Tobacco policy has been an issue in Indiana since 1893, when the legislature passed a law prohibiting selling tobacco to people under 16. Beginning as early as 1969, Indiana General Assembly members and tobacco control advocates launched uncoordinated efforts to pass a law restricting smoking in government buildings. The tobacco industry responded with a well-financed and well-connected network of lobbyists, campaign contributions and third-party allies which's lobbyists that defeated every statewide clean indoor air proposal from 1969 to 1986. In 1986, tobacco control advocates formed the Indiana Campaign for a Tobacco-Free Society and, in 1987, successfully advocated for Indiana's first clean indoor air law that created nonsmoking areas in government-owned buildings. Participating in the National Cancer Institute's American Stop Smoking Intervention Study (ASSIST; 1991 to 1999) provided Indiana with its first funded tobacco control local infrastructure, which laid the foundation for future progress. In 1997, despite opposition from tobacco control advocates, the Tobacco Institute, the tobacco industry's lobbying organization, convinced the Indiana Legislature to preempt local governments from regulating the sale, distribution or display of tobacco products. Between 2000 and 2009, the tobacco industry spent over $4 million on lobbying. From 1994 to 2008, the tobacco industry contributed $560,884 to elected officials. Nine of the 10 officials who accepted the highest amounts of money held high-ranking leadership positions. Industry contributions were associated with more pro-industry behavior by legislators. Tobacco Industry campaign contributions peaked during 1999-2000, when legislators were considering how to spend money from the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA), and during 2003-2004, when legislators cut the state tobacco control budget by 70 percent. In 2000, the Legislature created the Indiana Tobacco Use Prevention and Cessation (ITPC) Agency as an independent agency governed by an Executive Board with $35 million of MSA money for FY 2001, meeting the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's minimum funding recommendation. The ITPC Executive Board created the Hoosier Model, an adaptation of CDC's Best Practices for Comprehensive Tobacco Control Programs, with a particularly strong emphasis on community programs. In 2002, with active support from tobacco control advocates and ITPC, the Governor proposed and the Legislature enacted a 40¢/pack cigarette tax increase, the first increase since 1987. None of the money went to tobacco control. In 2007, again with support from the health advocates and ITPC, the Legislature enacted Governor Mitch Daniels' (R) Healthy Indiana Plan financed by a 44¢/pack cigarette tax increase (to 99.5¢). Only $1.2 million of the new tax revenues were allocated to ITPC, and even this small amount ended after just one year. As of 2010, Indiana's cigarette tax was still 45.5¢ below the national average. Bloomington passed Indiana's first comprehensive smokefree ordinance in 2003 which prohibited smoking in public places and enclosed workplaces, followed by bars in 2005. Indianapolis-Marion County passed an ordinance in 2005 prohibiting smoking in public places and enclosed workplaces, except for bars and private clubs. Thirty-five local ordinances passed after the Indianapolis-Marion County ordinance, 21 of which exempted bars and 28 exempted private clubs, mirroring the Indianapolis-Marion County ordinance. In 2006, tobacco control advocates adopted statewide "deal breaker" agreements establishing a minimum standard for comprehensive local smokefree ordinances without exemptions. These agreements resulted in fewer but stronger ordinances: from 2003 through 2006, only 5 of 28 ordinances included bars; between 2007 and 2009, 6 of 10 ordinances included bars. Decreases in ITPC funding to local communities has made it difficult for local coalitions to maintain staff levels and program efficacy. Advocates have been too focused on strengthening the 2005 Indianapolis-Marion County clean indoor air ordinance; advocates should reinvigorate local activity throughout the state to pass comprehensive ordinances in smaller communities. In 2009, statewide tobacco control advocates made a strategic error in not actively supporting a non-preemptive clean indoor air bill covering everything but casinos. In 2010, in an arrangement with House Speaker B. Patrick Bauer, Representative Charlie Brown (D-Gary) introduced essentially the same bill that the advocates passed on in 2009, which again failed without their support. Tobacco control advocates were divided which weakened their coalition. ITPC's funding was never secure; between FY 2001 and FY 2004, legislators cut ITPC's funding by 70%. ITPC received $10.9 million for FY 2010, just 14% of Best Practices. Despite the cuts, ITPC's programs decreased youth smoking. From 2000 to 2008, smoking prevalence decreased among high school students by 42 percent, from 31.6 percent to 18.3 percent and among middle school students by 58 percent, from 9.8 percent to 4.1 percent. During this period adult smoking prevalence remained stable, while per capita consumption dropped, indicating that smokers were smoking fewer cigarettes. The continuing decline in youth smoking while adult prevalence stagnated probably reflected the ITPC Executive Board's decision to give priority to reducing youth smoking in response to cuts in total funding available. State policy makers were correct to establish ITPC as an independent agency and to fund it at CDC-recommended levels. In 2010, tobacco control advocates defeated a proposal from Governor Mitch Daniels and Senator Luke Kenley (R-Noblesville) to dissolve the ITPC Executive Board and transfer the Agency's functions to the Indiana State Department of Health (ISDH). States that have dissolved or transferred their independent tobacco control programs into state health departments have historically raided funds and been left with ineffective programs. In 2011, advocates again fought a similar last minute amendment to the state budget bill to dismantle ITPC introduced by Sen. Kenley, but were unsuccessful in part. ITPC was dissolved and the program's budget transferred to ISDH and reduced by 25 percent. However, the public outcry generated by ITPC supporters influenced ISDH to create a new, high level division reporting directly to the State Commissioner of Health focused solely on tobacco prevention and cessation and to make a commitment to maintaining ITPC"s effective program focus. If advocates can successfully transition ITPC's programs into ISDH, broaden its program focus to reintegrate adults, and restore full funding, it will likely yield rapid decreases in health care costs and other economic losses stemming from tobacco-related illnesses and so contribute not only to the physical health of Hoosiers, but also the fiscal health of their government and businesses.
