It's been 64 years since the European Coal and Steel Community was created, or 58 years from the creation of the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community. This process of economic and political integration is unprecedented in modern history and represents a major challenge for contemporary concepts of the EU management system. Ways of the policy management and the depth of integration inside EU have changed dramatically since the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, while the Lisbon Treaty continued integration and maybe announced two opposite processes-deeper integration and the transfer of powers from member states to the EU level, and the overall crisis of EU, especially in light of the institutional and economic crisis. The main question that this paper addresses is whether the developments in recent years have consolidated EU or they have weakened it, or whether these events are part of the solution to the institutional crisis or its cause and if they weakened it, what level of management is formed in EU. The general assumption is that the main indicators of the overall institutional crisis in the EU are: 1. Difficulties in reaching a consensus on the issues of EU development and strengthening of the role of large Member States, 2. Poor representational capacity of the Commission, and 3. The loss of legitimacy in the functioning of the Union. The main way in which this analysis is conducted is a collision of two opposite concepts of policy management in EU, which are seen as a structural causes of the crisis in EU: country-centric policy management, which relies on a theory of liberal institutionalism and the Community method, and then we analyze the main settings of both theories by observing processes in the conduct of policies at various levels in EU. European integration was firstly built on the premise that member states will voluntarily deepen their relationships beyond the initial trade relations in order to establish a common political and social goals, and the integration process has proved to be a good recipe for survival of larger and smaller countries in EU. The Lisbon Treaty placed member states at the heart of European integration primarily through their role in the Council of Ministers, and their national parliaments were given special rights with regard to monitoring the principle of subsidiarity. The influence of member states is evident the most in the European Council, as the leading institution of EU, and the Council of Ministers, and the most important difference in the functioning of the EU member states and their behavior lies in the acronym QMV or a Qualified Majority Voting institute, which sets diplomacy and executive power in a completely new context. With the expansion of EU to 28 member states, the rules have changed, creating new coalitions, a new weight and balance of power and the creation of national interests. New members do not have much experience like the old EU member states, and many of them disagree with supranational tradition in EU. Many do not feel quite at ease because of the structure of power in EU and existing coalitions. The old coalitions are changing and some traditional such as Berlin-Paris axis are slowly dying. We have demonstrated the structural causes of the institutional crisis in EU through the two opposing concepts of the EU system management, the intergovernmental method of governance and supranational management methods. The third management method that has been more and more evident since the mid-nineties of the 20th century, is a system of multilevel governance, that combines the previous two. Such a hybrid control mode hides structural causes of the institutional crisis in EU because the differences between the two main methods of management of the EU system are gradually turning them into contradiction. When we talk about low-representational capacity, we can see that this is a consequence of the predominant role of the member states and a conferred jurisdiction. On the one hand, the national governments are monitoring the executive powers of the Commission, and on the other side after the establishment of a comitology procedure, the Council and the national governments have become part of the whole process. It seems that through this procedure, member states have full control over the Commission, but for them it is much harder to control it in areas where the Commission has exclusive power, for example in the area of competition, state aid, agriculture, trade policy and the internal market. At first glance, it appears that COREPER, yet another modern institution, serves as a meeting of diplomats of the EU member states and which prepares meetings of the Council. However, a deeper analysis of the role of COREPER suggests that it is evident that it is the main decision-making body in EU, which is used for communication with the EU member states. In this sense, the COREPER has evolved from a simple intergovernmental body, informal in its nature, to a de facto decision-maker. Although the original role of COREPER was to prepare the meetings of the Council, the development of these institutions is one of the unrecorded cases of the evolution of institutions in EU. In other words, much of the power, and undefined powers have been transferred into the hands of the Permanent Representatives of the Member States. When we talk about democratic legitimacy in the functioning of the EU, we must bear in mind that this legitimacy has not received specific place in the constitutional structure of the EU. Far greater importance is given to the principle of the rule of law, and a double-line of democratic legitimacy tells us that the EU is not based so much on the role of citizens of the Union, from which it should derive its legitimacy, but that it is based on the treaties between its member states. This dual line is expressed at the institutional level in elections for the European Parliament, which are the only way of voting for policy makers at the EU level. This second line of democratic legitimacy is far more significant, and elections for the European Parliament are second-rate. The only power the Parliament reflects in the influence in EU, is the composition of the Commission. We must also say that the democratic principle in the Lisbon Treaty replaced the principle of democracy, and instead it was replaced by the primacy of them the transparency, representativeness, public debate and flexibility. The executive power has been predominant in EU since its creation, which produced huge consequences at a European level especially with regard to the management and the legitimacy of the institutions of the EU, but also at the national level because of the large transfer of competences to EU. In addition, we must add the conceptual diversity or heterogenity of European political demos because it is not one nation, but nations, and thus the logical question of how EU can submit diversity in light of the current institutional crisis. The legitimacy of EU is measured primarily through benefits of integration, represented by the concept of output rather than input-and, what is at the root of the entire crisis, is the fact that EU citizens simply do not base their relationship with the EU institutions on previous confidence but the expected benefits instead. This leads directly to the EU civil clientelism, rather than democracy, a concept that will only temporarily, or situationally determine the functioning of EU, because it is not a permanent solution. ; Prošle su 64 godine od kada je stvorena Evropska zajednica za ugalj i čelik, odnosno 58 godina od stvaranja Evropske ekonomske zajednice i Evropske zajednice za atomsku energiju. Ovaj proces ekonomske i političke integracije je bez presedana u modernoj istoriji i predstavlja veliki izazov za savremene koncepte upravljanja sistemom EU. Načini vođenja politika i dubina integracije u EU su se dramatično promenili još od usvajanja Ugovora iz Mastrihta, dok je Lisabonski ugovor nastavio procese integracije i možda najavio dva suprotna procesa-dublju integraciju i prenošenje nadležnosti sa država članica na nivo EU, i sveukupnu krizu EU, naročito u svetlu institucionalne i ekonomske krize. Glavno pitanje kojim se rad bavi je da li su dešavanja proteklih godina konsolidovala EU ili su je oslabila, odnosno da li su ta dešavanja deo rešenja postojeće institucionalne krize ili su njen uzrok i ako su je oslabila, kakav nivo upravljanja se formira u EU. Opšta pretpostavka je da su glavni pokazatelji sveukupne institucionalne krize u EU oličeni u: 1. Teškoćama prilikom postizanja konsenzusa o najvažnijim pitanjima razvoja EU i jačanju uloge velikih država članica, 2. Slabom predstavljačkom kapacitetu Komisije, i 3. Gubitku legitimiteta u funkcionisanju Unije. Osnovni način na koji će se ova analiza sprovesti je sudaranje dva suprotstavljena koncepta upravljanja politikama u EU, koji su prepoznati kao strukturni uzroci krize u EU-državo-centričkog načina upravljanja politikama, koji se oslanja na teoriju liberalnog institucionalizma i metoda Zajednice, a zatim ćemo analizirati glavne postavke obe teorije posmatrajući procese u vođenju politika na različitim nivoima u EU.
