Suchergebnisse

Прошло совсем немного времени с того самого дня, когда внезапная террористическая атака исламистов на редакцию сатирического еженедельника «Шарли Эбдо» в Париже, унесшая жизни 12 человек, шокировала и всколыхнула весь мир. Французская полиция, армия и спецслужбы не смогли ни предотвратить этот теракт, ни защитить мирное население: старая Европа оказалась беззащитной перед лицом новой глобальной террористической угрозы. Ответственность за террористическую атаку в Париже взяла на себя наиболее опасная группировка исламистов – Исламское государство Ирака и Леванта (ИГИЛ), которая ранее заявила о демонтаже политической системы «новой римской империи западных христиан» и создании в Европе Исламского халифата. В этом ИГИЛ рассчитывает на помощь мусульманского населения европейских стран, с позиций своих анклавов контролирующего значительную часть территории крупнейших европейских городов. Помимо глобальной террористической угрозы, нависшей над Европейским союзом, пассионарный протестный потенциал мусульманских диаспор в Европе стремится найти выход в виде различного рода «майданов» – предикатов цветных революций, которые для старых европейских стран приобретают все большую реальность. Современные цветные революции – это технологии принудительного демонтажа политических режимов, успешно сочетающие жесткие силовые методы воздействия с мягкими технологиями манипулятивного управления массовым сознанием и массовым поведением широких масс гражданского населения. Долгое время считалось, что цветные революции не опасны для эталонных демократических режимов Старой Европы, поскольку эти технологии – изобретение американских англосаксов, и только англосаксы умеют их применять. Между тем мир меняется и новейшие модификации технологий цветных революций, взятые на вооружение афроамериканскими исламистами, вполне успешно применяются в Фергюсоне и Сент-Луисе, что не исключает их применение и на пространстве ЕС, где существуют аналогичные проблемы с диаспорами, не желающими ассимилироваться с европейским населением и все больше осознающих собственную силу. ; It has not been so long since the sudden terrorist attack of Islamists on the Paris headquarters of the satirical weekly magazine Charlie Hebdo, which killed 12 people, shocked and rocked the whole world. French police, the army and security forces could neither prevent the attack nor protect the civilians: Old Europe was completely defenceless in the face of the new global terrorist threat. Responsibility for this terrorist attack was claimed by the most dangerous Islamist group: the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), which had previously announced the dismantling of the "new Roman Empire of Western Christians" and establishment of the Islamic Caliphate in Europe. In this, ISIS counts on the help of the Muslim population in Europe, which, de facto living in enclaves, controls significant parts of Europe's largest cities. In addition to the global terrorist threat hanging over the EU, passionate protest potential of Muslim diasporas in Europe is seeking an outlet in the form of various "Maidans" – predicates of colour revolutions that for the old European countries are becoming ever more real. Modern colour revolutions are a technology of forced dismantling of political regimes, successfully combining "hard" methods with "soft" technologies of manipulative control over mass consciousness and behaviour of the civilian population. For a long time it was believed that colour revolutions present no danger for the perfectly democratic regimes of Old Europe, as these technologies had been invented by American Anglo-Saxons, the only ones who know how to use them. Meanwhile, the world is changing and the latest modifications of colour revolution technologies, adopted by African-American Islamists, have been successfully applied in Ferguson and St. Louis and just as well can be used within the EU where there are similar problems with diasporas, unwilling to assimilate with the European population and increasingly aware of their own strength.

П. ван Менша можно назвать первым «глобальным» читателем музеологической литературы в современном музейном мире. Знание нескольких языков вместе с широкими международными контактами дали ему возможность познакомиться с таким количеством специализированной литературы, которое было просто недоступно другим музеологам и музейным кураторам. Именно благодаря этому ему удалось предложить органический синтез наработок «восточноевропейской», «французской или латинской» и «англо-саксонской» школ. Одна из причин, по которым работа П. ван Менша все еще может представлять интерес, заключается в детальном объяснении того контекста (особенно международного контекста ИКОФОМ), в котором происходило формирование музеологии. Классификация, которую он предложил для различных подходов к пониманию термина «музеология», не имела прецедентов и сохраняет свое значение до сих пор; из нее видно, какой неопределенной была вся эта сфера, простиравшаяся от чрезвычайно интуитивного и обобщенного подхода сторонников «музейной науки» и до гораздо более сложно выстроенных положений З. Странского. Тщательно изучив имеющуюся литературу, П. ван Менш предложил не просто способ понимания и структурирования музеологии как научной дисциплины, но, что особенно важно, способ музеологического мышления, результатом которого стала уникальная музеологическая методология. В центре этой системы находится предмет как носитель данных, со всеми его многочисленными этапами жизни и уровнями информации. То, каким образом предмет попадает в музей музеализация находится в центре музеологической системы. Поэтому именно музеализация и структурирует различные функции музея. Модель таких функций, которую предлагает П. ван Менш сохранение, изучение, коммуникация получила широкое признание среди музеологов. Концептуальные рамки, которые П. ванМенш предложил в 1992 г. и затем постоянно детализировал в статьях, написанных после завершения диссертации, стали важной отправной точкой для понимания множественности взаимодействий предмета, музея как института и тех контекстов (его истории, музейной профессии, политического и экономического контекста и т.д.), в которых этот институт реализует свои функции. ; Peter van Mensch may be counted as the first "global" museology reader of the modern museum world. His knowledge of several languages, combined with his international network of associates gave him access to a larger body of literature than most other museologists or museum curators could be familiar with. This allowed him to propose a genuine synthesis between the "Eastern school", the "French or Latin school" and the "Anglo-Saxon school" of museology. One of the interests of P. van Mensch's essay is precisely to explain the context of this emerging field of museology, especially within the ICOFOM international context. The classification he proposed in 1992 for the different meanings of the term was unprecedented at the time and remains important; from it we see clearly how fuzzy the field appeared between the very intuitive and general approach of "museum science" and the more complexly articulated propositions of Z. Stránský. After a deep review of the literature, van Mensch proposed a way of conceiving and structuring museology, not just as a discipline but above all as a museological way of thinking, resulting in a uniquely museological methodology. At the centre of this system is the object as data carrier with multiple life stages and layers of information.The way objects enter the museum musealisation is at the centre of the museological system. For it is musealisation that somehow structures the museum functions. The P. van Mensch model of museum functions preservation, research, communication has been widely adopted by museologists. The conceptual framework that P. van Mensch proposed in 1992, and constantly refined in the many articles he has written since his PhD, has become a valuable point of reference for understanding the multiple interactions that take place between the objects, museums as institution, and the contexts (their history, the museum profession, the political and economical context, etc.) in which they perform their function.

Books Reviewed:Great Britain And IrelandNicholas Brooks, Anglo–Saxon myths: state and church, 400–1066Nicholas Brooks, Communities and warfare, 700–1400J. Bothwell, P. J. P. Goldberg, and W. M. Ormrod, ((eds.)), The problem of labour in fourteenth–century EnglandRobert Tittler, Townspeople and nation: English urban experiences, 1540–1640L. A. Botelho, (ed.), Churchwardens' accounts of Cratfield, 1640–1660Christopher Chalklin, The rise of the English town, 1650–1850J. M. Beattie, Policing and punishment in London, 1660–1750Richard Wilson and Alan Mackley, Creating paradise: the building of the English country house, 1660–1880M. E. Turner, J. V. Beckett, and B. Afton, Farm production in England, 1700–1914John E. Archer, Social unrest and popular protest in England, 1780–1840Stanley Chapman, (ed.), The autobiography of David Whitehead of Rawtenstall, 1790–1865Ian Inkster, Colin Griffin, Jeff Hill, and Judith Rowbotham, ((eds.)), The golden age: essays in British social and economic history, 1850–1870K. D. M. Snell and Paul S. Ell, Rival Jerusalems: the geography of Victorian religionWilliam Kenefick, 'Rebellious and contrary': the Glasgow dockers, c. 1853 to c. 1932F. M. L. Thompson, Gentrification and the enterprise culture: Britain, 1780–1980Alan Booth, The British economy in the twentieth centuryRichard Whiting, The Labour Party and taxation: party identity and political purpose in twentieth–century BritainDuncan Tanner, Pat Thane, and Nick Tiratsoo, (eds.), Labour's first centuryAsa Briggs, Michael Young: social entrepreneurDavid Kynaston, The City of London, IV: A club no more, 1945–2000Zofia Archibald, John Davies, Vincent Gabrielsen, and G. J. Oliver, (eds.), Hellenistic economiesMichael Wintle, An economic and social history of the Netherlands, 1800–1920: demographic, economic and social transitionBernd Widdig, Culture and inflation in Weimar GermanyS. R. Epstein, (ed.), Town and country in Europe, 1300–1800Peter Scholliers, (ed.), Food, drink and identity: cooking, eating and drinking in Europe since the middle agesRobert Fox and Anna Guagnini, Laboratories, workshops, and sites: concepts and practices of research in industrial Europe, 1800–1914E. Damsgaard Hansen, European economic history: from mercantilism to Maastricht and beyondThabit A. J. Abdullah, Merchants, mamluks, and murder: the political economy of trade in eighteenth–century BasraRussell R. Menard, Migrants, servants and slaves: unfree labor in colonial British AmericaMary B. Rose, Firms, networks and business values: the British and American cotton industries since 1750Andrew Godley, Jewish immigrant entrepreneurship in New York and London, 1880–1914: enterprise and cultureDonna J. Rilling, Making houses: crafting capitalismBrian Kelly, Race, class, and power in the Alabama coalfields, 1908–21Margaret B.W. Graham and Alec T. Shuldiner, Corning and the craft of innovationDavis Dyer and Daniel Gross, The generations of Corning: the life and times of a global corporationStanley L. Engerman and Robert E. Gallman, (eds.), The Cambridge economic history of the United States, III: the twentieth centuryStan J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, Winners, losers and Microsoft: competition and antitrust in high technologySteven Tolliday, (ed.), The economic development of modern Japan, 1868–1945: from Meiji restoration to the Second World WarAlice Bullard, Exile to paradise: savagery and civilization in Paris and the South Pacific, 1790–1900Peter Redfield, Space in the tropics: from convicts to rockets in French GuianaRobert Conlon and John Perkins, Wheels and deals: the automotive industry in twentieth–century AustraliaJames C. Riley, Rising life expectancy: a global historyPeter N. Stearns, Consumerism in world history: the global transformation of desireAngela Redish, Bimetallism: an economic and historical analysisTed Wilson, Battles for the standard: bimetallism and the spread of the gold standard in the nineteenth centuryHoward Temperley, (ed.), After slavery: emancipation and its discontentsChris Wrigley, (ed.), The First World War and the international economyAndrew Britton, Monetary regimes of the twentieth century

Der Beitrag zeichnet die Entwicklung des juristischen Austauschs mit Japan der letzten 100 Jahren nach. Ausgangspunkt für die deutsch-japanischen Rechtsbeziehungen waren die sogenannten "ungleichen Verträge". Die erste Orientierung der japanischen Juristen der Meiji-Zeit erfolgte zwar am französischen Recht, deutsche Rechtsberater waren damals jedoch auch als Lehrer und Legislatoren in Japan engagiert.Der Beitrag geht auch auf den sogenannten Kodifikationsstreit ein, bevor er sich dem Meiji-Zivilgesetz und dem Handelsgesetz, sowie schließlich dem Phänomen der Theorienrezeption zuwendet.(Die Redaktion) ; The legal exchange between Germany and Japan has a long tradition that persists even today, as the title of this article suggests. The orginator of this special relationship was an American, Commodore Matthew C. Perry. He was commander of the squadron which brought the self-imposed seclusion of Japan to an end. In the following years the diplomatically inexperienced representatives of the Tokugawa shogunate signed disadvantageous treaties with several Western powers. They instituted a system of extraterritoriality that provided for the subjugation of Western residents to the laws of their own consular courts instead of the Japanese law system. When the new Meiji government tried to get these "Unequal Treaties" revised, the Western powers refused. Instead, they set up the requirement of "modernization" (i.e. "Westernization") of the Japanese legal system as a precondition for the abolition of consular jurisdiction and extraterritoriality.This imposed reception of Western law was an incredible task. The main reason was simply that the Japanese legal tradition differed to the greatest possible extent from the developments in the West. Prior to the mid-nineteenth century there was not even a word or an understanding of an individual "right". This new word (kenri) had to be coined among many others to establish a modern legal terminology. The great Japanese pioneer in this field was Rinshô Mitsukuri, who translated the whole Code civil in the first Meiji decade. This also shows that Japan first looked to France to enact modern codes. The French legal advisor Gustave Boissonade was charged with the draft of the penal code and the code of criminal procedure. He was also charged with the draft of a civil code in 1880.However, two years earlier, the Japanese government had engaged Hermann Roesler, the first German legal advisor. This year marked an important watershed because from then on all other fundamental laws were essentially inspired by German models. The "German decade" began. The reasons for this change of legal course are not known. Presumably there was a close connection with the drafting of the Meiji constitution. It was to be based on the Prussian model since the Meiji leaders regarded this authoritarian kind of constitution as best suited for Japan. Heavily engaged in the drafting process were the two German legal advisors Hermann Roesler and Albert Mosse. Roesler was also a key figure in setting up the "Old Commercial Code", whereas Mosse is also well known as the compiler of the draft laws and systems for local government.Further on, the code of civil procedure was mainly drafted by the German legal advisor Hermann Techow, closely following the German model. The Code on the Constitution of the Courts, written by the German legal advisor Otto Rudorff, was also a close adaptation of the German pattern. The outcome of the famous "Postponement Controversy" (1887-92) led in the end to a "Germanization" of the Japanese civil code. Proponents of English law attacked the Boissonade Code ("Old Civil Code) for being drafted in great haste, for not being in accord with the "Old Commercial Code", for its disregard of native customs and for technical deficiency. They were backed by conservative forces, whereas the already promulgated code was defended by proponents of French law and by liberal politicians. More for the sake of completeness, they criticized the "Old Commercial Code", too. In the end the new parliament voted for postponement of both codifications in order to revise them. This revision meant drafting a completely new code. This time it was a "code from the Japanese for the Japanese", for the draft committee consisted exclusively of Japanese jurists. The three main compilers, Nobushige Hozumi, Kenjirô Ume and Masa'akira Tomii, paid close attention to German civil law but also to many other models. In the end, the Meiji civil code set in force in the summer of 1898 was really a "fruit of comparative jurisprudence".The following twenty years marked the heyday of German law in Japan. In order to deal with the implemented foreign law, Japanese jurists looked to German legal dogma. They were impressed by the self-assuredness of the German jurists of these days who were confident that they could solve any legal problem within the precincts of a closed system. Typical for this era was this saying among Japanese jurists: "Any law other than German law is no law."Later the Japanese legal world overcame this single-minded orientation on German law when they shifted their attention to the social reality. After World War II the Japanese legal system came under the strong influence of the Anglo-American legal system. Nevertheless, Japanese legal experts remained interested in the development of German law. In contrast, German jurists showed almost no interest in Japanese law until the 1980s, a phenomenon criticized as a "one-way road in comparative law between Japan and Germany". However, the situation changed when the economic success of Japan became apparent.

Book reviewed in this article:THE STRUGGLE FOR ASIA 1828–1914 A Study in British and Russian Imperialism. By David Gillard (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1977)THE INCH OF TIME Memoirs of Politics and Diplomacy. By Howard Beale (Melbourne: Melbourne University)MUCKING ABOUT: An Autobiography. By Paul HasluckINVESTIGATING SOCIAL MOBILITY. By Leonard Broom, P. Duncan‐Jones, F. Lancaster Jones and Patrick McDonncllTAMING THE WILDERNESS: The First Decade of Pastoral Settlement in the Kennedy District. By Anne Allingham (Townsville: James Cook University, 1977)AUSTRALIA IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER: Foreign Policy in the 1970s. Edited by J A.C. Mackie (Melbourne: Nelson and the Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1976)CRITICAL ISSUES IN ORGANIZATIONS. Edited by Stewart Clegg and David Dunkerley (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977)THE ORIGINS OF BRITISH BOLSHEVISM. By Raymond Challinor (London: Croom Helm, 1977)EARLY VICTORIAN GOVERNMENT. By Oliver MacDonagh (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977)A SURVEY OF MEMBERS OF THE AMALGAMATED METAL WORKERS' UNION IN THE SYDNEY METROPOLITAN AREA. By the 1976 Field Studies Class, Department of Government, University of Sydney.AUSTRALIAN EXTERNAL POLICY UNDER LABOR: Content, Process and the National Debate. By Henry S. AlbinskiAUSTRALIA'S MILITARY ALLIANCES: A Study in Foreign and Defence Policies. By B. Chakravorty (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1977)FRANCE 1848–1945, vol. 2: intellect, Taste and Anxiety. By Theodore ZeldinPLANNING—BECOMING—DEVELOPMENT A Study of Public Participation in Localized Social Planning Leading Towards Community Development. An Australian Assistance Plan Experience. By Tom O'BrienCOMRADE CHIANG CH'ING. By Roxane Witke (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977)NOBLES AND THE NOBLE LIFE 1295–1500. By Joel T. Rosenthal (London: Allen and Unwin, 1976)RURAL CATALONIA UNDER THE FRANCO REGIME: The Fate of Regional Culture Since the Spanish Civil War. By Edward C. HansenROBERT DELAVICNETTE ON THE FRENCH EMPIRE Selected Writings. Edited by William B. CohenTHE CANADIAN HOUSE OF COMMONS: Procedure and Reform. By John B. StewartSCOTLAND AND NATIONALISM: Scottish Society and Politics, 1707–1977. By Christopher Harvie (London: Allen and Unwin, 1977THE TRANSFER OF POWER, 1942–7, vol. 7: The Cabinet Mission. Edited by Nicholas Mansergh and Penderel Moon (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1977)PARTIES AND PARLIAMENT IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA 1964–1975: Two Studies. By P. Loveday and E.P. WolfersDOCUMENTS ON AUSTRALIAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1901–1918. Edited by Gordon Greenwood and Charles GrimshawAMERICAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE MIDDLE EAST, 1784–1975: A Survey. By Thomas A. BrysonTHE ORIGINS OF THE MOROCCO QUESTION 1880–1900. By F.V. Parsons (London: Duckworth, 1976)ALTERNATIVES OF ETHNICITY: Immigrants and Aborigines in Anglo‐Saxon Australia. By William W. BostockTHE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, 1939–1949. By Dennls J. DunnPEASANTS, POLITICS AND REVOLUTION: Pressures towards Political and Social Change in the Third World. By Joel S. MigdalTHE MARXIST CONCEPTION OF IDEOLOGY: A Critical Essay. By Martin SeligerTHE FIJI INDIANS: Challenge to European Dominance 1920–1946. By K.L. GillionRACE AND POLITICS IN FIJI. By Robert NortonAUTHORITARIANISM AND CORPORATISM IN LATIN AMERICA. Edited by James M. MalloyHUMAN NEEDS AND POLITICS. Edited by Ross FitzgeraldSTRUKTUREN DER UNTERENTWICKLUNC INDIEN 1757–1914: Eine Fallstudie über abhängige Reproduktion. By Werner KellerTOCSIN: Radical Arguments Against Federation 1897–1900. Edited by Hugh AndersonREVOLUTIONARY UNDERGROUND: The Story of the Irish Republican Brotherhood 1858–1924. By Leon O'BroinTHE PORTUGUESE ARMED FORCES AND THE REVOLUTION. By Douglas PorchFRANCE 1870–1914 Politics and Society. By R.D. AndersonTITO AS A POLITICAL LEADER AND EXTERNAL FACTORS IN YUGOSLAV POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT. By R.F. MillerCompiled and edited by Kenneth W. Wiltshire. (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1977)THE DIARIES AND CORRESPONDENCE OF DAVID CARGILL, 1832–1843. Edited by Albert J. SchützRESISTANCE IN THE DESERT Moroccan Responses to French Imperialism 1881–1912. By Ross E. DunnEdited by R.J. Johnston (Armidale: Department of Geography, University of New England, 1977)THE COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT AND EDUCATION 1964–1976 Political Initiatives and Developments. Edited by I.K.F. Birch and D. SmartA CHURCH FOR ITS TIME The Story of St. Thomas' Church, Toowong, Brisbane. By Helen GregoryTHE DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA—FUNDAMENTAL NEW ASPECTS The Proceedings of a Conference Organised by lhe Strategic and Defence Studies Centre. Edited by Robert O'NeillTHE FUTURE OF TACTICAL AIRPOWER IN THE DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA: The Proceedings of a Conference Organised by The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre.PUBLIC POLICY: Problems and Paradoxes. By Hugh V. Emy (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1976)WALTER MURDOCH: A Biographical Memoir. By John La NauzeTHE AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL SYSTEM. By Jean Holmes and Campbell SharmanPEOPLE VERSUS POWER. By Kenneth M. McCaw (Sydney: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1978)PARTIES OUT OF POWER IN JAPAN, 1931–1941. By Gordon Mark BergerRECOLLECTIONS OF AN INDONESIAN DIPLOMAT IN THE SUKARNO ERA. By Ganis Harsono, edited by C.L.M. Penders and B.B. HeringHANDBOOK OF RESEARCH DESIGN AND SOCIAL MEASUREMENT. Third Edition. By Delbert C. Miller (New York: Longman Inc., 1977)THE QUEENSLAND YEARS OF ROBERT HERBERT, PREMIER: Letters and Papers. Edited by Bruce KnoxDEUTSCHE MILITÄRVERWALTUNGEN 1938/39 Die militärische Besetzung der Tschechoslowakei und Polens. By Hans UmbreitANTARCTICA: Or Two Years Amongst the Ice of the South Pole. By Otto Nordenskjold and J.G. AndersonTHE POLITICAL THEORY OF MONTESQUIEU. By Melvin RichterCHINA AND THE WORLD SINCE 1949: The Impact of Independence, Modernity and Revolution. By Wang Cungwu (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1977)