A key factor in the sustainability of China's economic growth is the potential of Chinese firms to develop innovative capabilities autonomously and international management know-how thus enabling them to move up the technological ladder of the production process and to globalise their operations. If successful, some Chinese firms will eventually develop their own brands and open up subsidiaries abroad like their Japanese and South Korean counterparts a few decades ago. If this is not achieved, then China's future growth could remain overly dependent on overseas markets and foreign technology. Chinese firms could remain highly competitive in traditional labour-intensive exports (such as the textile, lighters and toys industries of the Zhejiang province) or in relatively simple electric products (such as household appliance) but would not possess the capacity to become innovators of high tech products. The Chinese firms could only operate internationally in highly competitive industries characterised by low barriers to entry and with moderate margins while firms from the most advanced economies could continue to extract rents in industries characterised by high tech and/or differentiated products thanks to their technological innovation capacities and management know-how. The purpose of this paper will be to assess the capacity of China's largest firms to transform themselves into global competitors possessing ownership-specific advantages or intangible assets like some of their East Asian counterparts and to determine to what extent could the Chinese state pursue a strategic industrial policy to help them do so. The fact that a firm establishes a subsidiary abroad does not make it a global competitor, not even a Multinational Enterprise (MNE) or a Trans-National Corporation (TNC). According to United Nations' (UN) classification, to be considered as TNC or MNE, a firm must have subsidiaries in at least six different countries. Many Chinese firms satisfy these criteria and can be considered as MNEs. Nevertheless, there is a significant gap in terms of possession of intangible assets between being a multinational enterprise and a top global competitor. According to UN estimates, in 2004, there were 70,000 MNE which controlled 690,000 subsidiaries across the globe (El Mouhoub, 2006: 17). Obviously all of those firms cannot be considered as truly global competitors. To delineate more clearly the prerequisites necessary for a firm to evolve into a global competitor, this section will refer to Dunning's eclectic paradigm and OLI configuration. For Dunning, in order for a firm to transform itself into a MNE, it must possess "ownership-specific advantages". That is, intangible assets which constitute substantial barriers to entry for other potential competitors. Dunning lists the following assets: "product innovations, product management, organizational and marketing systems, innovatory capacity, organization of work, non-codifiable knowledge (bank of human capital experience), ability to reduce the cost of intra and/or inter-firm transactions" (Dunning, 1993: 81). Dunning also includes absolute cost advantages coming from a privileged access to inputs, learning by doing, "knowledge of international markets and operations", "capacity to learn from societal difference in organisational and managerial processes and systems" (Dunning, 1993: 81). In this paper, the term "global competitors" refers to incumbents of their industries which are protected by natural and strategic barriers to entry and which operate across the different regions of the world economy. These global competitors enjoy most and often all of the ownership-specific Expert PDF Evaluation 2 advantages listed above. Many of them are the "prime movers" from America and Europe whose emergence in the late 19th century has been analysed by Chandler (Chandler, 1990). They were joined by the Japanese keiretsu in the 1960's and the South Korean chaebol in the 1980's. This paper will attempt to determine whether emerging Chinese champions are effectively acquiring sufficient ownership-specific advantages to have a hope of joining this group of global competitors. The analysis of China's greatest MNEs and outward FDI flows will show that both the type of ownership-specific advantages and the motivations of Chinese firms investing overseas differ radically from the global competitors of the developed economy. It will also show that, in that respect, Chinese firms are not following the internationalisation path of the Japanese keiretsu in the 1960's or the South Korean chaebol in the 1980's. The first part of the paper will provide an analysis of Chinese outward FDI outflows in an attempt to determine the importance of Chinese MNEs and their performance compared to other developing economies. It will also highlight the limitations of working with such an aggregate when it comes to the official Chinese data of foreign direct investment. The second part of this contribution will provide a qualitative analysis of the overseas projects made by Chinese MNEs. An attempt will be made to determine the technological level and the capital- intensity of their overseas operations. The extent of government protection and support extended to these largest firms and the sector in which they operate will be examined. It will be demonstrated that the largest Chinese firms are located in sectors which are heavily protected and aided by the Chinese central government. Finally, it will be made clear that that Chinese FDI outflows are predominantly motivated by the Chinese government's geopolitical objectives rather than by business profit maximisation. The third part of the paper will provide a comparative analysis of the performance of China's largest firms' with that of their global competitors. Aspects to be looked at include capital-intensity, profits and assets. This comparison has two purposes: to clearly delineate the existing gap between these two groups; and to compare the current relative situation of the largest Chinese firms with that of East Asian MNEs at the time of their overseas expansion. This will reveal that Chinese firms have a much lower degree of profitability and capital intensity than the largest Japanese and Korean firms had in the early stages of internationalising their business operations. The three first parts of this paper will highlight the weaknesses of the largest Chinese firms and the gap with their global competitors in terms of profitability, capital and technology intensity. It will be demonstrated that they are unlikely to transform themselves into global competitors without being sheltered by a strong Chinese state industrial policy, as was the case also for their South Korean and Japanese counterparts at a similar stage of their expansion. The fourth and fifth part of the paper will follow up on this by focusing on the capacity of the Chinese state to pursue a strategic trade and industrial policy necessary to transform its national champions into global competitors.
A key factor in the sustainability of China's economic growth is the potential of Chinese firms to develop innovative capabilities autonomously and international management know-how thus enabling them to move up the technological ladder of the production process and to globalise their operations. If successful, some Chinese firms will eventually develop their own brands and open up subsidiaries abroad like their Japanese and South Korean counterparts a few decades ago. If this is not achieved, then China's future growth could remain overly dependent on overseas markets and foreign technology. Chinese firms could remain highly competitive in traditional labour-intensive exports (such as the textile, lighters and toys industries of the Zhejiang province) or in relatively simple electric products (such as household appliance) but would not possess the capacity to become innovators of high tech products. The Chinese firms could only operate internationally in highly competitive industries characterised by low barriers to entry and with moderate margins while firms from the most advanced economies could continue to extract rents in industries characterised by high tech and/or differentiated products thanks to their technological innovation capacities and management know-how. The purpose of this paper will be to assess the capacity of China's largest firms to transform themselves into global competitors possessing ownership-specific advantages or intangible assets like some of their East Asian counterparts and to determine to what extent could the Chinese state pursue a strategic industrial policy to help them do so. The fact that a firm establishes a subsidiary abroad does not make it a global competitor, not even a Multinational Enterprise (MNE) or a Trans-National Corporation (TNC). According to United Nations' (UN) classification, to be considered as TNC or MNE, a firm must have subsidiaries in at least six different countries. Many Chinese firms satisfy these criteria and can be considered as MNEs. Nevertheless, there is a significant gap in terms of possession of intangible assets between being a multinational enterprise and a top global competitor. According to UN estimates, in 2004, there were 70,000 MNE which controlled 690,000 subsidiaries across the globe (El Mouhoub, 2006: 17). Obviously all of those firms cannot be considered as truly global competitors. To delineate more clearly the prerequisites necessary for a firm to evolve into a global competitor, this section will refer to Dunning's eclectic paradigm and OLI configuration. For Dunning, in order for a firm to transform itself into a MNE, it must possess "ownership-specific advantages". That is, intangible assets which constitute substantial barriers to entry for other potential competitors. Dunning lists the following assets: "product innovations, product management, organizational and marketing systems, innovatory capacity, organization of work, non-codifiable knowledge (bank of human capital experience), ability to reduce the cost of intra and/or inter-firm transactions" (Dunning, 1993: 81). Dunning also includes absolute cost advantages coming from a privileged access to inputs, learning by doing, "knowledge of international markets and operations", "capacity to learn from societal difference in organisational and managerial processes and systems" (Dunning, 1993: 81). In this paper, the term "global competitors" refers to incumbents of their industries which are protected by natural and strategic barriers to entry and which operate across the different regions of the world economy. These global competitors enjoy most and often all of the ownership-specific Expert PDF Evaluation 2 advantages listed above. Many of them are the "prime movers" from America and Europe whose emergence in the late 19th century has been analysed by Chandler (Chandler, 1990). They were joined by the Japanese keiretsu in the 1960's and the South Korean chaebol in the 1980's. This paper will attempt to determine whether emerging Chinese champions are effectively acquiring sufficient ownership-specific advantages to have a hope of joining this group of global competitors. The analysis of China's greatest MNEs and outward FDI flows will show that both the type of ownership-specific advantages and the motivations of Chinese firms investing overseas differ radically from the global competitors of the developed economy. It will also show that, in that respect, Chinese firms are not following the internationalisation path of the Japanese keiretsu in the 1960's or the South Korean chaebol in the 1980's. The first part of the paper will provide an analysis of Chinese outward FDI outflows in an attempt to determine the importance of Chinese MNEs and their performance compared to other developing economies. It will also highlight the limitations of working with such an aggregate when it comes to the official Chinese data of foreign direct investment. The second part of this contribution will provide a qualitative analysis of the overseas projects made by Chinese MNEs. An attempt will be made to determine the technological level and the capital- intensity of their overseas operations. The extent of government protection and support extended to these largest firms and the sector in which they operate will be examined. It will be demonstrated that the largest Chinese firms are located in sectors which are heavily protected and aided by the Chinese central government. Finally, it will be made clear that that Chinese FDI outflows are predominantly motivated by the Chinese government's geopolitical objectives rather than by business profit maximisation. The third part of the paper will provide a comparative analysis of the performance of China's largest firms' with that of their global competitors. Aspects to be looked at include capital-intensity, profits and assets. This comparison has two purposes: to clearly delineate the existing gap between these two groups; and to compare the current relative situation of the largest Chinese firms with that of East Asian MNEs at the time of their overseas expansion. This will reveal that Chinese firms have a much lower degree of profitability and capital intensity than the largest Japanese and Korean firms had in the early stages of internationalising their business operations. The three first parts of this paper will highlight the weaknesses of the largest Chinese firms and the gap with their global competitors in terms of profitability, capital and technology intensity. It will be demonstrated that they are unlikely to transform themselves into global competitors without being sheltered by a strong Chinese state industrial policy, as was the case also for their South Korean and Japanese counterparts at a similar stage of their expansion. The fourth and fifth part of the paper will follow up on this by focusing on the capacity of the Chinese state to pursue a strategic trade and industrial policy necessary to transform its national champions into global competitors.
