The Village of Salado has proposed the Salado Wastewater Line project where wastewater lines and associated lift stations will be constructed in Salado, Bell County, Texas. The Village of Salado retained Terracon Consultants, Inc. to conduct a systematic, intensive pedestrian survey of the approximately 11.36-acre project area. Because the Village of Salado, a political subdivision of the State of Texas, sponsored the project, the proposed undertaking is subject to compliance with the Antiquities Code of Texas and oversight from the Texas Historical Commission (THC). Funding for the project would come in part from the Economic Development Administration. Therefore, the undertaking triggers Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (Code of Federal Regulations, Title 36, Part 800). In addition, US Army Corps of Engineers Nationwide Permit 12 for Utility Lines (SWF-2015-00517) is being utilized for this project. The cultural resources survey was carried out under Texas Antiquities Permit Number 7736, issued to David Yelacic, MS, RPA, Principal Investigator. Fieldwork was carried out by David Yelacic with assistance from Caitlin Gulihur and Juan Morlock. Records from the project will be curated at the Center for Archaeological Studies at Texas State University. The approximate 16,500-linear-foot by 30-foot-wide alignment (11.36 acres) was considered the Area of Potential Effect (APE). Survey of the APE consisted of systematic pedestrian coverage, including discretionary shovel tests and backhoe trenching. The survey work was carried out on August 5 and 6, 2016. In coordination with staff from the THC, the study area was focused down to archaeologically sensitive areas, areas with deep impacts, and a previously unsurveyed (and undisturbed) portion of alignment to the east. Three backhoe trenches and four shovel tests were excavated. One newly discovered archeological site, 41BL1401, consisting of prehistoric lithics and historic-age materials, was recorded. The locations of site 41BL1401 and Backhoe Trench 2 were monitored during construction; limited cultural materials in disturbed contexts were observed at each location. No features or discrete archaeological deposits were observed. Site 41BL1401 is recommended as not eligible within the project right-of-way (ROW) for listing on the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) or for designation as a State Antiquities Landmark (SAL). Given the absence of eligible historic properties within the APE, it is Terracon's recommendation that the proposed project be allowed to proceed as currently designed. In the unlikely event that human remains or cultural features are discovered during remaining construction activities, construction should cease in the vicinity of the remains and Terracon, the Texas Historical Commission's Archeology Division, or other proper authorities should be contacted.
Memories in Stone: The Confederate Catawba Monument Controversies surrounding Confederate monuments and symbols have brought increased attention to issues of Civil War memory. Often overlooked, Native Americans play an important role in the ways in which some people remember the conflict. A particularly interesting example of this role exists in Fort Mill, South Carolina. in 1900, the town unveiled a limestone monument to Catawba Indians who served in the Confederate Army. These Native people had a specific historical relationship with local and state authorities that shaped how the white ruling class formed a particular memorialization of the Catawba after the Civil War. Furthermore, the two leading local figures in the monument's creation had strong personal motivations to sponsor it. These factors combined with national trends in Civil War memorialization to make the Catawba monument a unique, yet still representative, example of Civil War memory making. Unique in that the design and message of the monument served a local purpose of permanently enshrining the white population's version of Catawba history in Fort Mill's public space, and representative in that it bolstered the ideals of Lost Cause ideology that swept the country at the turn of the twentieth century. Caught between these powerful ideas were the Catawba themselves, who utilized the beliefs represented by the monument for their own strategic goals. Reconstructing the Street: Confrontations Over Norfolk's Public Sphere, 1862-1866 on April 16, 1866, several hundred African Americans marched through the streets of Norfolk, Virginia to celebrate the passage of the Civil Rights Bill of 1866. on the outskirts of town, a fight occurred between white onlookers and black marchers. Violence continued into the night, as white assailants prowled the streets of the city and killed several black people. This violence, which soon became known as the Norfolk Riot, garnered national attention. But it was not an exceptional event. Rather, it was one of many violent contests between white and black people over who had access to, and influence in, Norfolk's public spaces. Reconstruction brought irreversible changes to Norfolk's political and civic status quo. Previously excluded from or constrained within the city's public sphere, formerly enslaved and free black inhabitants seized the opportunities presented by the Civil War to exercise their demands for full access to it. However, white residents consistently resisted these claims, often resorting to organized violence. By examining several violent disputes that took place prior to April 16th, the Norfolk Riot can be contextualized as but one of a series of similar battles between the city's white and black communities centered around control of Norfolk's civic arena.