Why did Wilsonian ideals influence AEF actions in the First World War, and how did that affect the United States' involvement in the nation's first large-scale coalition operation? Wilsonian ideals influenced the AEF's actions in the First World War because most American leaders and soldiers shared Wilson's concepts of Progressivism and believed that the United States should play a role in saving Europe. Even if some did not agree with Wilson's politics, most doughboys shared his ideas of American Exceptionalism, and these views affected United States involvement in the nation's first large-scale coalition operation. In merging the two topic areas of Wilson's ideologies and AEF involvement in the war, this essay will attempt to answer how the American doughboy found motivation in the same principles that guided President Wilson. ; Master of Arts in Military History ; Week 11 Final Paper Wilsonianism in the First World War: Progressivism, American Exceptionalism, and the AEF Doughboy Brian P. Bailes A paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts in Military History Norwich University MH 562B Dr. John Broom August 16, 2020 Bailes 2 While the duration of American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) involvement in First World War combat operations remained short compared to the armies of the European powers, the experience had a lasting impact on the United States' status as a global power. President Woodrow Wilson's mediation in the European affair throughout American neutrality, his integration of the AEF into Allied operations, and his contribution to the post-war peace process cast him as a central figure of the conflict as well as a harbinger of United States interventionist foreign policy. Through the more than a century since the end of the war, historians have analyzed and debated various facets of United States belligerency. Historians have explored President Wilson's ideologies and the decision making that ultimately led to him making his April 1917 appeal to Congress for American belligerency. Additionally, historians have expanded on AEF actions in Europe and argued how General Pershing's adamancy on maintaining an independent American command created tension with the Allied leaders. Historians have not connected these two topics to analyze how a reader can conceptually link Wilson's ideas and doughboy exploits in Europe. Why did Wilsonian ideals influence AEF actions in the First World War, and how did that affect the United States' involvement in the nation's first large-scale coalition operation? Throughout the historiography of United States involvement in the First World War, specific themes reoccur as significant areas of consensus. The historiography presents two primary arguments in which historians agree. Historians agree that Wilson's peace objectives drastically differed from those of the Allies, and historians agree that these differences motivated Wilson's decisions regarding how the United States would enter the war. Historians also agree that friction existed between General Pershing and the Allied Commanders once the AEF arrived in Europe and began combat operations. These two commonalities in the historiography remain Bailes 3 relatively constant throughout the past 50 years of historical research, and even when portraying more positive sentiments expressed between AEF and Allied soldiers, historians still note some tension between Pershing and the Allied commanders. Historians agree that Wilson's peace objectives differed significantly from those of the Allies. David Woodford argues that the gap between British imperial interests and Wilson's peace objectives affected the alliance between the United States and England throughout the war.1 William Widenor argues that Wilson failed in achieving his goals during the Versailles Peace Settlement because he attempted to make too many concessions for enduring peace, and he claims that Wilson grew at odds with the Allied leaders at the peace conference.2 George Egerton argues that British policymakers were closely monitoring the dispute within the United States Senate during the Treaty of Versailles conference, and he suggests that British leadership remained skeptical of Wilson's League of Nations.3 Historians capture Wilson's opposing peace aims throughout the European conflict, and they seemingly agree on how these aims influenced Wilson's policies and actions. Some historians cite the most significant gap in peace aims as existing between the United States and France. David Stevenson argues that French leaders were continually at odds with Wilson throughout the war as the French war aims focused much more on their national security, which they saw as requiring the destruction of Imperial Germany.4 Stevenson points out that while Wilson's peace aims differed from England as well as France, many French objectives 1 David R. Woodward, Trial by Friendship: Anglo-American Relations, 1917-1918 (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1993), 7-25, 35-43, 77-80, 125-9, 208-20. 2 William C. Widenor, "The United States and the Versailles Peace Settlement," Modern American Diplomacy, eds. John M. Carroll and George C. Herring (Lanham: SR Books, 1996), 46-59. 3 George W. Egerton, "Britain and the 'Great Betrayal': Anglo-American Relations and the Struggle for United States Ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, 1919-1920," The Historical Journal 21, no. 4 (December 1978): 885-911, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2638973. 4 David Stevenson, "French War Aims and the American Challenge, 1914-1918," The Historical Journal 22, no. 4 (December 1979): 877-894, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2638691. Bailes 4 were more aggressive against Germany as they involved reclaiming land lost to Germany in previous wars, specifically the 1870 Franco-Prussian War.5 Stevenson highlights the fact that Wilson could not get French officials to see the "two Germanys" concept that prevailed in American thinking at the time. While the American public generally saw two Germanys – the autocratic ruling party dominated by the Prussian elite and the German people living under that oppressive regime – Stevenson argues that France only saw Imperial Germany as a total enemy.6 Robert Bruce explains that during the post-war occupation period, the American doughboys perceived Frenchmen as distrustful and hateful toward German soldiers, and this sullied the alliance between France and the United States.7 In line with Wilson's ideology, historians cite Wilson's desire for Europe to achieve a "peace without victory" as he attempted to serve as a mediator during the United States period of neutrality. These historians ultimately conclude that Wilson believed any of the European powers achieving their aims through victory would lead to a continuation of balance of power politics in Europe. They argue that Wilson thought merely putting an end to the fighting would be the only way to achieve lasting peace. Ross Gregory argues that Wilson acted as a persistent mediator throughout the war as he strove for a "peace without victory."8 Arthur Link explains that Wilson believed a "peace without victory" and a "draw in Europe" proved the best solution for establishing a new system to replace the broken power structure in Europe.9 Ross Kennedy portrays Wilson as advocating the United States as a neutral mediator striving for a "peace 5 Stevenson, 884, 892-4. 6 Stevenson, 885. 7 Robert B. Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms: America & France in the Great War (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 2003), 286-95. 8 Ross Gregory, The Origins of American Intervention in the First World War (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1971), 115-6. 9 Arthur Link, "Entry into World War I," Progress, War, and Reaction: 1900-1933, eds. Davis R.B. Ross, Alden T. Vaughan, and John B. Duff (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, Inc., 1970), 141. Bailes 5 without victory" before the U.S. entered the war, then as an advocate of "just peace" after they entered the war.10 Kennedy argues that Wilson blamed the international system that led to power politics and wanted to have a separate voice in the peace process to shape a new diplomatic and global political order.11 Historians point to Wilson's ideology as a reason for his differing peace objectives, and historians point to Wilson's Christian faith as a significant motivation for his progressive philosophy. Lloyd Ambrosius highlights Wilson's four tenets of national self-determination, open-door economic globalization, collective security, and progressive history as the framework in which he envisioned a global order shaped by American democratic ideals that would bring the world to peace.12 Ambrosius examines Wilson's embrace of "American Exceptionalism" and looks at how his Anglo-American bias clouded his vision and prevented him from seeing the various cultural factors throughout the world.13 Ronald Pestritto examines Wilson's progressive form of history while arguing that Wilson saw democracy emerging within society as a phenomenon only natural to specific groups of people, and he only saw a few civilizations as "progressed."14 Pestritto notes Wilson's Christian inspiration, referencing early manuscripts written by Wilson titled "Christ's Army" and "Christian Progress."15 William Appleman Williams argues that Wilson maintained a Calvinist idealism that intensified the existing doctrine 10 Ross A. Kennedy, "Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and American National Security," Diplomatic History 25, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 15, 29, https://doi.org/10.1111/0145-2096.00247. 11 Kennedy, "Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and American National Security," 2-3. 12 Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Wilsonianism: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy in American Foreign Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 2-47. 13 Ambrosius, Wilsonianism, 125-34; Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 33-49; Lloyd E. Ambrosius, "World War I and the Paradox of Wilsonianism," The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era 17 (2018): 5-22, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537781417000548. 14 Ronald J. Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005), 6-61. 15 Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism, 23, 40. Bailes 6 based on God's supposed ordination of American influence and expansion in the world.16 Richard Gamble explains that Wilson's vision and rhetoric nested with many of the Christian messages of progressive religious leaders in the United States during the First World War who saw the war as a Christian crusade to spread American ideals.17 Historians seem in unanimous agreement that Wilson's separate peace aims formed the primary impetus for him seeking an independent American presence in the war effort. David Esposito argues that Wilson wanted to have an American presence in the war because he realized that to establish a dominant American voice in the post-war peace talks, the United States needed to make a significant contribution to Allied victory.18 Edward Coffman details the United States' experiences in the First World War by explaining Wilson's desire to gain an independent voice in the peace process.19 David Trask maintains that Wilson wanted to "remain somewhat detached from the Allies" in defeating Imperial Germany to provide Wilson leverage so that he could directly influence the post-war peace process.20 Arthur Link explains that Wilson did see the benefit of not joining the Entente but keeping the United States independent of "any political commitments" with the Allies as providing a chance to ensure an American presence at the peace conference.21 Thomas Knock argues that Wilson faulted the "balance of power" politics of Europe and saw the United States as the actor to save Europe and create a new system of 16 William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1959; New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009), 67-112. Page references are to the 2009 edition. 17 Richard M. Gamble, The War for Righteousness: Progressive Christianity, the Great War, and the Rise of the Messianic Nation (Wilmington: ISI Books, 2003), 22-3, 86-208, 254-5. 18 David M. Esposito, "Woodrow Wilson and the Origins of the AEF," Presidential Studies Quarterly 19 no. 1 (Winter 1989): 127-38, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40574570. 19 Edward M. Coffman, The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1968), 5-8. 20 David F. Trask, The AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 1917-1918 (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1993), 2-6. 21 Link, "Entry into World War I," 141. Bailes 7 diplomacy.22 Overall, historians agree that President Wilson desired very different peace outcomes for a post-war Europe, and this influenced him as he made decisions regarding United States actions throughout the war. In addition to the agreement that Wilson's peace aims differed from the Allies, historians also agree that once the United States did enter the war and the AEF arrived in Europe, friction quickly developed between General Pershing and the Allied commanders. David Trask argues many instances of "increasing friction" existed between Pershing and the French and British command. Trask includes a case where the Allies "attempted to bypass Pershing" by working directly with Wilson even though Wilson had appointed Pershing as Commander in Chief of the AEF.23 Trask argues that Pershing believed that the preceding few years of trench warfare had "deprived the French and even the British of offensive spirit," and he maintains that with Pershing's "open warfare" tactics, his methods of training drastically differed from the Allies.24 Michael Adas cites disagreement between Pershing and the Allied commanders immediately after Pershing arrived in France due to Pershing's unwillingness to listen to the experienced French and British leaders as they tried to suggest ways to employ the AEF.25 Adas argues that Pershing's desire to pursue "open warfare" did not take into account the realities of trench warfare and resulted in costly casualties.26 Russell Weigley cites frequent tensions between Pershing and the Allied commanders, including an example in September of 1918 in which AEF 22 Thomas J. Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest For a New World Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), 30-69. 23 Trask, AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 38-9. 24 Trask, AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 19. 25 Michael Adas, "Ambivalent Ally: American Military Intervention and the Endgame and Legacy of World War I," Diplomatic History 38 no. 4 (September 2014): 705-7, http://doi.org/10.1093/dh.dhu032. 26 Adas, "Ambivalent Ally," 710. Bailes 8 "traffic congestion" caused a significant disturbance in a visit from Georges Clemenceau.27 Weigley explains that Pershing's belief in "open warfare" would not work due to the enormous American divisions built for the trenches, arguing that Pershing would need "smaller, maneuverable divisions" if he wanted his open warfare to work.28 All historians agree that the issue of AEF amalgamation with the French and British forces served as the primary reason for the friction between the military leaders. David Woodford cites the notion that AEF amalgamation would "undermin[e] the significance of the American military role." Hence, Pershing remained adamant in his stance not to let the Allies use American soldiers to fight under French or British flags.29 Woodward notes that Pershing felt his AEF superior to the Allies as he "believed that the Americans had almost nothing to learn from French and British officers."30 Woodford explains that war aims and peace objectives formed the basis of a fractured Anglo-American relationship that finally crumbled during the peace conference.31 Mitchell Yockelson argues that despite tension between Pershing and the Allied leaders regarding the question of amalgamation, the 27th and 30th Divisions contributed significantly to the Allied effort under British command. Yockelson highlights a fascinating illustration of Pershing's stubbornness in noting that Pershing did not follow the exploits of these divisions even though they proved instrumental in the offensive against the Hindenburg Line.32 As an enduring theme throughout the amalgamation debate, historians point to Pershing's desire for the United States to deliver the decisive blow against Germany with an independent 27 Russell F. Weigley, "Strategy and Total War in the United States: Pershing and the American Military Tradition," Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914-1918, eds. Roger Chickering and Stig Förster (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 333. 28 Weigley, "Pershing and the American Military Tradition," 341-2. 29 Woodward, Trial by Friendship, 57-8. 30 Woodward, 88. 31 Woodward, 7-80, 112-220. 32 Mitchell A. Yockelson, Borrowed Soldiers: Americans Under British Command, 1918 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008), 92-228. Bailes 9 American army. Allan Millett argues that Wilson gave Pershing the explicit directive to keep the AEF separate from the Allies and allowed Pershing the freedom to make decisions on how to integrate the AEF.33 Millett cites Pershing's initial plan to use an AEF offensive on Metz as the critical blow that would decide the war and establish an American contribution to defeating Imperial Germany. Pershing would not have his AEF ready to carry out this offensive until 1919, and his stubbornness in dealing with the requests for amalgamation in the interim "frustrated the Allies."34 Bullitt Lowry narrates Pershing's attempt to shape the post-war peace terms by arguing that Pershing wanted to force Germany into an "unconditional surrender." While Lowry concludes that Pershing's effort to influence the political realm failed, he believed that the only way to "guarantee victory" would be to crush Germany in battle.35 David Woodward argues that Pershing believed that the AEF would decide the war by becoming "the dominant role in the war against Germany."36 Woodward cites Pershing's ideas regarding "the aggressive American rifleman, whose tradition of marksmanship and frontier warfare" could rid the Western Front of trench warfare and execute a great offensive against Germany.37 Historians cite the notion throughout the ranks of the AEF that the United States should remain independent from the Allies, and historians point to the fact that many doughboys saw themselves as superior soldiers to the Allies. Robert H. Zieger argues that "virtually the entire military establishment" agreed with Pershing's desire to have an independent American 33 Allan R. Millett, "Over Where? The AEF and the American Strategy for Victory, 1917-1918," Against All Enemies: Interpretations of American Military History from Colonial Times to the Present, eds. Kenneth J. Hagan and William R. Roberts (Westport: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1986), 237. 34 Millett, "Over Where?," 239. 35 Bullitt Lowry, "Pershing and the Armistice," The Journal of American History 55 no. 2, (September 1968): 281-291, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1899558. 36 Woodward, Trial by Friendship, 81. 37 Woodward, 89, 207. Bailes 10 command.38 Still, Zieger does note that this separate American command relied heavily on the Allies for logistics support, and the AEF "misunderstood the military dynamics of the Western Front."39 Richard Faulkner argues that Pershing's doctrine rested on his belief that the "superior American rifle marksmanship, aggressiveness, and skilled maneuvering" could win the fight for the Allies.40 Faulkner argues that American soldiers saw themselves as intervening in the war effort to help the failing French and British, taunting their British partners by claiming AEF stands for "After England Failed." He devotes a chapter named as such to explain the AEF belief in the superiority of the American fighting man.41 Harold Winton argues that Pershing believed that the United States soldier was superior to his European counterpart.42 Jennifer Keene argues that issues such as the treatment of African-American soldiers and disagreements about which nation contributed the most to the Allied victory created rifts between the two allies.43 In her full text, Keene narrates AEF interactions with their French Allies, and she claims that doughboys saw themselves as superior fighters who could help turn the tide of war.44 Michael Neiberg explains that United States citizens and soldiers came away from the conflict with the belief in the "inherent superiority" of the American system over that of Europe.45 38 Robert H. Zieger, America's Great War: World War I and the American Experience (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), 92-102. 39 Zieger, America's Great War, 96. 40 Faulkner, Pershing's Crusaders: The American Soldier in World War I (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2017), 285. 41 Faulkner, 281-304. 42 Harold Winton, "Toward an American Philosophy of Command," The Journal of Military History 64, no. 4 (October 2000): 1059, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2677266. 43 Jennifer D. Keene, "Uneasy Alliances: French Military Intelligence and the American Army During the First World War," Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 1 (January 2008): 18-36, https://doi.org/10.1080/02684529808432461. 44 Jennifer D. Keene, Doughboys, the Great War, and the Remaking of America (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 105-11. 45 Michael S. Neiberg, The Path to War: How The First World War Created Modern America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 23. Bailes 11 Even when historians convey a more positive relationship between the AEF and their Allied counterparts, they still address the tension between Pershing and Allied leadership. Robert Bruce portrays a much more positive partnership between the doughboy and his French ally. Bruce documents Marshal Joseph Joffre's visit to the United States after Congress declared war against Germany to muster American support for the French. By comparing France's visit to Britain's, Bruce argues that Joffre established the framework for an intimate Franco-American partnership.46 Bruce maintains that the French respected the American soldier and viewed the entry of the AEF into the war as the saving grace of the Allies. Bruce narrates a bond between doughboys and French troops that increased as they trained and fought together.47 Despite this positive portrayal by Bruce of the French and AEF bond, Bruce still highlights the tension in Pershing's interactions with French commanders as well as noting the general perception amongst French commanders that Pershing thought "he knew everything there was to know about modern warfare."48 Bruce adds that different peace aims and post-war sentiments towards Germany created disagreements amongst American and French soldiers that fractured the relationship built during the war.49 Of note, Bruce suggests that the doughboys harbored what they saw as a "perceived lack of aggressiveness in the French."50 After synthesizing the historiography, the question remains regarding how these two arguments can be linked. Why did Wilsonian ideals influence AEF actions in the First World War, and how did that affect the United States' involvement in the nation's first large-scale 46 Robert B. Bruce, "America Embraces France: Marshal Joseph Joffre and the French Mission to the United States, April-May 1917," Journal of Military History 66 no. 2 (April 2002): 407-441, http://doi.org/10.2307/3093066; Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 32-59. 47 Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 86-121. 48 Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 128, 143. 49 Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 286-95. 50 Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 122. Bailes 12 coalition operation? Wilsonian ideals influenced the AEF's actions in the First World War because most American leaders and soldiers shared Wilson's concepts of Progressivism and believed that the United States should play a role in saving Europe. Even if some did not agree with Wilson's politics, most doughboys shared his ideas of American Exceptionalism, and these views affected United States involvement in the nation's first large-scale coalition operation. In merging the two topic areas of Wilson's ideologies and AEF involvement in the war, this essay will attempt to answer how the American doughboy found motivation in the same principles that guided President Wilson. Perhaps a reader will identify that the AEF demonstrated trends in Europe that highlight an "American way of war" that still resonates in United States coalition operations today. When President Wilson brought the United States into the First World War in April of 1917, he sold it as an effort to make the world safe for democracy. In Wilson's war address to Congress, Wilson called Imperial Germany's resumption of their unrestricted submarine campaign "warfare against mankind."51 Wilson maintained that Imperial Germany had given the United States no other choice but to declare war when they resumed their submarine attacks on merchant ships in the early spring of 1917. Still, Wilson furthered his justification for war by appealing to the broader ideal of fighting to defeat the Imperial German autocracy. Wilson described the "selfish and autocratic power" against which a free people needed to wage war.52 Later in his address, Wilson stated that he found hope in what he saw as the restoration of power to the people demonstrated in the Russian Revolution. Wilson saw a pre-Lenin revolution as 51 Woodrow Wilson, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress Calling for a Declaration of War" in "President Wilson," Essential Writings and Speeches of the Scholar-President, ed. Mario R. DiNunzio (New York: NYU Press, 2006): 399, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qfgbg.15. 52 Wilson, "Declaration of War," 400. Bailes 13 bringing democracy to the people of Russia, and it opened the door for the realization that the Allies fought because "the world must be made safe for democracy."53 Arthur Link comments on Wilson's initial optimism on hearing of the Russian Revolution overthrowing Czar rule.54 While the Russian Revolution took a different turn in the following years, the initial news of the Russian people revolting against the Czar gave Wilson confidence that democracy could spread in Europe since now the Allies truly represented a democratic system. Wilson had spent the first years of the war trying to mediate peace in Europe through United States neutrality, and he tried to negotiate an end to the fighting without a victory for any of the imperial belligerents. Wilson did not see a lasting peace coming to Europe if any of the imperial powers achieved their peace objectives, so he attempted to mediate a truce. Kendrick Clements narrates how Wilson's desire to keep the United States neutral grew at odds with his economic support for the Allies. War for the United States rose to be more likely as Imperial Germany became increasingly aggravated with the United States for supplying aid to France and Britain while professing neutrality.55 Fraser Harbutt argues that at the initial outbreak of war in Europe, leaders as well as citizens of the United States concerned themselves with the economic impacts of the war primarily, and the United States benefited economically by supporting the Allies, specifically in the steel trade.56 Imperial Germany's resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare, as well as the capture of Germany's Zimmerman Telegram in January 1917, soliciting an alliance with Mexico, prompted Wilson to support waging war on Imperial Germany. Now American entry into the conflict presented Wilson with some new options for shaping the post- 53 Wilson, "Declaration of War," 401-2. 54 Link, "Entry into World War I," 122-3. 55 Kendrick A. Clements, "Woodrow Wilson and World War I," Presidential Studies Quarterly 34, no. 1 (March 2004: 62-82, https://www.jstor.org/stable/27552564. 56 Fraser J. Harbutt, "War, Peace, and Commerce: The American Reaction to the Outbreak of World War I in Europe 1914," An Improbable War? The Outbreak of World War I and European Political Culture Before 1914, eds. Holger Afflerbach and David Stevenson (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 320-1. Bailes 14 war world. Thomas Knock describes how even though the United States entry into the war meant the essential failure of Wilson's "Peace Without Victory," the international community had seemingly bought into Wilson's concept of "collective security."57 In the previous few years of American neutrality, Wilson had advocated for creating a collection of democratic nation-states to band together to prevent war, and by 1917 the international community seemed interested. Wilson would use American belligerency to shape his new world order for peace. Russia's withdrawal from the war in March of 1918 made the need for a United States presence all the more significant for the Allies. The American soldier would be a crusader of sorts, attempting to cure Europe of the diplomacy of old that had brought her to destruction. The European July crisis of 1914 that erupted in a full-scale war the following month proved to be the culmination of decades of the European balance of power diplomacy that led to rival alliances and an armament race between the feuding dynasties.58 European power politics had dominated the continent for centuries, which inevitably escalated into a world war, and the United States soldier would have the opportunity to save the nations from which most of their ancestors had descended. Michael Neiberg argues that by 1917, the American people felt an obligation to enter the war to save Europe. While the people of the United States supported neutrality initially, Neiberg explains that public opinion swayed over time toward a desire to save Europe from the terror of Imperial Germany.59 The United States Secretary of War from 1916-1921, Newton Baker, published a text almost two decades after the armistice in which he maintained that the United States went to war to stop Imperial Germany and make the world safe for democracy. Baker took issue with the 57 Knock, To End All Wars, 115. 58 James Joll and Gordon Martel, The Origins of the First World War, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2013), 9-291. 59 Neiberg, The Path to War, 7-8, 31-3, 235. Bailes 15 historians of the 20s and 30s who claimed that economic interest influenced the United States entry into the war, and he argued they ignored the necessity of U.S. involvement to stop Germany. Baker explained that the American public remained overwhelmingly critical of the German autocracy and desired to intervene to save the European people.60 Private Alexander Clay of the AEF's 33rd Division demonstrated this sense of duty as he wrote regarding his 1918 deployment to France. As Clay's ship passed the Statue of Liberty while leaving the New York harbor, he thought to himself of the French leader Lafayette's role in securing United States victory during the American Revolution. He wrote that the AEF went to France to "repay the debt of our gratitude to your country for your country's alliance with our country in obtaining liberty from an oppressor England."61 For the United States to effectively reshape the world, there needed to be an independent American command that would ensure the United States contributed to the victory over Imperial Germany, which would give Wilson his seat at the post-war peace talks. In a January 22, 1917 address to the Senate in which he articulated his vision for peace in Europe, Wilson claimed that the warring European nations could not shape a lasting peace. While Wilson still did not advocate for United States intervention at this point, he did state that to achieve peace "[i]t will be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a guarantor of the permanency of the settlement so much greater than the force of any nation now engaged or any alliance hitherto formed or projected that no nation, no probable combination of nations could face or withstand it."62 In this speech, Wilson advocated for a "peace without victory" because he did not envision a peaceful 60 Newton D. Baker, Why We Went to War (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1936), 4-10, 20, 160-3. 61 Private Alexander Clay in American Voices of World War I: Primary Source Documents, 1917-1920, ed. Martic Marix Evans (Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 2001; New York: Routledge, 2013), 19, Kindle. 62 Woodrow Wilson, "Essential Terms for Peace in Europe" in "President Wilson," Essential Writings and Speeches of the Scholar-President, 393. Bailes 16 outcome if any of the imperial powers achieved victorious peace terms.63 Wilson reiterated his stance that the United States should play a decisive role in shaping post-war Europe and ensuring that "American principles" guided the rest of the world.64 When the United States declared war against Imperial Germany a few months after this speech, it essentially put Wilson's vision into motion. Diplomatic historian William Widenor argues that Wilson realized that the United States needed to participate in the war "rather than as an onlooker" to achieve his visions for peace.65 Widenor notes Wilson's desire for the United States to enter the war as an "associate" to the Entente as opposed to an "ally," and Widenor maintains that Wilson desired to change the world and "democratize and also, unfortunately, to Americanize it."66 The late international historian Elisabeth Glaser captures the Wilson administration's balancing between maintaining an economic relationship with the Entente powers while attempting to remain "an independent arbiter in the conflict."67 Wilson appointed General Pershing to lead the American effort, and Wilson gave him the simple instruction to keep the American Expeditionary Forces as a command separate from the Allies. In 1928, the Army War College published The Genesis of the American First Army, which documented the details surrounding how the War Department created an independent army of the United States. The text includes a caption from Secretary of War Baker's memorandum to Pershing. Baker informed Pershing of Wilson's order to "cooperate with the forces of the other countries employed against the enemy; but in so doing the underlying idea must be kept in view that the forces of the United States are a separate and distinct component of 63 Wilson, "Essential Terms for Peace in Europe," 394. 64 Wilson, 396-7. 65 William C. Widenor, "The United States and the Versailles Peace Settlement," 42. 66 Widenor, 42-3. 67 Elisabeth Glaser, "Better Late than Never: The American Economic War Effort, 1917-1918," Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914-1918, eds. Roger Chickering and Stig Förster (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 390. Bailes 17 the combined forces, the identity of which must be preserved."68 The President did give Pershing the authority to decide how the AEF would integrate into Allied operations. Upon Pershing's June 13, 1917 arrival in Paris, he began making decisions regarding AEF employment as it pertained to logistics, training, and an initial American area of operations on the Western Front. With a plan of achieving a force of 1,328,448 men in France by the end of 1918, Pershing needed to ensure his troops were able to build combat power and prepare for war while simultaneously ensuring that he maintained a distinct American command.69 The following 17 months of conflict with American boots on the ground in Europe saw significant political and diplomatic friction between Pershing and the Allied commanders. Pershing attempted to keep his AEF intact while satisfying Allied requests for American soldiers to replace French and British casualties, especially when Germany launched their Spring 1918 offensives. Pershing described in his memoirs that the French and British requested American soldiers to fill their gaps on the front lines when they had each sent diplomatic missions to America shortly after the United States entered the war. Pershing maintained his adamancy against the United States "becoming a recruiting agency for either the French or British," and he recounted that the War Department retained his position as well.70 While Allied leaders ostensibly supported having an independent American army participate in the war effort, the need to replace casualties in the trenches proved to be their immediate concern. Russia withdrawing from the conflict allowed Germany to reinforce their strength on the Western Front and mount a series of offensives. Germany knew they had a limited window of time for victory 68 Army War College (U.S.) Historical Section, The Genesis of the American First Army (Army War College, 1928), Reprints from the collection of the University of Michigan Library (Coppell, TX, 2020), 2. 69 The Genesis of the American First Army, 2-9. 70 John J. Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, vol. 1 (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1931), 30-3. Bailes 18 with the United States continuing to build combat power, so they surged in the early months of 1918. Pershing faced a strategic dilemma of trying to support the Allies and get his troops in the fight while simultaneously attempting to build an independent American army. Ultimately, Pershing gave the Allies some of his army divisions as much needed replacements, and he made an effort to ensure that these divisions remained as intact as possible. Pershing endeavored to organize these divisions under a U.S. corps level command, but this corps command proved mostly administrative rather than tactical.71 By the time Pershing activated his independent American First Army, it only spent a few months in combat. The temporarily amalgamated doughboys Pershing gave to the Allies to meet their requests had contributed more to the defeat of Imperial Germany than Pershing's independent army. Mostly because Pershing had interspersed his divisions throughout the French and British fronts to meet the Allied requests for replacements, the American First Army did not activate until August of 1918. The September 20-25 Meuse-Argonne offensive would be the first significant operation for Pershing's independent army.72 David Trask concludes his critique of Pershing by recognizing the contribution that the American soldier played in providing manpower to the Allies. Trask commends the bravery of the American doughboy, but he argues that the amalgamated U.S. divisions contributed more to victory than the American First Army.73 In a similar vein, Mitchell Yockelson contends that the 27th and 30th Divisions who remained under British command throughout the war benefited over the rest of the AEF from extensive training led by the experienced British troops, and they contributed significantly to the Allied 71 The Genesis of the American First Army, 9-46. 72 John J. Pershing, Final Report of Gen. John J. Pershing: Commander-in-Chief American Expeditionary Forces. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919), 37-8; The Genesis of the American First Army, 45-58. 73 Trask, The AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 174-7. Bailes 19 victory.74 Pershing detailed his plans to capitalize on the initiative gained with his Meuse-Argonne offensive to deliver his decisive blow against Germany. The November 11 armistice came before he could achieve his grand vision.75 While the American doughboy played a critical role in providing an Allied victory over Imperial Germany, Pershing never realized his concept of an independent American command autonomously crushing the German army. The American soldier contributed most significantly to the Allied victory by taking part in offensives planned and conducted under the control of French and British Generals. Understanding American motivation during the war effort requires understanding the Progressive Movement taking place in the early-twentieth-century United States. Michael McGerr writes a detailed account of the cause and effect of the Progressive Movement. McGerr describes the wealth disparity brought about by Victorian society and the Gilded Age, and the class conflict emerging from this gave birth to a social and political movement that attempted to enact massive change in the American system.76 McGerr claims that the Progressive Movement attempted such major reform that no social or political action since has tried "anything as ambitious" due to the adverse reactions of such massive change.77 The Progressive Movement engulfed American society and brought about changes in family structures, race relations, and governmental powers. Herbert Croly illustrated the drive for monumental change rooted in the Progressive Movement with his text Progressive Democracy. In his narrative, Croly advocated for a complete overhaul of the American system to achieve freedom and alleviate wealth disparity. Croly saw governmental reform as the method for spreading democracy to all 74 Yockelson, Borrowed Soldiers, 213-23. 75 Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, vol. 2, 355-87. 76 McGerr, A Fierce Discontent, 3-146. 77 McGerr, 315-9. Bailes 20 citizens.78 In describing American public opinion during the time of United States entry into World War I, David Kennedy argues that for those Americans who championed progressive ideals, "the war's opportunities were not to be pursued in the kingdom of commerce but in the realm of the spirit."79 While the United States maintained a formidable economic link with the Allies throughout American neutrality, Wilson appealed to American ideals to garner public support for the war. United States entry into the war did not come as the natural development of the Progressive Movement. Still, the American public's reason for supporting the war certainly borrowed progressive sentiments. Wilson championed progressive initiatives that had ingrained themselves in the national mood of early-twentieth-century America. Wilson ran for President in 1912 on the principles he codified the following year in his text The New Freedom. Wilson argued that the Jefferson era of United States democracy had long ended. Wilson maintained that because of the new complexities found in American society, a "reconstruction in the United States" needed to occur to achieve real economic and social freedom.80 Ronald Pestritto articulates Wilson's vision for a governmental system as it relates to a society's history and progress. According to Wilson, the method of government that works for people depends on how far that population has progressed. In that manner, the government should always change to reflect the progression of its people best.81 Pestritto argues that a major theme found in Wilson's 1908 text Constitutional Government in the United States rests in the idea that: [T]here are four stages through which all governments pass: (1) government is the master and people are its subjects; (2) government remains the master, not through 78 Herbert Croly, Progressive Democracy (New York: Macmillan, 1914; New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers; Second printing 2006), 25, 103-18. 79 David M. Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980; New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 39. 80 Woodrow Wilson, The New Freedom: A Call for the Emancipation of the Generous Energies of a People (New York and Garden City: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1913), www.philosophical.space/303/Wilson.pdf. 81 Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism, 34-42. Bailes 21 force but by its fitness to lead; (3) a stage of agitation, when leaders of the people rise up to challenge the government for power; and (4) the final stage, where the people become fully self-conscious and have leaders of their own choosing.82 Wilson epitomized the Progressive Movement's ideals regarding the government adapting to the changes of the people to create a more representative system of government. He would appeal to these principles in advocating for United States intervention in Europe. An underlying sentiment existed within the Progressive Movement that sought to bring about massive change, and this energy extended into the war effort. Lloyd Ambrosius explains the rise of the United States as an imperial power during the Gilded Age and Progressive Era. The outcome of the American Civil War created a more powerful central government, and economic growth during the following decades allowed more opportunity for global expansion.83 As the United States extended its global presence, the ideals that formed the nation began to influence foreign policy. David Kennedy writes about the shift in prominent progressives toward support of the war effort. Kennedy references John Dewey as a significant advocate for utilizing the war to satisfy progressive initiatives. According to Kennedy, progressives found appeal in Wilson's reasons for American belligerency in Europe as "a war for democracy, a war to end war, a war to protect liberalism, a war against militarism, a war to redeem barbarous Europe, a crusade."84 Michael McGerr states that the First World War "brought the extraordinary culmination of the Progressive Movement."85 Regardless of the typical progressive view of war, progressives could find merit in Wilson's justification for United States involvement. 82 Pestritto, 37. 83 Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism, 26-32. 84 Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society, 50-3. 85 McGerr, A Fierce Discontent, 280. Bailes 22 Even though a vast segment of the United States population did not support going to war in Europe, the notion of saving Europe still permeated throughout American society. In a series of essays published in the July 1917 edition of The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, multiple thinkers of the time expressed the necessity of the United States entering the war to save Europe. Miles Dawson argued the importance of the United States' mission in the war by documenting the five "fundamentals" that made the United States unique, and he explained the importance of spreading those principles globally. Dawson advocated for the spreading of American ideals throughout the rest of the world.86 George Kirchwey argued that the United States must go to war to defeat Imperial Germany and secure peace. Kirchwey suggested that the war was a fight against an autocratic empire and a crusade to make the world safe for democracy. Kirchwey maintained that the United States needed to lead the effort in creating a world order for peace.87 Samuel Dutton saw the purpose of the United States as transcending party lines. Dutton suggested that the aim of defeating autocratic Imperial Germany needed to be a united American mission.88 Emily Greene Balch wrote that the United States "enters the war on grounds of the highest idealism, as the champion of democracy and world order."89 Walter Lippman argued that once the United States entered the war, they were obligated to fight to make the world safe for democracy. Lippman placed the blame for the war squarely on Germany and their aggression in Belgium and unrestricted submarine warfare. Similar to Wilson in his war address, Lippman drew parallels to the Russian Revolution and the 86 Miles M. Dawson, "The Significance of Our Mission in This War," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 72 (July 1917): 10-13, http://www.jstor.com/stable/1013639. 87 George W. Kirchwey, "Pax Americana," Annals, 40-48, http://www.jstor.com/stable/1013645. 88 Samuel Dutton, "The United States and the War," Annals, 13-19, http://www.jstor.com/stable/1013640. 89 Emily Greene Balch, "The War in Its Relation to Democracy and World Order," Annals, 28-31, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1013643 Bailes 23 importance of it signaling that the Allies truly represented democracy.90 Wilson's reasons for war had found a voice in the academic circles of the United States, and they nested well with the progressive message. Wilson's goals for peace illustrate how Progressive initiatives manifested into the global sphere. In his August 18, 1914 address advocating for the American population to remain neutral during the European conflict, Wilson maintained that the United States held a responsibility "to play a part of impartial mediation and speak the counsels of peace and accommodation, not as a partisan, but as a friend."91 Similarly, when addressing the Senate over two years later communicating his persistent intent of mediating peace in Europe through American neutrality, Wilson criticized the demands for peace submitted by the Entente that sought revenge over Imperial Germany rather than a lasting peace. Wilson instructed that "peace must be followed by some definite concert of power which will make it virtually impossible that any such catastrophe should ever overwhelm us again."92 In line with his progressive ideology, Wilson believed in United States intervention in the European conflict that would fundamentally improve their diplomatic system entirely. The United States would intervene in Europe to not only end the conflict but restructure the political climate in a more peaceful, progressive manner. Kendrick Clements argues that Wilson's economic and diplomatic decisions throughout United States neutrality drew him into the war gradually as he continued to side with the Allies. Wilson attempted to maintain his ideals for peace as the United States continued to get closer to belligerency.93 When the United States entry into the war proved virtually inevitable, Wilson 90 Walter Lippman, "The World Conflict in Its Relation to American Democracy," Annals, 1-10, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1013638. 91 Woodrow Wilson, "An Appeal for Neutrality in World War I," 390. 92 Woodrow Wilson, "Essential Terms for Peace in Europe," 392. 93 Clements, "Woodrow Wilson and World War I," 63-81. Bailes 24 ensured that the reasons for fighting aligned with the progressive energy that moved within American society. A religious vigor inspired military action that can be seen as a product of the Progressive Movement as well. Richard Gamble narrates the origin of the opinion that the United States represented a light for the rest of the world, and he describes how this concept brought the nation into the war. Gamble argues that these Christian ideals drove the political climate as Wilson's vision echoed the religious sentiment, and they prompted men to fight.94 Gamble describes the "social gospel" movement that had energized progressive Christians in the United States as extending into the international realm. The same energy that had influenced Christians to enact domestic change had transcended into a desire to improve the world, and Wilson ensured these sentiments carried over into United States foreign policy.95 Ronald Pestritto argues Wilson's religious conviction and explains that Wilson linked his faith with his duty to help shape the rest of the world. Pestritto explains the belief that "America was a key battleground in the victory of good over evil."96 Richard Gamble's mention of literature such as Washington Gladden's 1886 "Applied Christianity" highlights the popular message of progressive faith that nests with Pestritto's argument.97 Wilson illustrated the linkage of religion and progressive reform when he spoke in Denver, Colorado, in a 1911 build-up to his run for the Presidency. Wilson commented that "liberty is a spiritual conception, and when men take up arms to set other men free, there is something sacred and holy in the warfare."98 Wilson went on to champion the necessity of finding truth in the Bible's message, and he concluded by warning against believing "that 94 Gamble, The War for Righteousness, 5-87. 95 Gamble, 69-87. 96 Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism, 40-3. 97 Gamble, The War for Righteousness, 49-67. 98 Woodrow Wilson, "The Bible and Progress" in "On Religion," Essential Writings and Speeches of the Scholar-President, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qfgbg.7, 54. Bailes 25 progress can be divorced from religion."99 To Wilson, Christianity taught the spiritual duty of working toward social progress, and most progressive men of faith believed in these same sentiments which carried over toward United States actions in France. At the core of this Progressive energy and Wilson's peace aims were the sentiments surrounding an idea of American Exceptionalism. Many of the same ideas found in the religious aspect of the need to work for social progression catered to a sense of American Exceptionalism. In the same May 7, 1911 address in Denver, Colorado, Wilson spoke of the greatness of the United States as a direct correlation to the religious zeal and Biblical principles with which the founders had established the nation. According to Wilson, "America has all along claimed the distinction of setting this example to the civilized world."100 Wilson believed that the United States should serve as the model of Christian values for the rest of the world as "America was born to exemplify that devotion to the elements of righteousness which are derived from the revelations of Holy Scripture."101 In his text In Search of the City on a Hill, Richard Gamble describes how the United States narrative utilized an interpretation of divine providence to create an image of a nation built on religious principles that should serve as an example for the rest of the world.102 Lloyd Ambrosius describes the prevalent belief in the early twentieth-century United States that considered the United States a "providential nation" as citizens attempted to justify global expansion.103 If the United States existed as a providential manifestation of God's will, then that could rationalize the spread of the American system into the international realm. 99 Wilson, "The Bible and Progress," 53-9. 100 Wilson, 56. 101 Wilson, 59. 102 Richard M. Gamble, In Search of the City on a Hill: The Making and Unmakng of an American Myth (London: Continuum International Publishng Group, 2012), 6-119. 103 Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and Ameriam Internationalism, 33. Bailes 26 Men of faith found a divine message in the need for the United States to intercede in the global sphere to mold the world in her image. Wilson's brand of progressive history nested well with his idea of American Exceptionalism. Lloyd Ambrosius explains Wilson's fundamental belief that "primitive peoples moved toward greater maturity over the generations."104 Wilson applied this to the history of the United States. As Ronald Perstritto describes, Wilson believed that "the history of human progress is the history of the progress of freedom."105 As people progressed, they, in turn, developed a governmental system that allowed for more representation for its citizens. According to Ambrosius, Wilson believed that "the United States represented the culmination of progressive historical development."106 The American people had achieved real progression in Wilson's historical model, and democracy achieved through the American Revolution solidified his theory. Wilson certainly made this point evident in his writings regarding history. Wilson suggests that "the history of the United States demonstrates the spiritual aspects of political development."107 The United States embodied the ideal form of Wilson's progressive history. Wilson saw it as the responsibility of the United States to spread its exceptional personification of progressive history with the rest of the world. Wilson acknowledged his views on the uniqueness of the United States in his New Freedom. While arguing for progressive reform in the states, Wilson stated that "[t]he reason that America was set up was that she might be different from all the nations of the world."108 Indeed, Wilson believed in the providential nature of the United States, and he desired to shape the rest of the world. 104 Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism, 236. 105 Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism, 37. 106 Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism, 236. 107 Woodrow Wilson, "The Historian," Essential Writings and Speeches of the Scholar-President, 216, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qfgbg.10. 108 Wilson, The New Freedom, 16. Bailes 27 Early in the war during the period of United States neutrality, Wilson's reasons for remaining neutral stemmed from his belief in the exceptional nature of the American system and his desire for the United States to stay clear of European affairs. Even in American neutrality, Wilson still sought to mediate a peace in Europe because he perceived a chance to spread the democracy of the United States to Europe. Wilson believed that he needed to mediate in the European conflict because "mere terms of peace between the belligerents will not satisfy even the belligerents themselves," and he questioned whether the Entente and Central powers fought "for a just and secure peace, or only for a new balance of power."109 Wilson's peace aims were in sharp contrast to the Allied leaders, which illustrated his emphasis that the United States should mold a post-war Europe, and this tied directly to American Exceptionalism. While the British leadership concerned themselves with imperial interests, the French sought revenge on Germany from the 1870 Franco-Prussian War. Wilson made it clear in his war address that the United States had "no quarrel with the German people."110 Wilson's vision for a post-war world remained focused on a lasting peace rather than what he perceived as selfish imperial gains or senseless revenge. American Exceptionalism formed the foundation for the interventionist foreign policy of the Progressive Era, and it profoundly motivated Wilson as well as the bulk of American society. Diplomatic historian William Appleman Williams details the rise of the United States as a global power. Williams argues that most Americans in the early twentieth-century United States agreed not only with "Wilson's nationalistic outlook," but they also agreed that the nation should serve as an example for the rest of the world.111 As mentioned previously, Miles Dawson contributed 109 Woodrow Wilson, "Essential Terms for Peace in Europe," 393. 110 Woodrow Wilson, "Declaration of War," 401. 111 Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, 86. Bailes 28 to the July 1917 The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science to voice the justification of United States intervention in France. In his text, Dawson defined the five uniquely American fundamentals as: 1. The inalienable right of every man to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness – not as a mere dead saying, but as a living reality. 2. The right of local self-government, within territories possessing or entitled to claim such right, embracing every power of government not expressly granted to the union. 3. The guaranty to each state of a forum for the redress of grievances of one state against another with full power to enforce the verdict of that forum. 4. The guaranty of a republican form of government to each constituent state. 5. The right and duty to maintain the union.112 To thinkers like Dawson, this unique set of traits not only provided United States citizens with a system of government that separated them from the rest of the world, but it inherently gave them a duty to spread the American ideology to the rest of the world. Fundamentally, the idea that the world should take the lead from the United States exemplified the broad theme of American Exceptionalism inspiring AEF actions in the war. With Progressivism and American Exceptionalism at the root of the war effort, the citizen-soldier of the AEF found inspiration in the same rhetoric. Nelson Lloyd described the "melting-pots" of the army cantonment areas in which soldiers who were born outside of the United States "have become true Americans. They have learned the language of America and the ideals of America and have turned willing soldiers in her cause."113 Michael Neiberg argues that a lasting legacy of United States involvement in the war became a unified American mission superseding any cultural allegiance, and "disagreements would no longer be based on ethnicity 112 Dawson, "The Significance of Our Mission in This War," 11. 113 Newson Lloyd, How We Went to War (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1922), 58, https://archive.org/details/howwewenttowar00lloyrich/page/n7/mode/2up. Bailes 29 or religion."114 United States entry into the war gave the American citizen-soldier a reason for fighting to preserve a democratic system in Europe, and Wilson's belief that the United States would play a central role became widespread amongst the ranks of the AEF. Lieutenant Willard Hill of the Transport Division and 94th Aero Pursuit Squadron claimed when hearing of the United States entry into the war "that this war is not over yet and that the U.S. troops will play a very decisive factor."115 The purpose of United States entry into the war inspired an idealism that would unify soldiers and champion a belief that the AEF would save Europe from the autocracy of Imperial Germany. Private Willard Newton of the 105th Engineers, 30th Division, exclaimed his joy during the September offensives by stating, "[a]t last we are at the beginning of a real battle between Prussianism and Democracy! And we are to fight on the side of Democracy that the world may forever be free from the Prussian peril!"116 The sentiments of these soldiers expressed a voice that echoed Wilson's desire to utilize an American army to bring peace to Europe, and Pershing dutifully followed his instructions. Pershing's stubbornness in not giving in to the Allies' request to amalgamate troops remained the most significant source of friction between him and the Allied military leaders. Still, Pershing's belief that the doughboy remained a superior warrior to the French and British soldier intensified Pershing's negative feelings toward his Allied counterparts. Pershing did not hide his views regarding coalitions when he wrote early in his memoirs that "[h]istory is replete with the failures of coalitions and seemed to be repeating itself in the World War."117 Russell Weigley argues that Pershing believed "that only by fighting under American command would 114 Michael S. Neiberg, "Blinking Eyes Began to Open: Legacies from America's Road to the Great War, 1914-1917," Diplomatic History 38, no. 4 (2014): 812, https://doi:10.1093/dh/dhu023. 115 Lieutenant Willard D. Hill (Cleburne, Texas) in American Voices of World War I, 47. 116 Private Willard Newton (Gibson, North Carolina) in American Voices of World War I, 140. 117 Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, vol. 1, 34. Bailes 30 American soldiers retain the morale they needed to fight well."118 This assertion proved incorrect as those American doughboys who fought under French and British command performed extraordinarily.119 David Trask maintains that Pershing's "presumption that the American troops were superior to others in the war helps explain his stubborn insistence on an independent army even during the greatest crisis of the war."120 Although the German Spring Offensives of 1918 put the Allies in desperate need of replacements, Pershing held his ground in resisting amalgamation. He only agreed to temporary amalgamation after much deliberation. Pershing's plan required maintaining a separate and distinct American force if the United States was to play a critical role in defeating Imperial Germany. This plan did not always synchronize with General Foch's overall plan for the Allied strategy for defeating Imperial Germany. Mitchell Yockelson describes an instance in late September 1918 in which a newly established AEF officers' school near Pershing's headquarters pulled a bulk of American officers from the front lines, which "affected the AEF First Army divisions that were about to attack in the Meuse-Argonne operation."121 United States political leadership back home undoubtedly noticed the friction between Pershing and the Allied leaders. David Woodward mentioned that at one point, Wilson and Secretary Baker intervened to plead with Pershing to be more accommodating to the Allies. According to Woodward, "Pershing proved as immovable as ever when it came to wholesale amalgamation and introducing Americans to trench warfare before he deemed them ready for combat."122 118 Weigley, "Pershing and the U.S. Military Tradition," 335. 119 Weigley, 335. 120 Trask, The AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 61. 121 Yockelson, Borrowed Soldiers, 127. 122 Woodward, Trial by Friendship, 168-9. Bailes 31 Pershing's doctrine of "open warfare" proved predicated on a firm belief in the exceptional quality of the American fighting man. In his memoirs, Pershing documented his view that the results of the Battle of the Marne had placed the opposing forces in a trench defensive that had taken away their aggression and ability to fight an offensive battle. Pershing maintained that "victory could not be won by the costly process of attrition, but it must be won by driving the enemy out into the open and engaging him in a war of movement."123 Sergeant-major James Block of the 59th Infantry, 4th Division, wrote after an offensive near Belleau Wood that his troops "had proven to ourselves that we were the Hun's master, even in our present untrained condition. The Hun could not stand before us and battle man to man."124 David Trask argues that Pershing's reliance on the rifle and bayonet under his open warfare doctrine limited the AEF's ability to adapt to the combined arms fight as quickly as did the French and British.125 In his Final Report, Pershing praised the Allied training system that prepared his inexperienced troops for combat on the Western Front. Although he admitted that his soldiers needed to learn from the experiences of the combat tested French and British, he stated that "[t]he long period of trench warfare had so impressed itself upon the French and British that they had almost entirely dispensed with training for open warfare."126 Pershing relied heavily on his infantrymen, and he saw the rifle and the bayonet as the superior weapon. He did not factor advances in the machine gun, tanks, and artillery to integrate all lethal assets onto the battlefield. According to Richard Faulkner, Pershing planned on using his troops – who he believed were 123 Pershing, 151-4. 124 Sergeant-major James W. Block (Marquette, Michigan) in American Voices of World War I, 108. 125 Trask, The AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 19. 126 Pershing, Final Report, 13-5. Bailes 32 better suited for offensive warfare – to "force the Germans from their trenches into open terrain where the Allies' greater resources would then destroy the unprotected enemy army."127 Perhaps nothing exhibited Pershing's obtuse attitude toward his Allied counterparts more than his desire to beat the French in seizing Sedan from the Germans. Pershing outlined his wishes that his "troops should capture Sedan, which the French had lost in a decisive battle in 1870."128 Russell Weigley comments on Pershing's intent "to try to snatch from the French army the honor of recapturing the historic fortress city of Sedan, where the Emperor Napoleon III had surrendered to the Prussians on September 1-2, 1870."129 Sergeant-major Block described the fierce German resistance during the late September Allied offensives. Still, he claimed that "[o]nce the Americans penetrated that line, their advance northward would be comparatively easy. Sedan would fall next."130 The AEF performed well during the offensives in early November, and the crumbling Imperial German army made Sedan easily attainable for either Pershing's Second Army or the Franco-American armies.131 David Trask points out the diplomatic issue that would ensue if Pershing were to "deprive the French army of this honor."132 The new commander of the American First Army, General Liggett, ultimately did not carry out the attack, which undoubtably prevented a political and diplomatic disaster.133 Russell Weigley maintains that Liggett changed plans after "the offended French" updated him of Pershing's plans on November 7.134 The idea that Pershing wished to take away French retribution by giving 127 Faulkner, Pershing's Crusaders, 285. 128 Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, vol. 2, 381. 129 Weigley, "Pershing and the U.S. Military Tradition," 342. 130 Sergeant-major Block in American Voices of World War I, 135. 131 Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 282-3. 132 Trask, The AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 174. 133 Trask, 174, 134 Weigley, 343. Bailes 33 his troops a decisive victory and morale boost demonstrated his disconnect from the sentiments of his Allied counterparts. Pershing's belief in the superiority of the American soldier to his French and British counterpart extended to the lower ranks of the AEF. While perhaps sensationalizing his account, Scout Corporal Edward Radcliffe of the 109th Infantry, 28th Division wrote regarding actions around St Agnon "that the French of the 10th or 6th army had fallen back, their officers being shot by our men when they ordered them to retreat."135 In a post-World War I survey, Sergeant Donald Drake Kyler of the 16th Infantry, 1st Division answered a question about what he learned about America and Americans from the war. Sergeant Kyler stated that "Americans are inclined to brag about their systems and accomplishments which may or not be superior to those of other peoples or cultures."136 In many of the accounts of AEF actions in Europe, General Pershing and his doughboys showcased American Exceptionalism. Richard Faulkner devotes a chapter of his text to argue that most of the AEF doughboys perceived inferiority in the French way of life compared to the United States. The majority of white AEF soldiers came away from the war, believing that, in terms of technology as well as general health and welfare, American society remained superior to that of France and England.137 Faulkner makes note that "with the notable exception of the African Americans, the soldiers generally believed that their society was markedly superior to anything they encountered in Europe."138 Sergeant-major Block wrote a letter home to his parents during the post-war occupation period. He wrote of the perception that "Paris makes up for the backwardness of the rest of France."139 135 Corporal Edward Radcliffe in American Voices of World War I, 94. 136 Sergeant Donald Drake Kyler (Fort Thomas, Kentucky) in American Voices of World War I, 196. 137 Faulkner, Pershing's Crusaders, 188-93. 138 Faulkner, 189. 139 Sergeant-major Block in American Voices of World War I, 191. Bailes 34 While the bond formed between the French and British soldiers and the AEF doughboy proved strong, there still seemed to be a sentiment of American superiority amongst the AEF ranks. Tasker H. Bliss, who served as Army Chief of Staff from September 1917 to May 1918, documented the challenge of absent unified Allied command in a 1922 essay. Bliss wrote a detailed piece in which he criticized the lack of a unified Allied mission while praising General Foch and championing his eventual selection as "Allied Commander-in-Chief."140 Bliss condemned the Allied leaders for waiting so long before establishing any sort of unified command, and he argued that for the first years of the war, they fought for their national goals only. Bliss maintained that this hindered United States integration into the war effort as well.141 Charles Pettit wrote an account of his time on the Western Front. Initially serving in the British army, Pettit joined the AEF once they arrived and concluded his 42 months of combat with the Rainbow Division. Pettit commented that "[w]e know why the French and English didn't win the War. They was waiting for us."142 Robert Bruce expands on the relationship between the American and French soldiers during the post-war occupation period. The doughboys believed that the Allied victory had eliminated the threat of autocratic Imperial Germany. At the same time, the French soldiers still demonstrated distrust of the German for fear of a future war. According to Bruce, "Americans did not want to hear about the need to prepare for a future war with Germany. They believed that victory in the Great War and the conversion of Germany to a democracy was enough to end the menace; Americans were unwilling to do more."143 For the AEF doughboy, the United States' actions in the war had saved Europe from the threat of the 140 Tasker H. Bliss, "The Evolution of the Unified Command," Foreign Affairs 1, no. 2 (December 1922): 1-30, https://www.jstor.org/stable/20028211. 141 Bliss, 7-30. 142 Charles A. Pettit in Echoes From Over There: By the Men of the Army and Marine Corps who Fought in France, eds. Craig Hamilton and Louise Corbin (New York City: The Soldiers' Publishing Company, 1919), 107-9. 143 Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 289. Bailes 35 Imperial German autocracy. United States' involvement in its first large-scale coalition operation had solidified the dominance of the American soldier and the system for which he fought. The American doughboy contributed significantly to the Allied victory over Imperial Germany. Without American boots on the ground in France, Imperial Germany may have defeated the Allies. Allan Millett argues that Pershing's independent army did not achieve all that Pershing had hoped. Still, Millett maintains that an accurate assessment of the war would be that the "Allies might have lost the war without the American Expeditionary Forces."144 With the Russian withdrawal from the war and Germany's surge in the Western Front in the Spring of 1918, the Allies desperately needed more boots on the ground. AEF actions in Cantigny, Belleau Wood, and the attack on the Hindenburg line proved the value of the doughboys to the Allied victory over Imperial Germany and the Central Powers. Acknowledging the contribution of the American soldier to the Allied victory should remain a critical focus of any study of United States involvement in the war. While the presence of American troops on the ground benefited the Allies and did give Wilson his seat at the post-war peace talks, Pershing did not realize his grand vision of an independent American army crushing Imperial Germany. Bullitt Lowry documents Pershing's desire to capitalize on increasing the United States combat power to continue pressing a weakening German army and deliver a crushing blow.145 The Germans signed the armistice before Pershing could make this happen. While Wilson gained his seat at the peace conference and Pershing did not get his chance to win a tactical victory, the French and British still received their original desires and delivered Germany "harsh armistice terms."146 144 Millett, "Over Where?," 251. 145 Lowry, "Pershing and the Armistice," 286-91. 146 Lowry, 291. Bailes 36 With the eventual collapse of the League of Nations, Wilson never achieved his vision of a new world order for peace. Still, the United States government had established its importance and commenced its entry into the realm of global powers. United States involvement in the First World War helped solidify a national identity as well as establish an American presence on the international stage. Theodore Roosevelt Jr. wrote a letter on May 15, 1919, in which he documented the benefit of the war and what he saw as "Americanizing and democratizing" the soldiers through military service.147 Roosevelt commented that through service in support of the war effort, "love of the men for their country has been deepened, that their sense of real democracy has been sharpened and steadied and that insofar as any possible bad effect goes, the men are more than ever ready and determined to see order and fair play for all."148 In a similar vein, Italian born AEF Sergeant Morini wrote that the war provided him a chance "to make good on my Americanism."149 To Morini, fighting in the war provided him with "the right to the name Yankee all right."150 While the United States' efforts in the war were in support of the Allies, the war became a chance for the nation to claim its identity. A country that had been torn apart by civil war half a century before utilized the war effort to continue to unify and recover its self-proclaimed providence. The war ostensibly became an effort to Americanize its own citizens. The historiography of United States involvement in the First World War presents various arguments. Some historians such as David Trask and Russell Weigley remain critical of General Pershing and his decision making. While some scholarly history shows a narrative less scathing of Pershing, most of the description found in popular history showcases valiant actions of 147 Theodore Roosevelt in Echoes From Over There, 95. 148 Roosevelt, 95. 149 Sergeant Morini in Echoes From Over There, 115. 150 Morini, 115. Bailes 37 Pershing and his efforts in maneuvering the American Expeditionary Forces to achieve victory for the Allies against Imperial Germany. The fact remains that while the doughboys contributed significantly to the Allied victory, they helped the most when they were not fighting Pershing's fight. In his Final Report, Pershing highlights the benefit that the Allies provided to the American forces. In terms of training as well as logistics, the Allies provided the doughboys with the resources they needed to defeat Imperial Germany and the Central Powers effectively.151 Pershing recognized what the Allies had supplied him and his men, but his stubbornness and arrogance still clouded his vision to a degree. While Pershing did build a trusting relationship with the Allied commanders, and his troops were efficient, he did not always operate per their same vision. At times, Pershing's desire to maintain an independent American army superseded his desire to enable the Allied strategy. Pershing strived to meet Wilson's intent of keeping a distinct American command. The question remains if, in carrying out his President's instructions, Pershing prolonged the war and delayed the defeat of the Central Powers. Secondary and primary source literature from the First World War showcases both Wilson's peace aims – which were shaped by his ideology – as well as General Pershing and AEF actions while attempting to remain an independent command in the war. When war broke out in August 1914 in Europe, Wilson tried to mediate a peace while maintaining United States neutrality. When continued trade with the Allies brought the United States into the war in April of 1917, he seized the chance to shape a new world order by establishing an independent American command to defeat Imperial Germany. Primarily because of the Progressive Movement in the United States and the concepts surrounding American Exceptionalism, the American soldier embraced Wilson's ideologies for fighting and fought valiantly to defeat the 151 Pershing, Final Report, 90. Bailes 38 Imperial German autocracy. The Progressive Movement had established itself in American society by the time the citizen-soldier went to war in France, and the principles of American Exceptionalism permeated in virtually every facet of American culture. The American doughboy carried both of these concepts with him to France. Despite Pershing not attaining his decisive blow against the German army, and Wilson not achieving his vision for a new world order, the United States still met a significant amount of Wilson's original intent for entering the war. Wilson's ideologies influenced how the AEF fought in France. As the First World War shaped the United States standing as a global power, it also demonstrated the critical nature of maintaining relationships with coalition partners. Hew Strachan begins the conclusion to his history of the war by stating that "[t]he First World War was a coalition war."152 The American doughboy established a positive relationship with his French and British counterparts. The ability of the American soldier to learn from the experiences of the combat tested Allies, to adapt to the rigors of trench warfare, and to perform well in battle fighting beside his international partners shows the success of the AEF's performance in the nation's first large-scale coalition operation. Despite these successes, the AEF doughboy exhibited American Exceptionalism in the First World War. As the United States built its presence in the international realm over the following century, and the need for maintaining partnerships with allied nations continued to increase, the precedent set by the AEF in the nation's first large-scale coalition operation would be essential. 152 Hew Strachan, The First World War (New York: Viking Penguin, a member of Penguin Group, 2004; New York: Penguin Group, 2013), 303. Bailes 39 Bibliography Secondary Sources Adas, Michael. "Ambivalent Ally: American Military Intervention and the Endgame and Legacy of World War I." Diplomatic History 38 no. 4 (September 2014): 700-712, http://doi.org/10.1093/dh.dhu032. Ambrosius, Lloyd E. Wilsonianism: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy in American Foreign Relations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. Ambrosius, Lloyd E. Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017. Ambrosius, Lloyd E. "World War I and the Paradox of Wilsonianism." The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era 17 (2018): 5-22, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537781417000548. Bruce, Robert B. A Fraternity of Arms: America and France in the Great War. Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 2003. Bruce, Robert B. "America Embraces France: Marshal Joseph Joffre and the French Mission to the United States, April-May 1917." Journal of Military History 66 no. 2 (April 2002): 407-441, http://doi.org/10.2307/3093066. Clements, Kendrick A. "Woodrow Wilson and World War I." Presidential Studies Quarterly 34, no. 1 (March 2004): 62-82. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27552564. Coffman, Edward M. The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1968. Egerton, George W. "Britain and the 'Great Betrayal': Anglo-American Relations and the Struggle for United States Ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, 1919-1920." The Historical Journal 21, no. 4 (December 1978): 885-911. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2638973. Esposito, David M. "Woodrow Wilson and the Origins of the AEF." Presidential Studies Quarterly 19 no. 1 (Winter 1989): 127-140, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40574570. Faulkner, Richard S. Pershing's Crusaders: The American Soldier in World War I. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2017. Gamble, Richard M. In Search of the City on a Hill: The Making and Unmaking of an American Myth. London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012. ———. The War for Righteousness: Progressive Christianity, the Great War, and the Rise of the Messianic Nation. Wilmington: ISI Books, 2003. Bailes 40 Glaser, Elisabeth. "Better Late than Never: The American Economic War Effort, 1917-1918." Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914-1918, edited by Roger Chickering and Stig Förster. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000: 389-407. Gregory, Ross. The Origins of American Intervention in the First World War. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1971. Harbutt, Fraser J. "War, Peace, and Commerce: The American Reaction to the Outbreak of World War I in Europe 1914." An Improbable War? The Outbreak of World War I and European Political Culture Before 1914, edited by Holger Afflerbach and David Stevenson. New York: Berghahn Books, 2007: 320-334. Joll, James and Martel, Gordon. The Origins of the First World War. 3rd ed. New York: Routledge, 2013. Keene, Jennifer D. Doughboys, the Great War, and the Remaking of America. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001. Keene, Jennifer D. "Uneasy Alliances: French Military Intelligence and the American Army During the First World War." Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 1 (January 2008): 18-36. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684529808432461. Kennedy, David M. Over Here: The First World War and American Society. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. First published 1980 by Oxford University Press (New York). Kennedy, Ross A. "Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and American National Security." Diplomatic History 25, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 1-31. https://doi.org/10.1111/0145-2096.00247. Knock, Thomas J. To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest For a New World Order. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019. First published 1992 by Oxford University Press (Oxford). Link, Arthur S. "Entry into World War I." Progress, War, and Reaction: 1900-1933, edited by Davis R.B. Ross, Alden T. Vaughan, and John B. Duff. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, Inc., 1970: 108-148. Lowry, Bullitt. "Pershing and the Armistice." The Journal of American History 55 no. 2, (September 1968): 281-291. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1899558. McGerr, Michael. A Fierce Discontent: The Rise and Fall of the Progressive Movement in America. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. Millett, Allan R. "Over Where? The AEF and the American Strategy for Victory, 1917-1918." Against All Enemies: Interpretations of American Military History from Colonial Times to the Present, edited by Kenneth J. Hagan and William R. Roberts. Westport: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1986: 235-256. Bailes 41 Neiberg, Michael S. "Blinking Eyes Began to Open: Legacies from America's Road to the Great War, 1914-1917." Diplomatic History 38, no. 4 (2014): 801-812. https://doi:10.1093/dh/dhu023. ———. The Path to War: How the First World War Created Modern America. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. Pestritto, Ronald J. Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005. Stevenson, David. "French War Aims and the American Challenge, 1914-1918." The Historical Journal 22, no. 4 (December 1979): 877-894. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2638691. Strachan, Hew. The First World War. New York: Viking Penguin, a member of Penguin Group, 2004. Reprinted with a new introduction. New York: Penguin Group, 2013. Page references are to the 2013 edition. Trask, David F. The AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 1917-1918. Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1993. Weigley, Russell F. "Strategy and Total War in the United States: Pershing and the American Military Tradition." Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914-1918, edited by Roger Chickering and Stig Förster. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000: 327-345. Widenor, William C. "The United States and the Versailles Peace Settlement." Modern American Diplomacy, edited by John M. Carroll and George C. Herring. Lanham: SR Books, 1996: 41-60. Williams, William Appleman. The Tragedy of American Diplomacy. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1959. Reprinted for Fiftieth Anniversary with a foreword by Lloyd C. Gardner and afterword by Andrew J. Bacevich. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009. Page references are to the 2009 edition. Winton, Harold R. "Toward an American Philosophy of Command." The Journal of Military History 64, no. 4 (October 2000): 1035-1060. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2677266. Woodford, David R. Trial by Friendship: Anglo-American Relations, 1917-1918. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1993. Yockelson, Mitchell A. Borrowed Soldiers: Americans Under British Command, 1918. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008. Zieger, Robert H. America's Great War: World War I and the American Experience. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000. Bailes 42 Primary Sources Army War College (U.S.) Historical Section. The Genesis of the American First Army. Army War College, 1928. Reprints from the collection of the University of Michigan Library Coppell, TX, 2020. Baker, Newton D. Why We Went to War. New York: Harper & Brothers for Council on Foreign Relations, 1936. Balch, Emily Greene. "The War in Its Relation to Democracy and World Order." The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 72 (July 1917): 28-31. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1013643. Bliss, Tasker H. "The Evolution of the Unified Command." Foreign Affairs 1, no. 2 (December 1922): 1-30. https://www.jstor.org/stable/20028211. Croly, Herbert. Progressive Democracy. New York: Macmillan, 1914. Second printing in 2006 of new material edition with an introduction by Sidney A. Pearson, Jr. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1998. Page references are to the 2006 edition. Dawson, Miles M. "The Significance of Our Mission in This War." The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 72 (July 1917): 10-13. http://www.jstor.com/stable/1013639. Dutton, Samuel T. "The United States and the War." The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 72 (July 1917): 13-19. http://www.jstor.com/stable/1013640. Echoes From Over There: By the Men of the Army and Marine Corps Who Fought in France. Edited by Craig Hamilton and Louise Corbin. New York City: The Soldiers' Publishing Company, 1919. Evans, Martin Marix, ed. American Voices of World War I: Primary Source Documents 1917-1920. New York: Routledge, 2013. Kindle. Kirchwey, George W. "Pax Americana." The Annals of the American Academy for Political and Social Science 72 (July 1917): 40-48. http://www.jstor.com/stable/1013645. Lippmann, Walter. "The World Conflict in Its Relation to American Democracy." The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 72 (July 1917): 1-10. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1013638. Lloyd, Newson. How We Went to War. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1922. https://archive.org/details/howwewenttowar00lloyrich/page/n7/mode/2up. Pershing, John J. Final Report of Gen. John J. Pershing: Commander-in-Chief American Expeditionary Forces.Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919. ———. My Experiences in the World War. 2 vols. New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1931. Bailes 43 Wilson, Woodrow. Essential Writings and Speeches of the Scholar-President. Edited by Mario R. DiNunzio. New York: NYU Press, 2006. https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qfgbg.1-18. ———. The New Freedom: A Call For the Emancipation of the Generous Energies of a People. New York and Garden City: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1913. www.philosophical.space/303/Wilson.pdf.

