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The empirical literature on charismatic or transformational leadership demonstrates that such leadership has profound effects on followers. However, while several versions of charismatic leadership theory predict such effects, none of them explains the process by which these effects are achieved. In this paper we seek to advance leadership theory by addressing this fundamental problem. We offer a self-concept based motivational theory to explain the process by which charismatic leader behaviors cause profound transformational effects on followers. The theory presents the argument that charismatic leadership has its effects by strongly engaging followers' self-concepts in the interest of the mission articulated by the leader. We derive from this theory testable propositions about (a) the behavior of charismatic leaders and their effects on followers, (b) the role of followers' values and orientations in the charismatic relationship, and (c) some of the organizational conditions that favor the emergence and effectiveness of charismatic leaders.

A widely accepted and usable taxonomy is a fundamental element in the development of a scientific body of knowledge. However, the creation of good empirical taxonomies of implementation processes is complicated by the need to consider the dynamics of the implementation process. This paper addresses this difficulty by using an optimal matching procedure to measure the pairwise distances among event sequences occurring in 53 computer-based information system (IS) implementation projects. Cluster analysis based on these inter-sequence distances is used to generate the empirical taxonomy of implementation processes. The resulting taxonomy includes six distinct archetypical processes. One of the process types is labeled textbook life cycle (type 4) due to its close resemblance to the detailed, rational approach commonly prescribed in IS textbooks. The logical minimalist process (type 1) follows some of the basic steps of the textbook approach, but is characterized by little project definition and infrequent assignment of personnel. Whereas both textbook life cycle and logical minimalist approaches use external vendors and consultants to some extent, external dependence is much greater in traditional off-the-shelf (type 2) and outsourced cooperative (type 5) processes. The traditional off-the-shelf process simply involves purchasing the system from an external vendor, with little system construction or assignment of personnel. In contrast, the outsourced cooperative process consists of joint system development by internally assigned personnel and external vendors. The remaining two process types—problem-driven minimalist (type 3) and in-house trial and error (type 6)—are both considerably influenced by performance problems. The problem-driven minimalist process is initiated by such problems, with little project definition, and results in a reassignment of organizational roles. The in-house trial-and-error process begins like textbook life cycle, with a clear project definition, but involves frequent system modifications to respond to the performance problems encountered during the project. The paper demonstrates how an empirical taxonomy that incorporates the dynamics of event sequences may be developed. The archetypes comprising the taxonomy are related to other implementation process models available in the literature. Some limitations of the study are acknowledged and its implications for future research and practice are discussed.

The objective of this research was to determine the effects of a firm's control system and dimensions of the work task environment upon ethical judgments made by salespeople. Industrial field salespeople are likely to encounter ethical conflicts on a daily basis in their dealings with customers, competitors, and their own management. How they resolve such conflicts is believed to be a function of both individual characteristics and factors in the situation. This study focuses on situational factors in the form of organization design variables, particularly control system and task environment. The firm's control system includes its method of monitoring, supervising and compensating salespeople. The study develops fourteen ethics-related selling scenarios and assesses, via projective questioning, how 446 salespeople would react to them. Findings indicate that organization design does influence the behavior a salesperson considers appropriate to cope with ethical conflicts. In particular, salespeople operating under a more bureaucratic, input-based control system advocate more ethical behavior than do salespeople operating under a more output-based, laissez-faire control system. Also, salespeople who perceive the market to be competitive recommend less ethical behavior. However, the proportion of salary versus commission in the salesperson's compensation system does not have an effect on response. Differences are also discovered with respect to the salesperson's seniority, rank, and certain features of the task environment.