The article analyzes the features of the modern system of organization of state power. The author substantiates the position that the domestic model of the state and territorial structure and the system of organization of the supreme bodies of state power result from reflecting of certain features of the legal nature of the Russian state administration, which is characterized by a monocratic style. The essence of Russian monocracy is manifested in the concentration of competence in one center, the complexity of manifestation of opposition forces in the political and legal field, the dominance of executive and administrative authorities in the system of public administration, the lack of a mechanism for the implementation of legal responsibility, primarily constitutional and legal, for the results of its activities. The modern problems of the organization of higher bodies of state power, as well as the further development of the domestic model of federalism, including both the improvement of the state and territorial structure and the modernization of federal relations, require their scientific comprehension and identification of ways and their optimization, taking into account the prospects for the formation of a right-wing state in Russia.In this regard, it is concluded that there is a need for a constitutional limitation of Russian monocracy in state administration in order to avoid excessive authoritarianism and centrism in state administration, the creation of certain sorts of conditions and circumstances that hamper the further monocraticization of state administration that is enshrined in the provisions of the Constitution of the Russian Federation.DOI 10.14258/izvasu(2017)6-04 ; Анализируются особенности современной системы организации государственной власти.Обосновывается позиция, что отечественная модель государственно-территориального устройства и система организации высших органов государственной власти являются результатом отражения некоторых особенностей юридической природы российского государственного управления, для которого характерен монократический стиль. Сущность российского монократизма проявляется в концентрации компетенционных полномочий в одном центре, сложности проявления в политико-правовом поле оппозиционных сил, доминировании исполнительно-распорядительных органов власти в системе публичного управления, отсутствии механизма реализации юридической ответственности, прежде всего конституционно-правовой, за результаты своей деятельности.Современные проблемы организации высших органов государственной власти, а также вопросы дальнейшего развития отечественной модели федерализма, включая как совершенствование государственно-территориального устройства, так и модернизацию федеративных отношений, требуют научного осмысления и определения путей их оптимизации с учетом перспектив становления правового государства в России.В связи с этим делается вывод о необходимости конституционного ограничения российского монократизма в государственном управлении во избежание излишнего авторитаризма и центризма в государственном управлении, создания определенного рода условий и обстоятельств, препятствующих дальнейшей монократизации государственного управления, нашедшего закрепление в положениях Конституции Российской Федерации.DOI 10.14258/izvasu(2017)6-04
This article describes as a first step, the surveillance in society of disciplinary control in light of the panoptic method of Jeremy Bentham and its link to the digital ecosystem and the "transparency" of the 21st century in the face of the protection of the right to privacy of the personal information, in scenarios of technological and informational pluralism where the integral governance of the data is required by the different operators and private and public organizations, which are called to implement inclusive and protectionist privacy policies both in the physical environment and in the field of Internet, as well as social interaction and human economic and political development in the framework of a globalized economy.Likewise, this thematic approach makes an approach to the legal regime of the protection of personal data in Colombia, which has some security mechanisms and surveillance of the information that identifies its citizens but at the same time they are insufficient compared to the era technological, where there is big data or large data in information platforms without a real control that allows to establish limits to the treatment of these that leads to the identification, identification, profiling, of people with economic purposes and without responsibility for the inadequate use of digital services that puts your private life at risk. ; El presente artículo describe como primera medida, la vigilancia en la sociedad del control disciplinario a la luz del método panóptico de Jeremy Bentham y su acoplamiento al ecosistema digital y la "transparencia" del siglo XXI frente a la protección del derecho a la privacidad de la información personal, en escenarios de pluralismo tecnológico e informacional donde se requiere de la gobernanza integral de los datos por parte de los diferentes operadores y organizaciones privadas y públicas, la cuales están llamadas a implementar políticas de privacidad incluyentes y proteccionistas, tanto en el entorno físico como en el ámbito de Internet, así como la interacción social y el desarrollo humano económico y político en el marco de una economía globalizada.Así mismo, este abordaje temático hace un acercamiento al régimen jurídico de la protección de los datos personales en Colombia, el cual reviste de algunos mecanismos de seguridad y vigilancia de la información que identifica a sus ciudadanos, pero a la vez, son insuficientes frente a la era tecnológica, donde existe el Big Data o gran volumen de datos en plataformas de información sin un verdadero control que permita establecer límites al tratamiento de estos que conlleva a la individualización, identificación y perfilación, de las personas con fines económicos y sin la responsabilidad por el inadecuado uso de los servicios digitales que pone en riesgo la vida privada.
