Suchergebnisse

InhaltsverzeichnisInhaltDanksagung.................................................................................................71 Einleitung .................................................................................................92 Ungleichheit und Wachstum: Ein Literaturüberblick............................162.1 Klassisch-neoklassische Perspektive..................................................202.2 Moderne Perspektive........................................................................282.2.1 Kreditmarktunvollkommenheiten...........................................312.2.2 De

Cover; Contents; Acknowledgements; 1 Introduction and Overview; 1.1 What is Experimetrics?; 1.2 Experimental Design; 1.3 The Experimetrics of Theory Testing; 1.4 Dependence in Experimental Data; 1.5 Parametric versus Non-parametric Approaches; 1.6 Structural Experimetrics; 1.7 Modelling Subject Heterogeneity; 1.8 Experimetrics of Other-regarding Preferences; 1.9 Experimetrics of Bounded Rationality; 1.10 Experimetrics of Learning; 1.11 What is in this Book?; 2 Statistical Aspects of Experimental Design in Experimental Economics; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 The Average Treatment Effect.

Das Kerninteresse der Dissertation gilt den Einsatzmöglichkeiten ökonomischer Experimente in der Institutionenanalyse. Sie setzt sich aus einem konzeptionellen und vier empirischen Aufsätzen zusammen. Im ersten Aufsatz werden drei theoretische Blickwinkel auf institutionellen Wandel unterschieden. Diese werden dann mit empirischen Arbeiten in der experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung in Beziehung gesetzt. Die empirischen Aufsätze greifen diese Überlegungen auf. Im zweiten Aufsatz findet für die Analyse der Verkehrsmittelwahl von Pendlern unter verschiedenen Politikszenarien ein "Framed Field Experiment" Anwendung. Es wird gezeigt, wie Verlustaversion und Statusängste die Entscheidungen der Pendler erklären können. Im dritten Aufsatz kommt ein "Public Goods Game" zum Einsatz, um den Einfluss von ökonomischer Ungleichheit und Vorbildverhalten auf Beiträge zu einer gemeinsam genutzten sanitären Einrichtung zu untersuchen. In einer strukturell ähnlichen Entscheidungssituation verhalten sich Teilnehmerinnen häufig so wie es ihnen aus anderen Zusammenhängen bekannt ist. Der vierte Aufsatz untersucht den Einfluss des sogenannten Status-Quo-Effekts auf umweltfreundliches Verhalten. In einem Feldexperiment wird gezeigt, dass sich ein Zwang zur Entscheidung positiv auf umweltfreundliches Verhalten auswirken kann. Der fünfte Aufsatz geht der Frage nach, ob sich Experimente als didaktisches Werkzeug zur Schaffung größeren Umweltbewusstseins einsetzen lassen. Im Vergleich zu einer Kontrollgruppe zeigen selbst Teilnehmende mit negativen Erfahrungen aus dem Experiment einen positiven Effekt auf umweltfreundliches Verhalten. In einem Fazit findet eine Synthese der Aufsätze statt. Ein Ergebnis ist die Entwicklung eines analytischen Rahmens für die Durchführung ökonomischer Experimente zur Untersuchung institutionellen Wandels. Konstitutionelle Regeln, also Regeln zur Änderung von Regeln, werden als erfolgversprechender Ansatzpunkt für die zukünftige Forschung identifiziert. ; The dissertation focuses on the use of economic experiments for institutional analysis. It consists of one conceptual and four empirical essays. In the first essay, three theoretical perspectives on institutional change are distinguished. These are linked to empirical work in Experimental Economics. The empirical essays expand on these considerations. In the second essay, commuters' transportation mode choice is analyzed. It is shown that loss aversion and status concerns drive behavior. In the third essay, a public goods game is employed to investigate the effect of endowment heterogeneity and leading by example on voluntary contributions to a jointly used sanitation facility. It is demonstrated that in a structurally similar decision context, choices are driven by experiences from other contexts. The fourth essay examines the impact of the so-called status quo bias on pro-environmental behavior. In a field experiment, it is shown that forcing a decision has a positive effect on pro-environmental behavior. The fifth essay investigates whether experiments can be used as a tool for environmental awareness building. Even participants with negative experiences from taking part in the dilemma experiment show a greater likeliness of behaving environmentally friendly in comparison to a control group. In a concluding part, the essays are synthesized. One outcome is an analytical framework for developing economic experiments on institutional change. Constitutional rules (i.e., rules on how to change the rules) are identified as a promising starting point for future research.

