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We analyze the effects of political fragmentation on fiscal policy in a number of ways, considering three kinds of fragmentation: size & control, institutional, & over time. In doing so we introduce a number of new variables that allow us to look at this issue in a broader way. At the same time we have tackled some methodological problems that affected previous analyses, using a panel of 19 OECD countries, 1975-1995. Overall, we find relatively poor evidence in favor of size & over-time fragmentation, & more evidence of institutional & control fragmentation. 7 Tables, 24 References. Adapted from the source document.

Considerable evidence suggests that legislative fragmentation can negatively affect the survival of democratic presidential regimes. While there is a vast literature examining the determinants of legislative fragmentation, one factor that has traditionally been overlooked is the impact of presidential elections. Do presidential elections increase or decrease legislative fragmentation? Does it matter if presidents are elected by plurality rule or by runoff? Using a new dataset that covers all democratic legislative and presidential elections between 1946 and 2000, I find that presidential coattails can reduce, increase, or have no effect on legislative fragmentation depending on the number of presidential candidates. I also find strong evidence that social heterogeneity increases the number of presidential candidates when runoff systems are employed. Taken together, these results suggest that the widespread adoption of runoffs by newly democratic presidential regimes will likely increase legislative fragmentation, thereby putting their democratic survival at increased risk.

The purpose of this article is to provide an economic analysis of the relationship between economic integration and political fragmentation. This follows previous contributions from Alesina et al (2000), Casella (2001, Casella and Feinstein (2002), or Leite-Monteiro and Sato (2003). We go a step further than these authors by assuming that economic integration and political fragmentation are both decided by a majority vote. As them, we observe that economic integration involves political fragmentation. But, we establish also that economic integration might be sometimes deterred by the majority to prevent political fragmentation from happening.

The purpose of this article is to provide an economic analysis of the relationship between economic integration and political fragmentation. This follows previous contributions from Alesina et al (2000), Casella (2001, Casella and Feinstein (2002), or Leite-Monteiro and Sato (2003). We go a step further than these authors by assuming that economic integration and political fragmentation are both decided by a majority vote. As them, we observe that economic integration involves political fragmentation. But, we establish also that economic integration might be sometimes deterred by the majority to prevent political fragmentation from happening.

Considers the implications of the fragmentation trend in higher education institutions that will target particular constituencies, suggesting that information technology will soon make it possible to deliver knowledge & education to disparate communities by learning businesses. Contrary to many commentators, it is argued that the introduction of market relations into higher education is not to be feared. Rather, these market relations should be understood as catering to a post-baby boom generation of US information workers who are in need of continuous learning opportunities. In this context, fragmentation is to be welcomed because it promises to create a broader variety of higher education institutions that can serve different populations. Individuals horrified by this prospect ought to give up their traditional elitism & recognize that vocational training is needed by large segments of the population. D. Ryfe