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The European Commission recently delivered on its promise to bring enlargement back into the limelight. On March 12, it recommended opening accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina and put forward draft negotiating frameworks for Ukraine and Moldova. The three countries checked off another significant (if yet symbolic) step on their respective paths towards EU membership, receiving approval from EU leaders at their meeting on March 21-22. The day before, the Commission also adopted the Communication on proposed pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews. Unlike the (justified) fanfare around Bosnia and Herzegovina's green light for membership talks, this document received little to no attention. However, according to the Commission it marks the start of the policy review process on internal EU reforms needed for enlargement. So how does the Commission plan to prepare for a larger and stronger union? Values remain fundamentalAs laid down in Article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union, the EU is founded on the respect for democratic principles, rule of law, and fundamental rights. Welcoming new member states therefore requires ensuring these values can continue being upheld throughout the Union. With the revised enlargement methodology from 2020, the Commission already put rule of law at the center of the accession process. Under this approach, new candidate countries must open and close their membership negotiations with the fundamentals cluster. This enables continued monitoring of progress and the ability to address backsliding in democratic norms and values throughout the negotiations. In last year's State of the Union Speech, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced the integration of candidate countries who are further along in their accession process into the annual Rule of Law Reports. This would provide an added tool for steering dialogue on the necessary reforms, if assessments are effectively integrated into the country progress reports, as well as a smoother administrative transition once they become full-fledged members. The EU, however, continues to have its fair share of difficulties fostering democratic resilience even among its current members. Since joining the EU, the bloc has seen democratic backsliding in Hungary and Poland. Most recently the Slovakian government also proposed worrisome legislation that would curtail freedom of expression, media freedom and protection of civic space. The key to protecting the rule of law after enlargement therefore does not only lie in "deep-rooted" transformations in candidate countries, but also in reforming the EU's internal approach for protecting its fundamental values and democratic principles. The EU has been struggling in this area with 27 members. Without concrete steps, it could struggle even more with over 30 members in the future. Resilience is crucial to safeguard democratic norms. The upcoming policy reviews should therefore not only focus on reinforcing a corrective and punitive rule-of-law mechanism. But also on how to strengthen the proactive measures, such as the Rule of Law Toolbox and support for democratic civic actors in member states, to effectively protect from democratic backsliding. Managing EU PoliciesBringing new countries into the mix will inevitably affect the benefits and functioning of several EU policies. While some policy reforms will be straightforward, others will be tougher to crack. The EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is a good example of the challenging reforms the future enlargement will bring. In the case of the CAP, the key will be successfully integrating Ukraine, which is among the top agricultural producers in the world, while ensuring a level-playing field between current and new members. Under the current CAP subsidy scheme, Ukraine would receive €85 billion in agriculture subsidies after joining the EU. This would result in a 20% cut of funds for current member states. Ukrainian agricultural imports are already testing the EU's unity and solidarity with the country. With vested interests of several member states, such as France and Poland, and big agribusiness stakeholders as well as recent pressures from farmers protesting across Europe, one can already picture more convoys of tractors rolling down the streets of European capitals. The CAP–although the most prominent–represents only one of the several difficult policies that will need to be substantially changed ahead of future enlargement. Another uphill battle will be reforming the cohesion policy and the EU budget. While the Commission is a well-oiled machine when it comes to drafting new policy proposals, the negotiations that follow among EU institutions can often be long, arduous, and highly politicized. These announced policy reviews by the Commission are only the beginning and will show the extent of reforms the EU will need to undertake.Gradual Access to the Single Market?The proposed policy reviews will also factor into gradual access to the Single Market for candidate countries. Western Balkan candidate countries have long been arguing for such an approach. The tangible economic benefits from access to certain areas of the Single Market would mitigate the public dissatisfaction with the speed and credibility of the enlargement process. This approach regained attention with the revived enlargement momentum after Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Since then, EU leaders have agreed on the need to "further advance gradual integration" in the European Council conclusions from June 2022. The Commission's proposal is, however, the first formal attempt to assess the feasibility of rolling out gradual access to the Single Market. While a positive development, more work needs to be done to define how candidate countries will be granted such "preliminary" access. Currently, progress in negotiations depends on member states' unanimous support. If the same applies for gradual integration, managing expectations in candidate countries will be crucial to avoid further loss of trust in the EU integration process. In addition, if candidate countries already take on certain obligations and benefits of EU membership before joining, this should have an impact on their formal accession process. To continue the enlargement momentum, the next Commission therefore needs to outline how gradual access to the Single Market can translate to progress in specific accession benchmarks. This can motivate further reforms in candidate countries, strengthen the merit-based approach, as well as make it more difficult for member states to block progress due to bilateral issues. Governing with 30+ MembersPreparing for a larger union will also require institutional adjustments. Discussions around EU institutional