Why are firms sometimes more efficient than markets at organizing transactions? Why are most transactions arrayed neither at the pure "market" nor at the pure "hierarchy" end of the continuum, but rather in the "swollen middle," incorporating features of both "market" and "hierarchy"? Why don't firms make greater use of price incentives? This paper addresses these three questions by developing a model of the choice of institution. One key building block is the distinction between organizing methods (hierarchy and the price system) and institutions (firms and markets). Hierarchy and the price system are two distinct methods for organizing transactions, each with particular costs and benefits. Markets and firms are institutions which use one or both of these methods. Although markets predominantly use prices and firms rely principally on hierarchy, there is not a one-to-one correspondence between prices and markets or between hierarchy and firms. Indeed, the paper argues that it is generally more efficient to use a mix of both methods than to specialize in either. The paper focuses on the enforcement properties of prices and hierarchy. Hierarchy controls individuals directly by constraining their behavior (by imposing behavior constraints) while prices do it indirectly by measuring their outputs (through price constraints). Under hierarchy, individuals receive a salary to do as told, while self-employed individuals governed by the price system are rewarded on the basis of their output. Each system has its own biases: using prices maximizes effort (minimizes shirking) but incites individuals to inflate the price and/or reduce the quality of their output. (It encourages cheating.) Relying on hierarchy results in the opposite bias: under hierarchy individuals are not paid in function of their output, but instead are rewarded for following directives. They have, thus, strong incentives to minimize effort (to shirk) unless properly supervised, but, being paid a fixed sum to follow orders, they have few incentives to cheat. Hence the price system experiences low shirking, but potentially high cheating costs, while hierarchy faces low cheating but high shirking costs. Organizing costs are the sum of shirking and cheating costs. Any given transaction will be organized by the mix of price and hierarchy (i.e., by the mix of price and behavior constraints) that minimizes organizing costs. A transaction will be organized within a firm if the reduction in cheating costs achieved by replacing price constraints by behavior constraints exceeds the resulting increase in shirking costs and by the market in the opposite case. The paper shows that cheating and shirking costs increase more than proportionately as one concentrates in either pure price or behavior constraints. Hence using a mix of both methods generally minimizes the sum of cheating and shirking costs. This explains why most transactions exhibit features of both markets and hierarchy. The paper shows clearly the tradeoff involved between price and behavior constraints. It explains the costs and benefits of using two types of price incentives in firms, piecework and profit centers, and predicts when they will be used.

Organizations frequently adopt formal rules, contracts, or other legalistic mechanisms when interpersonal trust is lacking. But recent research has shown such legalistic "remedies" for trust-related problems to be ineffective in restoring trust. To explain this apparent ineffectiveness, this paper outlines a theory that distinguishes two dimensions of trust—task-specific reliability and value congruence—and shows how legalistic mechanisms respond only to reliability concerns, while ignoring value-related concerns. Organizational responses to employees with HIV/AIDS are used as a case illustration that supports the theory's major propositions. The paper concludes with an agenda for future research.

A bulk of the marketing research on distribution channel design attempts to resolve the question of when a direct company-owned sales operation would be preferred to an indirect independent distributor operation. The widely accepted theoretical rationale is provided by transaction-cost theory which indicates that the total costs of going-to-market, inclusive of distribution as well as its administration, is likely to be lower for the direct option when the sales transactions require investments in unique assets for effectively serving the end customer. Examples of unique assets are account-specific sales teams and account dedicated repair and maintenance facilities. Conversely, transaction-cost theory indicates that an indirect option would be the more efficient one for sales transactions that require investments only in nonunique assets, such as an inventory of standard parts. Since its formulation in 1975, the transaction-cost framework has been empirically confirmed in a variety of marketing channel settings. It has been our observation, however, that most of these verifications have been of the easier rather than the more difficult problems in the field. Two such complex problems are: (1) the issue of hybrid channels, i.e., channel arrangements involving a sharing of going-to-market tasks between the direct and indirect channels, and (2) the evolution of channels from one form to the other, i.e., a direct channel evolving into an indirect channel and vice versa. To resolve our curiosity regarding the applicability of transaction-cost theory to these complex channel issues, we interviewed 50 key informants in 15 carefully selected manufacturing firms and 20 key informants in 7 related distribution firms. Because the purpose of our field research was to enhance our understanding of complex channel phenomena rather than to test existing theory, we did not gather structured quantitative data. Instead, we let managers describe to us the rationale for their channel choice decisions. In comparing the fit of our field observations to existing wisdom on transaction-cost theory, we reached the conclusion that the theory needs broadening in order to explain the variety and complexity of the real world channels we studied. In this paper, we attempt to suggest some useful directions for such enhancements. Specifically, (1) transaction-cost analysis is more meaningful when applied at the level of a channel function, (2) channel investments are influenced by a firm's uncertainty absorption mechanism, and (3) channel investments serve to raise competitive entry barriers.