Modern state has a distinction of possessing an amplified regulatory system - in practice it is difficult to name at least one industry or economic activity left without regulatory oversee. A close look at regulatory activities, especially regulatory activities in infrastructure industries, would suggest that a difference between public interest and economics has faded out (Kessides, Willing, 1995; Longley, 2003); other papers argue that often a regulatory institution is left to decide on its own what exactly "public interest", which is supposed to be defended by this institution, means (e.g., Condon, 2003).From the empirical view, in these cases the public interest's interpretation, which goes as a basis for regulatory decisions, might not coincide with the public interest per se; and even more, without a clear formulation and treatment of public interest, it might be misused at the stage of development as well as at the stage of implementing the regulatory policy. From the theoretical view, a distinct concept of public interest is relevant with regard to the fact that a major part of regulatory theories use the notion of public interest to justify the regulation as such, however, those theories do not analyze the public interest leaving it to be done by political science.The aim of this research was, with regard to achievements published in the theoretical literature, to provide a revised concept of public interest, which (the concept) would be correct in the view of political science and would be operational in the view of management for the purposes to employ it in the regulated industry. The research has justified the importance of a correct concept of public interest in the context of state regulation, analyzes the notion of public interest with regard to the four main historically developed approaches, analyzes the modern notion of public interest, and a revised concept of public interest is developed here; finally, the relevance of the revised concept of public interest to be used in a regulated industry is evaluated in the view of management.The first chapter analyzes the conception of the state regulation - a number of definitions of regulation are provided and three meanings of "regulation" are distinguished (a set of norms and specific prescriptions; state intervention of all kinds or the deliberate influence by the state; all the forms of social control disrespectfully of who implements it). The chapter also deals with regulatory theories - a dualistic-approach taxonomy is developed and two theories of regulation (those of public interest and reformulated public interest) are analyzed in detail. The analysis provided in this chapter enabled to conclude that regulatory theories, justifying regulation as a purpose of implementation of public interest, are the full·fledged stream of theoretical regulatory thought. Despite the fact that recently this stream acquires less attention by theoreticians, governments, planning and implementing the regulation of the economy and its reforms, more often than ever use the approach of regulation for the public interest sake and the out-flowing argumentation. Therefore, analysis of public interest remains an important component of the theoretical backgrounding of regulation.The second chapter provides the genesis and critics of the notion of public interest with regard to the four main historically developed approaches. The historical analysis of public interest has shown that none of the four approaches has provided a public interest concept that would be clear, universal and ready for effective usage within regulatory systems. The Public Contract approach clarified the discrepancy of public interest and private interest, emphasized the supremacy of the public interest over all the other interests, which (the supremacy) is achieved either by consensus or under compulsion; the approach did not elaborated on what exactly the public interest is. The Doctrine of Utilitarianism determined, how to measure the public interest, and endowed the mandate to implement public interest to administration, but this doctrine did not highlighted any possibility to eliminate the conflict between the public and the private interests. In the Laissez-Fair Doctrine, the public interest was an approach as the laissez-fair itself, i.e. the spontaneous satisfaction of interests of all the participants of the process. The forth approach to the public interest - as a goal of a higher level together with safeguarding the particular elements of society - was supposed to bring the benefit for all; however, this theoretical interpretation was convenient to widen the borders of state's intervention and to develop a nannystate. After the outcomes, their scale and directions were fully realized; a theoretical stream, completely denying the public interest as such, emerged.The critics of the traditional notion of public interest was structured into four main arguments: the (i) notion is indefinite, therefore it leaves space for conflicts; (ii) the indefiniteness of the notion necessitated a wider usage of the notion aiming to cover narrowed objectives, i.e. public interest became an outcome of activities instead of being a reason for it; (iii) the broad-brush nature of public interest stipulated oppression over individua1s and minorities, executed by collective organizations, (iv) the broad-brush nature also menaced individuality, variety, personal freedom and self-expression.The third chapter elaborates on the modem understanding of public interest, mainly with regard to the reborn liberal interpretation. The revised concept of public interest is formulated as follows: public interest is an overall, nonnative, conservative and equally to all applicable instrument, in the form of abstract norms providing better conditions to everyone for securing their own interests while utilizing their knowledge and their abilities in possession. This revised concept resolves the critical aspects applied to the traditional notion, and the elaboration is provided.Finally, the evaluation of the relevance of the revised concept for its use in a regulated industry is made, and the finding is that the revised concept of public interest is operational in the context of state regulation and is correct in the view of political science. ; Nustačius viešojo intereso svarbą atsižvelgiant į jo vietą reguliavimo teorijose, siejant jį su viešąja politika ir viešuoju administravimu, straipsnyje teorikai tiriama viešojo intereso koncepcija. Viešojo intereso analizė atliekama remiantis keturiais istorikai susiformavusiais požiūriais į viešąjį interesą - visuomeninės sutarties požiūriu, viešojo intereso kaip didžiausios naudos išraikos (utilitarizmo) požiūriu, viešojo intereso kaip pusiausvyros požiūriu bei viešojo intereso kaip aukštesniojo tikslo požiūriu, taip pat išanalizuota šiuolaikinė viešojo intereso samprata. Straipsnio rezultatas - remiantis moksliniais laimėjimais, publikuotais teorinėje literatūroje, pateikta patikslinta viešojo intereso sampratos formuluotė, kuri yra tinkama atlikti vadybos tyrimą bet kuriame ūkio sektoriuje ir korektika politikos mokslo požiūriu. Straipsnis yra teorinio pobūdžio.