Rosi Braidottis Deliberation über das Posthumane ist angesichts gegenwärtiger Bewegungen in den Geistes- und Kulturwissenschaften – oder, um den von der Autorin bevorzugten Begriff ins Treffen zu führen: den 'Humanities' – keine Zufälligkeit; vielmehr entspricht sie haargenau einer umfassenden Dynamik, die sich vor allem im anglo-amerikanischen Kontext seit einigen Jahren rapide und reich entfaltet: nämlich einer affirmativen Abkehr vom Menschen als dem Maß der Dinge, dem Nonplusultra aller Aneignung von Geist und Welt. Die Konsolidierung des Fachs 'Animal Studies', die hohe Konjunktur des Begriffs der Ökologie im Theoretischen, die Hinwendung zu sogenannten 'objekt-orientierten' Ontologien mögen diese Tendenz symptomatisch charakterisieren. In diesem Sinne schreibt sich Braidotti in ein weites Feld posthuman(istisch)er Forschungsanstrengung ein. Die Autorin selbst, wollte man eine Schublade für ihr Werk bereithalten, würde sich am ehesten das Etikett des 'Neo-Materialismus' gefallen lassen: Eine Denkbewegung mit stark feministischer Schlagseite, die für gewöhnlich mit den Namen Elizabeth Grosz, Jane Bennett, Karen Barad und Manuel De Landa assoziiert wird. Die Motivation dahinter besteht darin, Materie in ihrem auto-poietischen Charakter, also in ihrer unabhängigen, physischen Entfaltung zu denken. Nicht umsonst verweist Braidotti, im Rechtfertigen ihres Tuns, gerne auf die sogenannte 'Gaia-Hypothese' (S. 84), derzufolge, zurückgehend auf Lynn Margulis und James Lovelock, die Biosphäre als selbstorganisierter Lebenszusammenhang begriffen wird, innerhalb dessen einzelne Lebensformen nur in Relation zu den jeweils übrigen vorgestellt werden können. Welcher Name philosophiegeschichtlich für diese Art von Argument geradezustehen hat, liegt auf der Hand: Spinoza. Und zwar ein durch das jüngere französische Denken gefilterter. So versteht sich Braidotti zunächst als Schülerin von Deleuze und Foucault – und, durch die interpretativen Linsen des Ersteren hindurch – als Auslegerin des spinozistischen Immanenzgedankens: "The 'Spinozist legacy' […] consists in a very active concept of monism, which allowed these modern French philosophers to define matter as vital and self-organizing, thereby producing the staggering combination of 'vitalist materialism'. Because this approach rejects all forms of transcendentalism, it is also known as 'radical immanence'" (S. 56). Die berühmte Frage des Althusser-Schülers Pierre Macherey, 'Hegel oder Spinoza?', entscheidet sich bei Braidotti demnach zweifellos zugunsten des Letzteren – die Arbeit der Theorie müsse sich heute von der Einheit der Substanz und der Multitude ihrer lebendigen Ausdrücke, vor deren Hintergrund die Einmaligkeit des Menschen radikal an Boden verliert, her bestimmen. Das Fragwürdig-Werden des Menschen als Brennpunkt unseres Weltverständnisses ist dabei natürlich keine revolutionäre Nouveauté. Spätestens seit Heideggers "Brief über den Humanismus", in dem Jean-Paul Sartre höflich aber bestimmt ausgerichtet wird, dass der Existenzialismus eben kein Humanismus sein könne, arbeitet sich die Kontinentalphilosophie am Abschied vom Menschen ab. So folgten auf Heidegger Foucaults 'Ende' und Derridas 'Enden des Menschen', in jüngerer Zeit etwa Peter Sloterdijks Menschenpark-Fantasie und Donna Haraways Mediationen über den Cyborg-Charakter des Lebendigen; mit Judith Halberstam, Ira Livingston (Posthuman Bodies) und N. Katherine Hayles (How We Became Posthuman) erfuhr das Posthumane in den 1990er-Jahren schließlich seine begriffliche Prägung. Warum sie ihren Gegenstand dennoch als ganz zeitgeistig und dringend begreift, erklärt Braidotti im ersten Viertel ihres Traktats, worin gefordert wird, das Neinsagen einzustellen und über die Humanismus-Kritik des 20. Jahrhunderts noch ein Stück weit hinauszugehen: "Posthumanism is the historical moment that marks the end of the opposition between Humanism and anti-humanism and traces a different discursive framework, looking more affirmatively towards new alternatives" (S. 37). In dergestalt effektvoller Assertorik kommt der deleuzianische Spinozismus, durch den sich dieser Text animiert sieht, unumwunden auf seine Kosten. So firmiert 'Affirmation' – und zwar durchweg – als jene Kampfvokabel, in die Braidottis gesamte Argumentation ihr unbeschränktes Vertrauen investiert: Wo sich endlich die Epoche dekonstruktiver Melancholie ihrem Ende zuneigt, kann Politik als Handlung wieder bejaht werden – doch Handlung braucht, per definitionem, ein Subjekt. Genau dieses versucht die Autorin aus den Überresten des, nach den legitimen Anschlägen der anti-humanistischen Kritik, in Trümmern liegenden humanistischen Wertegerüsts zu retten. Zwischen dem humanistischen Angebot einer subjektiven Ipseität, die eher modellhaft ausschloss als dass sie eine menschliche Gemeinschaft beschwor (und letztlich die radikale Unterdrückung aller geschlechtlichen, rassischen, ökonomischen etc. Abweichungen vom europäischen weißen Mann programmatisch mit sich führte), und seiner ersatzlosen Abschaffung, soll demnach eine dritte Option sich auftun – eine Art von Subjektivität, die keinen universalen Standard ins Recht setzt, sondern sich relational (Deleuze würde schreiben 'transversal') vorstellt, das heißt: als differentieller Bezugspunkt inmitten der Multiplizität von Lebensformen unseres ökologischen Zusammenhangs. "Posthuman subjectivity expresses an embodied and embedded and hence partial form of accountability, based on a strong sense of collectivity, relationality and hence community building" (S. 49). Die Lücke, die diese feierliche Einsetzung einer neuen Handlungsmacht offen lässt, bezieht sich dabei auf das 'Wie' des Umsetzens. Politik als Handlung bedarf einer strategischen Disposition, zumindest eines Plans, der Richtung und Vorgehen determiniert. Weil Braidottis Gedankengang sich an diesem Dilemma der Praxis vorbeizustehlen scheint, entsteht eine unweigerliche Ratlosigkeit darüber, auf welche Weise sich das posthumane Subjekt denn nun konkret manifestieren soll. Noch diffiziler wird der Status dieser Subjektivität, wenn nach der Umwelt gefragt wird, innerhalb derer ihre Realisierung statt hat. Braidotti schlägt vor, einen singulären, allumfassenden Lebenszusammenhang zu denken, der sich in seinem Zentrum nicht mehr auf die Figur des Menschen als 'anthropos' hin zuspitzt; stattdessen soll das Leben selbst als kreative Kraft affirmiert werden, die den Rahmen der Spezies übersteigt, um den kosmischen Zusammenhalt an sich zu garantieren: "As a brand of vital materialism, posthuman theory contests the arrogance of anthropocentrism and the 'exceptionalism' of the Human as a trancendental category. It strikes instead an alliance with the productive and immanent force of zoe, or life in its non-human aspects" (S. 66). 'Zoe', der griechische Term für eine Lebendigkeit, die allen Lebewesen gemeinsam ist, wird von der Autorin in Stellung gebracht, um den verbrauchten, anthropozentrisch justierten Begriff des 'Bios' abzulösen (womit auch eine Substitution des foucaultschen 'biopouvoir' durch eine vitalistische 'Zoe'-Politik einhergeht). Dem posthumanen Subjekt inhäriert mithin ein Solidaritätsverhältnis der Arten untereinander, die Teilhabe an einem produktiven Lebensprozess, der mehr ist als bloß menschlich. Jedwedem Naturalismusverdacht soll dabei allerdings postwendend der Wind aus den Segeln genommen werden, da Braidotti die Effekte der Technik selbst dem monistischen Relationsgeflecht der Lebensressourcen zuschreibt. Was nichts anderes bedeutet, als dass das technologische Artefakt der Physis nicht mehr gegenübersteht, sondern selbst als intelligent und vom generativen Lebensprozess beseelt verstanden wird. Damit geht der Zusammenbruch der Natur-Kultur-Distinktion einher, die sich in das Kontinuum eines einzigen energetischen Kontexts, in welchem natürlicher und technischer Substanzsausdruck ineinander übergehen, auflöst: "A rather complex symbiotic relationship has emerged in our cyber universe: a sort of mutual dependence between the flesh and the machine" (S. 113). Allein, bei aller Emphase für den medial-technischen Charakter der von ihr vorgeschlagen relationalen Subjektivität wehrt sich Braidotti vehement, den Immaterialitätsphantasien des Transhumanismus nachzugeben und betont wiederholt die unabweisbare Körperlichkeit ('embodiment') des Lebendigen. Nicht zuletzt, reflektiert Braidotti im letzten Teil des Buchs, nimmt die posthumane Kondition die Arbeit der Universität in die Pflicht. Die traditionellen Geistes- und Kulturwissenschaften, die sich – der anglo-amerikanische Begriff der 'Humanities' lässt da keine Zweifel aufkommen – vom gesicherten Status des Subjekts Mensch her derivieren, riskieren ihre absolute Geltungseinbuße, gelingt es nicht, den disziplinären Anthropozentrismus zu brechen und zugleich das Nachmenschliche auf den zeitgemäßen Begriff zu bringen: "As a vitalist and self-organizing notion of 'matter' comes to the fore, the Humanities need to mutate and become posthuman, or to accept suffering increasing irrelevance" (S. 147). Ein Festhalten an den rigiden Grenzen der klassischen Disziplineneinteilung sei dabei mindestens kontraproduktiv, wenn nicht gefahrvoll. Um den Geist der Zeit zu fassen bedarf es einer grenzüberschreitenden Begriffsarbeit, die Braidotti vor allem in den am akademischen Rand florierenden 'Studies'-Formationen realisiert sieht (vgl. das gegenwärtige Interesse an den erwähnten 'Animal Studies', 'Disability Studies', 'Critical Science Studies', 'Extinction Studies' etc.) – das heißt in dynamischen Denkfeldern, die flexibler manövrierbar und methodisch offener sind als das traditionelle Fach es zulässt. Damit einher geht die vehemente Forderung der Autorin nach einer Neudefinition (besser: einem Sich-neu-etablieren) des Verhältnisses zwischen Geistes- und Naturwissenschaften. Dass Braidotti dem nüchternen Titel The Posthuman keinen Untertitel beifügt, gibt dem Werk eine enzyklopädische Note und kreiert den Eindruck, der Diskurs über das Nachmenschliche sei hier ganz konvenient eingerahmt und auf den Punkt gebracht worden. Während es zutrifft, dass die Autorin sich sehr bemüht zeigt, etwas wie eine posthumanistische Ideengeschichte möglichst umfassend wiederzugeben, darf dabei nicht übersehen werden, dass sich Braidotti einem spezifischen philosophiepolitischen Programm verschreibt, das im Lichte eines post-marxistischen Materialismus alles daran setzt, den 'Linguistic Turn' zu Grabe zu tragen: "The posthuman subject is not postmodern, because it does not rely on any anti-foundationalist premises. Nor is it post-structuralist, because it does not function within the linguistic turn or other forms of deconstruction" (S. 188). Was dabei unbeantwortet bleibt, ist die Frage, wie eine Theorie des Posthumanen an gesellschaftlicher Relevanz gewinnen soll, wenn sie die Analyse der Sprache – unhintergehbares Moment jedwedes Repräsentationsprozesses – dem Nichts überlässt.

