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This paper examines the process of distress selling and asset market feedback. It splits this process into several stages, in order to analyse what triggers distress selling, why asset prices fall, and how falling prices generate additional rounds of selling. This framework enables us to understand and compare models relevant to distress selling from diverse literatures. The paper also considers what policy options are available at each stage to mitigate the adverse economic consequences of distress selling and asset market feedback

The paper provides a unified analysis of globalization effects on the Phillips curve and monetary policy, in a New-Keynesian framework. The main proposition of the paper is twofold. Labor, goods, and capital mobility flatten the tradeoff between inflation and activity. If policy makers are guided by the welfare criterion of the representative household, globalization forces also lead monetary policy to be more aggressive with regard to inflation fluctuations but, at the same time, more benign with respect to the output-gap fluctuations.

The cross section of returns can largely be summarized by the market factor and mimicking portfolios based on investment-to-assets and earnings-to-assets motivated from neoclassical reasoning. The neoclassical three-factor model can capture average return variations related to momentum and financial distress anomalous to traditional factor models. The model also captures the relations of average returns with earnings-to-price, cash flow-to-price, book-to-market, dividend-to-price, long-term past sales growth, long-term prior returns, and market leverage.

This paper employs heterogeneity in institutional shareholder tax characteristics to identify the relationship between firm payout policy and tax incentives. Analysis of a panel of firms matched with the tax characteristics of the clients of their institutional shareholders indicates that "dividend-averse" institutions are significantly less likely to hold shares in firms with larger dividend payouts. This relationship between the tax preferences of institutional shareholders and firm payout policy could reflect dividend-averse institutions gravitating to low dividend paying firms or managers adapting their payout policies to the interests of their institutional shareholders. Evidence is provided that both effects are operative. Instrumental variables analysis indicates that plausibly exogenous changes in payout policy result in shifting institutional ownership patterns. Similarly, exogenous changes in the tax code indicate that as the tax cost of paying dividends changes, managers alter their dividend policy to serve their institutional shareholders.

Public-private partnerships (PPPs) cannot be justified because they free public funds. When PPPs are desirable because the private sector is more efficient, the contract that optimally trades demand risk, user-fee distortions and the opportunity cost of public funds is characterized by a minimum revenue guarantee and a cap on the firm's revenues. Yet income guarantees and revenue sharing arrangements observed in practice differ fundamentally from those suggested by the optimal contract. The optimal contract can be implemented via a competitive auction with realistic informational requirements; and risk allocation under the optimal contract suggests that PPPs are closer to public provision than to privatization.