Suchergebnisse

Durch die Gesetze für moderne Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt ("Hartz-Gesetze") wurde die Arbeitsmarktpolitik in Deutschland in den letzten Jahren reformiert. Im Bereich der aktiven Arbeitsmarktpolitik betreffen diese Reformen insbesondere die Umstrukturierung der Arbeitsvermittlung durch die Einführung von "Personal-Service-Agenturen", die Förderung von Existenzgründungen ("Ich-AG"), Eingliederungszuschüsse und Entgeltsicherung für ältere Arbeitnehmer, Arbeitnehmerüberlassung sowie die Beschäftigungsförderung im Bereich geringer Erwerbseinkommen ("Mini"- und "Midi"-Jobs). Im Zuge der Einführung dieser Instrumente wurden die traditionellen Instrumente der aktiven Arbeitsmarktpolitik, wie Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen und Förderung der beruflichen Weiterbildung, die sich in der Vergangenheit als wenig effektiv erwiesen haben, deutlich reduziert (vgl. dazu Caliendo und Steiner 2005). Im Rahmen der Hartz-Gesetze wurde auch die wissenschaftliche Evaluation der neuen und bereits bestehenden Instrumente der AAMP verpflichtend vorgesehen. In diesem Schwerpunktheft der Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung werden erste Ergebnisse aus der Evaluation ausgewählter Instrumente der AAMP präsentiert, die auf Grundlage der seit kurzem verfügbaren verbesserten Datenbasis erstellt wurden.1 Die Analysen werden ergänzt durch die Einbeziehung der Erfahrungen anderer Länder mit Instrumenten der AAMP, die zunehmend auch in Deutschland Bedeutung erlangen, für die aber hierzulande zurzeit noch kaum empirische Evaluationsstudien vorliegen.

This paper analyses harmonization on fuel taxes between two coalitions. Harmonization is considered as a tool to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, and reduce environmental costs. Domestic fuel producers can sell abroad, and their profits influence national governments in the negotiations. If all countries are identical, harmonization is environmental friendly provided environmental marginal damages are high. It is also economically profitable, but may be unstable if one of the coalitions is small enough. In this case, however, financial transfers between coalitions can stabilize harmonization. Nevertheless, countries can be heterogeneous with respect to the existence of a domestic producer. Heterogeneity introduces a new instability: not only the size, but also the composition of coalitions matters. Furthermore, the level of environmental damages also influences the stability of harmonization. In this case, intra- and inter-coalition financial transfers are necessary but not sufficient to stabilize harmonization.

This paper analyses harmonization on fuel taxes between two coalitions. Harmonization is considered as a tool to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, and reduce environmental costs. Domestic fuel producers can sell abroad, and their profits influence national governments in the negotiations. If all countries are identical, harmonization is environmental friendly provided environmental marginal damages are high. It is also economically profitable, but may be unstable if one of the coalitions is small enough. In this case, however, financial transfers between coalitions can stabilize harmonization. Nevertheless, countries can be heterogeneous with respect to the existence of a domestic producer. Heterogeneity introduces a new instability: not only the size, but also the composition of coalitions matters. Furthermore, the level of environmental damages also influences the stability of harmonization. In this case, intra- and inter-coalition financial transfers are necessary but not sufficient to stabilize harmonization.

This paper analyses harmonization on fuel taxes between two coalitions. Harmonization is considered as a tool to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, and reduce environmental costs. Domestic fuel producers can sell abroad, and their profits influence national governments in the negotiations. If all countries are identical, harmonization is environmental friendly provided environmental marginal damages are high. It is also economically profitable, but may be unstable if one of the coalitions is small enough. In this case, however, financial transfers between coalitions can stabilize harmonization. Nevertheless, countries can be heterogeneous with respect to the existence of a domestic producer. Heterogeneity introduces a new instability: not only the size, but also the composition of coalitions matters. Furthermore, the level of environmental damages also influences the stability of harmonization. In this case, intra- and inter-coalition financial transfers are necessary but not sufficient to stabilize harmonization.

This paper analyses harmonization on fuel taxes between two coalitions. Harmonization is considered as a tool to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, and reduce environmental costs. Domestic fuel producers can sell abroad, and their profits influence national governments in the negotiations. If all countries are identical, harmonization is environmental friendly provided environmental marginal damages are high. It is also economically profitable, but may be unstable if one of the coalitions is small enough. In this case, however, financial transfers between coalitions can stabilize harmonization. Nevertheless, countries can be heterogeneous with respect to the existence of a domestic producer. Heterogeneity introduces a new instability: not only the size, but also the composition of coalitions matters. Furthermore, the level of environmental damages also influences the stability of harmonization. In this case, intra- and inter-coalition financial transfers are necessary but not sufficient to stabilize harmonization.