The Annual Register (Edmund Burke ?) : on the Decadence and the Renaissance of Poland in the 18th Century.
In the 18th century, the current events in Poland had been extensively reviewed in the London Annual Register, which described «into one connected narrative» the most important happenings in different countries of the world. It was initiated in 1758 by Edmund Burke who edited it singlehanded for some years, and then, until his death, «inspired and directed its composition» through his closest friends. For contemporary readers it was a reference book on the immediate past, and for the historians an uninterrupted record of events by writers who reflected the outlook of the time.
Burke's apprehension of Poland has proved remarkably accurate; as with India and America, he thoroughly acquainted himself with the historical, political, social, and religious circumstances affecting that country and he clearly studied them for a number of years before he wrote on that subject at length. In the 1760s the chapters on Poland had been rather critical. Poland was presented as a country where the idea of liberty had been carried to the extreme and most injustly distributed, and this led to the anarchy and civil wars, encouraged and provoked by Poland's rapacious neighbours. Before the first partition in 1772, the Annual Register repeatedly affirmed that in Poland the life for individuals had become unbearable, and that they would prefer anything — even a foreign yoke — to the calamities to which they were everyday subject. Subsequently however, the partition was qualified by the Annual Register as a most horrible international crime and «the first great breach in the modern political system of Europe».
After having stated in 1769 that «only a miracle» could save Poland, and in 1774 that she was «irretrievably ruined as a state», for nearly two decades the Annual Register stopped writing about that unhappy country. During those years, Burke had made a great political carrier and became world famous as the author of the Reflections on the French Revolution. Out of the three nearly simultaneous revolutions in America, France and Poland, Burke hated the second but admired the third which was, in fact, a practical application of his theory of the state as an organical developing body. In his Appeal of the New Whig to the Old Ones he prized highly the Polish May Constitution of 1791, but his position as a practical politician became rather difficult. When, in 1793, during the debates in the House of Commons, his years-long friend, Charles Fox, suggested that England should assist Poland instead of making war with France, Burke opposed categorically.
After prolonged silence, extensive reviews of the events in Poland appeared in the Annual Registers for 1791 and 1795. According to general rule, they were anonymous, but revealed the author's proficiency in Polish affairs and contained some little known details. Unlike the writings of the 1760's, they were not critical, but rather flatterous for Poland, her inhabitants and their monarch. They concluded by general «Reflections» and deplored an event so common in history, as the triumph of the wrong over the right.
Who was their author, undoubtedly expressing the opinions of Burke? The Anglo- Saxon scholars, who still labourously study the life and writings of Edmund Burke, confess «that no Burke scholar has yet worked out to his and anyone else's satisfaction the full truth about Burke's involvement with the Annual Register to around 1795»; they consider, however, it «unwise to assume that Burke was responsible for all the writings on Poland up to a date as late as 1795», and are not sure whether «any single sentence was Burke's.» Such an extreme prudence is worthy of admiration. However, several clues show that Edmund Burke wrote, or edited, or inspired, the Polish chapters in the Annual Registers not only in the 1760's but also in the 1790's, and this hypothesis will prevail as long as it will not be positively proved that some other person than Burke was their author.