reform are not new, yet even two years after the end of the Conference on the Future of Europe there seems to be little agreement on the way forward. As the EU faces geopolitical challenges, the need for more efficient decision-making persists. The Commission's proposal, however, lacks ingenuity when it comes to institutional reform. It only puts forth refurbished ideas of changing the decision-making process from unanimity to qualified majority voting (QMV) using the passerelle clauses or constructive abstention, brushing aside the European Parliament's (EP) call for a convention for the revision of the treaties. Despite current security imperatives, many, mostly smaller, member states remain against QMV, due to fears of losing influence in the EU's internal power dynamics. These concerns will need to be reconciled if the EU really wants to move from words to deeds on becoming a more agile actor in this increasingly uncertain geopolitical landscape. Unanimous decision-making does not only affect the governing of an enlarged Union, but the process of getting to it. The candidate country's progress depends on unanimous support in the Council at every stage of the accession process. Yet most Western Balkans accession paths have up to this point been vetoed at least once by a member state due to bilateral issues, affecting the credibility of the process in the region. In the proposal, the Commission rightly calls for the Council to change to voting with a qualified majority in "certain interim steps of the enlargement process." Such a change is needed. It could drastically speed up the negotiations process as well as build up its credibility. The Commission's proposal is a welcomed reassurance of the EU's commitment to be ready for new members. It shows enlargement remains the EU's strongest geopolitical tool, while also its biggest challenge. In the coming months, the European Council is expected to adopt a new strategic agenda and an internal reform roadmap. While Europe is in campaign mode for the European Parliament elections in June, adoption of these documents will play a vital role in ensuring the reform and enlargement efforts stay the course in the next EU institutional cycle. The EU of tomorrow will be defined by change. The to-do list of reforms is long and ambitious, and will require strong political will from all actors involved. The results of the upcoming EP elections as well as several national elections will therefore serve as a crucial indicator of whether and how the EU will move towards a Union fit for enlargement and fit for tomorrow.
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Herausgeber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie diese Quelle zitieren möchten.
The European Commission recently delivered on its promise to bring enlargement back into the limelight. On March 12, it recommended opening accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina and put forward draft negotiating frameworks for Ukraine and Moldova. The three countries checked off another significant (if yet symbolic) step on their respective paths towards EU membership, receiving approval from EU leaders at their meeting on March 21-22. The day before, the Commission also adopted the Communication on proposed pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews. Unlike the (justified) fanfare around Bosnia and Herzegovina's green light for membership talks, this document received little to no attention. However, according to the Commission it marks the start of the policy review process on internal EU reforms needed for enlargement. So how does the Commission plan to prepare for a larger and stronger union? Values remain fundamentalAs laid down in Article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union, the EU is founded on the respect for democratic principles, rule of law, and fundamental rights. Welcoming new member states therefore requires ensuring these values can continue being upheld throughout the Union. With the revised enlargement methodology from 2020, the Commission already put rule of law at the center of the accession process. Under this approach, new candidate countries must open and close their membership negotiations with the fundamentals cluster. This enables continued monitoring of progress and the ability to address backsliding in democratic norms and values throughout the negotiations. In last year's State of the Union Speech, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced the integration of candidate countries who are further along in their accession process into the annual Rule of Law Reports. This would provide an added tool for steering dialogue on the necessary reforms, if assessments are effectively integrated into the country progress reports, as well as a smoother administrative transition once they become full-fledged members. The EU, however, continues to have its fair share of difficulties fostering democratic resilience even among its current members. Since joining the EU, the bloc has seen democratic backsliding in Hungary and Poland. Most recently the Slovakian government also proposed worrisome legislation that would curtail freedom of expression, media freedom and protection of civic space. The key to protecting the rule of law after enlargement therefore does not only lie in "deep-rooted" transformations in candidate countries, but also in reforming the EU's internal approach for protecting its fundamental values and democratic principles. The EU has been struggling in this area with 27 members. Without concrete steps, it could struggle even more with over 30 members in the future. Resilience is crucial to safeguard democratic norms. The upcoming policy reviews should therefore not only focus on reinforcing a corrective and punitive rule-of-law mechanism. But also on how to strengthen the proactive measures, such as the Rule of Law Toolbox and support for democratic civic actors in member states, to effectively protect from democratic backsliding. Managing EU PoliciesBringing new countries into the mix will inevitably affect the benefits and functioning of several EU policies. While some policy reforms will be straightforward, others will be tougher to crack. The EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is a good example of the challenging reforms the future enlargement will bring. In the case of the CAP, the key will be successfully integrating Ukraine, which is among the top agricultural producers in the world, while ensuring a level-playing field between current and new members. Under the current CAP subsidy scheme, Ukraine would receive €85 billion in agriculture subsidies after joining the EU. This would result in a 20% cut of funds for current member states. Ukrainian agricultural imports are already testing the EU's unity and solidarity with the country. With vested interests of several member states, such as France and Poland, and big agribusiness stakeholders as well as recent pressures from farmers protesting across Europe, one can already picture more convoys of tractors rolling down the streets of European capitals. The CAP–although the most prominent–represents only one of the several difficult policies that will need to be substantially changed ahead of future enlargement. Another uphill battle will be reforming the cohesion policy and the EU budget. While the Commission is a well-oiled machine when it comes to drafting new policy proposals, the negotiations that follow among EU institutions can often be long, arduous, and highly politicized. These announced policy reviews by the Commission are only the beginning and will show the extent of reforms the EU will need to undertake.Gradual Access to the Single Market?The proposed policy reviews will also factor into gradual access to the Single Market for candidate countries. Western Balkan candidate countries have long been arguing for such an approach. The tangible economic benefits from access to certain areas of the Single Market would mitigate the public dissatisfaction with the speed