Suchergebnisse

(LUPO) vests all land indicated as public roads on a development plan in the local authority upon approval of such a plan. This includes land that is in excess of the normal need of the development. The appellant must hence be compensated for the "expropriation" of such excess land if the provision is to comply with section 25(2) of the Constitution. This ruling is problematic for both expropriation law and administrative law. In terms of section 25(2) four objections may be raised against the Arun decision. Firstly, it disregards the function of the public interest requirement for expropriation, as understood in view of the law-of-general-application requirement (which, in turn, is informed by the legality principle). The state cannot expropriate property for purposes that are ultra vires (or ulterior to) the authorising legislation. Yet the Arun court seems to allow just this by permitting the local authority to acquire land unrelated to the normal need of the development against payment of compensation instead of setting the attempted expropriation aside. The judgment, secondly, ignores the role of compensation under section 25(2). Merely paying compensation to an affected party cannot turn an invalid expropriation into a valid one, since compensation is merely the result of a valid expropriation and not a justification for it. Thirdly, it makes the distinction between deprivation and expropriation pivot on the effect of the property limitation, which is unable to properly distinguish between these two forms of limitation in all instances. Finally, Moseneke DCJ's ruling seems to afford an election to litigants who are affected by materially defective expropriations to choose whether to accept the expropriation and claim compensation or to have it reviewed and set aside under PAJA. This election, if it indeed exists, subverts the principles of expropriation law and may have negative repercussions for both expropriation law and administrative law, especially in view of the single-system-of-law principle. From an administrative law perspective the authors identify four considerations that could assist courts in determining whether administrative law should be considered, if not applied, in a given case. The first is the internal coherency of the law in view of the subsidiarity principles. The subsidiarity principles provide guidelines for courts to decide cases where two fundamental rights might be applicable. A principled approach is necessary in this context to ensure that the law operates as a single system and displays the positive characteristics of such a system. The fact that Moseneke DCJ preferred to award compensation to Arun instead of reviewing the expropriation under PAJA runs contrary to these principles and seems to result in an outcome which endorses – instead of prevents – administrative injustice. Secondly, the Constitutional Court's refusal to follow PAJA by reason of its being onerous on the appellant contradicts earlier case law where the Court held that time-periods under the Act cannot be circumvented by reason of their being burdensome. The rationale behind these time-periods is integral to securing administrative justice, since time-periods are not merely formalistic technicalities. Thirdly, the authors argue that a green-light approach to internal remedies could have resulted in the broadening of the interpretative context and recognition of the legitimate role of the public administration in the state. Finally, deference as understood by Dyzenhaus also exemplifies why administrative law should not be ignored in cases which concern the exercise of public power. According to Dyzenhaus, deference requires courts to actively participate in the justification of administrative decisions by asking whether the administration's "reasoning did in fact and also could in principle justify the conclusion reached".

"List of authorities". v. 2, p. 303-307. ; Mode of access: Internet.

"Serial no. 57". ; Includes bibliographies. ; Mode of access: Internet.

"Serial no. 110-165." ; Shipping list no.: 2009-0242-P. ; Includes bibliographical references. ; Mode of access: Internet.

European Governance is more than just a policy instrument without legal significance. Its regulatory sub-divisions, such as Comitology, the Lamfalussy procedure, and the growing number of European administrative agencies, have colonized substantive parts of the law-shaping and law-making processes. This contribution argues that European Governance is a distinct phenomenon that cannot be easily reconciled with traditional notions of legislation and administration, but needs to be theorized differently. Accordingly, its legal shape has to be adjusted to this new situation, too. Neither a - still only vaguely defined - concept of 'accountability', nor a non-binding policy concept of 'good governance' can fill this gap. A re-definition of European Governance - as an 'integrating administration' – has to take the new developments of a distinct European administrative governance sphere seriously. At the same time, it has to address the specific legitimatory problématique of the new governance structures in a sufficient manner. The specific character of these structures calls for an institutionalization of participatory patterns within the governance structures: by ensuring the involvement of civil society actors, stakeholders and the public in the arguing, bargaining, and reasoning processes of both European governance and European regulation, the odd position of European governance, which oscillates between legislative and administrative functions, can be targeted more adequately.

In Beckman v. Little Salmon/Carmacks, Binnie J. observed that administrative law processes and remedies are sufficiently nimble and robust to account for the constitutional rights and interests of Indigenous Peoples. The comment, directed to a procedural issue, disclosed a faith in existing frameworks of Canadian administrative law to compel government actors to act honourably and respond meaningfully when Indigenous communities are, or could be, affected by government action. This faith was not intended to diminish or downplay the constitutional character of the honour of the Crown or the duty to consult and accommodate. Rather, it affirmed that this principle and these duties are not only matters of interest to constitutional law, but are also of particular concern for the law of good government decision-making; that is, for administrative law. There was no need therefore, in Binnie J.'s conception of Canadian state public law, to develop novel constitutional remedies to address failures of consultation or dishonourable public decision-making practices. Rather, the remedies of administrative law, with their capacities to declare, quash and compel, already offered mechanisms for substantial redress and the pursuit of reconciliation.

"Serial no. 54." ; Shipping list no.: 97-0361-P. ; Distributed to some depository libraries in microfiche. ; Includes bibliographical references. ; Mode of access: Internet.