Аналізується комунікативна складова мовної політики Росії у сучасній Україні, опираючись на ідеологічний, інформаційно-комунікаційний, культурно-історичний напрями. Наголошується на систематичних заборонах мовною політикою Росії на території України у минулому поширення комунікацій українською мовою в усіх сферах і галузях суспільно-політичного життя країни. Сучасна Росія поставила щодо України амбітну мету: знекровити її в економічному, культурному, духовному плані; розколоти український народ за мовно-культурною і територіальною ознаками, та схилити Україну до союзу із Росією ; Analyzyruetsya kommunykatyvnaya sostavnaya yazykovoy policy of Russia in Modern Ukraine, opyrayas on ideological, ynformatsyynno-kommunykatsyonnoe, cultural ystorycheskoe direction. Aktsentyruetsya systematycheskyh prohibition on Wikipedia yazykovoy polytykoy Russia on the territory of Ukraine in the past, expansion in the Ukrainian language communications vo vseh filds of industry and socio-political life of the country. What kasaetsya Ukraine, the Modern Russia has put ambytsyoznuyu purpose: Her obeskrovyt in ekonomycheskom, culturally, spiritually; raskolot Ukrainian people on the basis yazykovyh, cultural and terrytoryalnyh otlychyy, Ukraine on slope for union with Russia. Given the language policy carried out by the Ukrainian authorities at this stage in the context of decentralization, it is quite a bit of optimism, given that local authorities will have the right to impose the language she chooses. The current government is trying to implement one language policy of the Communists and the «Regionals» against which she performed when she was in the role of the opposition? This is a question for thought and leave to the discretion of readers! There is the fact that the Ukrainian language will be used only in the central and western regions some that are not implemented at regional and local levels any regional language. As for the western regions of Ukraine, here the language situation is also diffiult, given that in Transcarpathia functioning Rusyn, Hungarian and Romanian languages, and the last - even in Bukovina. What communication space remains for the operation and distribution of Ukrainian as the state language? It is necessary to remember that we are not living in France, not in Britain, where there are several offiial languages but which nobody ever heard because of the existence of French and English, and in Ukraine. ; Анализируется коммуникативная составная языковой политики России в современной Украине, опираясь на идеологическое, информацийнно-коммуникационное, культурно-историческое направления. Акцентируется внимание на систематических запретах языковой политикой России на территории Украины в прошлом, расширении коммуникаций на украинском языке во всех сферах и отраслях общественно-политической жизни страны. Что касается Украины, то современная Россия поставила амбициозную цель: обескровить её в економическом, культурном, духовном плане; расколоть украинский народ на основе языковых, культурных и территориальных отличий, склонить Украину к союзу с Россией
В статье рассматривается вопрос возможности реформирования модели административно-территориального устройства Украины как механизма сохранения её территориальной целостности и единства. Отмечено, что о федеративной модели устройства страны как единственно приемлемой для Украины, говорили как в начале, так и в конце ХХ в. идеологи украинской государственности М. Драгоманов, М. Грушевский, В. Липинский, В. Черновол и др. Обоснованы два возможных механизма формирования федеративного устройства страны федерализация «сверху» и федерализация «снизу». Краткий обзор принципов и причин формирования федеративного устройства отдельных стран Европы позволил сделать вывод о том, что созданная на национально-этнической основе федерация, базирующаяся на соблюдении и уважении основополагающих прав и свобод всех граждан, способна не только существовать как единое государство, но и получить новые импульсы для экономического развития и повышения роли страны на международной арене. Именно такой принципиальный путь предлагается взять за основу при разработке проекта реформирования территориального устройства страны. В аспекте векторов внешнеполитических интеграционных процессов, являющихся одним из факторов социального раздела в стране, предложена концепция регионального интеграционного конфедерализма как возможности отдельных федеративных единиц принимать участие в интеграционных объединениях, выгодных и интересных для них. В статье делается вывод о том, что именно переход к федерализму способен сохранить государство Украина как реальный субъект мировой геополитики и объект политической карты мира. ; The possibility of reforming the administrative-territorial structure model of Ukraine as a mechanism for the preservation of its territorial integrity and unity is considered in the article. M. Drahomanov, M. Hrushevsky, W. Lipinski, B. Chornovol and other ideologists wrote about federal model of state system as the only acceptable for Ukraine. Two possible mechanisms of formation the federal structure of the country the federalization from the «top» and the federalization from «bottom» are substantiated. A brief overview of principles and causes of federal structure formation of some European countries led to the conclusion that, federation, which was created at the national and ethnic principles, is based on compliance and respect for the fundamental rights and freedoms of all citizens, it is capable not only save itself as single state, but also to get new impulses for economic development and the country 's role on the international arena. Such a fundamental way is proposed to take as a basis for time worked on a project-reform and territorial structure of the country. When it comes to foreign policy vectors of integration processes, NE-governing one of the factors in the social section of the country, proposed the concept of regional integration as an opportunity confederalism separate federal units to take part in integration associations, profitable and interesting for them. The article concludes that transition to federalism is able to keep the Ukrainian state as a real subject of world geopolitics and the political map of the world.
Facultad de Derecho y Ciencias Sociales. Maestría en Derecho de la Información ; What defines community radio, according to the Charter of Community and Citizen Radios issued by the World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters (AMARC), is its sociocultural profitability. Just as there is a place in the radio spectrum for commercial transmissions that seek economic profitability and for state radios seeking political, social and cultural profitability, there must be space for broadcasters who do not seek gain or proselytism, but the construction of citizenship; The exercise of rights and the fulfillment of duties; The creation of consensuses around noble causes, and in general, the improvement in the quality of life of the people. In general, community radios are the organized expression in the management of a medium of communication that, in remote locations or without communication with each other, is the only way to warn the weather, to communicate with the doctor or to send messages of local interest And staff. In indigenous peoples, community radios are fundamental tools for the conservation and reproduction of the culture of communities and peoples. Granting these peoples the guarantee of effective access to the media and giving them real possibilities to thereby disseminate their uses and customs among their communities gives, in turn, the guarantee to a mestizo people that their identity will be preserved And Reproduced. ; Lo que define a las radios comunitarias, según la Carta de Radios Comunitarias y Ciudadanas emitida por la Asociación Mundial de Radios Comunitarias (AMARC), es su rentabilidad sociocultural. Así como hay lugar en el espectro radioeléctrico para transmisiones comerciales que buscan la rentabilidad económica y para radios estatales que buscan la rentabilidad política, social y cultural debe haber espacio para emisoras que no pretenden la ganancia ni el proselitismo, sino la construcción de ciudadanía; el ejercicio de derechos y el cumplimiento de deberes; la creación de consensos en torno a causas nobles, y en general, la mejoría en la calidad de vida de la gente. En general, las radios comunitarias son la expresión organizada en la gestión de un medio de comunicación que, en localidades alejadas o sin comunicación entre sí, es la única vía para advertir el clima, para comunicarse con el médico o para enviar mensajes de interés local y personal. En los pueblos indígenas, las radios comunitarias son instrumentos fundamentales para la conservación y reproducción de la cultura de las comunidades y los pueblos. Otorgar a esos pueblos la garantía de acceso efectivo a los medios de comunicación y darles posibilidades reales para, por ese medio, diseminar sus usos y costumbres entre sus comunidades otorga, a su vez, la garantía a un pueblo mestizo de que su identidad será preservada y Reproducida.