Combining economic, social-psychological and sociological approaches trust, this book provides a general theoretical framework to explain conditional and unconditional trust; it also presents an experimental test of the corresponding integrative model and its predictions. Broadly, it aims at advancing a "cognitive turn" in trust research by highlighting the importance of (1) an actorś context-dependent definition of the situation and (2) the flexible and dynamic degree of rationality involved in the phenomenon. In essence, trust is as multi-facetedʺ as there are cognitive routes that take us to the choice of a trusting act. Therefore, adaptive rationality has to be incorporated as an independent and orthogonal dimension to the typological space of trust. Going from description to prediction, the work develops an analytically precise and tractable model of trust and adaptive rationality. The empirical test presented combines trust games, high- and low-incentive conditions, framing manipulations, and psychometric measurements; it is complemented by decision-time analyses.

Traditional macroeconomic theories often assume that aggregate economic figures originate in the behaviour of individuals who optimise their utility. In doing so, it is casually taken for granted that all agents act self-centered, profit maximising, and risk neutral. A growing number of studies, mainly from the areas of microeconomics and psychology, contradicts this presupposition. Through data gathered by laboratory experiments it is possible to explore whether humans behave according to theoretical predictions. In order to lay a behavioural foundation to macroeconomic theories, such laboratory experiments can be conducted with a macroeconomic scope. In this dissertation thesis, three different macroeconomic topics are investigated experimentally. One focus is put on the interlinks between economic policy and the labour market. In a laboratory experiment where players in the role of various institutions interact, the policy decisions of governments and central banks, their motivations, and their consequences are analysed with respect to wages and employment. The reactions of the labour market are mainly in line with theory. If the official sector's employment goals are not met, governments tend to increase expenditures, whereas the decisions of central banks seem rather to be motivated by the attainment of price goals. The total of the effects observed deliver a new explanation for the existence of a relationship between employment and the inflation rate. The second emphasis is on the currency trade decisions of firms in the same experiment. The players are guided by interest rate differences rather than by expected exchange rate movements since they are unable to predict exchange rate changes correctly and thus are ambiguity averse. This results in the absence of technical trade, highest profits for interest-conforming traders, and pessimistic expectations concerning the exchange rate. The firms engage in hedging their production-incurred foreign debts against exchange rate risks. A simple decision rule is described on the base of which players would have made profits on average. A transaction tax as proposed by James Tobin is studied in the third part. Experiments have been conducted with an asset market model that includes equally endowed traders. In another variant of the model, a transaction tax is levied on the asset. The trade volume decreases with an increasing tax rate, and so do the fiscal revenues. Price volatility is reduced drastically under a tax regime. Although the market efficiency is higher on taxed markets, there is evidence for lower efficiency with higher tax rates. Concluding it can be said that the Tobin tax has volatility reducing effects on the market, but the tax rate should be low to limit a negative impact on trade volume and market efficiency. The last part derives efficient ways to calculate significance levels of differences in two independent and in two matched samples. This is done with Fisher-Pitman permutation tests, which are frequently used throughout this thesis.

Ökonomie 2.0 stellt eindrucksvoll unter Beweis: Volkswirtschaft ist keine staubtrockene Wissenschaft. - Was passiert, wenn ein Kindergarten Strafgebühren für verspätetes Abholen der Kinder einführt? - Die Verspätungen nehmen zu. - Wer sind die größten Gewinner der Globalisierung? - Die Ärmsten der Armen in der Dritten Welt. - Womit verdienen Fitnessstudios und Anbieter von Internet-Zugängen das meiste Geld? - Mit der Faulheit und Irrationalität ihrer Kunden. 99 Fallbeispiele fördern verblüffende, neue Erkenntnisse zu Tage. Ganz ohne Formeln und theoretischen Ballast präsentieren die Autoren aktuelle Ergebnisse bedeutender Ökonomen und erweitern die volkswirtschaftlichen Kenntnisse der Leser. Den Autoren gelingt der Geniestreich, mit leichter Feder komplexe Zusammenhänge zu veranschaulichen. Vor allem Studenten werden davon profitieren.