Book Reviews in This Article:W. E. Lunt. Studies in Anglo‐Papal Relations during the Middle Ages, II. Financial Relations of the Papacy with England, 1327‐1534.W. G. Hoskins. Provincial England. Essays in Social and Economic History.Thomas W. Parker. The Knights Templars in England.G. Parsloe (Ed.). The Wardens' Accounts of the Worshipful Company of Founders of the City of London. 1497–1681.Mary Dewar. Sir Thomas Smith. A Tudor Intellectual in Office.T. A. Penfold (ed.). Acts of the Privy Council of England, 1630 June–1631 June.J. G. Jenkins (ed.). Victoria County History, the County of Stafford.William Letwin. The Origins of Scientific Economics. English Economic Thought, 1660–1776.D. C. Coleman. Sir John Banks, Baronet & Businessman.L. A. Burgess. The Origins of Southampton.Virgínia Rau and Jorge de Macedo. O Açúcar da Madeira nos Fins do Séulo XV. Problemas de Produção e Comércio.H. van der Wee, The Growth of the Antwerp Market and the European Economy (fourteenth to sixteenth centuries).Zs. P. Pach. Die Ungarische Agrarentwicklung im 16–17. Jahrhundert: Abbiegung vom westeuropäischen Entwicklungsgang.Jean‐François Bergier. Genève et l'economie européenne de la Renaissance.Hubert Pinsseau. Un aspect du développement économique de la France: histoire de la construction, de l'administration et de l'exploitation du canal d'Orléans de 1676 à 1954.Pierre Léon. Marchands et spéculateurs dauphinois dans le monde antillais du XVIIIe siècle: les Dolle et les Raby.Ferdinand Lot. Recherches sur les effectifs des armées françaises des Guerres d'Italie aux Guerres de Religion, 1492–1562.Pierre Dardel. Navires et merchandises dans les ports de Rouen et du Havre au XVIIIe siècle.Renée Doehaerd. Études Anversoises. Documents sur le commerce international à Anvers, 1488‐1514.Boris Porschnev. Les soulèvements populaires en France de 1623 à 1648.Herbert Luthy. La Banque Protestante en France de la Révocation de l'Édit de Nantes à la Révolution. II: De la Banque aux Finances (1730–1794).Adeline Daumard. La bourgeoisie parisienne de 1815 à 1848.J. C. Toutain. La population de la France de 1700 à 1959.Félix Rivet. La navigation à vapeur sur la Saǒne et le Rhǒne (1783–1863).Pierre Bauchet. Economic Planning. The French Experience. Translated by Daphne Woodward. (London: Heinemann. 1964. Pp. xvi + 299. 35s.)Ludwig Beutin. Gesammelte Schriften zur Wirtschafts‐ und Sozialgeschichte.Richard Gaettens. Die Wirtschaftsgebiete und der Wirtschaftsgebietspfennig der Hohen‐staufenzeit.Manfred Unger. Stadtgemeinde und Bergwesen Freibergs im Mittelalter. (Abhandlungen zur Handels‐ und Sozialgeschichte. Ed. im Auftrag des Hansischen Geschichtsvereins. Vol. V.Rudolf Kleiminger. Das Heiligengeisthospital von Wismar in sieben Jahrhunderten. Ein Beitrag zur Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Stadt, ihrer Höfe und Dörfer. (Abhandlungen zur Handels‐ und Sozialgeschichte, Commissioned by of the Hanse History Association. Vol. IV.Hildegard Weiss. Die Zisterzienserabtei Ebrach. Eine Untersuchung zur Grundherrschaft, Gerichtsherrschqft und Dorfgemeinde im fränkischen Raum. (Quellen und Forschungen zur Agrargeschichte, Vol. VIII.Kurt Hinze. Die Arbeiterfrage zu Beginn des modernen Kapitalismus in Brandenburg‐Preussen 1685‐1806. Mit einer Einführung von O. Büsch. (Veröffentlichungen der Historischen Kommission zu Berlin beim Friedrich‐Meinecke‐Institut der Freien Universität Berlin, Vol. 9.Wilhelm Treue. Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Neuzeit im Zeitalter der Industriellen Revolution 1700 bis 1960.Joachim Lampe. Aristokratie, Hofadel und Staatspatriziat in Kurhannover. Die Lebenskreise der höheren Beamten an den kurhannoverschen Zentral‐ und Hofbehörden, 1714‐1760. Vol. 1: Darstellung. Vol. 2: Beamtenlisten und Ahnentafeln.Herbert Milz. Das Kölner Grossgewerbe von 1750 bis 1835. (Schriften zur rhein.‐west‐fälischen Wirtschaftsgeschichte.Willy Freitag. Die Entwicklung der Kaiserslauterer Textilindustrie seit dem 18. Jahrhundert. (Veröffentlichungen des InstitutS für Landeskunde des Saarlandes. Vol. 8.Werner Hofmann. Ideengeschichte der sozialen Bewegung des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts. (Sammlung Göschen, Vol. 1205/1205a.Alois Brusatti, Wilhelm Haas und Walter Pollock (Eds.). Geschichte der Sozialpolitik mit Dokumenten.Hansjörg Gruber. Die Entwicklung der pfälzischen Wirtschaft 1816‐1834. (Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Landeskunde des Saarlandes, Vol. 6.Jürgen Kuczynski. Die Geschichte der Lage der Arbeiter unter dem Kapitalismus. Teil I. Die Geschichte der Lage der Arbeiter in Deutschland von 1789 bis zur Gegenwart. Vol. 3: Darstellung der Lage der Arbeiter in Deutschland von 1871 bis 1900.Hans Mommsen. Die Sozialdemokratie und die Nationalitätenfrage im habsburgischen Vielvölkerstaat. Part I: Das Ringen um die supranationale Integration der zisleithanischen Arbeiterbewegung, 1867‐1907. (Veröffentlichungen der Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung in österreich. Vol. I.Karl‐Bernhard Netzband und Hans Peter Widmaier. Währungs‐ und Finanzpolitik der ära Luther 1923‐1925. (Veröffentlichungen der List‐Gesellschaft e.V. Vol. 32, Reihe B.Horst Hans Hergel. Industrialisierungspolitik in Spanien seit Ende des Bürgerkrieges. (Die industrielle Entwicklung, Abteilung A: Untersuchungen zur Volkswirtschaftspolitik, Vol. 7.Fritz Federau. Der zweite Weltkrieg–Seine Finanzierung in Deutschland.Wilhelm Weber. Österreichs Finanzpolitik 1945‐1961.Karl G. Thalheim. Grundzüge des sowjetischen Wirischaftssystems. (Abhandlungen des Bundesinstituts zur Erforschung des Marxismus‐Leninismus, Vol. I. Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 1963, Part II.

