Suchergebnisse

Konrad Henlein founded the Sudeten German Heimatfront (SHF) in October 1933 and in less than a year and a half it would become the largest party in the First Czechoslovak Republic. This achievement is all the more remarkable in light of the initiative undertaken by the Czech and German Social Democrats, as well as the Communists to have the SHF banned in the year before the elections. This initiative would most likely have succeeded had the matter not been referred to Czechoslovakia's ailing President, Tomáš Masaryk. After the state had banned both the Sudeten German Nazi and Nationalist parties on account of their alleged ties to Hitler, Masaryk concluded one month before the 19 May 1935 general elections that the SHF should be allowed to campaign.1 Masaryk, however, mandated that the Heimatfront must change its name to the more democratic "Sudeten German Party" (SdP). Despite the specter of a ban that still haunted the party in the month before the election, the SdP succeeded in transforming itself from a political pariah into a majority German party by using the legal protections and security forces of Czech democracy to wage a legalistic campaign against the state. In light of this stunning success, how then did the party leadership perform this act of political alchemy and what strategies did it deploy in campaigning against the state?

Erich Gierach, geboren 1881 in Bromberg (Bydgoszcz), war einer der erfolgreichsten Gelehrten und Hochschullehrer der deutschen Minderheit in der CSR. Das Werk und Wirken dieses Volkskundlers und Germanisten bildete die paradigmatische Basis für den Aufstieg der Henlein-Bewegung. Er schuf bereits unmittelbar nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg das Paradigma des Sudetendeutschen und baute es in der Zwischenkriegszeit zielgerichtet aus. Er führte bereits vor 1933 großdeutsche, völkisch-nationalistische und rassistische Bevölkerungspolitikmodelle mit revisionistischen Neuordnungsideen zusammen, so dass er als Vordenker des Münchener Abkommens gelten kann. ; Erich Gierach, born in 1881 in Bromberg (Bydgoszcz), was one of the most successful scholars and university professors of the German minority in interwar Czechoslovakia. The writings and actions of this ethnographer and Germanist provided the ideological foundations for the rise of Konrad Henlein's Sudeten German nationalist movement. In the wake of the First World War, Gierach created the archetype of the 'Sudeten German' and continued to develop it, in the service of specific political goals, throughout the interwar period. Even before 1933, Gierach helped conjoin völkisch-nationalist and racist population policy models with revisionist ideas about territorial and social reordering (Neuordnungsideen). Consequently, he can be considered an intellectual godfather of the 1938 Munich Agreement.

Sudeten German activism was formed through cooperation within the system of Czechoslovak democracy. Three Sudeten German parties were engaged in activist politics in the First Czechoslovak Republic, despite the fact that many of their expressed convictions contained elements of the antidemocratic thought that was to become the root of national socialism. The activist political parties, as represented by their leading politicians, accepted the democratic system as the basis of their existence, but it proved impossible to reconcile the antidemocratic thinking that permeated their views with the Czechoslovak notion of democracy. In 1935, among Sudeten Germans there was a tide of feeling of appurtenance to the German nation & widespread dissatisfaction resulting from the impact of the global economic crisis on those regions of Czechoslovakia settled by Germans, which paved the way for Konrad Henlein's nationalist party, & later, Adolf Hitler.

The study uses unpublished sources from the National Archives in London and scientific literature toanalyse the British Legation in Prague's perception of Czech-German relations in Czechoslovakia upto 1933. After some initial fumbling caused by a lack of knowledge of the Central European region followingthe collapse of Austria-Hungary, responsible officials in London decided to wait for the outcomeof the peace conference in Paris. At the same time, British diplomats acknowledged that theywould have to rely on co-operation with France in the region, and as a result indirectly supportedFrench claims and demands; once the peace conference had ended, however, Great Britain focusedon its own issues and the affairs of its empire. At the start of the 1920s, the British diplomatic missionin Prague also settled in its position and the first Minister, George Clerk, provided unbiased informationon Czech-German coexistence within Czechoslovakia, and partially acknowledged that bothsides were right (he understood some of the Germans' objections), but on the other hand he clearlyrecognised the new state and perceived its minorities policy as very accommodating, and respecting international obligations. Following the calm period of the 1920s when even the British Legationin Prague remarked on the qualitative shift in relations between both ethnicities, the beginning ofthe 1930s arrived alongside the economic crisis, which transformed the domestic political situationwithin the First Czechoslovak Republic. According to British Minister, Joseph Addison, the positionof the largest minority in the country had deteriorated, something he thought was due to the factthat Czechoslovak officials were breaching the Minority Treaty and were not doing enough for thewellbeing of its German population, and that this did not bode well for the future. ; 102 ; 114

