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There is growing interest in food quality and safety, thus creating the demand for the development of highly sensitive devices to detect freshness and quality of perishable food. The development of on-package dual sensor and smart packaging systems is gaining momentum at the end of the supply chain management, regarding the quality of packed marine products. The colour change provides a clear indication of the quality to the consumers. Simultaneously, the manufacturers can track the quality of the packed marine products, at any point in time, to take an appropriate call depending on the quality. The on-package double sensors were built dependent on two pH pointers, and applied to screen the freshness of marine products. Methyl red (MR) and bromocresol purple (BCP) are commonly used pH indicators to detect the freshness of marine products. Once the marine products start spoiling, the MR changes from red to yellow, while the BCP changes from yellow to purple, based on the pH. Therefore, the label can be used as a simple and practical freshness indicator to continuously monitor and detect the quality of packaged products by data capturing, and also collecting it by cloud computing and the internet of thinking (IoT).

ABSTRACTThis article builds on work by Devine and Kopko (2021) and Lacy and Burden (1999) who estimated a probit model of candidate choice from nationally representative survey data to determine the second choice of third-party voters. Using this model on 2020 election data, we show that the Libertarian candidate Jo Jorgenson probably cost Donald Trump victory in at least two states: Arizona and Georgia. Additionally, the popular-vote margin enjoyed by Joe Biden could have been between 260,000 and 525,000 fewer votes, using conservative estimates. The motivation for this article is to provide contrary evidence for two main misconceptions. First, that third-party candidates are "spoiling" elections for the Democrats. Our evidence clearly shows that third parties have the potential to hurt either of the two main parties; however, in 2020, it was Donald Trump who was hurt the most, although not consequentially. Second, some reformers believe that ranked-choice voting benefits the Democrats; again, we show that—all else being equal—in the 2020 presidential election, it was the Republicans who would have benefited by the change in rules because the majority of third-party votes went to the Libertarian candidate, whose voters prefer Republicans over Democrats 60% to 32%.

This paper shows that corruption constitutes a threat to the rule of law in a democratic law-observing state, destroying it from within and ridiculing it outside. It destabilises social relations in such a state, which adversely affects the political system as well as the development of legislation and economy. The paper also reminds that corruption erodes social relations, causing demoralisation and slackening of morals in society. Corruption may also be a threat to the life, health and property of citizens. The author tracks views about corruption using the method of theoretical analysis of the notions (critical analysis of secondary sources); the statistical method, mainly analysing the latest Corruption Perceptions Index (2019); and the dogmatic-legal method. He concludes that corruption destabilises multiple areas of the functioning of a democratic law-observing state, disrupting the political space, spoiling the law, and causing destructive phenomena in the economic as well as in the moral sphere. It ultimately destabilises state structures, rendering them dysfunctional and perverting the principles of democracy. Corruption interacts with legality acting as a feedback loop, as it destroys the rule of law and democracy, which in turn deepens corruptive phenomena.

Armed groups are prone to instability and fragmentation, but what explains variation among the new groups that emerge? I argue that the internal politics preceding organizational splits is critical. When it comes to the survival of breakaway groups, those forming around single issue areas gain an advantage by attracting more homogeneous, preference-aligned recruits. On the other hand, those forming over a variety of grievances attract a more heterogeneous population whose divergent views undermine cohesion and cooperation, necessitate hierarchy, and diminish the odds of organizational survival. I test this argument with a case study of two Republican groups from Northern Ireland—the Real Irish Republican Army and the Irish National Liberation Army. The findings confirm my argument and underscore the limited utility of studying organizational fractures from the sole perspective of contemporaneous external events like conciliation and repression. Rather, I show how internal political dynamics influence the composition, identity, and overall trajectory of breakaway groups. This has implications for designing effective counterinsurgent policies, for understanding the formation of armed groups, and for anticipating whether breakaway groups are likely to escalate, moderate, or adopt spoiling behavior.