The tobacco industry is a major political and legal force in Florida through campaign contributions, public relations efforts, lobbying and litigation, which at least from the late 1970s, has had a centralized political organization in Florida that defends and promotes its political and economic interests at the local and state levels of government. Although the industry has operated in the open in some political campaigns, it has also operated quietly behind the scenes, often through front groups, in various other state and local political campaigns. In Dade County in 1979, GASP of Miami ran a clean indoor air initiative without the active support of the local affiliates of the American Cancer Society, American Lung Association, and American Heart Association. Despite being outspent by the tobacco industry 90 to 1, GASP only lost by 820 votes. Had the health groups provided public and political support, the initiative may well have won, substantially increasing the momentum for clean indoor air ordinances in Florida and elsewhere. Prior to 1985, there were numerous ongoing local efforts to pass and enact a wide variety of local clean indoor ordinances. These efforts subsided considerably after the passage of the preemption clause in the weak Florida Clean Indoor Air Act (FCIAA) of 1985 which, at first, was supported by the American Cancer Society, American Lung Association, and American Heart Association. Since the passage of FCIAA, the tobacco industry has been able to stop all efforts by the three health groups and sympathetic politicians to repeal the preemption clause. After the passage of campaign contribution limit laws in 1991 in Florida, tobacco industry campaign contributions have been redirected away from individual candidates and to the two major political parties. In the 1993-1994 election cycle, the industry gave the largest amount of contributions with $475,000 given to the parties compared to $95,856 to political candidates. The largest contribution to a political party came from Philip Morris, which gave $382,500 to the Republican Party. These contributions in conjunction with others has reinvigorated the two major parties as political power brokers who provide their candidates with advertising, technical assistance, and paid staff. During the 1997-1998 electoral cycle, the tobacco industry's total campaign contributions were $398,194, with $310,250 given to the two major political parties in comparison to $84,194 for legislators. The Republican Party received $227,250 compared to the Democratic Party which received $82,500. The largest contribution to a political party came from Philip Morris, which contributed $125,000 to the Republican Party. In August 1997, Florida and the industry settled a Medicaid fraud lawsuit. Under the terms of the settlement, the industry agreed to pay Florida $11.3 billion, end outdoor billboards, pay for public anti-tobacco campaigns, remove vending machines from places accessible to children, end tobacco advertising on buses and trains, complete an anti-tobacco youth campaign within two years of the settlement, and not name the industry in anti-tobacco ads. Due to further negotiations with the industry, on September 11, 1998, the amount paid to Florida was increased to $13 billion and restrictions on the two year time limit regarding the youth anti-smoking campaign and specifically naming the industry in anti-tobacco advertisements were lifted. After February 1998, Florida began an effort to establish a $200 million youth anti-smoking campaign called the Tobacco Pilot Program in an effort to meet the two year deadline. The Tobacco Pilot Program has engaged in an extensive media campaign known as the "Truth Campaign" which began in late April 1998 and included tough in-your-face print, billboard, and media advertisements which ran throughout Florida. The major theme of this campaign is that Florida youth should choose "Truth" rather than use tobacco and be targets of industry advertising manipulation in the use of tobacco. A report released on March 17, 1999 by the Florida Department of Health, Office of Tobacco Control regarding the progress of the Tobacco Pilot Program indicated that the Tobacco Pilot Program and its anti-tobacco media advertising campaign, in less than a year, had a substantial impact on influencing a significant number of Florida teens not to smoke. From February 1998 to 1999, the number of teens who were current smokers (smoked in the last 30 days) dropped from 23.3% to 20.9%. This represented 31,000 fewer Florida teenagers who were current smokers. These results represent the best results ever obtained in a large scale primary prevention program. Although new Republican Governor Jeb Bush publicly called for the continuation of the Tobacco Pilot Program and the Truth Campaign, the program's funding was reduced from $70.5 million to $45.2 million (-36%) for the 1999-2000 Fiscal Year due to legislative votes by Republican colleagues in the House and the Senate to substantially reduce the funding of the program. These cuts were made despite public opinion polls showing that 49% of the public supported the program without any cuts and 30% supported the program with the $8.5 million cut proposed by Governor Bush. Two projects of the Tobacco Pilot Program which are crucial to maintaining the viability of the program including the Truth Campaign and administrative support for the Students Working Against Tobacco (SWAT) also received large budgetary reductions. While the Tobacco Pilot Program received substantial funding cuts in the 1999 Legislative Session, funding for the American Heart Association's Youth Fitness Program of $3 million and $1 million for the Just The Facts program which was derived from the $45.2 million Tobacco Pilot Program budget, would have reduced the amount of funding for projects directly oriented towards tobacco control efforts to $41.2 million for 1999-2000. On May 27, 1999, Governor Bush vetoed these two diversionary projects, as well as the $2.5 million Sports for Life project which was related to tobacco control, further reducing the program's funding of projects directly related to tobacco control efforts from $70.5 million to $38.7 million (-45.1%). For the past twenty years, a consistent pattern has emerged with respect to the American Cancer Society, the American Heart Association, and the American Lung Association missing key political opportunities that would have significantly advanced anti-tobacco efforts and public health in Florida. These lost opportunities included failing to support GASP of Miami in its 1979 Dade County clean indoor air initiative, supporting the preemption clause in the Florida Clean Indoor Air Act of 1985 which essentially quashed a blossoming grassroots anti-tobacco movement, and failing to forcefully advocate for the Tobacco Pilot Program by holding specific legislators directly and publicly accountable for the substantial funding cuts that occurred in the 1999 Legislative Session.