The study uses unpublished sources from the National Archives in London and scientific literature toanalyse the British Legation in Prague's perception of Czech-German relations in Czechoslovakia upto 1933. After some initial fumbling caused by a lack of knowledge of the Central European region followingthe collapse of Austria-Hungary, responsible officials in London decided to wait for the outcomeof the peace conference in Paris. At the same time, British diplomats acknowledged that theywould have to rely on co-operation with France in the region, and as a result indirectly supportedFrench claims and demands; once the peace conference had ended, however, Great Britain focusedon its own issues and the affairs of its empire. At the start of the 1920s, the British diplomatic missionin Prague also settled in its position and the first Minister, George Clerk, provided unbiased informationon Czech-German coexistence within Czechoslovakia, and partially acknowledged that bothsides were right (he understood some of the Germans' objections), but on the other hand he clearlyrecognised the new state and perceived its minorities policy as very accommodating, and respecting international obligations. Following the calm period of the 1920s when even the British Legationin Prague remarked on the qualitative shift in relations between both ethnicities, the beginning ofthe 1930s arrived alongside the economic crisis, which transformed the domestic political situationwithin the First Czechoslovak Republic. According to British Minister, Joseph Addison, the positionof the largest minority in the country had deteriorated, something he thought was due to the factthat Czechoslovak officials were breaching the Minority Treaty and were not doing enough for thewellbeing of its German population, and that this did not bode well for the future.

"Aus militärstrategischen Gründen suchte Hitler die Tschechoslowakei zu beseitigen. Deren Bündnisse mit Moskau und Paris jedoch sowie starke militärische Befestigungen und das Vertrauen auf britische Protektion veranlaßten Prag zum trotzigen Widerstand gegen den wachsenden Druck aus Berlin. Prags Unnachgiebigkeit versuchte Hitler deshalb nicht nur mit Gewaltandrohung von außen sondern auch durch unannehmbare Autonomieforderungen seitens der Sudetendeutschen im tschechoslowakischen Staatsverband zu zermürben. Entsprechend bekam die Sudetendeutsche Partei vom Auswärtigen Amt in Berlin den Auftrag, von der Prager Regierung immer mehr zu verlangen als diese zugestehe, um die politische Sprengkraft in der Tschechoslowakei zu steigern. Parallel dazu inszenierte Droh-Reden Hitlers und grenznahe militärische Demonstrationen mußten in Europas Hauptstädten als brutale Entschlossenheit des deutschen Diktators gedeutet werden, der wegen der Sudeten einen neuen Krieg mit den Westmächten riskieren zu wollen schien. Um den Frieden in Europa zu retten, fügten sich die Ministerpräsidenten Italiens, Englands und Frankreichs dem Münchener Verhandlungsdiktat. Das der Tschechoslowakei zugemutete Opfer war kein Beleg blinder Appeasement-Politik. Großbritannien als Schlüsselmacht Europas war aufgrund seiner weltweit bedrohten Empire-Interessen und des erheblichen Rüstungsdefizits weder willens noch fähig, wegen der das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker für sich reklamierenden Sudeten einen Präventivkrieg auszulösen. Ein solcher war faktisch in Frankreich und England um so weniger durchsetzbar, als Hitler pathetisch mehrfach versicherte, nach dem Anschluß der Sudeten an das Deutsche Reich keine weiteren territorialen Forderungen mehr zu haben." (Autorenreferat)

Gerold Tietz was born in 1941 in Horka (north Bohemia) in a family of Sudeten Germans. Germans lived in this village together with Czechs, Roma people and Jews. The family also involved Czech relatives and many of German relatives spoke good Czech and kept relations with Czech cultural groups. After the war Gerold Tietz and his family were expelled to Swabia. He studied history, French and political science. From 1969 the graduated historian lived in Esslingen where he taught in the grammar school for thirty years. In the autobiographically oriented novels Böhmische Fuge (1997), Böhmisches Richtfest (2007) and in Böhmische Grätschen (2009) Tietz tried to depict official social-political events connected with famous political and cultural figures as well as the stories of ordinary days of "small people" who had to face the consequences of historic changes which influenced their lives. The paper analyses the conditions of Czech and German coexistence and confronts the authentic historic context. Nevertheless, negative features of these ethnic groups are not overlooked and the positive ones are presented as a positive contribution to the current European multiculturalism.

Gerold Tietz was born in 1941 in Horka (north Bohemia) in a family of Sudeten Germans. Germans lived in this village together with Czechs, Roma people and Jews. The family also involved Czech relatives and many of German relatives spoke good Czech and kept relations with Czech cultural groups.After the war Gerold Tietz and his family were expelled to Swabia. He studied history, French and political science. From 1969 the graduated historian lived in Esslingen where he taught in the grammar school for thirty years.In the autobiographically oriented novels Böhmische Fuge (1997), Böhmisches Richtfest (2007) and in Böhmische Grätschen (2009) Tietz tried to depict official social-political events connected with famous political and cultural figures as well as the stories of ordinary days of "small people" who had to face the consequences of historic changes which influenced their lives.The paper analyses the conditions of Czech and German coexistence and confronts the authentic historic context. Nevertheless, negative features of these ethnic groups are not overlooked and the positive ones are presented as a positive contribution to the current European multiculturalism.

Examines impact of the Sudeten German question on German-Czech relations since 1989.

257Nationality — Loss of — On Change of Sovereignty — Cession — Nationality of Sudeten Germans in 1938.