Boards of directors have been substantially affected by recent changes in their legal environment. The most profound change has been in the area of director liability. New legislation and regulations and a series of court decisions increased the extent to which directors are held accountable for their actions and those of their organizations. These changes resulted in increased liability exposure for directors and a crisis in director liability insurance. Corporations have successfully developed strategies to manage the adverse consequences of these changes in the legal environment. This paper develops an extension of resource dependence theory to enable us to analyze events surrounding the director liability crisis from the perspective of the corporation. It then reviews the legal forces which have affected boards of directors. The concept of director liability is discussed, including the business judgment rule, which has historically protected the decision making discretion of boards. Indemnification and director liability insurance, which provide protection from monetary penalties against directors arising from liability suits, are also described. Recent environmental changes which have affected director protection from liability are then examined. These include legislation specifying certain director responsibilities and granting additional enforcement powers to federal regulatory agencies, court decisions which expanded the personal liability of directors in several important ways, and changes in director liability insurance policies and markets. These developments increased the liability exposure of corporate directors and precipitated the director liability crisis of 1986. Corporations responded to this threat by making changes in board composition, director compensation, and board decision making structures and processes; by developing alternative forms of director liability insurance; and by lobbying for legislation providing greater liability protection for directors. These actions are interpreted within the framework of resource dependence theory. Implications for future research are also discussed.

A "litigation mentality" increasingly pervades today's workplace, as an ever wider variety of managerial decisions are the target of employee-initiated lawsuits. In this paper we identify different psychological factors that could explain why employees consider suing their employers. One group of factors suggests that employee consideration of litigation is motivated primarily by self-interest, as employers perceive they have more to gain than lose by going to court. A second group of factors suggests that employees' decision to go to court is influenced largely by the perceived fairness of their dealings with the organization. In a survey of 141 currently employed workers, we found that the perceived fairness of organizational rules and procedures was the primary factor influencing whether employees consider a litigious response. In particular, employees were concerned about how the rules and procedures were implemented and the quality of interpersonal treatment received from managers. Job satisfaction also had an impact on employees considering litigation. We argue that while our findings support organizational efforts to create more formalized policies and procedures that emphasize due process or procedural justice, such efforts, in and of themselves, may undermine the intended goal of ensuring fairness and reducing employee litigation. The solution to this dilemma is not in the creation of formal procedures per se, but in the moral and interpersonal conduct of those implementing the procedures. We conclude by identifying directions for future research on employee litigation.

This analysis starts with models of the diffusion of due process protections in organizations that emphasize the role of the state, especially those from the institutional perspective. The case of equal pay for work of comparable value is used to develop propositions concerning important additions to current models of the expansion of due process protections in the workplace. First, we suggest that models of the nation-state should include an explicit recognition that the progressiveness of public policy varies over time. Second, we suggest that models of the nation-state should include explicit recognition of the fact that state authority is fragmented by the separation of powers and the partition of federal and local authority. Implications for future theory and empirical study that follow from these additions to current models are discussed.

Review of research concerning whistle-blowing suggests that legal sanctions have been singularly unsuccessful in encouraging whistle-blowing but that legalistic responses by organizations seem to have been somewhat more successful. Below, we review three sets of studies that illustrate this point. The first set includes federal employees, both before and after a legal change intended to encourage whistle-blowing. The second study examines the effects of state laws, by comparing states with whistle-blowing statutes to those without such statutes. The third study focuses on whistle-blowers who are role prescribed and therefore have legalistic protections but not legal protections. Results from these three sets of studies suggest that legal procedures seem not to be effective in encouraging positive organizational responses to whistle-blowing, but legalistic responses designed by the organizations themselves have more positive effects both for the whistle-blowers and for the organizations themselves. We attempt to resolve this apparent paradox by considering two theoretical frameworks, power relations and justice theory, and using these frameworks to predict the behaviors of both whistle-blowers and their organizations when legal mechanisms are involved and when legalistic mechanisms are used. Finally, drawing on the implications of our theoretical analysis, we provide policy suggestions for the encouragement of legalistic mechanisms, in addition to legal mechanisms, to persuade organizations to respond positively to whistle-blowers.