The World Health Report (WHR) 2000, which focused on improving health system performance, has been a lot of pro and cons. This article assesses critically the WHR 2000 for Indonesia health system. It discusses the elements of WHO evaluation model, weighting the indicators used, the variablesmeasure, and sources of data. Of 191 countries in the world,Indonesia has attained the total rank of 106, while the level of health and distribution of health was in the rank of 103 and 156, respectively. Furthermore, the rank of health financing responsiveness and fairness was in 63-64 and 73, respectively. Meanwhile, health expenditure indicator rankwas in 154 with the performance of Indonesia national health system for level of health was in 90. Overall, the rank of health system performance for Indonesia was in 92. Nevertheless, there are five critics to the WHR 2000 for Indonesia, namely, issues of obtaining the right data, method to assess responsiveness, fair financing calculation, limitation of scientific value, and further discussion on political agenda and method for assessing health system performance. Despite the limitations on methods and framework used,however, the WHR 2000 has influenced countries to prioritize the health system attainment and performance. This article recommends the necessity of comprehensive health system monitoring and evaluation with sustainable policy.Key words: Attainment, performance, national health systemAbstrakLaporan Kesehatan Dunia (LKD) tahun 2000, yang memfokuskan pada program peningkatan kinerja sistem kesehatan, mengundang banyak pro dan kontra. Artikel ini menilai secara kritis laporan tersebut terhadap sistemkesehatan nasional Indonesia. Artikel ini membahas unsur-unsur model evaluasi WHO, pembobotan indikator yang digunakan, ukuran variabel, dan sumber data. Sebanyak 191 negara di dunia, Indonesia telah mencapai total peringkat 106, dengan tingkat kesehatan dan distribusi kesehatan masing-masing pada posisi 103 dan 156. Lebih lanjut, ketanggapan dan keadilan pembiayaan kesehatan masing-masing berada pada peringkat 63-64 dan 73. Sementara itu, indikator pengeluaran kesehatan berada pada peringkat 154 dengan kinerja Sistem Kesehatan Nasional Indonesia untuk tingkat kesehatan menduduki peringkat 90. Ssecara keseluruhan, sistem kinerja kesehatan Indonesia berada pada peringkat 92. Namun, ada 5 kritik terhadap LKD tahun 2000 untuk Indonesia yang meliputi masalah cara memperoleh data yang benar, metode menilai ketanggapan, perhitungan pembiayaan yang wajar, keterbatasan nilai ilmiah dan diskusi lebih lanjut tentang agenda politik dan metode untuk menilai kinerja sistem kesehatan. Meskipun memiliki keterbatasan metode dan kerangka yang digunakan, LKD 2000 telah mempengaruhi banyak negara untuk memprioritaskan pencapaian dan kinerja sistem kesehatan mereka. Artikel ini menyarankan perlunya pemantauan dan evaluasi sistem kesehatan yang komprehensif dengan kebijakan yang berkelanjutan.Kata kunci: Pencapaian, kinerja, sistem kesehatan nasional
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"We speak the truth here," was how Alexei Navalny used to end his YouTube videos. He spoke to the Russian authorities in the language of facts, law, and irony. They answered Navalny in the language of lies, revenge, and violence. Navalny was born a quarter century after Putin. Navalny had ideas about the future. One of the names of the political party that he led and had never been allowed to officially register in Russia was "Russia of the Future." A resentful, cowardly KGB man from the past killed a fearless man of the future. A man mad about the past killed someone who was bravely looking into the future. I knew Alexei personally. I remember him telling me, thoughtfully, "It turns out that when we come to power, the first thing we will have to do will be to limit our own power." He was full of plans to expand his anti-corruption agenda into a more comprehensive one that went beyond fighting crooks and thieves in the Russian government. Yet those crooks and thieves would never stop providing him with subjects for his and his team's investigations. Alexei understood better than most whom he was dealing with. Putin has never tired of repeating that he adored the Soviet Union. But he had fully preserved just one aspect of the Soviet system—the extraordinary power, an above-the-law force, originally established by Bolsheviks to fight the enemies of the revolution. The core of that system was formed by the Cheka (ЧК, in Russian), the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission, which was the first of a succession of Soviet and Russian secret police organizations. After going through a dozen name changes and their respective acronyms, it is now called the FSB, the Federal Security Service. Members of this agency, according to Navalny's own investigation, were complicit in his attempted poisoning in 2020. Those shaky checks and balances to central power that pre-revolutionary Russia created were destroyed in the 1917 revolution. Since then, ideologies and rulers have changed, but the willingness to put themselves above the law has been passed on to each successive ruler intact. Russia is a state that builds the legitimacy of government on the uncontrollable nature of its power. Navalny always understood that he could not play by the same rules as Putin. He could not become the extremist that the Kremlin labeled him, turning the truth inside out, as usual.The Russian state tried to kill Navalny for several years. This murder began long before August 2020, when Alexei was poisoned with a nerve agent in the Siberian city of Tomsk. As the investigation—conducted by Alexei himself and his colleagues—showed, the assassins began stalking him several years prior to the event. There is no reason to believe the "diagnoses" reported by officials and prison authorities. This is a show assassination committed by the Russian state.In the beginning, Putin's emergency rule was a deliberate fueling of alarm and anxiety in society in order to justify uncontrollability. But as time went on, with more and more wars, with more and