Suchergebnisse

The development of fair and impartial criteria for judging those accused of international crimes is one of the most critical issues facing the international community and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Are the resources, experience, and moral force so weighted in favor of the international community that the accused cannot obtain a fair contest? Are international criminal trials legalistic exercises that cloak a victor's justice, or do such courts premise their decisions on fair criteria? Data on ICTY verdicts and punishment of convicted war criminals show that the ICTY judges follow a "legal" model and that punishment is based primarily on the gravity of the crimes committed and the defendant's level of responsibility in the political and military chain of command. Political factors largely do not explain verdicts or sentences.

Students of bargaining have long focused on the dual nature of international negotiations, which take place both internationally and domestically. The prevailing wisdom is that under certain conditions political leaders can use domestic constraints to get a better deal at the negotiating table. In this article, I argue that under certain conditions leaders have an incentive to use 'international constraints' to pressure their domestic constituents into accepting a particular policy. I apply this argument to the Serbian and Croatian cases of Western pressure for cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (Hague Tribunal).