The Prohibition of Propaganda for War in International Human Rights Treaties
In: The Prohibition of Propaganda for War in International Law, S. 133-190
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In: The Prohibition of Propaganda for War in International Law, S. 133-190
In: Handbook of Transportation Policy and Administration; Public Administration and Public Policy, S. 505-521
In: (2007) 25:2 Nordic Journal of Human Rights 140-157
SSRN
In: Berliner Debatte Initial: sozial- und geisteswissenschaftliches Journal, Heft 1, S. 4-13
ISSN: 0863-4564
In: West European politics, Band 30, Heft 1, S. 220-221
ISSN: 0140-2382
In: Canadian journal of political science: CJPS = Revue canadienne de science politique : RCSP, Band 40, Heft 1, S. 278-279
ISSN: 0008-4239
In: Journal of Latin American studies, Band 39, Heft 2, S. 425-426
ISSN: 0022-216X
In: SAIS Review, Band 27, Heft 1, S. 147-157
Resource populism is a dominant feature of today's energy market: politicians around the world are attacking oil companies with both words & deeds. This battle has caused tension & has amplified business risk, the result being reduced investment in future energy projects. And although there appears to be no end in sight, there is still hope that the trend towards more resource populism is not sustainable in the long term; sooner or later politicians will need to reach out to the oil companies they have made a habit of demonizing. Adapted from the source document.
In: Défense nationale et sécurité collective. [Französische Ausgabe], Band 63, Heft 5, S. 70-78
ISSN: 1950-3253, 0336-1489
In: Foreign affairs, Band 86, Heft 6, S. 183
ISSN: 0015-7120
In: Der Donauraum: Zeitschrift des Institutes für den Donauraum und Mitteleuropa, Band 46, Heft 3-4, S. 183-193
ISSN: 2307-289X
In: Perspectives on politics, Band 4, Heft 4
ISSN: 1541-0986
In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Band 39, Heft 9, S. 1133-1156
ISSN: 1552-3829
What explains the variation of trade protection across countries and years? The author argues that other things equal, democracies with strong parties will choose freer trade policies. He focuses on two aspects of party strength—organizational centralization and stable party linkages to large groups of the electorate. He contends that legislative logrolls leading to high protection are significantly less likely when parties are centralized. Furthermore, because parties with stable connections to the electorate have longer time horizons, the author argues that they will generally support more open trade policies that provide long-run economic benefits. Finally, he contends that parties linked to large electoral groups—as measured by district size—will prefer public goods such as freer trade over trade patronage. After coding a measure of party centralization developed by Cary and Shugart (1995), the author conducts a quantitative analysis of democracies from 1975-2000. His results support the theory and highlight an understudied institution in trade policy.
In: Environmental and resource economics, Band 34, Heft 4, S. 535-563
ISSN: 1573-1502
In: Asia policy: a peer-reviewed journal devoted to bridging the gap between academic research and policymaking on issues related to the Asia-Pacific, Band 1, Heft 1, S. 89-108
ISSN: 1559-2960