Book reviewed in this article: THIS IS THE ABC: The Australian Broadcasting Commission 1932–1983. By K. S. lnglis assisted by Jan Brazier. STRATEGY AND DEFENCE: Australian Essays. Edited by Desmond Ball. SIR THOMAS PLAYFORD: A Portrait. By Walter Crocker. THE YOUNG MAN FROM HOME: James Balfour 1830–1913. By Andrew Lemon. THE DEMON OF DISCORD: Tensions in the Catholic Church in Victoria, 1853–1864. By Margaret M. Pawsey. SOLID BLUESTONE FOUNDATIONS AND OTHER MEMORIES OF A MELBOURNE GIRLHOOD, 1908–1928. By Kathleen Fitzpatrick. THE HALF‐OPEN DOOR: Sixteen modern Australian women look at professional life and achievement. Edited by Patricia Grimshaw and Lynne Strahan. HELEN PALMER'S OUTLOOK. Edited by Doreen Bridges. THE ETHNIC DIMENSION: Papers on Ethnicity and Pluralism by Jean Martin. Edited by S. Encel. AUSTRIA TO AUSTRALIA: The Autobiography of an Australian Jew from birth to emigration 1904–1938. By Walter Krauss. THE FRENCH IN AUSTRALIA. By Anny P. L. Stuer. COLONIAL CASUALTIES: Chinese in Early Victoria. By Kathryn Cronin. A NEST OF HORNETS: The Massacre of the Fraser Family at Hornet Bank Station, Central Queensland, 1875 and Related Events. By Gordon Reid. BLACK DEATH, WHITE HANDS. By Paul Wilson.AUSTRALIAN ABORIGINES IN THE NEWS. THE OTHER AUSTRALIA: The Crisis in Aboriginal Health. By Peter D. Osborne. SERVICE DELIVERY TO REMOTE COMMUNITIES. Edited by P. Loveday. SERVICE DELIVERY TO OUTSTATIONS. Edited by P. Loveday. SERVICE DELIVERY TO REMOTE COMMUNITIES. Edited by P. Loveday. CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS IN AUSTRALIA. By Chris Chamberlain. OPEN CUT: The working class in an Australian mining town. By Claire Williams. DEMOCRACY IN TRADE UNIONS: Studies in Membership Participation and Control. By Mary Dickenson. FROM SUBSERVIENCE TO STRIKE: Industrial Relations in the Banking Industry. By John Hill. A FRACTURED FEDERATION? AUSTRALIA IN THE 1980s. Edited by Jennifer Alfred and John Wilkes. A LIBERAL NATION: The Liberal Party and Australian Politics. By Marian Simms. STABILITY AND CHANGE IN AUSTRALIAN POLITICS. Second Edition. By Don Aitkin. THREE CORNERED CONTESTS IN SOUTH EAST QUEENSLAND STATE SEATS. By David Hamill and Paul Reynolds. THE TEAM AT THE TOP: Ministers in the Northern Territory. By Patrick Weller and Will Sanders. THE AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM AFTER THE CAMPBELL REPORT. By J. O. N. Perkins. TEACHING HUMAN RIGHTS: An Australian Symposium. Edited by Alice Erh‐Soon Tay in collaboration with Graeme Connolly and Roger Wilkins. STUCK! Unemployed people talk to Michele Turner. By Michele Turner. ASIA–THE WINNING OF INDEPENDENCE. Edited by Robin Jeffrey. LOMBOK: Conquest, Colonization and Underdevelopment, 1870–1940. By Alfons van der Kraan. LAWYER IN THE WILDERNESS. By K. H. Digby. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. By Willy Kraus. WESTERN REPORTS ON THE TAIPING: A selection of documents. By Prescott Clarke and J. S. Gregory. THE ORIGINS OF SOCIALIST THOUGHT IN JAPAN. By John Crump. THE HIRI IN HISTORY: Further Aspects of long distance Motu trade in Central Papua. Edited by Tom Dutton. THE UNION OF CHRISTMAS ISLAND WORKERS. By Les Waters. THE CREATION OF THE ANGLO‐AMERICAN ALLIANCE, 1937–41: A Study in Competitive Cooperation. By David Reynolds. LORD LOTHIAN AND ANGLO‐AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1939–1940. Transactions of the American Philosophical Society held at Philadelphia for Promoting Useful Knowledge, Vol. 73, Part 2, 1983. By David Reynolds. SUPERPOWERS IN COLLISION: The Cold War Now. By Noam Chomsky, Jonathan Steele and John Gittings. CONGRESSMEN, CONSTITUENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS: Determinants of Roll Call Voting in the House of Representatives. By James B. Kau and Paul H. Rubin. A FLANNEL SHIRT AND LIBERTY: British Gentlewomen in the Canadian West, 1880–1914. Edited by Susan Jackel. THE JACOBITE ARMY IN ENGLAND 1745: The Final Campaign. By F. J. McLynn. AUGUSTAN ENGLAND: Professions, State and Society, 1680–1730. By peoffrey Holmes. NEWMAN. By Owen Chadwick. BRITAIN AGAINST ITSELF: The Political Contradictions of Collectivism. By Samuel H. Beer. CROMWELLIAN SCOTLAND 1651–1660. By F. D. Dow. SCOTTISH CULTURE AND SCOTTISH EDUCATION 1800–1980. Edited by Walter M. Humes and Hamish M. Paterson. REBIRTH OF A NATION: Wales 1880–1980. By Kenneth O. Morgan. IRELAND AND SCOTLAND 1600–1850: Parallels and Contrasts in Economic and Social Development. Edited by T. M. Devine and David Dickson. A NEW HISTORY OF IRELAND. III. EARLY MODERN IRELAND, 1534–1691. Edited by T. W. Moody, F. X. Martin and F. J. Byrne. THE MAKING OF THE SANS‐CULOTTES: Democratic ideas and institutions in Paris, 1789–92. By R. B. Rose POLICY AND POLITICS IN FRANCE: Living with Uncertainty. By Douglas E. Ashford. ALPHONSE DE LAMARTINE: A Political Biography. By William Fortescue. NIDROITE NI GAUCHE: L'ideologie fasciste en France. By Zeev Sternhell. FRANCE IN THE 1980s: The Definitive Book. By John Ardagh. THE MAKING OF RUSSIAN ABSOLUTISM, 1613–1801. By Paul Dukes. KHRUSHCHEV. By Roy Medvedev. KHRUSHCHEV AND BREZHNEV AS LEADERS: Building Authority in Soviet Politics. By George W. Breslauer. CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE USSR: A Guide to the Soviet Constitutions. By Aryeh L. Unger. GOD'S PLAYGROUND: A History of Poland. Volume II: 1795 to the Present. By Norman Davies. THE MINANGKABAU RESPONSE TO DUTCH COLONIAL RULE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. By Elizabeth E. Graves. COMINTERN ARMY: The International Brigades and the Spanish Civil War. By R. Dan Richardson. STUDIES ON THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF GAETANO MOSCA: The Theory of the Ruling Class and its Development Abroad. Edited by Ettore A. Albertoni. PEREIASLAV 1654: A Historiographical Study. By John Basarab. EUROPE SINCE HITLER: The Rebirth of Europe. By Walter Lacqueur. THOMAS MORE: History and Providence. By Alistair Fox. MARX AND MARXISM. By Peter Worsley. MAX WEBER. By Frank Parkin. EMILE DURKHEIM. By Kenneth Thompson. THE HISTORY OF MARXISM. Volume One: Marxism in Marx's Day. Edited by Eric J. Hobsbawm. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT THEORY: The Contemporary Debate. By Richard A. Higgott. LEGAL RIGHT AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY: Essays in Legal and Political Philosophy. By Neil MacCormick THE END OF SOCIAL INEQUALITY? Class, Status and Power Under State Socialism. By David Lane. LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR: Political Theory and War Conventions. By Ian Clark MEN AT WAR: Politics, Technology and Innovation in the Twentieth Century. Edited by Timothy Travers and Christon Archer. Chicago, Precedent, 1982. OPEC BEHAVIOR AND WORLD OIL PRICES. Edited by James M. Griffin and David J. Teece. THE CHALLENGE OF ENERGY: Policies in the Making. Edited by Mohammad W. Khouja. ARGUMENTS FOR DEMOCRACY. By Tony Benn. SOCIALISM WITH A HUMAN FACE: The political economy of Britain in the 1980s. By Michael Meacher. BROADCASTING AND SOCIETY 1918–1939. By Mark Pegg. THE HEALTH OF NATIONS: A North‐South Investigation. By Mike Muller. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BIG BUSINESS. By M. A. Utton HOW TO TELL THE LIARS FROM THE STATISTICIANS. By Robert Hooke.