and credibility of the enlargement process. This approach regained attention with the revived enlargement momentum after Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Since then, EU leaders have agreed on the need to "further advance gradual integration" in the European Council conclusions from June 2022. The Commission's proposal is, however, the first formal attempt to assess the feasibility of rolling out gradual access to the Single Market. While a positive development, more work needs to be done to define how candidate countries will be granted such "preliminary" access. Currently, progress in negotiations depends on member states' unanimous support. If the same applies for gradual integration, managing expectations in candidate countries will be crucial to avoid further loss of trust in the EU integration process. In addition, if candidate countries already take on certain obligations and benefits of EU membership before joining, this should have an impact on their formal accession process. To continue the enlargement momentum, the next Commission therefore needs to outline how gradual access to the Single Market can translate to progress in specific accession benchmarks. This can motivate further reforms in candidate countries, strengthen the merit-based approach, as well as make it more difficult for member states to block progress due to bilateral issues. Governing with 30+ MembersPreparing for a larger union will also require institutional adjustments. Discussions around EU institutional reform are not new, yet even two years after the end of the Conference on the Future of Europe there seems to be little agreement on the way forward. As the EU faces geopolitical challenges, the need for more efficient decision-making persists. The Commission's proposal, however, lacks ingenuity when it comes to institutional reform. It only puts forth refurbished ideas of changing the decision-making process from unanimity to qualified majority voting (QMV) using the passerelle clauses or constructive abstention, brushing aside the European Parliament's (EP) call for a convention for the revision of the treaties. Despite current security imperatives, many, mostly smaller, member states remain against QMV, due to fears of losing influence in the EU's internal power dynamics. These concerns will need to be reconciled if the EU really wants to move from words to deeds on becoming a more agile actor in this increasingly uncertain geopolitical landscape. Unanimous decision-making does not only affect the governing of an enlarged Union, but the process of getting to it. The candidate country's progress depends on unanimous support in the Council at every stage of the accession process. Yet most Western Balkans accession paths have up to this point been vetoed at least once by a member state due to bilateral issues, affecting the credibility of the process in the region. In the proposal, the Commission rightly calls for the Council to change to voting with a qualified majority in "certain interim steps of the enlargement process." Such a change is needed. It could drastically speed up the negotiations process as well as build up its credibility. The Commission's proposal is a welcomed reassurance of the EU's commitment to be ready for new members. It shows enlargement remains the EU's strongest geopolitical tool, while also its biggest challenge. In the coming months, the European Council is expected to adopt a new strategic agenda and an internal reform roadmap. While Europe is in campaign mode for the European Parliament elections in June, adoption of these documents will play a vital role in ensuring the reform and enlargement efforts stay the course in the next EU institutional cycle. The EU of tomorrow will be defined by change. The to-do list of reforms is long and ambitious, and will require strong political will from all actors involved. The results of the upcoming EP elections as well as several national elections will therefore serve as a crucial indicator of whether and how the EU will move towards a Union fit for enlargement and fit for tomorrow.
Institutions, as mechanisms of social order, often constrain the behavior of individuals within a society. Political institutions constrain the behavior of politicians, financial institutions constrain the behavior of businesses and payment processors and social institutions often constrain the behavior of individuals. These institutions often play an important role in constraining activities that may be seen as illicit or unwanted and careful analysis of these constraints can allow researchers to learn more about activities that are often hidden or go unreported.This dissertation explores the role of institutional constraints on unwanted behavior by studying deforestation in Brazil and Malawi as well as underground activity in fraudulent software sales. These cases share the commonality that they are influenced by institutional constraints. Politicians in Brazil are constrained by reelection incentives, perpetrators of fraudulent antivirus software are constrained by payment processors and the cultural practice of ethnic favoritism in public good provision leads to particular ethnic groups in Malawi receiving much more fertilizer subsidies than others.The first chapter examines deforestation in Brazil. Local political authority (formal or informal) over natural resources may create rents for politicians. The political decision to use or allocate resources involves balancing private rents with reelection prospects. I examine the case of deforestation in Brazil and a presidential decree granting the federal government the authority to punish counties that failed to limit total deforestation within their borders. This collective punishment aimed to generate pressure on local politicians to slow deforestation. Using binding term limits as a source of variation in reelection eligibility, I find eligibility has no effect on deforestation prior to the decree. After the decree, reelection eligible mayors reduced annual deforestation 10% more than mayors ineligible for reelection. These findings are consistent with the equilibrium outcome of a lobbying model. Policies such as sanctions, which target the electorate in order to influence political behavior, may be less effective when politicians are not accountable to voters.The second chapter examines Fake antivirus (AV) programs which have been utilized to defraud millions of computer users into paying as much as one hundred dollars for a phony software license. As a result, fake AV software has evolved into one of the most lucrative criminal operations on the Internet. In this chapter, we examine the operations of three large scale fake AV businesses, lasting from three months to more than two years. More precisely, we present the results of our analysis on a trove of data obtained from several backend servers that the cybercriminals used to drive their scam operations. Our investigations reveal that these three fake AV businesses had earned a combined revenue of more than $130 million dollars. A particular focus of our analysis is on the financial and economic aspects of the scam, which involves legitimate credit card networks as well as more dubious payment processors. In particular, we present an economic model that demonstrates that fake AV companies are actively monitoring the refunds (chargebacks) that customers demand from their credit card providers. When the number of chargebacks increases in a short interval, the fake AV companies react to customer complaints by granting more refunds. This lowers the rate of chargebacks and ensures that a fake AV company can stay in business for a longer period of time. However, this behavior also leads to unusual patterns in chargebacks, which can potentially be leveraged by vigilant payment processors and credit card companies to identify and ban fraudulent firms. This chapter is joint work with Brett Stone-Gross, Richard Kremmerer, Christopher Kruegel, Douglas Steigerwald, and Giovanni Vigna and was published