more political assassinations, the threats to his personal existence became higher because the risks of a serious pushback increased. And so, going further and further beyond the limits of any laws, Putin felt the danger more and more acutely and, falsely calling it a danger to the country, extracted from the fear for his own life the right to dispose of the lives of everyone in the country. Designating some people as "foreign agents" and others as "loyal" is going beyond the bounds of law. Crimes can be categorized according to legal codes, and these formulations will apply to anyone. Acts of revenge against the disloyal, acts of rewarding the loyal are to be found in the repertoire of organized crime organizations, because law knows no revenge. Going beyond the law is a transition to the territory of good and evil.The Russian authorities and the elites that support them have arrogated to themselves the right to execute enemies and reward friends. Evil is an attempt to turn the whole world around in favor of one's own group, party, or organization, make the entire world "ours." The authorities use loyalty oaths and rituals, they turn religion into a set of "good" or "bad" omens. It has nothing to do with genuine faith because icons are magical objects for them. Their real faith is expressed in loyalty to the boss, obeying orders, and following the rules of criminally understood "honor." The Polish poet Czesław Miłosz starts his 1953 book, The Captive Mind, with the parable about his nation being swept by an occupying force. The occupiers distribute among the populace a drug that induces contentment. Miłosz then builds his study of his former friends' compliance strategies on the premise of an outside intervention. Albert Camus in his 1947 novel The Plague depicts a society fighting a deadly virus. This has been interpreted by many as an allegory of French resistance to Nazi occupation during World War II. However, no external force has ever compelled the Russian elites to submit to an aggressive government. No smuggler boat has ever brought in an unknown foreign disease. The present crisis of humanity in Russia is nothing but homegrown. A profound moral shift has occurred within Russian society. The wise, the responsible, the professional, and all the others may not have noticed when they proceeded past the point of no return. For decades, the same individuals have been making political decisions. They are no occupiers; they have been around for at least two decades. For many in Russia there was no need to pledge formal allegiance to the "party of war." People just stayed where they were—in their old posts and rooms. The transition happened by default. Effort was required to break free from the grip of the war party, but those willing to consciously step out of the game have always been far fewer than those who accept changes by default. Navalny was one beacon of hope for some moral normalcy to be established in Russia in the future. Sprawled in his chair, as is his habit, Putin, in between murders and war crimes, asserts the extraordinary power he has arrogated to himself, the power to kill and mock his opponents. Alexei Navalny, in between his numerous investigations, asserted that he believed in the power of truth and could smile in the face of evil. The Russian authorities killed Russia's Mandela, Russia's Havel. Putin broke a mirror that was not to his liking. He fears the future and death, but by destroying an alternative, he has brought the violent end of his own regime closer.The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute
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"We speak the truth here," was how Alexei Navalny used to end his YouTube videos. He spoke to the Russian authorities in the language of facts, law, and irony. They answered Navalny in the language of lies, revenge, and violence. Navalny was born a quarter century after Putin. Navalny had ideas about the future. One of the names of the political party that he led and had never been allowed to officially register in Russia was "Russia of the Future." A resentful, cowardly KGB man from the past killed a fearless man of the future. A man mad about the past killed someone who was bravely looking into the future. I knew Alexei personally. I remember him telling me, thoughtfully, "It turns out that when we come to power, the first thing we will have to do will be to limit our own power." He was full of plans to expand his anti-corruption agenda into a more comprehensive one that went beyond fighting crooks and thieves in the Russian government. Yet those crooks and thieves would never stop providing him with subjects for his and his team's investigations. Alexei understood better than most whom he was dealing with. Putin has never tired of repeating that he adored the Soviet Union. But he had fully preserved just one aspect of the Soviet system—the extraordinary power, an above-the-law force, originally established by Bolsheviks to fight the enemies of the revolution. The core of that system was formed by the Cheka (ЧК, in Russian), the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission, which was the first of a succession of Soviet and Russian secret police organizations. After going through a dozen name changes and their respective acronyms, it is now called the FSB, the Federal Security Service. Members of this agency, according to Navalny's own investigation, were complicit in his attempted poisoning in 2020. Those shaky checks and balances to central power that pre-revolutionary Russia created were destroyed in the 1917 revolution. Since then, ideologies and rulers have changed, but the willingness to put themselves above the law has been passed on to each successive ruler intact. Russia is a state that builds the legitimacy of government on the uncontrollable nature of its power. Navalny always understood that he could not play by the same rules as Putin. He could not become the extremist that the Kremlin labeled him, turning the truth inside out, as usual.The Russian state tried to kill Navalny for several years. This murder began long