[spa] Este trabajo de investigación trata sobre Geografía de Puertos. Es un tema tradicionalmente poco seguido por los profesionales del país en comparación a otras especialidades geográficas, y pese a que en los últimos años se han elaborado interesantes investigaciones aplicadas sobre temas marítimos y portuarios, escasean todavía las aportaciones teóricas sobre estas cuestiones. Con esta tesis es pretende contribuir a la expansión de los estudios portuarios, confeccionando una síntesis teórica sobre el cuerpo disciplinario de la Geografía Portuaria (origen, contenido temático, métodos de trabajo, estudios geográficos portuarios, bibliografía reciente significativa, etc.). Tanto las reflexiones teóricas como la extensa bibliografía -unas 900 fichas clasificadas temáticamente- son instrumentos de trabajo útiles que facilitan la tarea a futuros investigadores que opten por esta línea geográfica. El contenido de la Tesis está estructurado en dos niveles de enfoque distinto. La Parte Primera que presenta el estudio de los puertos marítimos en Geografía y la Parte Segunda que comenta la especificación y el estado actual de la Geografía Portuaria forman el cuerpo teórico del trabajo. En cuanto al otro bloque que estructura el contenido tiene un carácter aplicado: la Parte Tercera se dedica a analizar la proyección exterior del puerto de Barcelona en la actualidad (finales de la década de los ochenta). La Parte Primera presenta las especialidades geográficas que han potenciado el estudio de los puertos marítimos, y explica la influencia que han tenido en la expansión de los análisis de temas portuarios, la revolución técnica del transporte y la nueva organización económica, política y jurídica de los asuntos marinos, posteriores a la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Otros capítulos de esta Parte Primera exponen que dos hechos recientes han provocado la revalorización del estudio de los puertos marítimos por los geógrafos: a) la incidencia de los grandes puertos comerciales en la expansión territorial, y b) la conversión de las metrópolis portuarias en centros mundiales de comercio exterior. Finalmente se valora la orientación y los contenidos de la nueva Geografía Marina, que es una especialidad de reciente consolidación que integra múltiples fenómenos que se relacionan con el mar. En la segunda parte se juzga la identidad de la Geografía de Puertos, evidenciando que a mediados de los años cincuenta tomó cuerpo esta concepción, y que durante la segunda mitad del siglo se han ido desarrollando sus principios teóricos (ámbitos espaciales de estudio, escalas, contenido temático, métodos de trabajo, etc.). Luego se pasa a comentar el estado actual de la Geografía Portuaria en los Departamentos Universitarios de los países que más han contribuido a su desarrollo (docencia, investigación, equipos de especialistas, etc.) Esta exposición es el resultado de una encuesta enviada a más de noventa geógrafos maritimistas de unos veinte países. La Parte Segunda concluye con la evaluación geográfica de los puertos marítimos en España. La última parte de la Tesis se inicia con un conjunto de reflexiones conceptuales sobre las áreas de influencia portuaria. Después de presentar esquemáticamente los rasgos característicos del puerto de Barcelona en su faceta de centro de comercio internacional, se procede al análisis de su proyección exterior espacial, que se lleva a cabo, 1) delimitando sus áreas de influencia exterior, - "foreland" global, "foreland" sectorial y conectividad interportuaria-, y 2) estudiando la organización de la red de comunicaciones regulares oceánicas internacionales. En cada caso se expone previamente la metodología aplicada: fuentes estadísticas usadas, reconversiones de categorías arancelarias de mercancías, índices internacionales, confección de las escalas espaciales de referencia, etc. El resultado de estos análisis, que se expresa además cartográficamente, permite conocer a) cuáles son los territorios ultramarinos -puertos y países-, que se relacionan con el puerto de Barcelona mediante los flujos de mercancías y barcos, originados por los mecanismos de su comercio exterior marítimo, b) cuál es el grado de intensidad de las relaciones, según distintas variables: tonelaje y valor de los flujos globales de mercancías y de estos mismos según categorías macroeconómicas, y frecuencia de los contactos náuticos interportuarios. El texto de la Tesis, que se estructura en las tres partes comentadas, hace continua referencia a la Bibliografía y al Apéndice documental, que aparecen al final. Otro volumen recoge las estadísticas usadas para analizar la proyección exterior del puerto de Barcelona. Se trata de datos no publicados y algunos sin ningún tipo de elaboración, que primero se tuvieron que copiar manualmente y luego un sistema de hoja electrónica de cálculo. ; [eng] With this investigative research, the intention has been to contribute to the expansion of maritime research in Spain, firstly by creating a theoretical base for the disciplinary body of Port Geography (origin, thematic content, methodology, conceptual discussions, current world status of Port Geography studies, significant recent publications, etc.), and in the second place, bringing about an analysis of the spatial distribution of commercial transportation negotiated through the Port of Barcelona. The first part presents the geographic majors which have traditionally encouraged the study of maritime ports, explaining how economic, urban, social, political and regional analysis geography majors have adressed and analyzed the subject of Port Geography. In addition, port studies undertaken in the context of new Marine Geography, a recently created major which combines all areas of study related to the ocean, is evaluated. The second part assesses the identity of Port Geography. How this emergence took shape during the fifties and how principle theories have developed throughout the second half of the century (spatial limits of study, scales, types of analysis, thematic content, methodology, etc.). Next, the current status of Port Geography in the University Departments of the countries which have most contributed to its development (education, research, teams of specialists, etc.). This section ends with the evaluation of geographical studies of maritime ports in Spain. In the final part of the Thesis, which is of an applied nature, the foreign spatial projection of the port of Barcelona is analyzed, 1) delimiting the global "foreland", the sectorial "foreland", and interport connectivity, and 2) studying the organization of the international oceanic communications network. The result of the analysis, which is also expressed cartographically, illustrates: a) the overseas territories -ports/countries- related to Barcelona through traffic of merchandise and ships engaged in international maritime commerce, b) the intensity of foreign relations, according to specific variables: tonnage and value of the flow of global merchandise, by macroeconomic categories, and frecuency of interport nautical contacts.
In: Sociologia ruralis, Band 9, Heft 4, S. 321-332
ISSN: 1467-9523
