in the region. In the Republic of Serbia, the situation is somewhat better, but certainly below expectations and with big delays, so the positive effects are significantly weaker. The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the post-transition period is such that institutional support and incentive measures of agrarian policy at all levels, starting from the state through cantons and municipalities, are lacking, and market reforms of the agricultural sector are facing problems and delays. The transit of agriculture in Bosnia and Herzegovina did not produce the expected effects, as it was not modernized nor based on efficiency, competitiveness, intensity and marketability. There is a somewhat better situation in the Republic of Serbia, but the agriculture sector is certainly not developed, and the goals of transition have not been fully met.