before August 2020, when Alexei was poisoned with a nerve agent in the Siberian city of Tomsk. As the investigation—conducted by Alexei himself and his colleagues—showed, the assassins began stalking him several years prior to the event. There is no reason to believe the "diagnoses" reported by officials and prison authorities. This is a show assassination committed by the Russian state.In the beginning, Putin's emergency rule was a deliberate fueling of alarm and anxiety in society in order to justify uncontrollability. But as time went on, with more and more wars, with more and more political assassinations, the threats to his personal existence became higher because the risks of a serious pushback increased. And so, going further and further beyond the limits of any laws, Putin felt the danger more and more acutely and, falsely calling it a danger to the country, extracted from the fear for his own life the right to dispose of the lives of everyone in the country. Designating some people as "foreign agents" and others as "loyal" is going beyond the bounds of law. Crimes can be categorized according to legal codes, and these formulations will apply to anyone. Acts of revenge against the disloyal, acts of rewarding the loyal are to be found in the repertoire of organized crime organizations, because law knows no revenge. Going beyond the law is a transition to the territory of good and evil.The Russian authorities and the elites that support them have arrogated to themselves the right to execute enemies and reward friends. Evil is an attempt to turn the whole world around in favor of one's own group, party, or organization, make the entire world "ours." The authorities use loyalty oaths and rituals, they turn religion into a set of "good" or "bad" omens. It has nothing to do with genuine faith because icons are magical objects for them. Their real faith is expressed in loyalty to the boss, obeying orders, and following the rules of criminally understood "honor." The Polish poet Czesław Miłosz starts his 1953 book, The Captive Mind, with the parable about his nation being swept by an occupying force. The occupiers distribute among the populace a drug that induces contentment. Miłosz then builds his study of his former friends' compliance strategies on the premise of an outside intervention. Albert Camus in his 1947 novel The Plague depicts a society fighting a deadly virus. This has been interpreted by many as an allegory of French resistance to Nazi occupation during World War II. However, no external force has ever compelled the Russian elites to submit to an aggressive government. No smuggler boat has ever brought in an unknown foreign disease. The present crisis of humanity in Russia is nothing but homegrown. A profound moral shift has occurred within Russian society. The wise, the responsible, the professional, and all the others may not have noticed when they proceeded past the point of no return. For decades, the same individuals have been making political decisions. They are no occupiers; they have been around for at least two decades. For many in Russia there was no need to pledge formal allegiance to the "party of war." People just stayed where they were—in their old posts and rooms. The transition happened by default. Effort was required to break free from the grip of the war party, but those willing to consciously step out of the game have always been far fewer than those who accept changes by default. Navalny was one beacon of hope for some moral normalcy to be established in Russia in the future. Sprawled in his chair, as is his habit, Putin, in between murders and war crimes, asserts the extraordinary power he has arrogated to himself, the power to kill and mock his opponents. Alexei Navalny, in between his numerous investigations, asserted that he believed in the power of truth and could smile in the face of evil. The Russian authorities killed Russia's Mandela, Russia's Havel. Putin broke a mirror that was not to his liking. He fears the future and death, but by destroying an alternative, he has brought the violent end of his own regime closer.The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute
The Zambia Mining Investment and Governance Review (MInGov) collects and shares information on mining sector governance, its attractiveness to investors and how its activities affect national development. It reviews sector performance from the perspective of three main stakeholder groups– government, investors in the mining value chain and civil society – and identifies gaps between declared and actual government policy and practice. The review's key findings are: Performance across the value chain is strongest in topics most closely associated with mining and which are related to the content of laws and regulations, though implementation of these is wanting in some instances; Sector development is constrained by a number of bottlenecks; According to investors, a number of areas are constraining mining investment and returns; The three key stakeholder groups agree on a number of topics they believe are particularly important to strengthen sector governance, investment and development impact; Civil society believes there is a number of weaknesses sector governance, including the poor handling of environment and social impacts of mining; problems with human rights associated with the sector; ineffective development planning as it relates to mining; issues concerning land access, compensation and resettlement; and the absence of revenue sharing between national and local government.MInGov's methodology focuses on the status of governance and investment conditions in the mining sector from the perspective of stakeholders, and as reported in primary and secondary sources. However, less-well covered areas include the quality of its infrastructure services, the security of property from theft, the underlying strength of institutions, and ways to enhance mining's contribution to local and national development.This report presents data on mining investment and governance indicators for Zambia that are current as of October 2015.