Socially produced security concerns underlie the proliferation of urban surveillance practices through informal policing. Neighborhood watch and neighborhood patrol initiatives have recently mushroomed in several countries in Europe, spurred by a culture of insecurity that has continuously and globally grown since the seventies. Such practices signal the intensification of struggles for social control and order in the urban space, but also the capillarization of surveillance, devolved from waning state institutions onto the citizenry. Neighborhood patrols police the urban landscape, blame suspect Others for spoiling it, and enforce a particular aesthetic order which, in turn, legitimizes social hierarchies along nation, race, gender, and class lines. Through an empirically informed analysis of the security practices enacted by a neighborhood patrol in the peripheries of Rome, I trace the genealogies and cultural tenets of what I call vertical non-state surveillance as a form of informal policing of subaltern Others in the urban space. I explore the ways in which this form of surveillance meets neoliberal conceptions of citizenship, becoming productive of new subjectivities and socialities, and argue that such forms of surveillance need to be linked with the political economies and the materialities of the urban spaces in which they emerge.

Socially produced security concerns underlie the proliferation of urban surveillance practices through informal policing. Neighborhood watch and neighborhood patrol initiatives have recently mushroomed in several countries in Europe, spurred by a culture of insecurity that has continuously and globally grown since the seventies. Such practices signal the intensification of struggles for social control and order in the urban space, but also the capillarization of surveillance, devolved from waning state institutions onto the citizenry. Neighborhood patrols police the urban landscape, blame suspect Others for spoiling it, and enforce a particular aesthetic order which, in turn, legitimizes social hierarchies along nation, race, gender, and class lines. Through an empirically informed analysis of the security practices enacted by a neighborhood patrol in the peripheries of Rome, I trace the genealogies and cultural tenets of what I call vertical non-state surveillance as a form of informal policing of subaltern Others in the urban space. I explore the ways in which this form of surveillance meets neo-liberal conceptions of citizenship, becoming productive of new subjectivities and socialities, and argue that such forms of surveillance need to be linked with the political economies and the materialities of the urban spaces in which they emerge.

This article provides an investigation into claims that paramilitary violence in Colombia can pose a threat to the peace agreement signed in 2016 between the Colombian government and the FARC rebels. These claims highlight the capacity for paramilitary groups to 'spoil' the peace deal. Hitherto, however, there is a lack of scholarly research to investigate the potential of paramilitary spoiling. Firstly, this article highlights the flaws in the government's perspective that paramilitarism no longer exists in Colombia. Instead, the government argues that Colombia is plagued by criminal bands (known as BACRIMs). Secondly, through fieldwork interviews and questionnaires conducted in FARC demobilisation camps, together with descriptive data analysed through a uniquely coded dataset on violence in western Colombia, this article supports claims that successor paramilitary groups represent a key spoiler threat to the current government-FARC peace process. On the one hand, the paramilitaries can represent a direct spoiler threat by, for instance, violently targeting demobilising FARC guerrillas. On the other hand, successor paramilitary groups represent a key indirect spoiler threat, as paramilitary violence is exacerbating the root causes of the conflict that the peace deal seeks to address, with negative implications for the prospects for peace.

We consider whether the fragmentation of combatants during civil war has downstream effects on the durability of peace following civil wars. We contend that the splintering of combatant groups, a primary manifestation of rebel group fragmentation, produces potential spoiler groups that are neither incidental nor unimportant in the process of civil war resolution. Making connections to the spoiling and credible commitment literatures, we hypothesize that rebel splintering hastens the recurrence of civil wars. Using event history modeling and propensity score matching to analyze two different civil war datasets, we examine whether the occurrence of fragmentation during a civil war influences the length of peace after the civil war. The empirical analysis of fragmentation events during civil wars since World War II offers support for the hypothesis that splintering decreases the duration of post-civil war peace. The results suggest the need to pay closer attention to the dynamics of fragmentation, and particularly how these dynamics lead to future consequences – even when those consequences take place after the war has concluded. For example, governments that attempt to splinter groups or to use existing fragmentations within rebel groups to end a civil war may encourage the unintended consequence of shorter peace duration.

