Suchergebnisse

This article explores the complexity of managing refugee issues, particularly
refugee repatriations, taking the Horn of Africa as a case. I argue that refugee
repatriation endeavours are complex because their success depends on at
least four actors, each with different – indeed often conflicting – interests. I
examine the proposition that as the number of actors involved in a given
issue area increases so does the likelihood of less-than-successful outcomes.
This is particularly true if resource-poor actors are included in the decision-making process, and, because of the need to extract maximum benefits and/or
minimise maximum losses, usually operate under the assumption of zero-sum situations. This assumption narrows their range of responses and
hampers their ability to engage in mutually beneficial exchange
relationships. As a result, repatriations, which are necessarily consensus-based, become more difficult to accomplish successfully as evidenced in the
Horn of Africa.

The purpose of this article is to consider the options for settling equilibrium on the world gas market in the absence of international regulating institutions while political instruments of non-market competition are actively being used by European market players. A market analysis from the point view of cost structure and the interests of key suppliers and consumers is undertaken, and an attempt to build a model of market interactions accompanied by sanctions is made. Modelling the internalization of political restrictions is used to ground actors' motives and their strategies in new conditions. The results of this analysis provide for essential conclusions regarding market change in general as well as changes in the positions of separate players. Mathematically sound results inspire optimism that actors can take optimal and efficient decisions despite non-economic competition and de facto failure of international institutions.

The book reconstructs how the normative yardsticks that underpinevaluations of international organizations have changed since 1970. Basedon in-depth case studies of normative change in five internationalorganizations over a period of five decades, the authors argue that, thesedays, international organizations confront a longer and moreheterogeneous list of normative expectations than in previous periods. Twochanges are particularly noteworthy. First, international organizations needto demonstrate not only what they do for their member states, but also forthe individuals in member states. Second, while international organizationscontinue to be evaluated in terms of what they achieve, they areincreasingly also measured by how they operate. As the case studies reveal,the more pluralist patchwork of legitimacy principles today's internationalorganizations confront has multiple origins. It includes the politicization ofexpanding international authority, but also a range of other driving forcessuch as individual leadership or normative path dependence. Despitevariation in the sources, however, the consequences of the normative shiftare similar. Notably, a longer and more heterogenous list of normativeexpectations renders the legitimation of international organizations morecomplex. Strikingly, then, at a time when many feel internationalcooperation is needed more than ever, legitimating the forms in which suchcooperation takes place has become most difficult. Internationalorganizations have come under pressure.