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This global public opinion poll asking respondents whether they have a favorable view of the USA has been bouncing around the interwebs. The topline finding — the US is pretty popular! — surprised many American cultural critics who remember the bad old days of the Iraq War when global criticism of US imperialism surged. I find the handful of countries where the opinion of the US remains more negative just as interesting. Hungary's worst‐in‐Europe result is amusing given how the far Right in the US fetishizes Viktor Orban's reactionary politics. American Hungary stans suffer from sublimated self‐hatred, wishing they could be as xenophobic and culturally chauvinist as team "Make Hungary Magyar Again." But the other outlier country on this list with a marked dislike of the US might be more of a surprise to Americans: Australia. We're almost underwater Down Under. This is in sharp contrast with how highly Americans think of Australia; if you combine all positive responses from this survey, Americans consider Australia their warmest ally. Which means the gulf between how Americans and Australians view each other would be one of the widest in the world! As it so happens, I spent eight summers as a teenager living in Australia. That certainly doesn't make me a country expert — and it's been two decades since I was last there — but it does mean that Australian antipathy towards the US doesn't take me by surprise. That dislike was very much on the surface when I was a 10 or 11 year old trying to make Aussie friends. The most popular country singer in Australia at the time was the man, the legend, John Williamson. I've written about Australian country music elsewhere, but I can still sing many of Williamson's top hits from memory, including his rip‐roaring nationalist anthem "A Flag of Our Own" (1991). Williamson was a republican, which meant that he believed Australia should leave the British Commonwealth, reject the monarchy, and take the British stripes off the Australian flag. Here's the song's chorus: 'Cause this is Australia and that's where we're from We're not Yankee side‐kicks or second class P.O.M.s And tell the Frogs what they can do with their bomb Oh we must have a flag of our own
Let me decipher that for you. P.O.M.s stands for "Prisoners of Her Majesty," or Brits, which is often amended with an adjective such as "whingeing POMs" to describe those who yearn for ye olde country and constantly complain about Australia's supposedly backward ways. This was a particularly popular complaint in Australia in the aftermath of Australia's 1975 constitutional crisis. The Australian Governor‐General — a crown appointee in a mostly symbolic role — had invoked a long neglected royal power and replaced the elected left‐wing prime minister with a conservative. (For comparison, imagine the hoopla if King Charles III were to kick British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak out of office and install a Labour prime minister!) "Frogs," of course, are the French, who were on the radar of Aussie nationalists in the 90s for conducting nuclear testing in their Polynesian colonies — which Australia considered its own backyard — and doing so without regard for the effects of nuclear fallout on surrounding islands and Australia itself. That leaves us with Yankees, commonly shorted to "Yanks," which quickly becomes, via Australia's penchant for rhyming puns, "Septic Tanks," or then shortened further to "seppos." (Aussies are world leaders in slang. It's like if Cockney wasn't just the lingo of one neighborhood in London but had been exported en masse via prison ships, transported to the other side of the globe, and then had taken over an entire continent. Oh wait…) Maybe you're wondering why America made that opprobrious list alongside the POMs and Frogs. We weren't testing any nukes in the Pacific (at least, we hadn't for a while) and we weren't meddling in their domestic politics (though blaming the CIA for the 1975 constitutional crisis remains popular among Aussie conspiracists). But when this song was released in 1991, the Australian military had just participated in the US‐led Gulf War. Although suffering no combat casualties, Australian nationalists saw this as yet another example of Australia blindly serving the interests of foreign superpowers, from dying at the command of callous British generals in the trenches at Gallipoli — the subject of a 1981 blockbuster starring a young Mel Gibson — to the failed fight alongside the Yanks in the jungles of Vietnam. Bear in mind that Australia's anti‐Vietnam War protests in 1970 were the *largest* protests in their history; by contrast, the much feted anti‐Vietnam war protests in the US don't even crack our top 27! Australia's involvement in the Iraq War did little to assuage critics who believed Australia should stop playing second fiddle to the US, especially after leaked documents showed that the Aussie government's primary purpose for sending troops was to cozy up to the US. All the talk about eradicating weapons of mass destruction and promoting democracy was merely "mandatory rhetoric." However, when I was a teenager in Australia in the late‐90s, especially while visiting rural communities in Northern Queensland, the complaint I heard the most often revolved around US trade policy, specifically US tariffs on the import of Australian lamb meat. I remember riding around the bush in a ute (flatbed pickup truck) with a local farmer who was spitting mad about US tariffs and who said that the Monica Lewinsky scandal was Bill Clinton getting his just desserts for harming Aussie sheep farmers. What a thought! Australian headlines from the time were simply scathing in their critique of Clinton's hypocrisy in signing a free trade deal with Canada and Mexico while slapping new tariffs on Australia. Yet other than the mad cow panic, meat import policies — let alone veal tariffs, lol — have never been a major political issue in recent US national politics. But they sure mattered a great deal to Australia, which is the second largest sheep exporting country in the world (Australia and New Zealand combine for an incredible 93% of the global market). In any case, US trade policy in the 1990s fit with Australian nationalists' broader critique of the US as a bully who simply expected Australia to meekly comply with its broader geopolitical agenda regardless of whether it