This study employed content analysis to examine the portrayals of grandparents' images and their grandparenting roles in Laotongzhi Zhiyou (Friend of Old Comrades). With a current circulation of 480, 000, Friend of Old Comrades is a national monthly magazine in China whose target audiences include retirees, institutions, and governmental agencies engaged in work and services related to the elderly. Articles (N = 195) that feature grandparent-grandchild interactions were chosen from 156 issues--from 1995 to 2007--of the magazine and were content analyzed to uncover images of grandparents and portrayals of grandparenting roles. Results revealed that grandparents were predominantly portrayed as positive, healthy, and respected. In addition, positive age stereotypes such as Perfect Grandparent, Golden Ager, and Honorable Elder were prevalent with very little negative stereotyping (e.g., Impaired Elder, Despondent) found in the majority of the articles. Results also indicated that over half of the articles featuring grandparents and younger grandchildren depicted grandparents as adopting an involved grandparenting style, playing roles such as caregiver, mentor, playmate, and spoiling grandparent. Findings are discussed in light of cultivation theory and prior research on the media portrayal of intergenerational communication in both Eastern and Western cultural contexts.

Intro -- Acknowledgments -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Table -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- References -- Chapter 2: On Terrorism -- 2.1 In Search of a Definition -- 2.2 What Makes a Terrorist? -- 2.3 The Economic Impacts of Terrorism -- 2.3.1 Effects on Households -- 2.3.2 Effects on the Private Sector -- 2.3.3 Effects on Governments -- References -- Chapter 3: Terrorism as a Mode of Warfare -- 3.1 Strategy or Tactics or Whatever -- 3.2 Guerrilla Warfare and Terrorism -- 3.3 The ``Strategies´´ of Terrorism -- 3.3.1 Attrition -- 3.3.2 Spoiling -- 3.3.3 Provocation -- 3.3.4 Intimidation -- 3.3.5 Advertising -- 3.3.6 Outbidding -- 3.4 Some Comments on the Choice of Target -- References -- Chapter 4: The Economics of Terrorism -- 4.1 Terrorism and Rationality: A Contradiction? -- 4.2 Countermeasures -- 4.3 The Facets of Competition in the Context of Terrorism -- 4.3.1 Faction-Specific Competition -- 4.3.2 Cooperation and Alliances -- 4.3.3 Outbidding Continued and Differentiation -- References -- Chapter 5: Competition Between Homogenous Terrorist Organizations: A General Model -- 5.1 Building The Model -- 5.1.1 Why Large-Scale Attacks Occur At All -- 5.1.2 A Not So Obvious Dominant Strategy -- References -- Chapter 6: Al-Qaeda and Daesh: The Rise of the Islamic State -- 6.1 Origins and Raisons d´être -- 6.2 Case Study: Jabhat Fateh al-Sham Versus Daesh -- 6.3 Case Study: Towards a Model for al-Qaeda and Daesh -- References -- Chapter 7: Conclusion -- Reference -- Appendix A -- Appendix B -- References.

Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright -- Acknowledgements -- 1 Interacting selves: Symbolic interactionism encounters identity -- What is identity? -- The social self -- Multi-dimensional subjects: fixity or fragmentation? -- Symbolic interactionism -- Goffman's dramaturgy -- Criticism and defence -- Symbolic interactionism and identity -- Outline of the book -- 2 Relating in public: Rudeness, civility and polite fictions -- The interaction order -- Politeness and civility -- Definition of the situation -- Ritualized observance -- Unfocused encounters: regulating involvement -- Polite fictions and presented realities -- Rudeness and incivility -- Conclusion -- 3 Framing pictures: Definitions, accounts and motive talk -- Language and the social construction of reality -- Ethnomethodology: talk-in-interaction -- Conversation analysis -- Discourse analysis -- Aligning actions -- Frame analysis -- Conclusion -- 4 Managing faces: Roles, performance and self-presentation -- Performing the self -- Role-taking or role-making? -- Artful strategies -- Decorating the stage: scenery and props -- Lines and moves -- Facework -- Students' self-presentation strategies -- Belief in one's own performance -- Role immersion, embracement and engulfment -- Role conflict -- Role distance -- Discrepant roles -- Conclusion -- 5 Casting members: Teamwork, collusion and dramaturgical loyalty -- A loyal cast of players -- Harmonious co-operation between team-mates -- Team collusion and pseudomutuality -- Symbolic displays of membership -- Facilitative rituals -- Protective and collective facework -- Directorial procedures -- Conclusion -- 6 Spoiling careers: Deviance, stigma and moral trajectories -- Identity as career -- Making sense of ourselves -- Trajectories -- Critical junctures -- Moral careers -- Stigma -- Deviant careers -- Career exit -- Conclusion.

