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The Allen-Unger Database contains price series for commodities from locations in Europe from the late Middle Ages to 1914 and also from cities in the Americas, the Middle East and the Far East. It is also possible to search for series by date range, location and commodity or any combination of the three. Data are reported in Excel spreadsheets with the files downloadable. The Database serves as a useful tool for various forms of research in economic history and in social history with the information presented in an easily accessible and flexible format. The data are available at three different sites, each with its own unique features and advantages.

According to political theory, the primary function of the modern state is to protect its citizens--both from each other and from external enemies. Yet it is the states that essentially commit major forms of violence, such as genocides, ethnic cleansings, and large-scale massacres, against their own citizens. In this book Paul Dumouchel argues that this paradoxical reversal of the state's primary function into violence against its own members is not a mere accident but an ever-present possibility that is inscribed in the structure of the modern state. Modern states need enemies to exist and to persist, not because they are essentially evil but because modern politics constitutes a violent means of protecting us against our own violence. If they cannot--if we cannot--find enemies outside the state, they will find them inside. However, this institution is today coming to an end, not in the sense that states are disappearing, but in the sense that they are increasingly failing to protect us from our own violence. That is why the violent sacrifices that they ask from us, in wars and even in times of peace, have now become barren

The aim of this thesis is to get a better understanding of how centralization affects the efficiency of policy making. To analyze this, the chapters in this thesis deal with political incentive problems. The chapters have in common a set of assumptions on the institutional setting in which centralized policy making takes place. First, the centralized policy making setting is modeled as a legislature consisting of local representatives. For this reason, the models are most applicable to loose federations such as the EU, where there is no (strong role for a) federal executive. In addition, the political process is set up as an agency problem, where citizens within a member state of the federation act as principals to their political agent. In this set up, centralization a¤ects the incentives for the principals. As I will treat preferences as given, this means that centralization alters the constraints on policymaking, for example through cost-sharing. Two elements of the models developed in this thesis are worth mentioning. The first - that may not be too restrictive for the taste of most economists - is that all actors (including voters) are fully rational and maximize their individual utility. Readers who believe that this assumption is too restrictive may consider the outcomes of the thesis as benchmark cases. In addition, all chapters assume perfect information, which indeed may seem restrictive to economists as well. Clearly, it is well worth exploring how imperfect information affects the results. In the concluding chapter, I discuss some papers that deal with centralization issues when some actors are imperfectly informed. The chapters in this book are positive in the sense that, given the assump- tions, they aim to uncover the mechanisms through which centralization may lead to failures in policy making. Wherever possible, I have formulated these mechanisms as hypotheses that can be falsified by empirical analysis. How- ever, in this thesis I only make a limited attempt to confront theory with data. To defend this, it should be borne in mind that the object of the study (inefficiency in policy making) is difficult to observe. Certainly, there is much anecdotal evidence on political failure. However, hard systematic data are mostly missing. One could resort to studying the relation between centralization and policy outcomes such as overspending and corruption, but then one treats the political mechanism through which these come about as a black box. Even if empirical evidence on the effects of centralization is missing, when the assumptions are judged not to be overly restrictive, the models can be used for normative analysis. I will do so where appropriate. These rec- ommendations will take the form of institutional arrangements. A follow- up question, beyond the scope of this book, is whether these institutional arrangements will be chosen by rational actors. In the concluding chapter, I will briefly discuss some work that deals with such endogenous political institutions.

Reseña de: RAVECCA, Paulo. The politics of political science. Re-writing Latin American experiences. New York: Routledge, 2019. 275 p. ; ***Sobre o poder do conhecimento, ou o conhecimento como poder Reflexões sobre a política da Ciência Política***

ABSTRACTThis article focuses on decision sciences research in China, providing an overview of current research and developing a foundation for future China‐based research. China provides a unique research opportunity for decision sciences researchers, owing to its recent history, rapid economic development, and strong national culture. We examine recent economic reforms and their impact on the development of research questions in the decision sciences, as well as discuss characteristics of the diverse regions in China and their potential as sites for various types of research. We provide a brief overview of recent China‐based research on decision sciences issues relating to national culture, supply chain management, quality management, production planning and control, operations strategy, and new product development and discuss some of the unique methodological challenges inherent in China‐based research. We conclude by looking forward to emerging research opportunities in China.