Divided government and the bias against presidential restraint
In: Social science journal: official journal of the Western Social Science Association, Band 61, Heft 2, S. 474-491
ISSN: 0362-3319
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In: Social science journal: official journal of the Western Social Science Association, Band 61, Heft 2, S. 474-491
ISSN: 0362-3319
SSRN
In: Journal of development economics, Band 163, S. 103091
ISSN: 0304-3878
SSRN
Working paper
In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 132, Heft 647, S. 2366-2391
ISSN: 1468-0297
AbstractPiketty and Saez (2003) found a pronounced U-curve pattern of American income inequality since 1917, displaying a precipitous decline during World War II to a level that would hold until 1980. We offer revisions to their income inequality estimates prior to 1960 with three important findings. First, Piketty and Saez overstate inequality levels in this period. Second, the decline during World War II was smaller than depicted. Third, the Great Depression, rather than World War II, played the more significant role. These findings indicate a need to re-evaluate commonly held assumptions about the evolution of inequality during the period of the 'great levelling', as well as the nature of its posited relationship to tax policy.
In: New political economy, Band 24, Heft 2, S. 159-180
ISSN: 1469-9923
Normally, privatisation is seen as beneficial. In the case of Serbia, the results are disappointing. This paper considers the failure of privatisation in Serbia - a latecomer in the matter - where privatisation was partly a result of exogenous pressures. In Serbia, a sizeable number of privatised firms were bought by bureaucrats and politicians and all firms were subjected to a period of supervision. We argue that this process of privatisation was designed to allow rentseekers to conserve their privileges through asset stripping and that this explains the failure. In order to do so, we perform empirical analysis of the determinants of liquidation, merger and bankruptcy of privatised firms from 2002 to 2015. We construct a novel data set from primary sources, free of the 'survivorship bias' and containing proxies for various types of owners, indirect signs of asset stripping strategy and a broad range of controls. Our results indicate that firms owned by politicians face significantly higher risks of bankruptcy, especially after the end of supervision.
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