SummaryRealizing the necessity of attending to the social, human and institutional problems of agriculture and rural life, the European Conference on Rural Life in Bad Godesberg, Federal Republic of Germany, April 1957, recommended establishing a Working Party of experts (a) to coordinate rural sociological research in Europe, and (b) to ensure closer association of rural sociologists with those engaged in technical and economic research in the rural field. Since 1958, the Working Party has held seven meetings. The first four were held under ad hoc arrangements. In 1964 it became a regular subsidiary body of the European Commission of Agriculture with its first regular session in Paris and the second in Maynooth, Ireland (1966). The third session in Wageningen, in August 1968, was at the invitation of the Government of the Netherlands.A list of 18 scientific reports and studies on different aspects of rural life in Europe indicates a satisfactory development by the Working Party during the past decade. While encouraging, it is yet too early for a true assessment of accomplishments. However, the contribution of the FAO Secretariat and the utilization of its limited funds have been fruitful.The collaboration of the member Governments, the interested international organizations, as well as the European Society for Rural Sociology have all contributed to the growth of rural sociology in Europe. The Working Party has reached a new stage and should now take a wider view of its activities. It should consider a broader application of sociology in the solution of agricultural development problems. It may even look beyond Europe and consider some of the urgent problems besetting humanity in the developing countries.RésuméAyant pris conscience de la nécessité de se préoccuper des problèmes institutionnels, humains et sociaux de l'agriculture, la Conférence Européenne de la Vie Rurale qui se tint à Bad‐Godesberg (R.F.A.) en avril 1957, préconisa la constitution d'un groupe de travail, composé d'experts, afin de coordonner la recherche sociologique en Europe, d'assurer une collaboration plus étroite entre les sociologues ruraux et les chercheurs, économistes ou techniciens. Depuis 1958, le groupe de travail s'est réuni 7 fois. Les quatre premières réunions eurent lieu selon une procédure ad hoc, mais en 1964, le groupe de travail devint un organe régulier de la Commission Européenne de l'Agriculture. Sa première session se déroula a Paris, en 1964 et la seconde à Maynooth, Irlande (1966). La troisième session se tint sur l'invitation du gouvernement des Pays‐Bas, à Wageningen, en Août 1968.Un ensemble de 18 rapports et études scientifiques portant sur différents aspects de la vie rurale en Europe prouvent que pendant ces dix années les activités du groupe de travail se sont développées de manière satisfaisante. Bien que les résultats en soient encourageants, il est encore trop tôt pour que Ton puisse faire un bilan de ces activités. Cependant, la contribution du Secrétariat de la FAO ainsi que l'aide financière qu'elle a assurée, se sont révélées, bien que modestes, très fructueuses.La collaboration des gouvernements membres, des organisations internationales intéressées ainsi que de la Société Européenne de Sociologie Rurale, a contribué au développement de la sociologie rurale en Europe. Le groupe de travail a désormais atteint une nouvelle étape. II doit élargir le champ de ses activités et envisager une plus large participation de la sociologie à la solution des problèmes que pose le développement agricole. Ses préoccupations doivent également dépasser le cadre européen et prendre en considération les problèmes urgents qui assaillent l'humanité dans les pays en voie de développement.ZusammenfassungDie europäische Konferenz über Probleme des ländlichen Lebens in Bad Godesberg, Bundesrepublik Deutschland, im April 1957, war sich über die Notwendigkeit klar, die sozialen, menschlichen und institutionellen Probleme der Landwirtschaft und des Dorfes zu beachten. Sie empfahl daher, eine Arbeitsgruppe aus Experten zu bilden, um (a) die Forschung in Landsoziologie in Europa zu koordinieren, (b) eine engere Verbindung der Landsoziologen mit den Fachleuten der technischen und wirtschaftlichen Forschung auf dem Gebiet der Landwirtschaft herzustellen. Seit 1958 hat die Arbeitsgruppe sieben Tagungen abgehalten. Die ersten vier waren ad hoc‐Sitzungen. 1964 wurde die Arbeitsgruppe in ein ordentliches Organ der Europäischen Landwirtschaftskommission umgewandelt. Ihre erste ordentliche Sitzung fand in Paris statt, die zweite in Maynooth, Irland, 1966. Die dritte Tagung im August 1968 fand auf Einladung der Niederländischen Regierung in Wageningen statt.Eine Liste von 19 wissenschaftlichen Berichten und Untersuchungen ùber die verschiedenen Aspekte des ländlichen Lebens in Europa bezeugt eine befriedigende Entwicklung der Arbeitsgruppe im vergangenen Jahrzehnt. Wenn ihre Leistungen auch ermutigend sind, ist es dennoch zu früh, sie voll zu beurteilen. Die Unterstützung des FAO‐Sekretariats und die Ausnutzung seiner begrenzten Mittel haben jedoch Früchte getragen.Die beteiligten Regierungen, die interessierten internationalen Organisationen und die Europäische Gesellschaft für ländliche Soziologie haben alle zur Entwicklung der Landsoziologie in Europa beigetragen. Die Arbeitsgruppe hat eine neue Etappe erreicht und sollte nun ihre zukünftige Tätigkeit unter einem weiteren Blickwinkel erwägen. Sie sollte eine breitere Anwendung der Soziologie bei der Lösung der landwirtschaftlichen Entwicklungsprobleme in Betracht Ziehen. Ferner müsste sie auch über Europa hinaussehen und einige der drängenden Probleme erörtern, die die Menschen in den Entwicklungsländern beschäftigen.ResumenLa conferencia europea sobre los problemas de la vida rural efectuada en Bad Godesberg, República Federal Alemana tenía por objeto hacer notar los problemas sociales, humanos e institucionales de la agricultura como asimismo de las aldeas rurales. De allí surgió la recomendación de fundar un Grupo de Expertos para a) coordinar la investigatión sobre Sociologiá Rural en Europa, b) fomentar un estrecho contacto entre los sociólogos rurales, los técnicos y los cientificos dentro del dominio agrícola. Desde 1958 ha celebrado el grupo siete jornadas. Las cuatro primeras se han realizado bajo condiciones ad hoc. En 1964 se transformó el Grupo de Trabajo en un organismo regular de la Comisión Europea Agrícola. La primera reunión fue efectuada en París, la segunda en Maynooth, Irlanda, en 1966. La tercera reunión se realizó a instancias del gobierno de los Países Bajos, en Wageningen, en 1968.Una lista con diecinueve informes e investigaciones técnicas sobre los distintos aspectos de la vida rural en Europa testimonia un satisfactorio desarrollo del Grupo de Trabajo en la década pasada. Si bien los comienzos de la obra son alentadores es aún demasiado temprano para emitir juicios. El apoyo de la Secretaría de la FAO y el aprovechamento de sus limitados medios ha mostrado sus frutos.Los colaboradores de los gobiernos participantes, las organizaciones internacionales interesadas y la Sociedad Europea de Sociología Rural han contribuído al desarrollo de la Sociología Rural en Europa. El Grupo de Trabajo ha alcanzado una nueva etapa y debe considerar ahora otros diferentes puntos de vista. Deberá asimismo conseguir una mayor aplicación de la Sociología teniendo en cuenta la solutión de los problemas del desarrollo agrícola. Debe también asomarse fuera de Europa y atender algunos problemas urgentes que preocupan a los habitantes de los países en vías de desarrollo.