A talk by Anthony Pym in a course in variation in English. - Transcript below: What is diglossia? It's from Greek: di- means two; gloss, the tongue. Two languages. Not to be confused, however, with bilingualism, which is from Latin: bi-, two: lingua, the tongue. Two languages. There is, however, in English social linguistics a systematic difference between the two terms, diglossia and bilingualism. Usually, bilingualism is the capacity of the individual, of a person, to speak one, two, or three—more than one—language, let's say: bilingualism, okay? You could call them polyglots, that's a nice term for describing people, and French and French-inspired social linguistics talks about plurilingualism for the capacity of the individual. Now, diglossia is something quite different. Diglossia is a social situation; it's not concerning individuals, it concerns a society in which there are two languages related in such a way that they have different social functions. Okay? That's diglossia: a social situation; bilingualism, plurilingualism is concerned with the capacities of the individual. Now, a standard definition of diglossia—this is [Charles] Ferguson, 1959—oh, it's long and complicated, but anyway, diglossia is a relatively stable language situation. And that's important; it's not a transitory thing, it's not a bad thing, it's something that we observe occurring over centuries in many parts of the world. So, a situation in which, in addition to the primary dialects of the language, there is a very divergent, highly codified (often grammatically more complex) superposed variety. So we have these two kinds of varieties happening within the same language; one would be spoken—the dialects, etc.—and the other would be learned, standardized, the language of literature. Then he goes on of written literature either of an earlier period or in another speech community, which is learned largely by formal education—so you get to this other one by going to school—and is used for written and formal spoken purposes but is not used by any section of the community for ordinary conversation. So it's easier to understand if you go to Zurich, for example, where you've got people speaking Swiss German in the street and on television, on local television, and then going and studying in standard German and learning to write standard German, and they wouldn't write down their spoken language. These two varieties of the language with different social functions, and they are highly separate. Another classic example would be Arabic in Morocco, where we do have classical Arabic for religious functions, certainly for the King, and then spoken Moroccan Arabic in the street, although Moroccan Arabic does get into the press in that case, okay, So those are cases where the one language has varieties with different social functions. The functions are traditionally called H and L in English. H stands for high, but you don't say high; H stands for the written, official social functions. L stands for the spoken, non-official, vernacular social functions; low, okay. We try to avoid high and low because that was Charles Darwin's mistake, when he talked about the higher species, that led to all sorts of racism and misunderstandings. H and L are there not in the sense of H being superior but of them simply being different. That's why the decision has been made to use H and L as letters rather than as descriptors. Now that's a strict definition of diglossia. There's a more relaxed definition, and that would be when the two varieties in question don't have to belong to the same language, okay? So in parts of the complex society around us here, we find Spanish being used for official functions. Certainly, here, 50 years ago, Spanish would be absolutely the H variety and Catalan would be the L variety. They are different languages—cognate, but different—and yet they would satisfy most non-demanding definitions of diglossia. So that would be the relaxed definition, or the loose definition: the two varieties, two different functions. The varieties don't have to belong to the same language; they can, but they don't have to, okay. I'll point out that now with the standardization of Catalan—so it's become very much the H variety around us here—we find situations where Catalan occupies H functions in official society, certainly Barcelona. Spanish can move to L for many of the immigrant groups and occupy those functions, and then we have another Catalan, which is that of the farmers and the traditional working class, with its many regional varieties, and that's becoming an L as well. So it needn't be just H and L. There can be other languages, or the same language can move into those two positions if, uh, if the society takes on that sort of form. Um, when we— when we use— Catalan linguists don't like the theory of diglossia and the basic reason is this: diglossia sort of accepts asymmetries; it accepts that language is going to have different power relations, and that this is a stable and normal thing. Whereas their fight has long been for Catalan to assume full H functions, and the official language policy in Spain is for all co-official languages to have full H functions. So they want a situation that they call bilingüisme, which is H and H full capacity in everything. Why not? That can happen; there's no law against it. The simple observation in English-language social linguistics is that it needn't happen, that we have long-term stable asymmetries in language functions. So, if you find that you haven't got it, it's not because you're an aberration, it's just because your societies tend to suggest that we can have asymmetric language functions without any disaster befalling anybody. The other thing that, um, that my students will say is that "we don't want our language to have an L function—L means powerless; H means power. Give me power, empower me, make my language big and strong and written and standardized." Which, of course, is what any linguist would do because linguists are the people who do that sort of work. Great work for ourselves, yeah. All right, but be careful. Over history, the languages that die are often those that are in the H position. Look no further than classical Greek or Latin. All the romance languages that we speak had an L function in relation to H-variety Latin. Which one won out over history? The L varieties, not the H. English itself is the result of a diglossic situation where we had Old French in H we had Anglo-Saxon varieties in L. And did H repress L and kill L over time? Quite the opposite. The result, the English that we have is a merger of the two but with a rising influence, I suspect over time, of the L. The L came up and absorbed the H. So it's not true that it's bad, historically, to be in an L position. An L position is close to where the people are and economic activity is and where people vote, after all. In our course we look, of course, at certain things that depend on diglossia. Diglossia is like the basic social situation that sets up the possibility of, for example, a lot of code-switching that we find. And then if you think of the example of Oberwart where, uh, Hungarian and German were in contact we found that the language shift that we saw there was a classic case of what we now know and would call diglossia, where German had the official function, the H functions, Hungarian had the social life, the association with territory over time. And in that particular case, because of the political shift of the village, the H took over and displaced L in that particular situation. There are no fatalities. It's not always bad to be in the L position, and H and L relations in diglossia can continue and be stable for many centuries. That's the lesson, at least, of English social linguistics. You're welcome to find counter-examples.

This bibliography addresses the discourse between Latina/o/xs and various architectural and spatial traditions. In the architectural context of the United States, Latina/o/x communities have struggled to carve a space for themselves, sometimes described as a third, subaltern, or alter/native space. Peoples of Latin American descent have experienced persecution in certain architectural settings, operating in consort with state strategies to stereotype, relegate, and criminalize Latina/o/x bodies. Examples here include the border wall dividing the United States and Mexico, urban development projects that segregate and displace historic populations, prison systems holding disproportionate numbers of minorities, and border facilities designed to control and contain immigrant communities. State-sponsored violence—witnessed historically in public lynchings during the 19th century and police brutality used to suppress the Chicano Movement of the 1960s—has likewise produced a feeling that architectural environments, particularly those in the public sphere, remain out of reach for Latina/o/xs. Yet, the architectural history of Latina/o/xs can be said to precede the formation of the United States by more than a thousand years, particularly if we consider the broader history of architecture in the Americas and the Caribbean. It is a history that reaches back to ancient monumental sites of Indigenous peoples in Mesoamerica, the Andes, Amazon, Caribbean, and US Southwest. It projects forward through Spanish and Portuguese urbanization during the colonial period, including African influences that accompanied the trauma of slavery in the Americas after 1492, and Asian material cultures that followed indentured laborers during the 19th century. It is a history that moves forward through nationalist beaux-arts and neoclassic works of the 19th and early 20th centuries into the international modernist styles of the mid- to late 20th century, associated with notable architects like Luis Barragán of Mexico and Oscar Niemeyer of Brazil, among many others. Those architects of the modern era produced spaces that would include multiple publics in a bid to rethink national identities in places like Brazil, Cuba, and Mexico. Haunted by the socio-racial and gendered hierarchies of the colonial era, modern architects strove toward utopic decolonial solutions in the built environment. We might productively place Latina/o/x architecture within those histories of the wider hemisphere, as a facet of that striving toward a decolonial future. There are political, cultural, and historical reasons, however, to study Latina/o/x architecture on its own terms. To do so requires us to critically assess the limits of categories like "Latin American" and "Latina/o/x," which are often confused, disputed, and in flux. These categories impossibly encompass huge and diverse populations. The term "Latin American" attempts to define peoples and cultures across the Spanish-, French-, and Portuguese-speaking Americas and Caribbean, while "Latina/o/x" describes members of the Latin American diaspora, particularly in the United States. Within these shifting terms of inclusion and exclusion, Latin American architecture has received notably more attention in scholarly literature, to the detriment of Latina/o/x contributions. This is, in part, because of historic discrimination faced by immigrants from Latin America in the United States and elsewhere. It also reveals a lacuna in histories of architecture more broadly, and the practice of architecture itself, which has tended to be dominated by heteronormative, white, Anglo-male norms and narratives. In the early 21st century, Latina/o/xs account for less than 10 percent of registered architects in the United States according to the American Institute of Architects (AIA). Nonetheless, with a population at nearly 40 million, Latina/o/xs are the largest minority group in the United States, projected to comprise a quarter of the population by the year 2050. The lack of representation in the field of architecture, compared to demographic realities, makes clear why the study of Latina/o/x architecture is of critical importance. The following bibliography works against social and historical factors that would ignore or erase Latina/o/xs from architectural discourse. This bibliography will focus on major works of scholarship that discuss Latina/o/xs as both users and producers of architecture. Special attention is paid to the ethnic and cultural diversity of Latina/o/x architecture, from the largest historic populations of Mexico, Puerto Rico, and Cuba to the vernacular building practices and decolonial aesthetics of an increasingly transcultural and transregional Latina/o/x population.

Book reviewed in this article:1988 AND ALL THAT: New Views of Australia's Past Edited by George Shaw.AUSTRALIAN DICTIONARY OF AUSTRALIA: Volume 11:1891–1939 Nes‐Smi General Editor, Geoffrey Serle.GIPPS‐LA TROBE CORRESPONDENCE 1839–1846 Edited by A. G. L. Shaw.CONSTRUCTING CAPITALISM: An Economic History of Eastern Australia 1788–1901 By Andrew Wells.SEX & SECRETS: Crimes Involving Australian Women Since 1800 By Judith A. Allen.FEDERATION FATHERS By L. F. Crisp, edited by John Hart, with a foreword by Professor Manning Clark.ENEMY ALIENS: Internment and the Homefront Experience in Australia 1914–1920 Gerhard Fischer.THE SECRET ARMY AND THE PREMIER: Conservative Paramilitary Organisations in New South Wales 1930–1932 By Andrew Moore.DEFENDING THE NATIONAL TUCKSHOP: Australia's Secret Army Intrigue of 1931 Michael CathcartTHE BLACK DIGGERS: Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders in the Second World War By Robert A. Hall.THE SHADOW'S EDGE: Australia's Northern War Alan Powell.DIVISION OF LABOUR: Industrial Relations in the Chifley Years, 1945–1949 By Tom Sheridan.MANAGING GENDER: The State, The New Middle Class and Women Workers 1830–1930 By Desley Deacon.NATION: The Life of an Independent Journal of Opinion 1958–1972 Edited by K. S. Inglis.THE PREMIERS OF QUEENSLAND Edited by Denis Murphy, Roger Joyce and Margaret Cribb.LABOR IN QUEENSLAND FROM THE 1880s TO 1988 By Ross Fitzgerald and Harold Thornton.CORRUPTION AND REFORM: The Fitzgerald Vision Edited by Scott Prasser, Roe Wear and John Nethercote.THE HAWKE‐KEATING HUACK: The ALP in Transition By Dean Jaensch.SEVENTEENTH CENTURY EUROPE: State, Conflict and the Social Order in Europe 1598–1700 By Thomas Munck.EIGHTEENTH CENTURY EUROPE 1700–1789 By Jeremy Black.NAVIES AND ARMIES: The Anglo‐Dutch Relationship in War and Peace 1688–1988 Edited by G. J. A. Raven & N.A.M. Rodger.SOCIALISM, RADICALISM, AND NOSTALGIA: Social Criticism in Britain, 1775–1830 By William Stafford.GOOD GIRLS MAKE GOOD WIVES: Guidance for Girls in Victorian Fiction By Judith Rowbotham.DEMOCRACY AND RELIGION: Gladstone and the Liberal Party 1867–1875 By J. P. Parry.RULING PERFORMANCE: British Governments from Attlee to Thatcher Edited by Peter Hennessy and Anthony Seldon.BRITISH GENERAL ELECTIONS SINCE 1945 By David Butler.CONSERVATIVE PARTY CONFERENCES: The Hidden System By Richard N. Kelly.THATCHERISM Edited by Robert Skidelsky.BRITISH DEFENCE SINCE 1945 By Michael Dockrill.THE DYNAMICS OF CULTURAL NATIONALISM: The Gaelic Revival and the Creation of the Irish Nation State By John Hutchinson.THE REVOLUTIONARY CAREER OF MAXIMILIAN ROBESPIERRE By David P. Jordan.GLASNOST IN ACTION: Cultural Renaissance in Russia By Alec Nove. BostonFEDERALISM AND EUROPEAN UNION: Political Ideas, Influences and Strategies in the European Community By Michael Burgess.THE FRENCH PRESENCE IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC, 1842–1940 By Robert Aldrich.NO LONGER AN AMERICAN LAKE? Edited by John Ravenhill.LAND, POWER AND PEOPLE: Rural Elite in Transition, 1801–1970 By Rajendra Singh.POLITICS OF TERRORISM: The Sri Lanka Experience By Sinha Ratnatunga.THAILAND AND THE UNITED STATES By Robert J. Muscat.THE ROAD TO MADIUN: THE INDONESIAN COMMUNIST UPRISING OF 1948 By Ann Swift.FROM CLASS TO CULTURE: Social Conscience in Malay Novels Since Independence By David J. Banks.BASIC PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW IN CHINA Edited by William C. Jones.HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: National and International Dimensions By Ann Kent.THE BLIGHTED BLOSSOM By Roy Thomas.THE DEFICIT AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: The Search For Responsible Budgeting in the 1980s By Joseph White and Aaron Wildavsky.NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE: An International Review of Achievements and Prospects Edited by Adrian Leftwich.THE STATE By John A. Hall and G. John Ikenberry.MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY Edited by Geoffrey Marshall.FOREIGN POLICY AND LEGISLATURES: An Analysis of Seven Parliaments Edited by Manohar L. SondhiINTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: The Johnson Presidency By David M. Welborn and Jesse Burkhead.DEMOCRACY AND THE WELFARE STATE: Studies from the Project on the Federal Social Role Edited by Amy Gutmann.POLITICAL THEORY AND THE MODERN STATE: Essays on State, Power and Democracy By David Held.GOVERNING FEDERATIONS: Constitution, Politics, Resources Edited by Michael Wood, Christopher Williams and Campbell Sharman.NETWORKS OF POWER: Organisational Actors at the National, Corporate, and Community Levels Robert Perrucci and Harry R. Potter, eds.HOW TO BECOME PRIME MINISTER By Barry Cohen.VICTORIAN LIBERALISM: Nineteenth‐Century Political Thought and Practice Edited by Richard Bellamy.SIMONE WEIL: Utopian Pessimist By David McLellan.POLITICS FOR A RATIONAL LEFT: Political Writing 1977–1988 By Eric Hobsbawm.ARGUING FOR SOCIALISM: Theoretical Considerations By Andrew Levine.ARGUING FOR EQUALITY By John Baker.POLITICS, INNOCENCE AND THE LIMITS OF GOODNESS By Peter Johnson.COLONIALISM, TRADITION AND REFORM: An Analysis of Gandhi's Political Discourse By Bhikhu Parekh.THE ANALYSIS OF IDEOLOGY By Raymond Boudon. Translated by Malcolm Slater.THE PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE OF MODERNITY: Twelve Lectures By Jürgen Habermas.THE NATURE OF HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE By Michael Stanford.THE NATURE OF HISTORY By Arthur Marwick.

