Suchergebnisse

Abstract In order to test the notion that the electorate relies, derivatively, on professional economic forecasts, we consider the entire chain between elite economic expectations, economic news, mass economic expectations, and voter preferences. We find that while elite expectations are based on the objective economy, they are politically biased in the neighborhood of elections. Reports of economic news, while based on the objective economy and on elite expectations, have their own political rhythm in the form of election–related cycles. The pattern in news coverage, in turn, is mirrored by election–related cycles in personal and general expectations formed by the mass public. While the relevance of each of the linkages from elite expectations to news coverage to mass expectations is thus confirmed, our findings challenge the view that the link between mass expectations and voting intentions can be attributed mainly to the dissemination of elite forecasts to the general public. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for an understanding of the ability and functioning of mass electorates.

In order to test the notion that the electorate relies, derivatively, on professional economic forecasts, we consider the entire chain between elite economic expectations, economic news, mass economic expectations, and voter preferences. We find that while elite expectations are based on the objective economy, they are politically biased in the neighbourhood of elections. Reports of economic news, while based on the objective economy and on elite expectations, have their own political rhythm in the form of election-related cycles. The pattern in news coverage, in turn, is mirrored by election-related cycles in personal and general expectations formed by the mass public. While the relevance of each of the linkages from elite expectations to news coverage to mass expectations is thus confirmed, our findings challenge the view that the link between mass expectations and voting intentions can be attributed mainly to the dissemination of elite forecasts to the general public. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for an understanding of the ability and functioning of mass electorate. (European Journal of Political Research / FUB)

We argue that voters' assessments of party leaders are comparative and prospective rather than individual and retrospective. Therefore, a prospective leadership-comparison evaluation should outperform a leader-approval, retrospective indicator as a determinant of government and party popularity. Using data from 1984–92, a popularity function that includes a variety of economic and political components, and several dependent variables, we test this hypothesis by comparing the performance of a 'best prime minister' question and the more usual 'approval' questions about party leaders. We find that the former gives consistently better results than the latter.

We argue that voters' assessments of party leaders are comparative and prospective rather than individual and retrospective. Therefore, a prospective leadership-comparison evaluation should outperform a leader-approval, retrospective indicators as a determinant of government and party popularity. Using data from 1984-92, a popularity function that includes a variety of economic and political components, and several dependent variables, we test this hypothesis by comparing the performance of a 'best prime minister' question and the more usual 'approval' questions about party leaders. We find that the former gives consistently better results than the latter. (British Journal of Political Science / FUB)

We address two questions: How do people form their expectations about the likely winner of the next general election? and What are the links between expectations and votes? Using data collected by the Gallup organization in Great Britain, we find that the expectations formation process (1) has a significant inertia component but also a rapid adjustment to current information; (2) reflects voters' ability to translate economic expectations into political forecasts; and (3) is "time-bounded," possessing special characteristics immediately before and after a general election. The analysis also confirms the existence of a small bandwagon effect, whereby expectations that one party will win inflate that party's vote. The ability of voters to make reasonable forecasts without being unduly influenced by their own preferences suggests that under normal circumstances voters are expressing real preferences and not simply following the crowd.

Wie weit werden die parteipolitischen Präferenzen, die Wählerinnen und Wähler zeigen, durch ihre Erwartungen über den Wahlerfolg beeinflußt? Daten, die den allgemeinen Wahlen in Großbritannien entnommen sind, belegen, daß es zweifelsohne eine Beziehung zwischen den Erwartungen der Wähler und ihrem Wahlverhalten gibt und insofern eine gewisse Sogwirkung angenommenen Wahlerfolgs vorhanden ist. Auffälliger aber ist noch, daß unter normalen Bedingungen, also ohne spektakuläre Ereignisse, Wählerinnen und Wähler ihren vorgefaßten Präferenzen folgen und nicht den werbewirksam behaupteten Erwartungen über den wahrscheinlichen Wahlerfolg. (AuD-Nar)

This study undertakes an empirical test of the "bandwagon effect"—individuals rallying to the majority opinion. The study is done outside the electoral context on two issues: abortion and the constitutional future of Quebec. A panel is used, as well as an experimental design in which respondents are told the state and direction of public opinion. Three methodological criteria are used as minimal requirements for a satisfac tory test of the bandwagon thesis. "Underdogging," as well as opinion movement due to factors outside the experiment, are both accounted for. Though the reasons for a bandwagon remain unclear, the authors demon strate that a bandwagon effect of 5-7 percent existed on both issues.

"Satisfaction with democracy is a vastly studied research topic. In this Element, the authors aim to make sense of this context by showing that elections (electoral processes and outcomes) influence citizens' satisfaction with democracy in different ways according to the quality of a democratic regime. To do so, they leverage the datasets from the Comparative Study on Electoral Systems (CSES) and uphold the belief that social scientists must take advantage of the increased availability of rich comparative datasets. The Element concludes that elections do not only have different impacts on citizens' satisfaction with democracy based on the quality of the democratic regime that they live in, but that the nature of the meaning attributed to electoral processes and outcomes varies between emergent and established democracies."--Provided by publisher