Having reached the mark of 2,118 delegates, Barack Obama has gone from candidate in the closest head-to-head primary ever to presumptive nominee. Appropriately, he will accept the nomination at the August convention in Denver, on the 45th anniversary of Martin Luther King's "I have a dream" speech. This is political history in the making: he is the first African-American to be the head of the presidential ticket of a major party. After years of angst and self doubt, there is a renewed optimism on the street, and a whole new group of voters has been mobilized. However, Obama, who has run on a message of hope and change, faces an extremely difficult path ahead. His vulnerabilities have become apparent in the succession of events over the last few weeks of this long primary season.He lost nine of the last fourteen primaries, including South Dakota, where he was favored (55% to 45%), and Puerto Rico (68% to 42%); he has had to cut ties with his Church due to its radicalism and anti-establishment stance, and, one day after Obama claimed the nomination, one of his top fund-raisers was found guilty of wire fraud and money laundering in a federal court in Chicago. Now his campaign will have to overcome this dry patch and move forward to the greater challenge, that of defeating McCain. His next task at hand is to choose a vice-president, and this, too, poses a serious dilemma.In the first place, Hillary Rodham-Clinton took five days to acknowledge defeat, giving cause for some speculation that she is pressing for the vice-presidential spot with the implied threat that she will continue fighting all the way to the convention. She has the right to do so, if we consider the fact that she has won all of the big states and probably a larger number of the popular vote (around 18 million). And, as she not so humbly claims, she is the more experienced candidate who could better stand up to McCain. On the other hand, there is great concern that Barack's image as the unconventional, charismatic, post-modern Washington outsider will be damaged if he chooses her. So the decision will require reflection, pondering and a lot of vetting interviews of alternative candidates.Much ink will be spent in speculating why Hillary lost the primary. Here, I will just offer a few reflections, leaving the second guessing of the way her campaign was run to those who will manically analyze every decision taken, every tactic used, every gesture, every word, and will have their eureka moments when finding the flaw, the error, the underestimation that brought her down. And yet, quite often fate, luck and other imponderables irrevocably determine the outcome of a narrow race, regardless of the brilliant strategies of the campaign managers, advisers and other experts. It has already been said that Rodham Clinton started her campaign as the inevitable candidate, as the incumbent, and that her sense of entitlement turned many voters away. At the same time, her main message was one of change, of moving forward, of undoing the Bush legacy, but Obama co-opted that message, and he was much more convincing as an agent of change. Hillary began her campaign running not as a woman, but as the most hardened and experienced, candidate that would deliver both peace and prosperity to all Americans. Obama ran from the beginning as the post-racial candidate and this theme remained constant throughout his campaign. She was trying to woo independents and disaffected Republicans and had thus to prove that she was as tough as John McCain. Obama had no intention of treading down that path, which he derided as part of the Washington game. Instead, he stuck fearlessly to his convictions. It was this independent streak, his absolute confidence in the soundness of his cool, post-modern world vision that was irresistible to the young voters. This should not obfuscate the fact that both ran historic campaigns and have unremittingly shattered the barriers of gender and race in American politics at the highest level. Still, the promise of change was more credible when pledged by the young unknown than by the seasoned insider. With no substantial philosophical differences between the two, the richer contrast was all inspiration and charisma versus politics as usual.First of all, we need to consider a fundamental fact: even if the media and their respective campaigns have played up the differences between the two candidates, their basic policy choices and ideologies are one and the same. From health care to fiscal policy, from education to foreign policy, there may be some minimal disagreements but they both share the basic ideology of more equitable economic distribution, protection of civil rights and overall tolerance toward others that typify Democrats in the United States. Some observers may bring up Hillary's vote in favor of the Iraqi invasion of 2003 as evidence of an important disagreement, and also a cause of her loss of popularity in the early stages of the campaign. That certainly did her harm, which is ironic because, in academic and political circles alike, few believe it represents her real conviction. As a Senator for New York and a future presidential candidate, she carefully chose to vote in favor of a war that, in October 2002, had a high rate of approval among the population, who had clearly bought the Republican idea that the invasion "over there" would make us safer "over here". At the time, she hedged that gamble against the fact that "there was enough evidence" Saddam was piling up WMDs, which had little to do with 9-11 and Al Qaeda. But a scared populace is an easy target for deception and false reassurances. Intent on proving her masculine toughness on security issues, she fell into the Republican trap. Five years down the road, this carefully measured decision came back to haunt her, and the controversy over that vote generated an enormous surge of support for Obama that might have created the momentum that helped him win the early contests, namely, the Iowa caucuses and the wins of February 5th. This momentum, coupled with the televised debates, proved he was a worthy, viable candidate; it brought the media to his side and attracted new voters. He irradiated a cool self-assurance, a subdued charm, an understated intelligence that was indeed enchanting to young voters, to black voters and to hard core Democrats tired of the vitriol of Washington. The country, it seemed, was ready for Obama. His timing was impeccable and had the effect of making Rodham-Clinton look tired, strident and blasé. The media had found its golden boy and started treating Hillary as the intruder, who would do anything to prevent a new Camelot.After his initial sweep, Hillary slowly started to recover and as the campaign progressed, her message became more focused and she found her voice. She switched strategies and, from being the more experienced candidate that would deliver peace and prosperity to all Americans, she turned back to her traditional constituencies, namely, women and blue-collar workers. Speaking to her strengths, namely, her devotion to public service and her familiarity with the intricacies of policy-making, she became a great communicator that invariably connected with her audiences. And she started winning again.Even those that dislike her have to acknowledge her skills as a campaigner, her endurance and poise under tremendous pressure and, more importantly, her dramatic recovery of the popular vote towards the end of the campaign, which made her claim to bring this battle to the convention quite legitimate. Her wins in Pennsylvania, Ohio and West Virginia, as well as her immense support in the Hispanic community as shown by the Puerto Rican vote, cannot be discounted by the party when it looks ahead to the national election in November.One should bear in mind that these primaries were the closest contest in primary history, and in spite of having the whole media establishment against her from the beginning, Hillary did not at any time show signs of faltering or self-doubt and never allowed herself to make the road easier for Obama. She stayed on message, speaking to the issues, proving she was ready to become the first woman president. Both her competency and her warmth gained her a huge following. But once she lost the media she also started losing the super-delegates from inside the party. One after the other, the big names in the party started lining up behind Obama: Tom Daschle, Ted and Caroline Kennedy, Christopher Dodd, Bill Richardson, and towards the end, even John Edwards.This took many by surprise, and is related to another phenomenon that very few had perceived before: the animosity that the Clintons, especially Bill, provoke from within the party itself. Although Bill and Hillary are the most powerful brand name in the Democratic Party, there is a surprising amount of anger against them that had remained latent till now. Bill Clinton's harsh remarks in South Carolina primary astonished many and may have hurt her campaign, reinforcing the perception that the Clintons would do anything, even play the race card, in order to win the White House.Then there was the question of demographics and identity politics. Although Rodham-Clinton attempted to run as the candidate for all, after the first losses and as she increasingly won the vote of women and blue collar workers, she turned to her natural constituencies. She started running as a woman and as the champion of the working class. In her new more populist persona, she also won among Jews, Catholics and rural workers. Obama did best among college educated youth, intellectuals and black voters. In other words, they both win the identity vote. Identity has come up often during the campaign, and not in a positive way. Irate at the way the media were treating Hillary and indulging Obama especially in interviews (there was even a sketch in Saturday Night Live that parodied this noticeable difference), Geraldine Ferraro accused the media of sexism and went as far as saying that Obama would not be treated with so much deference if he was a white man. After disproportionate outcry by the media and the public, Clinton had to fire Ferraro as her advisor. Thus, bringing up sexism completely backfired for Hillary.The irony once again, is that Identity Politics is most likely the prism through which both Hillary and Obama, see America: as a society divided by categories of class, gender, race, ethnicity and sexual preference. His as well as her policies are