Suchergebnisse

Introduction. The concept of "moral agent" and its boundaries are not currently clearly defined. Given the connection between moral agency and moral responsibility, it seems necessary to introduce a clear definition of "moral agent", as well as to differentiate the types of moral agency. The hypothesis of this article is that although the notion of a moral agent in itself is rather limited, there are a number of "borderline" groups, the definition of the status of which needs to be clarified.Methodology and sources. The article provides an ethical and philosophical analysis of approaches to the definition of a moral agency, a comparative analysis of the concepts of a moral agent and a moral subject, as well as approaches to determining the moral statuses of various "borderline" groups in the context of the works of J. MacMurray, A. Taylor, I. Kant, M Rowlands, J. Searle and others.Results and discussion. The article presents an analysis of the definitions of a "moral agent", highlights the key features that make it possible to speak of a moral agency as an independent moral concept, as well as determine the conditions for the onset of moral agency. To differentiate the types of moral agents, the article introduces the concept of "limited moral agent" to denote the special status of children and the mentally ill. Evidence is provided that people belonging to these categories may have the status of a moral agent, although not to the extent that this status initially implies. As part of the definition of artificial intelligence as a "quasi-moral agent", the key features of AI in the framework of moral communication between AI and a person are identified.Conclusion. Based on the analysis, the article proposes a number of requirements for a moral agency. Based on these requirements, it is proposed to distinguish such types of moral agency as a limited moral agent, including children and the mentally ill, as well as a quasi-moral agent, which is an artificially created agent, including artificial intelligence.

There is presently a debate between Subjectivists and Objectivists about moral wrongness. Subjectivism is the view that the moral status of our actions, whether they are morally wrong or not, is grounded in our subjective circumstances - either our beliefs about, or our evidence concerning, the world around us. Objectivism, on the other hand, is the view that the moral status of our actions is grounded in our objective circumstances - all those facts other than those which comprise our subjective circumstances. A third view, Ecumenism, has it that the moral status of our actions is grounded both in our subjective and our objective circumstances. After outlining and evaluating the various arguments both against Subjectivism and against Objectivism, this Element offers a tentative defense of Objectivism about moral wrongness.

Intro -- Title Page -- Copyright -- Contents -- Foreword -- Contributors -- Introduction -- Historical Perspectives -- 1. In search of the unseen wound -- 2. Atrocity propaganda and moral injury -- Personal Perspectives -- 3. A commander's perspective -- 4. A combatant's view -- 5. A chaplain's experience -- Ethical Perspectives -- 6. Moral ambiguity and ethical dilemma -- 7. Conceptual distinctions -- 8. Moral trauma and moral degradation -- 9. 'Dents in the Soul'? -- Psychological Perspectives -- 10. The utility of moral injury -- 11. Dealing with horror -- Practical Perspectives -- 12. Is moral injury the answer? -- 13. Moral status and reintegration -- Religious Perspectives -- 14. Moral injury: whose responsibility? -- 15. The influence of religious conviction -- Postscript -- Notes

A moral code consists of principles that assign moral status to individual actions – principles that evaluate acts as right or wrong, prohibited or obligatory, permissible or supererogatory. Many theorists have held that such principles must serve two distinct functions. On the one hand, they serve atheoreticalfunction, insofar as they specify the characteristics in virtue of which acts possess their moral status. On the other hand, they serve apracticalfunction, insofar as they provide an action-guide: a standard by reference to which a person can choose which acts to perform and which not. Although the theoretical and practical functions of moral principles are closely linked, it is not at all obvious that what enables a principle to fill one of these roles automatically equips it to fill the other. In this paper I shall briefly examine some of the reasons why a moral principle might fail to fill its practical role, i.e., be incapable of guiding decisions. I shall then sketch three common responses to this kind of failure, and examine in some detail the adequacy of one of the most popular of these responses.

We develop scholarship on status in international politics by focusing on the social dimension of small and middle power status politics. This vantage opens a new window on the widely-discussed strategies social actors may use to maintain and enhance their status, showing how social creativity, mobility, and competition can all be system-supporting under some conditions. We extract lessons for other thorny issues in status research, notably questions concerning when, if ever, status is a good in itself; whether it must be a positional good; and how states measure it.

We develop scholarship on status in international politics by focusing on the social dimension of small and middle power status politics. This vantage opens a new window on the widely-discussed strategies social actors may use to maintain and enhance their status, showing how social creativity, mobility, and competition can all be system-supporting under some conditions. We extract lessons for other thorny issues in status research, notably questions concerning when, if ever, status is a good in itself; whether it must be a positional good; and how states measure it. ; acceptedVersion ; publishedVersion

AbstractWe develop scholarship on status in international politics by focusing on the social dimension of small and middle power status politics. This vantage opens a new window on the widely-discussed strategies social actors may use to maintain and enhance their status, showing how social creativity, mobility, and competition can all be system-supporting under some conditions. We extract lessons for other thorny issues in status research, notably questions concerning when, if ever, status is a good in itself; whether it must be a positional good; and how states measure it.

AbstractChildren's moral judgments of resource distributions as having "fair" or "unfair" origins play an important role in early social cognition. What factors shape these judgments? The present study advances research on this question in two primary ways: First, while prior work has typically assigned children to an advantaged or disadvantaged position in an experimental setting, here we also investigated how relative objective and Subjective Socioeconomic Status (OSS and SSS) predicted children's judgments. Second, while prior work has asked children to judge distributions with known origins, here we presented children with novel and causally ambiguous distributions, thereby simulating children's initial encounter of resource distributions in the social world. We assessed participants' (n = 113, 6‐ to 9‐year‐olds) OSS and SSS and then introduced them to a machine that distributed Skittles on an unknown basis. Participants received half as many, twice as many, or the same number of Skittles as a peer in three between‐subjects conditions, and then rated the machine's fairness. Results revealed that children who rated their families as wealthier relative to their neighborhoods (higher SSS) rated the machine as more fair. However, children from families that were actually wealthier relative to their neighborhoods (higher OSS) were more likely to rate the disadvantage‐giving machine as unfair. Together, results represent the first evidence that OSS and SSS shape children's moral judgments of resource distributions, consistent with evidence that these two forms of socioeconomic status have unique impacts on adults' judgments of inequality. Implications for moral and social development are discussed.

Identifying specific traits to justify according differential moral status to humans and non-human animals may be more challenging than Chapman & Huffman suggest. The reasons for this also go against their recommendation that we ought to attend to how humans and non-humans are similar. The problem lies in identifying the moral relevance of biological characteristics. There are, however, other reasons for treating non-human animals as worthy of moral consideration, such as the Precautionary Principle.