was in Australia's own national interest. So Australians' mixed opinions regarding the US are grounded in real, pragmatic considerations. It's yet another situation in which our imperial entanglements and trade protectionism have provoked blowback. It's possible that in the future those feelings might revert towards the more US‐positive, Australasian mean given Chinese economic and military expansionism in the region. Up until now, Australia has been insulated from the downside risks of Chinese expansion — funnily enough, the intervening Indonesians have been a more significant target for Australian jingoism — while benefitting greatly as a supplier of raw materials for the post‐Mao Chinese economic miracle. Until the pandemic, Australia hadn't experienced a recession in nearly thirty years (!). On a more speculative note, if Noah Smith and other India boosters are correct, Australia's role as a potential trading partner with India could matter as much for that country's success as its trade with China has for the past three decades. Last year, Australia signed a new free trade deal with India and expects its exports to triple by 2035. And given the ongoing decoupling of global investment from the Chinese market, Australia could benefit from a major boost of foreign investment given its proximity and ties with India, Vietnam, and other high growth South and Southeast Asian markets (nicknamed "Altasia"). There's little in the way of Australia enjoying another thirty years of torrid economic growth. The US should forge a new, peer relationship with Australia, signaling that it takes Australia seriously as a vital regional ally rather than treating it as a junior partner in our foreign misadventures. We have a golden opportunity to do so right now. As Doug Bandow has noted, China has foolishly kicked off a trade war with Australia, and while Trump considered following suit with new tariffs on Australian exports, he was finally persuaded not to. We should take advantage of China's mistake by expanding our 2005 free trade agreement with Australia and lower rates on agricultural products that are feeling the pinch from Chinese tariffs. This is a crosspost from the author's Substack. Click through and subscribe for more content on the intersection of history and policy.
Relatório apresentado à Universidade Fernando Pessoa como parte dos requisitos para o cumprimento do programa de Pós-Doutoramento em Ciências da Informação ; Cybersecurity has gone through several changes that have presented new challenges in recent years, complicated by the rise of cybercrime and digital warfare. With the introduction of militarizing the space domain, it has become apparent that we must consider multidomain concepts. Thus, the threat landscape has again shifted, and defenders must become knowledgeable about how the cyber domain crosses into maritime, land, air, and space. The traditional thinking of protecting enterprise systems locked away in a building is no longer. Thus, we have the emergence of cyber warfare and cyber as a fifth domain that brings together maritime, land, space, and air. These domains are not just for the military but the civilian sector as well. Understanding the role of cyber and how it can be used to take advantage or secure the remaining domains will give entities the upper hand in strategy. The technological advancements that pave the way to the mass implementation of the Internet of Things (IoT) and Internet connectivity to everyday devices have led to an explosion in cyberattacks such as breaches resulting in millions of accounts being compromised. (Dawson, Eltayeb, & Omar, 2016). Bad actors such as those focused on criminal activities regarding human trafficking and espionage navigate these domains to circumvent law enforcement agencies globally. We must understand how exploitation, circumvention, and defense needs to occur in a multidomain concept. However, knowing that the cyber domain is a domain that goes through land, maritime, space, and air can be an area that serves as a central point for realizing assured security. Executive Orders (EO), laws, policies, doctrine, and other directives have shaped the landscape of cybersecurity. New EOs have been released that allow a cyber-attack with responsive measures such as one that involves military force. Laws created that impose rights for Personal Identifiable Information (PII) being breached, leaving millions of individuals unprotected. One of these most well-known items is General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) as it relates to the European Union (EU) and the evolving threats with hyperconnectivity (Martínez, 2019a; Martínez, 2019b). Understanding the role of cybercrime and digital warfare and how they continue to play in shaping the technological landscape is critical. These various actions change the spectrum regarding combating nefarious actors or design errors that leave the system susceptible. As attacks continue to rise from bad actors such as nation-states, terrorists, and other entities, it is essential to understand the threat landscape and select cybersecurity methodologies that can be put in place to provide adequate measures. This document presents the work form a post-doctoral project that provides a perspective of cybersecurity under a information science perspective. This six-month project allows to stress the broadly importance that information and its management (not just within the information security context), and the urgent need to deal with cybersecurity as a societal challenge. The document is organized in four main chapters presenting different but complementary issues, going from high level to a more operational level: National Cybersecurity Education: Bridging Defense to Offense, stressing the importance of societal awareness and education. Emerging Technologies in the Fourth Industrial Revolution, stressing the importance to consider cybersecurity issues as core ones, even to economic and production areas. Nefarious Activities within the Deep Layers of the Internet, stressing the need to be part of digital places where information is traded, shared and, even sometimes, created. The fourth chapter provide a few hints and issues related with software development and test: Software Security Considerations. A final session presents several remarks as Final Thoughts, closing the work pointing out some of the current challenges that we are facing of. ; N/A