as Stone-Gross et al. (2013).The final chapter returns to deforestation and studies it in the context of agriculture in Malawi. The effect of development policies on the environment is often ambiguous ex ante. Programs designed to improve agricultural productivity may increase deforestation by raising the marginal productivity of agricultural land, thus increasing the demand for land clearing. However, in a setting of subsistence farming on unproductive land, increasing agricultural productivity may reduce the need to shift cultivation to maintain the desired yields. This chapter examines the impact of agricultural subsidies on deforestation in Malawi by leveraging ethnic favoritism in government resource allocation. By exploiting a change in the ethnicity of the Malawi president following the 2004 election, we show that coethnic districts received more fertilizer subsidies and experienced significant declines in deforestation compared to districts with other predominant ethnicities. This paper studies a case in which poverty alleviation programs have beneficial environ- mental impacts demonstrating that, in certain contexts, input subsidies may provide a 'win-win' scenario. This chapter is joint work with Conor Carney.
Speeches Delivered In Other Languages. ; United Nations S/PV.8182 Security Council Seventy-third year 8182nd meeting Wednesday, 14 February 2018, 3 p.m. New York Provisional President: Mr. Alotaibi. . (Kuwait) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Inchauste Jordán China. . Mr. Zhang Dianbin Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue Equatorial Guinea. . Mr. Ndong Mba Ethiopia. . Ms. Guadey France. . Mrs. Gueguen Kazakhstan. . Mr. Umarov Netherlands. . Mrs. Gregoire Van Haaren Peru. . Mr. Meza-Cuadra Poland. . Ms. Wronecka Russian Federation. . Mr. Polyanskiy Sweden . Mr. Skoog United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Mr. Clay United States of America. . Ms. Tachco Agenda The situation in Guinea-Bissau Report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (S/2018/110) This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-04195 (E) *1804195* S/PV.8182 The situation in Guinea-Bissau 14/02/2018 2/20 18-04195 The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. The situation in Guinea-Bissau Report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (S/2018/110) The President (spoke in Arabic): In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representatives of Guinea-Bissau and Togo to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following briefers to participate in the meeting: Mr. Modibo Touré, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau, and His Excellency Mr. Mauro Vieira, Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations, in his capacity as Chair of the Guinea- Bissau configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission. Mr. Touré is joining the meeting via video-teleconference from Bissau. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2018/110, which contains the report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau. I now give the floor to Mr. Touré. Mr. Touré: I thank the Security Council for this opportunity to introduce the report of the Secretary- General (S/2018/110) on the situation in Guinea-Bissau and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS). As the report already presents a detailed outline of recent events in Guinea-Bissau, my intervention will focus on updating the Council on political developments since its issuance, while analysing present challenges and making proposals for the way forward. This briefing takes place against the backdrop of a rapidly evolving political situation in Guinea-Bissau. Over the past several weeks, a series of key events have occurred with important ramifications. At the country level, President José Mário Vaz dismissed former Prime Minister Umaro Sissoco Embaló and replaced him with Mr. Artur Da Silva. The African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) finally held its party congress despite attempts by national authorities to block it, and re-elected Domingos Simões Pereira as its leader. At the regional level, on 4 February, the Authority of Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), pursuant to its decision of 27 January, imposed targeted sanctions on 19 individuals deemed to be obstructing the implementation of the Conakry Agreement. Those individuals and their family members are subject to travel bans and assets freeze. They have also been suspended from ECOWAS activities. The ECOWAS Authority also requested the African Union (AU), the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries, the European Union, the United Nations and other partners to support and facilitate the enforcement of the sanctions. Since the imposition of the sanctions, the reaction of national stakeholders has been mixed. Those upon whom the sanctions were imposed have described them as unsubstantiated and unjust, while those in favour of the sanctions have characterized them as a necessary measure to safeguard the country's democratic course. Meanwhile, national reactions to the appointment of Mr. Artur Da Silva as the new Prime Minister have been generally consistent. On 31 January, the PAIGC issued a statement denouncing Mr. Da Silva's appointment as not being in conformity with the Conakry Agreement. Last week, the Party for Social Renewal, the second largest party in Parliament, and the group of 15 dissident parliamentarians of the PAIGC also issued public statements stressing that they would participate only in a Government formed under a consensual Prime Minister, in strict compliance with the Conakry Agreement. Thus far, the Prime Minister's efforts to consult with political parties represented in the National Assembly on the formation of an inclusive Government have not borne fruit. Under my leadership, the group of five regional and international partners, comprised of representatives of the African Union, the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries, ECOWAS, the European Union and the United Nations, has continued 14/02/2018 The situation in Guinea-Bissau S/PV.8182 18-04195 3/20 to harmonize efforts and messaging at opportune moments with the aim of creating a stable and enabling environment for dialogue among political leaders. So far this year, I have convened three meetings of the group. My efforts, together with those of the partners, have focused on engaging national authorities and key political stakeholders in Guinea-Bissau to defuse escalating tensions, encourage political dialogue in order to ease the political gridlock, call for the protection and respect for the human rights of Bissau-Guinean citizens, and urge all aggrieved stakeholders to pursue their grievances through legal and constitutional means. Furthermore, under my direction, UNIOGBIS continues to play a central role in supporting and facilitating the regional mediation efforts of ECOWAS by, inter alia, ensuring the participation of Bissau- Guinean stakeholders at the ECOWAS Summit in Abuja in December 2017, providing substantive and logistical support for the ECOWAS high-level delegations during their missions to Bissau and regularly sensitizing regional leaders to ongoing political developments within the country, while encouraging them to exert their influence on protagonists in order to reach compromises. The absence of a functioning and stable Government for more than three years has limited the ability of UNIOGBIS to effectively and sustainably implement some of its mandated tasks. As recommended by the strategic review mission headed by the Department of Political Affairs in 2016 and endorsed by the Council last year, I have streamlined the UNIOGBIS leadership and structure to promote better integration and complementarity with the United Nations country team and other international partners, while boosting the Mission's political capacities, which has enabled me to exercise my good offices more effectively at the national level. Those changes