informed by this view. But Obama skillfully downplays it and tries to portray himself as the candidate for all Americans who want change and are tired of Washington politics. He does not deny that race and gender play a role in politics but prefers not to bring it up since it is "not productive". His strategy has paid off so far, but this topic will certainly be revisited in the national election. Due to his background and life experience, McCain has a very different view based on patriotism and service to the country, on individual responsibility and a common civic culture. He will find a way to turn the notion of Identity Politics against Obama, who, in spite of his unifying message, often speaks about redressing balances and ending injustice.Finally, the closeness of the race and the resilience of these two formidable candidates were again in display towards its end, and led to a new critical stage. The momentum that had carried Obama through the early and middle stages started to weaken. As time went by, more scrutiny brought up the issue of his membership in a radical Black Liberation Theology Church, the (inane) fact that he did not wear a US flag pin on his lapel (a symbol of patriotism that became particularly important after 9-11, when even academics came under no small degree of peer pressure to wear one), and this past week, the conviction by a Chicago federal jury of former fund-raiser and friend, Antoin Retzko.As momentum weakened, and as Clinton seemed to resurrect and come closer to Obama in the delegate count, party rules regarding delegate selection became more important . Because in most primaries there has been an early front-runner, and because the last primary contest that had to be taken all the way to the convention without a presumptive nominee was in 1976, very few party leaders and even fewer journalists are aware of the rules. As they began to play out, we were all submitted to a crash course on these intra-party rules. The Democratic Party has a centralized structure, so all states play by the same rules, and its selection system is based on proportional representation, the most democratic form of representation: within each state, any candidate that reaches a threshold of 15% of votes is allocated delegates proportionally to the vote. This, while it is better for representation, tends to prolong the race and make it closer. While Clinton was recovering and making important gains, Obama still continued to pick up a few delegates here and there, and the media kept its constant drum roll in his favor. Super-delegates were swayed to his side, irrevocably. In contrast, Republicans have a decentralized structure so that each state establishes its own rules, and most choose a winner-take-all selection system. This system, while less democratic and representative, enabled them to have a clear winner by March, with all the advantages that that entails.This year a very peculiar situation arose out of Michigan and Florida, where the state governments scheduled the primaries too early, in breach of the Democratic Party rules, so the Democratic National Committee determined they would not seat their delegates. There were 313 delegates at stake. Obama withdrew his name from the ballot in Michigan, and did not campaign in Florida. Clinton won both. At that time nobody thought this issue would become decisive for the nomination, but in such a close race, it certainly did. Last weekend the DNC met with representative so both sides and settled on a formula that allocated delegates to both in a very non-scientific way. It gave each of those delegated half a vote at the convention. While the formula was accepted by both sides, it has been perceived as a bonus for Obama, whose name was not even on the ballot in Michigan and yet he still got delegates allocated. This may still come up again at the National Convention in August. Many factors have thus combined to make Obama the presumptive nominee of the Democratic Party. In addition to momentum and rules we should also consider the fortunate pairing of Obama to the spirit of the times. The timing for an unconventional candidate could not have been better, and he emerged as the prophetic leader the times demanded. His demeanor, his background, and his non-assuming attitude, all make for the perfect post-modern candidate. The public embraced him and the media anointed him. Now, the question still remains, is his "gift of grace" strong enough to unify America? Can he summon the support he needs to win a national election? Given the complex electoral system based on state votes and an electoral college, and not on the popular vote, can he win the major states and the swing states?Here is where the selection of a vice-president becomes crucial.There is a big movement both from the grassroots and from Clintonites inside the party (yes, there are still some left!) to pressure Obama to pick Hillary as running mate. There are of course, both huge advantages and dismal disadvantages for Obama to ponder in his selection. His first consideration must be to win the election, but he also needs to be able to govern, once he wins.Hillary would bring in those votes that have eluded Obama: mature women, blue collar, rural. Seventy-six of her supporters want her to be Vice-president. She energizes audiences and has won the hearts of all those groups above-mentioned. They feel very strongly about her place in History and demand respect for their candidate. Some may not even come out to vote if Obama's ticket does not include her. She would also help win the big states (she won them all, among them California, Texas and New York) and the swing states, noticeable among them, Ohio, that determined Bush's victory in 04. On the other hand, she does evoke the past in the minds of many voters, and she is now undoubtedly a Washington insider (in fact, her experience has been counted as both an asset and a liability in this sense). She would distort Obama's image as the unconventional candidate, and his message of change and hope may be, if not lost, at least diminished.Insofar as governing, their ideologies and policy positions are perfectly compatible, if not identical, so that would not constitute a problem. She has been studying the intricacies of policy and politics since she was a university student at Wellesley College. She is capable, efficient, convincing and tireless. She is experienced in navigating the meandering straits of policy making, and can muster bipartisan support with her well-reasoned arguments.Another often-mentioned handicap is Bill Clinton himself. With his larger than life personality, can he play prince consort? Or would he be the one that governs behind the scenes, and have his own shadow cabinet, Cheney-style? His reputation has suffered a lot lately, not any more because of that infamous blue dress but because he has not disclosed the list of donors to his library, among which there allegedly are several Middle Eastern governments. There is real vitriol against him, and that is directly transferred to Hillary.For now, both candidates seem to be catching their breaths.Hillary postponed her concession speech for as long as possible, some say to put pressure on Obama to include her in the ticket. Barack, on his part, has quietly named a vetting team for a vice-presidential search. Caroline Kennedy is among its members, as is Eric Holden, President Clinton's former attorney- general. It is headed by Jim Johnson, former Chairman of Fannie Mae, who vetted VPs for John Kerry and Walter Mondale. After exhaustive interviews and background checks, Obama will decide.In the last two months of the campaign, the pundits were prone to repeating that the "math" was against Hillary. This was a gross oversimplification of a race that was characterized by peculiar circumstances and surprises at every turn, and one which was less about math than about intangibles: momentum, media frenzy, rules, emotions, charisma and zeitgeist . In the end, however, it may all very well come down to the "math": if Barack can be convinced that he needs Hillary to win against McCain, then he will pick her as his VP and put the rest of his concerns aside. This will also heal party wounds and bring into the fold her loyal constituencies. But public opinion is fickle, politics is an inexact science and many times emotions can trump the best thought- out and scientifically devised plans. Like Sisyphus rolling the boulder up the mountain, Obama may find he has to prove himself all over again and then come out empty-handed in November.In the meantime, and just for good measure, Obama, the "transformative candidate" is now wearing a US flag pin on his lapel.Puerto Ricans do not have the right to vote in national elections due to the "associated state "status, but they can vote in primary elections.This dynamic in the relationship between momentum and rules has been pointed out in a recent article by Jason Bello and Robert Shapiro, published in the Political Science Quarterly, vol. 123 No.1 Spring 08.Super delegates are unpledged party leaders who do not have to declare their presidential preferences until balloting takes place at the ConventionSenior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia
Mit der Einführung des SGB II im Jahr 2005 wurden Arbeitslosen- und Sozialhilfe zur Grundsicherung für erwerbsfähige Hilfsbedürftige zusammengelegt. Ziel der Arbeitsmarktreformen war es auch, Leistungsempfänger zu aktivieren und möglichst schnell zu integrieren. Damit hat sich die Arbeitsmarktpolitik von einem bloßen Versorgungssystem entfernt und die Betreuung einerseits sowie die Zumutungen andererseits verstärkt. Die Diskussion über die Folgen dieser Reformen beherrscht weiterhin die öffentliche Diskussion in Deutschland. Vier Jahre nach der Einführung ist es Zeit für eine erste Zwischenbilanz. Der hier vorgelegte Bericht fasst die Forschungsergebnisse zum SGB II zusammen, die das IAB erarbeitet hat und stellt die Befunde in einen größeren Zusammenhang. So wird der Stand des Wissens zum Übergang vom alten in das neue System, zum Prozess und zur Wahrnehmung von Aktivierung und Betreuung, zu den Instrumenten und deren Wirkung sowie zur Bedeutung der Reform für den Arbeitsmarkt beschrieben. Damit zeigt der Band auch auf, wo die Forschung zur Grundsicherung heute steht und welche Fragen künftig zu beantworten sind. Die Wirkung des Gesetzes auf verschiedene Dimensionen gesellschaftlicher Teilhabe bildet den roten Faden der Darstellung.