Dottorato di ricerca in Storia d'Europa: società, istituzioni e sistemi politici europei,19.-20. secolo ; Per comprendere appieno come sia nata la proposta francese di una Comunità Europea di Difesa (CED) rivolta ai paesi dell'Europa occidentale, è necessario ricostruire il quadro storico alla fine della seconda guerra mondiale, con particolare riferimento ai rapporti tra le potenze alleate e al nuovo assetto territoriale della Germania. Il primo capitolo analizza le decisioni del secondo dopoguerra (a partire dall'accordo franco-sovietico di Mosca del dicembre 1944 in funzione anti-tedesca) tese a garantire la demilitarizzazione tedesca fino al mutamento strategico conseguente alla contrapposizione tra il blocco occidentale e l'Unione sovietica: lo scopo centrale di questa parte del testo è di analizzarne il punto di svolta, con l'inversione dell'atteggiamento alleato nei riguardi della Germania sconfitta. L'intera ricerca si poggia su un'analisi di tipo storiografico, sia di storia delle istituzioni che delle relazioni internazionali, che vuole mettere alla prova comparata delle fonti d'archivio americane e francesi (con particolare riferimento ai fondi transalpini solo ora disponibili alla consultazione, a 60 anni dalla conclusione della vicenda CED) le principali tesi prodotte dalla letteratura sul riarmo della Germania e sull'esercito europeo. Si descrive quindi il processo decisionale che autorizzò, da parte degli Stati Uniti, della Francia e della Gran Bretagna durante la Conferenza di Londra, l'utilizzo delle risorse economiche e industriali della Germania occidentale occupata per il consolidamento dello sforzo difensivo atlantico; attraverso l'esame di fonti primarie transalpine è stata inoltre analizzata la percezione, da parte francese, del contrasto in atto tra i due dicasteri americani degli Esteri e della Difesa in merito al possibile concorso tedesco alle forze di difesa, con le proposte che filtravano dall'alto commissario statunitense Mc Cloy e dal suo staff. Le proposte lanciate dalla tribuna dell'Assemblea consultiva del Consiglio d'Europa, prima da Bidault e poi da Churchill in merito alla necessità di creare un esercito europeo, mettevano quindi in luce un cambiamento decisivo negli obiettivi strategici delle potenze occidentali: fino allo scoppio della guerra di Corea la preoccupazione maggiore nello scacchiere europeo era d'impedire che la Germania potesse riguadagnare uno status tale da minacciare la pace nel mondo; dopo l'apertura delle ostilità nel lontano continente asiatico, l'attenzione dei governi 2 dell'alleanza atlantica si era focalizzata sulle modalità per accrescere l'apparato difensivo atlantico nell'Europa continentale, per far fronte alla minaccia sovietica. Alcuni Stati, come la Francia e gli altri paesi occidentali che avevano subito in passato le invasioni delle armate tedesche, continuavano però a percepire come maggiormente attuale il pericolo di una rinascita della potenza militare ed economica della Germania, se pur divisa: queste le due visioni destinate a determinare un confronto molto aspro tra i principali alleati atlantici durante l'estate e l'autunno del 1950, che portò alla formulazione di due distinti e contrapposti piani di riarmo della Germania Occidentale. Nel secondo e nel terzo capitolo si descrivono conseguentemente, anche mediante una revisione completa e approfondita della letteratura scientifica al riguardo, i due distinti piani di riarmo, successivi cronologicamente e legati da un rapporto di causa ed effetto: l'evoluzione della posizione dell'amministrazione Truman, a partire dalle due diverse proposte del Pentagono e della Segreteria di Stato sulla politica nei confronti della Germania, per arrivare poi alla decisione finale di presentare un piano denominato "one package" agli alleati francesi e inglesi a New York il 12 settembre 1950; questa proposta del segretario di Stato Acheson ebbe come conseguenza un periodo di profonda riflessione nell'esecutivo francese, che portò alla formulazione del "piano Pleven" per la creazione di un esercito europeo. L'obiettivo di questi due capitoli centrali è quindi di mostrare prima come le mutate condizioni strategiche avessero condotto l'amministrazione Truman a chiedere agli alleati atlantici un poderoso rafforzamento del dispositivo militare in Europa che comprendesse anche forze militari tedesche e poi evidenziare che solo in reazione a questo piano americano, non quindi per un'autonoma volontà politica, il governo francese avesse elaborato una contro-proposta, che sarebbe stata la base da cui elaborare l'esercito europeo e la sovrastruttura istituzionale destinata a garantirne il funzionamento, la Comunità europea di Difesa. Il quarto e ultimo capitolo è dedicato interamente alla ricostruzione delle trattative diplomatiche che portarono alla firma del trattato CED, mediante il confronto sistematico dei principali fondi francesi e americani: partendo dall'analisi dei rigurgiti isolazionisti negli USA, si descrivono prima i lavori della Conferenza di Parigi con la stesura del Rapport Intérimaire e poi le attività della Conferenza per l'organizzazione di una Comunità europea di Difesa fino alla firma del trattato CED del 27 maggio 1952; la stesura del capitolo rende conto anche dell'importanza di alcune figure fondamentali (come i diplomatici McCloy e Bruce o come Eisenhower, nella duplice veste di Comandante supremo atlantico e poi di presidente) o di alcuni snodi determinanti, come la svolta federalista della delegazione italiana alla Conferenza. 3 Questo lavoro di ricerca sulla Comunità europea di Difesa vuole quindi ripercorrere una vicenda fondamentale per la nascita delle istituzioni europee, dalle sue origini radicate al termine del secondo conflitto mondiale e fino alla firma del trattato di Parigi, che sembra di profonda attualità nell'attuale dibattito sulla cessione di sovranità dagli Stati nazionali all'Unione europea, nel campo della Difesa e della politica estera. Il confronto tra i fondi americani e francesi, in particolare quelli di recente apertura alla consultazione dei ricercatori, ha permesso di aggiungere alcuni elementi di originalità alla descrizione del processo di riarmo della Germania e delle trattative tra gli alleati per la nascita dell'esercito europeo. ; The Second World War ended with an onerous legacy for the European Continent: the conflict has brought damage, poverty and the spectre of a new fight between Western countries and the Soviet Union. In that period, the USSR maintained the mobilization of the Armed Forces while the Russian soldiers were settled in Germany. This opposition has divided post-war Europe into two different blocs or coalitions: on the one hand Western Europe countries, which were starting a difficult recovery assisted by American aid, and on the other hand Eastern Europe under Soviet hegemony. In this complex scenario, the German role became increasingly central. Within this historical background, the first important attempt to build a European policy was focused on common defence, through the Treaty instituting the European Defence Community (EDC). In the light of this premise, the EDC affair seems paradigmatic for the analysis of the European dawn: on one side the founding fathers have looked for a solution to the divisions in the continent, but on the other side national self-interests have affected the path for ratifying the EDC Treaty, till the French refusal to ratify, by the French Assembly on 1954, August 30th. The aim of my Doctoral Research Thesis is divided in four different chapters: - in the first one, the object is related to the study and the description of the German role in post-war Europe and its rearmament, from the end of WWII to the mid 1950s, when the United States urged Western allies to use the German industrial and military potential; - secondly, the American proposal called 'one package', presented by Acheson on September 1950, is illustrated with regard to the existing international literature and primary sources; 2 - the third chapter deals with the French proposal to control German rearmament, the 'Pleven Plan', and the Petersberg talks; - finally, the agenda and the deliberations of the Paris Conference regarding the EDC, which started the 15th February 1951 up to 27th May 1952, when the EDC Treaty was signed. I am also researching an original aspect in my thesis, with regard to the state of the art in EDC studies: a synchronic comparison of EDC events in France and the USA based on the original documents preserved in different Archives in the United States and in France: in the recent past, 60 years after the "defeat" of the EDC, other primary sources were declassified, mostly in Paris. The research has focused on the studies that put this issue in the perspective of historiography. Several French works about the EDC could be cited, such as the texts by Clesse A.(Le projet de C.E.D. du Plan Pleven au "crime du 30 août. Histoire d'un malentendu européen, 1989), by Aron R., Lerner D. eds. (La querelle de la C.E.D. essais d'analyse sociologique, 1956), by Moch J. (Histoire du réarmement allemand depuis 1950, 1965), by Fabre-Luce A. (Lettre sur la CED, 1954) and the essays by Vial P. (Redécouvrir la CED, 1992), by Poidevin R. (La France devant le problème de la CED: incidences nationales et internationales - été 1951 à été 1953, 1983), by Guillen P. (Les chefs militaires français, le réarmement de l'Allemagne et la CED 1950-1954, 1983), by Vaïsse M. (Le général de Gaulle et la défense de l'Europe, 1947-1958, 1992), by Rioux J. P. (L'opinion publique française et la CED: querelle partisane ou bataille de la mémoire?, 1994). With regard to Italian works, studies which stand out for their significance are the studies by Preda D. (Storia di una speranza: la battaglia per la CED e la Federazione europea nelle carte della Delegazione italiana 1950-1952, 1990), by Preda D. (Sulla soglia dell'Unione: la vicenda della Comunità Politica Europea 1952-1954, 1994), by Ballini P. L. ed. (La Comunità Europea di Difesa (CED), 2009), by Bertozzi S. (La Comunità Europea di Difesa. Profili storici, istituzionali e giuridici, 2003), by Caviglia D., Gionfrida A. (Un'occasione da perdere. Le Forze Armate italiane e la Comunità Europea di Difesa 1950-54, 2009). Finally, a series of American and British studies concerning the European Defence Community and the "German question" were appraised, such as the works by Fursdon E. (The European Defence Community: a history, 1980), by Ruane K. (The Rise and Fall of the European Defence Community, Anglo-American Relations and the crisis of European Defence 1950-55, 2000), by Lundestad G. (Empire by integration: The U.S. and European Integration, 1945-1997, 1998) by Armitage D. T. jr. (A comparative analysis of U.S. policy toward European defense autonomy. Enduring 3 Dilemmas in Transatlantic Relations, 2008), by Risso L. (Divided we stand: the French and Italian political parties and the rearmament of West Germany 1949-1955, 2007), by Hunter R. E. (The European Security and Defence Policy, NATO's Companion – or Competitor?, 2002), by Hitchcock, W. I. (France restored: Cold War diplomacy and the quest for leadership in Europe, 1944-1954, 1998), by McAllister, J. (No Exit: America and the German problem, 1943-1954, 2002). With regards to the methodology, the research has been conducted following the comparative approach as described by Bloch M. (Pour une histoire comparée des sociétés européennes, 1923), by Braudel F. (Civiltà e imperi del Mediterraneo nell'età di Filippo II, 1976), by Haupt H. G. (European History as Comparative History, 2004 and Comparative History – a Contested Method, 2007).

The appearance of book science as an autonomous discipline of science can be traced back in Eastern Europe to the beginnings of the 19th century. It was evolving from bibliography, history of literature, editorial, bookselling and library activities and practice, and from educational needs. Its further growth has been enhanced by the rapid increase of book world, institutional and professional developments in book culture, and realization of a multitude of benefits arising from bibliological studies. The latter could have been identified in the field of science, development of ideas, social and political relations. Initially, theoretical background of East European bibliology was influenced by Western European concepts, particularly French and German. Afterwards, however, original concepts and specific approaches to book science have been developed in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine, followed by other countries. There has been a significant degree of unification observed in views and thoughts about book and book science, resultant from the largely common past of book culture in Eastern Europe, shared historical experience, political, language and religious situation, and fairly continuous exchange of scientific ideas. Nevertheless, local circumstances related to dissimilar traditions in book studies, variable influence of ideology and politics, uneven potential of scientific communities, and uneven recognition of the discipline in different countries, have left their clear imprint too. Their result is the variety of research paradigms, different focus points in book studies, and the development of various research schools, some of them specific for certain countries. The notion of 'national research schools', present in the science about science, was introduced by Robert Estivals, who wrote in the encyclopaedia Les sciences de l'écrit (1993): "The French school of bibliology is undoubtedly one the most important schools, besides the Belgian, Polish, Russian, and Swiss one. They are so much unlike the Anglo-saxon school, which tends to brings bibliography and bibliology together, that one may speak about the continental European bibliological school, different from English and North American concepts". The essence of a national research school usually shows through a larger number of variables considered, convincing facts and evidence, but it also involves a certain degree of subjectivity, so that proper explanation is only achieved after considering opinions and emotions as well. In addition, the perception of research schools varies depending on the observer, whether from inside, through the eyes of representatives or supporters, or from outside. In the former case, there is a trend towards emphasizing differences in fundamental views about a given discipline or research direction. Consequently, different criteria of school identification are used (e.g. narrower subjects, influential persons or institutions), and the number of schools appears to grow. In the latter, though, a trend towards generalization and synthesis at broader spatial and temporal scales prevails. Breakthrough events in the development of national research schools in Eastern Europe include the origin and re-establishment of independent states after the World War I (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Czechoslovakia), and later the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991, when Baltic states, Byelorussia and Ukraine have become independent, and substantial political and social changes occurred in all countries formerly belonging to the communist block. The characteristic features of book science in Eastern European countries – before and later after the World War II – appear to include the following: 1. focus on the history and present-day of own national cultures as a part of a wider framework of bibliological studies; 2. intensive theoretical research on book as a means of communication and as a cultural factor; 3. construction of numerous theoretical and methodological models of bibliology; 4. extensive development of historical studies, focused on the history of book culture;5. close links between bibliological studies and other disciplines;6. application of bibliological theory and history in the shaping of ontemporary book system. ; Uniwersytet Wrocùawski, Instytut Informacji Naukowej i BibliotekoznawstwaPl. Uniwersytecki 9/13, 50-137 Wrocùaw, PolandE-mail: kmigon@liber.ibi.uni.wroc.plKnygotyra kaip savarankiška mokslo disciplina Rytų Europoje pasirodė XIX amžiaus pradžioje. Ji rutuliojosi iš bibliografijos, literatūros istorijos, redaktorių, knygų prekiautojų bei bibliotekų patirties ir tenkino švietimo poreikius. Tolesnį jos augimą spartino knygų pasaulio plėtra, knygos kultūros institucinis ir profesinis augimas, bibliologinių studijų įvairiopos naudos supratimas. Pastaroji siejosi su mokslo, idėjų raidos, socialinių ir politinių santykių sritimis.Iš pradžių teoriniai Rytų Europos knygotyros pagrindai rėmėsi Vakarų Europoje, ypač Prancūzijoje ir Vokietijoje, gyvavusiomis koncepcijomis. Tačiau vėliau Lenkijoje, Rusijoje ir Ukrainoje, o netrukus ir kitose šalyse atsirado originalios knygotyros koncepcijos ir specialūs tyrimo metodai.Kadangi Rytų Europos knygos kultūra daugiausia buvo bendras paveldas, taip pat dėl bendros istorinės ir kalbinės patirties, religinės situacijos ir gana pastovių mokslo idėjų mainų visoms šio regiono šalims būdingas tam tikras knygos ir knygotyros mokslo idėjų bendrumas. Vis dėlto vietinės sąlygos, skirtingos knygos studijų tradicijos, nevienoda ideologijos ir politikos įtaka, mokslo bendruomenių potencialo netolygumas ir disciplinos pripažinimo laipsnis taip pat paliko aiškų pėdsaką. Dėl to atsirado įvairios tyrimų paradigmos, skirtingi knygotyros tyrimų aspektai, išsiplėtojo nemaža mokslo mokyklų.Robert'as Estivals'is į mokslotyrą įtraukė nacionalinių mokslo mokyklų sąvoką. Enciklopedijoje Les sciences de l'écrit (1993) jis rašė: "Prancūziškoji bibliologijos mokykla šalia belgiškosios, lenkiškosios ir šveicariškosios yra, be abejo, pati svarbiausia. Jos labai nepanašios į anglų saksų mokyklą, kuriai būdinga sulieti bibliografiją ir bibliologiją, tad galima kalbėti apie kontinentinę bibliologijos mokyklą, skirtingą nuo Anglijos ir Šiaurės Amerikos koncepcijų". Nacionalinių mokyklų esmė dažniausiai išryškėja iš daugelio akivaizdžių požymių, įtikinamų faktų ir liudijimų, tačiau išskiriant mokyklas pasireiškia ir tam tikras subjektyvumas. Taigi tik pasvėrus nuostatas ir nusiteikimus, suformuluojami tam tikri apibrėžimai. Be to, mokslo mokyklų suvokimas skiriasi pagal stebėtojo padėtį – ar jis stebi mokyklą iš vidaus kaip jos atstovas ir gynėjas, ar iš išorės. Pirmuoju atveju linkstama pabrėžti fundamentalių tam tikros disciplinos ar tyrimų krypties sampratų skirtumus. Dėl to mokykloms identifikuoti naudojami skirtingi kriterijai (pavyzdžiui, siauros temos, įtakingi asmenys ar institucijos) ir atrodo, kad mokyklų daugėja. Antruoju atveju vyrauja apibendrinimo, platesnio erdvinio ir chronologinio masto sintezės tendencijos.Rytų Europos nacionalinių mokslo mokyklų plėtros proveržis įvyko po Pirmojo pasaulinio karo, kai susikūrė (ar atsikūrė) nepriklausomos valstybės (Lietuva, Latvija, Estija, Lenkija, Čekoslovakija), ir sugriuvus Sovietų Sąjungai, kai 1991 m. Baltijos valstybės, Baltarusija ir Ukraina tapo nepriklausomos. Tuo laikotarpiu visose buvusio komunistinio bloko šalyse įvyko esminių politinių ir socialinių pokyčių. Prieš Antrąjį pasaulinį karą ir po jo Rytų Europos šalių knygotyrą apibūdina šie bruožai: dėmesys telkiamas į savo nacionalinės kultūros istoriją ir dabartį, kaip platesnių bibliologinių studijų sudedamąją dalį; intensyvus teorinis knygos kaip komunikacijos priemonės ir kultūros veiksnio, tyrimas; konstruojama daug ir įvairių teorinių ir metodologinių bibliologijos modelių; atliekami platūs istoriniai knygos kultūros istorijos tyrimai; mezgami glaudūs ryšiai tarp bibliologijos studijų ir kitų disciplinų, bibliologijos teorija ir istorija taikoma formuojant šiuolaikinę knygos sistemą.