have also assisted the broader United Nations system in Guinea-Bissau in delivering more focused and integrated peacebuilding support to national authorities and civil society, including women and youth. In this regard, the support provided by the Peacebuilding Fund has been critical. Going forward, UNIOGBIS will need to focus its energies on supporting national leaders in their efforts to appoint an acceptable Prime Minister, establish an inclusive Government, organize and conduct timely elections, and implement the priority reforms outlined in the Conakry Agreement and the ECOWAS road map. Until the completion of the electoral cycle in 2019, Guinea-Bissau remains more than ever a country that requires a dedicated United Nations presence to prevent a further deterioration in the political and security situation at the national level and avoid any negative consequences in the subregion. In this context, my good offices, political facilitation, advocacy and mediation roles, alongside my efforts aimed at promoting respect for human rights and the rule of law and at carrying out integrated peacebuilding support, will continue to be critical. As the Secretary-General has indicated in his report, it is vital that the United Nations remain engaged in peacebuilding efforts in the country while supporting ECOWAS involvement in resolving the political crisis for at least one more year. The Secretary-General has expressed his intention to authorize an assessment of the current mission at the end of that period and to present options to the Security Council for a possible reconfiguration of United Nations presence in the country. It is my hope that the Council will give favourable consideration to this recommendation. The African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC), through its communiqué of 13 February, has fully endorsed the measures taken by ECOWAS on 4 February, including the application of sanctions against political obstructionists. It has also requested the African Union Commission to coordinate with the ECOWAS Commission to ensure the effective implementation of these measures. Moreover, it has requested that the Security Council endorse the AUPSC communiqué that endorsed the ECOWAS decision. At this critical juncture, it would be important for the Security Council to continue to reaffirm the centrality of the Conakry Agreement and reiterate its full support for ECOWAS in its mediation efforts and for the measures that it has taken against political stakeholders deemed to be obstructing the resolution of the political crisis. I would further seek the Council's support in underscoring the importance of urgently organizing and holding legislative elections within the constitutionally mandated timeline. Lastly, throughout the past year, the presence of the ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB) has consistently acted as a stabilizing factor in the country. I would therefore call on members of the Council and international donors to support the continued presence of ECOMIB through to the holding of a presidential election in 2019, including by advocating for the renewal S/PV.8182 The situation in Guinea-Bissau 14/02/2018 4/20 18-04195 of its mandate and the provision of the financial support needed to maintain its deployment. I would like to express my gratitude to the Council for its continued interest in promoting peace and stability in Guinea-Bissau. I would also like to commend ECOWAS and its current Chair, President Faure Gnassingbé of Togo, and the ECOWAS Mediator for Guinea-Bissau, President Alpha Condé of Guinea, for their tireless mediation efforts. Finally, I would like to express appreciation to all multilateral and bilateral partners, especially to the AU, the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries and the European Union for their commitment to promoting peace and prosperity in Guinea-Bissau. After several years of long-term investment in the stability of Guinea- Bissau, it is time to consolidate and reap the dividends of our concerted efforts. It is vital that we accompany this process to its completion. The President (spoke in Arabic): I thank Mr. Touré for his briefing. I now give the floor to Mr. Vieira. Mr. Vieira (Brazil): I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for the invitation to address the Security Council in my capacity as Chair of the Guinea-Bissau configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). Since my last briefing to the Security Council, on 24 August last year (see S/PV.8031), there have been several important developments in the country. The situation in Guinea-Bissau is rapidly evolving, and the PBC is following it closely. At the most recent Summit of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), held in Abuja on 16 December, the Heads of State and Government gave a 30-day deadline for political actors of Guinea-Bissau to implement the Conakry Agreement. The situation was discussed again by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union, held in Addis Ababa on 27 January, in the context of its thirtieth ordinary session. After 15 months as Head of Government, Prime Minister Umaro Sissoco Embaló tendered his resignation to President José Mário Vaz, who accepted it on 16 January. On 31 January, Artur Da Silva took office as the new Prime Minister. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Togo, Robert Dussey, led two ECOWAS missions to Bissau this year. On 1 February, the ECOWAS mission issued a final communiqué stating that the nomination of a Prime Minister by consensus, as determined by the Conakry Agreement, had not taken place and that the ECOWAS Commission would start applying sanctions against those who create obstacles to a political solution. On 4 February, ECOWAS issued a decision listing 19 names that will be subject to sanctions, consisting of the exclusion from the activities of the community, a travel ban, and the freezing of assets of the sanctioned persons and their families. The Guinea-Bissau configuration is actively engaged in following the situation in Guinea-Bissau and in providing support for the country through different initiatives. I am also in permanent contact with the Brazilian Ambassador in Bissau, who maintains excellent relations with national authorities, political actors and United Nations representatives. I would remind Council members that Brazil was one of the first countries to recognize Guinea-Bissau in 1974. In that same year we opened an embassy in Bissau. In 2017, I organized a working breakfast with the members of the PBC and four ambassador-level meetings of the Guinea-Bissau configuration. We issued three press statements last year on the situation in the country. I also briefed the Security Council on two occasions, on 14 February (see S/PV. 7883) and on 24 August. Between 25 and 28 July 2017, I conducted my first visit to Bissau in my capacity as Chair of the Guinea-Bissau configuration. I met many political actors, including President José Mário Vaz, then-Prime Minister Sissoco, a number of ministers, members of all parties in the Parliament, and representatives of the United Nations. On my return, I stopped in Lisbon, where I met with the Executive Secretary of the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries, Ms. Maria do Carmo Silveira. On 15 December 2017, the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) approved six new projects for Guinea-Bissau, totalling $7 million, to be implemented between January 2018 and June 2019. These projects are designed to help stabilize the country by providing support to the media and the justice sector, as well as support for national reconciliation efforts and the participation of young people and women in peacebuilding and in politics. The Guinea-Bissau configuration of the PBC discussed and 14/02/2018 The situation in Guinea-Bissau S/PV.8182 18-04195 5/20 supported these projects in a meeting held in November last year. The PBC will continue to support Guinea-Bissau not only through the PBF, but also