In recent years, concerns over the risks posed by artificial intelligence (AI) have mounted. In response, international organizations (IOs) have begun to translate the emerging consensus on the need for ethical AI into concrete international rules and standards. While the path toward effective AI governance faces many challenges, this essay shifts attention to an obstacle that has received little attention so far: the growing illiberal backlash in IOs. Prompted by Poland's recent rejection of a European position on AI due to the document's mention of "gender equality," we argue that Poland followed a strategy that illiberal actors now regularly employ in IOs. To combat gender norms and women's rights across issue areas, illiberal contesters first identify the progressive language in international documents and then threaten to veto those documents—unless such language is watered down or removed. This spoiling strategy, we argue, may not only lead to the compromising of fundamental human rights norms but may also prevent much needed rules for AI from being adopted altogether. Against this background, we urge scholars and practitioners concerned with AI ethics to pay closer attention to illiberal backlash politics. IOs are emerging as spaces where progressive AI rules and standards are increasingly contested—and where they need to be defended to safeguard fundamental rights in an age of rapid technological change.

In recent years, concerns over the risks posed by artificial intelligence (AI) have mounted. In response, international organizations (IOs) have begun to translate the emerging consensus on the need for ethical AI into concrete international rules and standards. While the path toward effective AI governance faces many challenges, this essay shifts attention to an obstacle that has received little attention so far: the growing illiberal backlash in IOs. Prompted by Poland's recent rejection of a European position on AI due to the document's mention of "gender equality," we argue that Poland followed a strategy that illiberal actors now regularly employ in IOs. To combat gender norms and women's rights across issue areas, illiberal contesters first identify the progressive language in international documents and then threaten to veto those documents—unless such language is watered down or removed. This spoiling strategy, we argue, may not only lead to the compromising of fundamental human rights norms but may also prevent much needed rules for AI from being adopted altogether. Against this background, we urge scholars and practitioners concerned with AI ethics to pay closer attention to illiberal backlash politics. IOs are emerging as spaces where progressive AI rules and standards are increasingly contested—and where they need to be defended to safeguard fundamental rights in an age of rapid technological change.

N° 9 ; This paper capitalizes on EU-LISTCO's analytical framework to assess the preparedness of the European Union and Member States in addressing situations of limited statehood and contested orders in Mali. The first part of the working paper contextualizes the risks and challenges in Mali prior to the military coup which occurred in 2012. It identifies the fall of President Amadou Toumani Touré as the tipping point which led to the dramatic deterioration of the situation in Northern Mali. This part also unravels the components of resilience in Mali according to the typology suggested by Thomas Risse and Tanja Börzel (social trust, legitimacy of governance actors and institutional design). The second part focuses on the policies undertaken by the EU and three Member States (France, Germany, Italy). It shows that France, and to a lesser extent Germany, demonstrated a genuine capacity and willingness to engage in the crisis resolution process and foster resilience, even though some divergences have appeared. Other Member States, such as Italy, however, proved to be far less enthusiastic until the 2014 migration crisis which involved their national territory. The third part of the working paper identifies the persistent deficit of policy coordination and the existence of local rent-seeking mechanisms as spoiling factors which affect the efforts shown by EU and selected Member States to foster resilience in Mali.

N° 9 ; This paper capitalizes on EU-LISTCO's analytical framework to assess the preparedness of the European Union and Member States in addressing situations of limited statehood and contested orders in Mali. The first part of the working paper contextualizes the risks and challenges in Mali prior to the military coup which occurred in 2012. It identifies the fall of President Amadou Toumani Touré as the tipping point which led to the dramatic deterioration of the situation in Northern Mali. This part also unravels the components of resilience in Mali according to the typology suggested by Thomas Risse and Tanja Börzel (social trust, legitimacy of governance actors and institutional design). The second part focuses on the policies undertaken by the EU and three Member States (France, Germany, Italy). It shows that France, and to a lesser extent Germany, demonstrated a genuine capacity and willingness to engage in the crisis resolution process and foster resilience, even though some divergences have appeared. Other Member States, such as Italy, however, proved to be far less enthusiastic until the 2014 migration crisis which involved their national territory. The third part of the working paper identifies the persistent deficit of policy coordination and the existence of local rent-seeking mechanisms as spoiling factors which affect the efforts shown by EU and selected Member States to foster resilience in Mali.