Suchergebnisse

Discusses historical basis for a standing UN armed force, effectiveness of burden sharing and regional efforts, verification and monitoring of peace accords, managing civil-military relations in humanitarian interventions, and possible privatization of peacekeeping operations; 5 articles. Text in both English and French. Parallel title: Maintien de la paix: évolution ou extinction?

Explores what constitutes "success", who conducts the operation, timing of intervention, host state consent, cooperation, mission, and geographic considerations. Compares traditional peacekeeping to new perspectives.

Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "This testimony discusses the decisions by the United States to support new or expanded United Nations (U.N.) operations in the following four locations: Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. These decisions were made between January 1999 and June 2000. This testimony focuses on: (1) whether GAO had sufficient access to agency records to conduct the study requested by Congress, (2) how Presidential Decision Directive 25 was used in deciding to support new or expanded U.N. operations, and (3) how the executive branch consulted with Congress during the Directive 25 decision process. GAO found that it lacked the full and independent access to agency records needed to complete its work. The intent of Directive 25 is to ensure selective and effective use of peacekeeping as a tool for advancing U.S. interests and to also establish factors to help assess whether U.S. support for an operation is appropriate. GAO found that Directive 25 factors were considered in the initial operation in East Timor, but GAO could not determine whether those factors were considered in other operations. Communications between Congress and the executive branch consisted of briefings, letters, and testimonies. However, communications provided little information about: (1) the risks and weaknesses of operations identified by Directive 25 analyses, and (2) plans addressing these risks and weaknesses."

THIS ARTICLE PRESENTS SEVERAL PAIRS OF META-LEVEL NARRATIVES DERIVED FROM THE STORIES THAT ARE TOLD BY GREEK AND TURKISH CYPRIOTS, BY PEACEKEEPERS IN THE UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS (UNFICYP), AND BY INTERESTED EXTERNAL ACTORS AND SCHOLARS. EXPLORING UNFICYP IN NARRATIVES IS APPROPRIATE GIVEN THAT THE PRIMARY DISPUTANTS--THE GREEK AND TURKISH CYPRIOTS--REPRESENT THE CYPRUS PROBLEM IN NARRATIVE FORM. EXPLICATION OF THESE MULTIPLE AND CONTENDING NARRATIVES IS AN ESSENTIAL FIRST STEP TO BUILDING NEW NARRATIVES ON PEACEKEEPING IN CYPRUS THAT WOULD CONTAIN WITHIN THEIR PLOTS THE CONDITIONS FOR GENUINE PEACE. SUCH NEW NARRATIVES CANNOT BE CONSTRUCTED WITHOUT FIRST FACING UP TO THE REALITIES OF THE MULTIPLE CONTENDING ACCOUNTS AND THEN MOVING BEYOND THEM.

Examines violence and intimidation by Indonesian military and paramilitary groups against pro-independence forces in East Timor, May 1999 agreement for a UN-sponsored referendum on independence, and prospects for international intervention.

Examines national and international information-gathering and sharing during United Nations peacekeeping operations; case studies. Secrecy verus openness, information analysis and dissemination, and international security.

Examines range, extent, and frequency of peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace-enforcing activities. Excerpted from the World Peace Encyclopedia.

THE BUILDING AND MAINTENANCE OF A STRONG AND EFFECTIVE UN FORMS A KEY OBJECTIVE OF IRISH FOREIGN POLICY WITHIN WHICH PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS HAVE COME TO PLAY A CENTRAL ROLE. IRELAND IS A MIDDLE POWER CONTRIBUTOR TO PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES AND ITS CONTRIBUTION HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIAL. IN 1993, IRELAND AGREED TO CONTRIBUTE TROOPS TO UNOSOM II WHICH BROUGHT ABOUT A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN POLICY. THIS MARKED A NATURAL PROGRESSION IN IRISH POLICY.

Discusses the conditions under which UN peacekeeping missions were undertaken, 1948-88, and their later expansion to include preventive measures and missions of humanitarian relief.

With the end of the Cold War and the resurgence of dormant ethnic and intrastate conflicts within many nations, the demands for international forces to keep the peace, ensure humanitarian relief, and secure democratic institutions in splintering states around the world have increased dramatically. The United States has significantly increased its own involvement in United Nations operations. At the same time as demands for forceful intervention have increased, events in Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, and other troubled areas around the world have revealed shortfalls in the developed world's ability to deal the non-traditional missions of nation building, securing humanitarian rights, and large scale peace enforcement operations. A fundamental question arises in the face these new operations: how well do rules developed during the era of limited classical peacekeeping fit these new missions? Can the old rules still apply in this new age of peace operations? Part of the problem in applying classical peacekeeping rules today is that they are a mishmash of guidelines on when to intervene, and once decision to intervene is made, what the rules on the use of force should be. The issue of regulation of the use of force in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions is covered. A third important issue, the legal status United Nations forces engaging in new types of expanded peace operations and their resulting obligations under the international law of armed conflict, is also discussed. ; Thesis (Master's) ; With the end of the Cold War and the resurgence of dormant ethnic and intrastate conflicts within many nations, the demands for international forces to keep the peace, ensure humanitarian relief, and secure democratic institutions in splintering states around the world have increased dramatically. The United States has significantly increased its own involvement in United Nations operations. At the same time as demands for forceful intervention have increased, events in Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, and other troubled areas around the world have revealed shortfalls in the developed world's ability to deal the non-traditional missions of nation building, securing humanitarian rights, and large scale peace enforcement operations. A fundamental question arises in the face these new operations: how well do rules developed during the era of limited classical peacekeeping fit these new missions? Can the old rules still apply in this new age of peace operations? Part of the problem in applying classical peacekeeping rules today is that they are a mishmash of guidelines on when to intervene, and once decision to intervene is made, what the rules on the use of force should be. The issue of regulation of the use of force in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions is covered. A third important issue, the legal status United Nations forces engaging in new types of expanded peace operations and their resulting obligations under the international law of armed conflict, is also discussed. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Civil society is crucial to the creation of peaceful intra- & international relations. Civil society excludes formal governmental officials, state-funded economic & social enterprises, family, & ethnic groups. It includes a wide range of nongovernmental organizations, including religious, academic, business, professional, media, & indigenous organizations. Civil society is by its nature democratic & peaceful, in that citizens are unarmed & noncoercive. The UN has taken the first step toward integrating civil society into international policy by recognizing its importance in the 50th anniversay declaration. The creation of a popularly elected Second Assembly & a civil society would make the UN a more democratic institution, better able to foster cosmopolitan peace. 11 References. E. Munson

Examines some of the financial and other problems that have arisen since the scope of peacekeeping missions was enlarged in the late 1980s to include humanitarian interventions, with acceptance of the idea that force or the threat of force might be used to ensure delivery of assistance. Problems related to financing, administration, definition of mission, command structure, and lack of an early warning system.