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Modified, British versions of the Californian Fascism & Ethnocentrism scales were admin'ed to writers of letters to the press, expressing support of opposition to Enoch Powell (extreme right wing Member of Parliament in British Parliament) after his first speech on race relations in May 1968. 60 Pro-Powellites & 23 anti-Powellites completed the scales. The ethnocentrism scale consisted of 5 ingroup items & 7 items expressing rejection of colored immigrants. The same scales were also completed by 96 'naive' S's, students at a Coll of educ, where the issue of Powell's views on race relations had never been a public one. It was found that there were large & signif diff's in both E- & F-scale scores between the 3 groups. The pro-Powellite S's had high scores on both scales, while the anti-Powell S's had low scores on both of them. The naive S's occupied intermediate positions. AA.

The recent comparative literature on authoritarian institutions has been tracing the consequences formal institutions bear on the longevity of authoritarian rule. Striving to explain transitions from electoral authoritarian regimes, the present paper shifts emphasis from the presence of institutions (multiparty elections) to the political dynamics and structural contexts that surround them. Under which conditions, it asks, are authoritarian multiparty elections more likely to reproduce the authoritarian status quo? Under which conditions are they prone to produce democratizing outcomes? And under which are they vulnerable to provoke interruptions of the electoral cycle? Drawing upon the larger literature on democratic transitions, the paper proposes a simple (non-formal) decision-theoretic framework that emphasizes the pivotal role of electoral uncertainty, vital interests, and repressive capacities. In its empirical part, it explores the sources of electoral authoritarian transition trajectories on the basis an original dataset that covers (almost) the universe of authoritarian elections in the world from 1980 through 2002. ; Elecciones multipartidistas tienden a aumentar la longevidad de regímenes autoritarios, pero también contienen el potencial de provocar cambios democratizadores y rupturas autoritarias. El presente documento examina tanto las condiciones estructurales como las dinámicas políticas que influyen en las trayectorias de regímenes electorales autoritarios. Apoyado en la literatura comparada sobre transiciones democráticas, el documento enfatiza tres factores explicativos: la incertidumbre electoral, los intereses vitales de los actores y las capacidades coercitivas del Estado. En su parte empírica, explora las fuentes de diferentes trayectorias de régimen basado en una base de datos original de elecciones autoritarias en el mundo (1980-2002).

Do autocracies tend to govern better than democracies? Will a plainly authoritarian recasting of Russia's political system necessarily lead to a more capable state? Russia's president, Vladimir Putin would have us believe so, but recent events—not to mention the long arc of Russian and Soviet history—suggest a different answer. Putin's claims about what ails Russia are wrong. The culprit behind Russia's ungovernability is not the country's halting democracy but rather its weak, poorly institutionalized state. The best cure, moreover, is not authoritarianism— hard or soft —but rather an enhanced democracy, more deeply institutionalized than it ever was under Putin or his predecessor Boris Yeltsin.

Authoritarianism seems to be emerging as the default mode of global capitalism. In the absence of reliable economic growth, and with working-class incomes in long-term stagnation, both liberal and social democratic parties have lost support in many countries, and authoritarian regimes have come to power in several. But poor people in the USA, UK and Europe have long experienced coercion, being forced to accept low-paid, insecure work or face benefits sanctions. As a growing proportion of workers have come to rely on supplements such as tax credits, the working class has been divided, and opportunistic authoritarian politicians have mobilised the anxiety and resentment of those on the margins of poverty. This article argues that only an active civil society, with voluntary agencies uncompromised by involvement in coercive policies, along with universal, unconditional Basic Incomes for all citizens, can reverse these trends.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan — Turkey's current president (elected 2014) and former prime minister (2003–2014) — infamously once declared that "democracy is like a train; you get off once you have reached your [real] destination." In other words, one can use democratic means to achieve authoritarian goals. Analyzing Erdogan's imaginary train journey, one must conclude that the Turkish leader never had the intention of reaching democracy. Indeed, now that he has achieved his actual authoritarian goal, he has jumped off the train. However, his journey did not always seem to be destined for such a terminus. Indeed, in his first decade in power, Erdogan won three parliamentary elections by ever-larger shares of the popular vote because he had helped to build Turkey into a burgeoning economic powerhouse and a moderate Islamic democracy. In the past decade, however, despite winning Turkey's first popular election for president in August 2014, presiding over another great parliamentary victory in November 2015, and then winning re-election as president as well as retaining control of parliament in June 2018, Erdogan's increasing authoritarianism has helped precipitate an accelerating crisis both domestically and externally for Turkey. His actions have also negatively affected the Kurds. Although his partial setback in the local elections held in March and June 2019 did seem to affect his hold on power, his seemingly successful creation of a Turkish safety zone in Northern (Syrian) Kurdistan in October 2019 revived his flailing domestic fortunes.

Case, William: Low-quality democracy and varied authoritarianism : elites and regimes in Southeast Asia today. - S. 255-270 Hlaing, Kyaw Yin: Setting the rules for survival : why the Burmese military regime survives in an age of democratization. - S. 271-292 Davidson, Jamie S.: Dilemmas of democratic consolidation in Indonesia. - S. 293-310 Case, William : Electoral authoritarianism in Malaysia : trajectory shift Quimpo, Nathan Gilbert: The Philippines : predatory regime, growing authoritarian features. - S. 335-354 Connors, Michael K.: Liberalism, authoritarianism and the politics of decisionism in Thailand. - S. 355-374 London, Jonathan: Viet Nam and the making of market-Leninism. - S. 375-399

Digital authoritarianism threatens the privacy and rights of Internet users worldwide, yet scholarship on this topic remains limited in analytical power and case selection. In this article, we introduce a comprehensive analytical framework to the field of Internet governance and apply it first, briefly, to the well-known case of China and then, in more depth, to the still-understudied Russian case. We identify the extent and relative centralization of Internet governance as well as proactive versus reactive approaches to governance as notable differences between the cases, highlighting variation among digital authoritarians' governance strategies. We conclude that Russia's Internet governance model is less comprehensive and consistent than China's, but its components may be more easily exported to other political systems. We then consider whether recent changes to Russia's Internet governance suggest that it could converge with the Chinese model over time.

Despite much attention to the problematic consequences of authoritarianism, little research focuses on the causes of such unquestioning respect for "proper" authority. Elaborating on the social learning approach to authoritarianism, this article argues that economic inequality within countries shapes individuals' feelings toward authority. As differences in condition increase, so does the relative power of the wealthy. As a result, regardless of their incomes, individuals' experiences are more likely to lead them to view hierarchical relations as natural and, in turn, to hold greater respect for authority. Multilevel models of authoritarianism in countries around the world over three decades support this relative power theory. Adapted from the source document.

This definitive contribution to social science literature describes German's general theory of authoritarianism in modem society, and applies it to authoritarian movements and regimes likely to merge out of the social mobilization of the middle and lower classes. Germani analyzes the nature, conditions, and determinants of authoritarianism in the context of Latin American political and social developments and compares it to European fascist movements.

This definitive contribution to social science literature describes German's general theory of authoritarianism in modem society, and applies it to authoritarian movements and regimes likely to merge out of the social mobilization of the middle and lower classes. Germani analyzes the nature, conditions, and determinants of authoritarianism in the context of Latin American political and social developments and compares it to European fascist movements.