through consultations with different partners, including the World Bank and other international financial institutions. In this context, I am planning a visit to Washington in the coming weeks in order to talk to representatives of the World Bank about possibilities for cooperation with Guinea-Bissau. On Monday, 12 February, I convened a meeting of the Guinea-Bissau configuration of the PBC to discuss the most recent developments in the country. On that occasion, we heard a briefing from the Under- Secretary-General for Political Affairs and Head of the Department of Political Affairs, Mr. Jeffrey Feltman. I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General Feltman for his presence there. It was a positive sign of engagement and trust in the role of the PBC. It also showed his commitment to contributing to a solution to the current impasse in Guinea-Bissau. During that meeting, the participants had the opportunity to discuss the recent developments in the country, including the decision of ECOWAS to impose sanctions. They underlined the need for dialogue and mentioned the role of the region, including the importance of the implementation of the Conakry Agreement. Member States also commended the work of the PBF in Guinea-Bissau. Many participants stressed the relevance of respecting the constitutional framework in organizing elections. Member States welcomed the non-involvement of the armed forces in the political crisis. Many delegations mentioned the positive presence of the ECOWAS Mission in Guinea- Bissau (ECOMIB). Delegations also supported the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS), which is expected to happen by the end of this month, and underlined the importance of the good offices of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Modibo Touré. Finally, I also would like to inform the Council that it is my intention to visit Guinea-Bissau in the coming months to consult with a broad range of stakeholders on how the PBC can support peacebuilding efforts in the country and help the political actors find a solution to the current impasse. The exact date of the visit will depend on developments on the ground and will be scheduled in consultation with local authorities. I would like to recall that Brazil is currently the Chair of the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries (CPLP). As was done when I previously briefed the Council, the CPLP has endorsed my remarks. I would like to conclude my statement by reaffirming that the PBC will continue to make every effort to support Guinea-Bissau and I would like to outline the following recommendations in that regard. I reiterate the support of the configuration for the Bissau six-point road map and the Conakry Agreement as the framework for the resolution of the crisis. I call upon the authorities of Guinea-Bissau and key political actors to show leadership and determination by engaging in actions that would lead to the implementation of those agreements. I take note of the efforts of the region to resolve the political impasse in the country. I stress the importance of holding free and fair elections, in accordance with the Constitution of Guinea- Bissau, and call upon the international community to support that process. I underline the importance of renewing the mandate of UNIOGBIS for another year, as recommended by the Secretary-General. I also recognize the effective, preventive and deterrent role of ECOMIB. Finally, I would like to commend the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Modibo Touré, for his efforts to help ensure an enabling political environment in the country. The President (spoke in Arabic): I thank Ambassador Vieira for his briefing. I now give the floor to those Council members who wish to make statements. Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue (Côte d'Ivoire) (spoke in French): I would like to begin my statement by thanking the Special Representative of the Secretary- General, Mr. Modibo Touré, for his insightful briefing on the situation in Guinea-Bissau and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau. I will focus my statement on two main points: the implementation of the Conakry Agreement by the Guinea-Bissau signatories and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau. S/PV.8182 The situation in Guinea-Bissau 14/02/2018 6/20 18-04195 Guinea-Bissau is going through a new phase in the serious and deep political and institutional crisis of recent years. My country and West Africa are concerned about this situation, which is characterized by a political impasse and requires the Council to act with greater firmness alongside the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union to bring the political actors of Guinea-Bissau to honour their commitments. Indeed, despite the signing on 14 October 2016 of the Conakry Agreement, which was supposed to favour the appointment of a consensus Prime Minister and the establishment of an inclusive Government, the country is again without a Government and confronted by a blockage of Parliament and a deep lack of trust between the President of the Republic and his party, the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde. The stalemate heightens raises concerns not only of a detrimental delay in the electoral calendar, which calls for the holding of legislative elections in May 2018 and presidential elections in 2019, but also of the exacerbation of political tensions and the growth of the criminal economy linked to drug trafficking. My country welcomes the ongoing efforts of ECOWAS to definitively resolve the crisis in Guinea-Bissau, in strict compliance with the communal arrangements and constitutional framework of the country. The current deadlock in Guinea-Bissau is the culmination of a prolonged deterioration of the political situation and the manifest lack of will on the part of the political actors to commit themselves to a consensual settlement of the crisis, despite the appeals and efforts of ECOWAS. Côte d'Ivoire calls on the parties to implement the Conakry Agreement in good faith and without delay. My delegation once again commends ECOWAS for its leadership and the ongoing commitment of its leaders, the Chairperson of the ECOWAS Authority, President Faure Gnassingbé of Togo, and the ECOWAS Mediator for Guinea-Bissau, President Alpha Condé of Guinea, in the quest for a solution to the political impasse in Guinea-Bissau. Côte d'Ivoire also commends the ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau for its invaluable contribution to stability in the country. ECOWAS, after a lengthy process of futile warnings, decided to adopt individual sanctions against 19 persons considered to be hostile to the process of ending the crisis in Guinea-Bissau. The sanctions are a strong signal of the resolve of ECOWAS to bring the country out of a crisis that has persisted too long. Those measures — which specifically involve the suspension of the participation in the activities of ECOWAS of all persons concerned, a travel ban on travel, the denial of visas to them and their families, and the freezing of their financial assets — must be applied with utmost rigour. The sanctions, I recall, are based on the Supplementary Act of 17 February 2012, which imposes sanctions on Member States that fail to honour their obligations vis-à-vis ECOWAS, and article 45 of the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. My country congratulates ECOWAS on taking those courageous measures, which will serve as a wake-up call to the Guinea-Bissau political class, and looks forward to their effective endorsement by the African Union. Côte d'Ivoire invites the Council to fully support ECOWAS in the interests of peace and national cohesion in Guinea-Bissau. To that end, my country calls on the Security Council to adopt by consensus the draft resolution on the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau, which also requires the endorsement of those sanctions. Furthermore, my delegation urges the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries (CPLP), the European Union and the United Nations to also support the efforts of ECOWAS to effectively implement measures that seek to ensure that the Conakry Agreement be upheld. Institutional and political stability, peace and security in Guinea-Bissau depend primarily on the people of Guinea-Bissau themselves. To achieve that, we call on them to take ownership of the Conakry Agreement. Without the involvement of the parties themselves, the prospects for finding a solution to the crisis and for restoring lasting peace to Guinea-Bissau will remain illusory. With regard to the activities of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau, my delegation welcomes the various initiatives to support the political dialogue and the national reconciliation process. Furthermore, we encourage ongoing consultations in order to make progress on security sector reform and to meet the needs of the peacebuilding mechanism under way in Guinea-Bissau. My delegation thanks the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Guinea-Bissau for his efforts in mediation, promoting the rule of law and building the capacity of the Guinea-Bissau institutions. Côte d'Ivoire encourages its international partners, in 14/02/2018 The situation in Guinea-Bissau S/PV.8182 18-04195 7/20 particular the United Nations, the African Union, the European Union, the CPLP and ECOWAS, to cooperate more closely with regard to their work on the ground to ensure greater effectiveness. My country also welcomes the strong involvement of Guinea-Bissau women in the political process, and in particular their role in facilitating dialogue between the parties. With regard to the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau, I would like to inform the members of the Council that Côte d'Ivoire will soon submit a draft resolution for adoption on that issue. At the same time, if it is acceptable to all members of the Council, a draft press statement will also be submitted for adoption. My country reiterates its appeal to all stakeholders in the crisis in Guinea-Bissau to participate fully in the efforts of the international community, in particular of ECOWAS, to promote the comprehensive implementation of the Conakry Agreement, which guarantees a way out of the political impasse that the country has long suffered. I would like to finish by thanking Ambassador Mauro Vieira of Brazil, Chair of the Guinea-Bissau configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission, for all the information that he has kindly provided to the Council. Ms. Tachco (United States of America): I wish to thank Mr. Touré, Special Representative of the Secretary-General, for his briefing and Ambassador Vieira not only for his briefing but also for his leadership of the Guinea-Bissau configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission. Recently, the Security Council has witnessed significant success in West Africa in places that have experienced years or even decades of violence and tragedy. Such success includes the first democratic transfer of power in Liberia in more than 70 years and the continued consolidation of democracy in The Gambia, as well as strong economic growth in countries across the region. However, there remain many serious and profound challenges, such as the terrorist threat posed by Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa, elections and reform challenges facing countries with upcoming democratic transition, and humanitarian crises and displacement, all of which merit the continued attention of the Security Council. Given the urgency and magnitude of such problems, the United States believes that a self-inflicted 30-month political impasse, such as that in Guinea-Bissau, is unacceptable. For too long we have gathered to hear updates on fits and starts of political progress that eventually fade to obstruction and obfuscation from the country's leadership. The United States is profoundly disappointed by the decision of President Vaz to ignore the Conakry Agreement by failing to appoint a consensus Prime Minister and to create an inclusive Government. President Vaz must take urgent steps towards a unity Government that will pave the way for peaceful legislative elections in May. The people of Guinea-Bissau are understandably frustrated at the failure of their Government to make progress on the implementation of the Agreement. They deserve better. Time is running out. We have witnessed rising tension. Political gatherings in Bissau have provoked clashes as the people of Guinea- Bissau publicly express their frustration at the skeletal political process. Those clashes led to a crackdown by the Guinea-Bissau leadership. The Government must respect the people's right to peaceful expression and protect that right. On 4 February, the Economic Community of West African States took the ambitious step of sanctioning 19 spoilers of the Conakry Agreement, including their family members. The United States applauds such efforts to hold those in power accountable and to compel them towards finally doing what is right for the people of Guinea-Bissau. We also applaud the renewal of the mandate of the ECOWAS Mission in Guinea- Bissau and encourage the Guinea-Bissau military to continue its political non-interference, while playing its constitutional role. For years, the international community and the United Nations have put resources into Guinea-Bissau to do important things for the benefit of its people. However, with a Government at an impasse, important issues such as security sector reform and combating transnational organized crime, narcotics and human trafficking cannot be adequately addressed. That is unacceptable. As Ambassador Haley noted in the peacekeeping context, the United Nations cannot operate effectively in environments with uncooperative Governments. That also applies to political missions such as the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea- S/PV.8182 The situation in Guinea-Bissau 14/02/2018 8/20 18-04195 Bissau (UNIOGBIS). For UNIOGBIS to continue on that path would not be the continuation of a partnership with a willing Government but would simply enable its obstruction. Elections must take place on time and will require support. However, first, the Government must first end the impasse to convince its partners that international support will build on established political progress and a willingness to overcome differences to enable the Government to function again. In conclusion, we once again draw attention to the ordinary people of Guinea-Bissau who, for the better part of their lives, have not known the stability of sustainable democratic governance. The Security Council must keep them in mind as we take steps to put pressure on leaders to abandon their self-serving wilfulness and to take action to better the lives of their people. They should know that our patience has now run out. Ms. Guadey (Ethiopia): I wish to thank Mr. Modibo Touré, Special Representative of the Secretary- General, for his briefing on the latest developments in Guinea-Bissau and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS). I would also like to express appreciation to Ambassador Mauro Vieira in his capacity as Chair of the Guinea-Bissau configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) for his remarks. The continued political stand-off and institutional paralysis in Guinea-Bissau remain a source of serious concern. The consequent socioeconomic difficulties over the past two years have impacted the people of Guinea-Bissau and will eventually undermine the peace and stability of the country. We appreciate the important role of the PBC and welcome the approval of useful projects to be financed under the Immediate Response Facility of the Peacebuilding Fund to the amount of $7.3 million. Such projects will certainly contribute to easing the socioeconomic difficulties of women and young people, as well as to promoting stability. The centrality of the Conakry Agreement to sustaining peace, security and development in Guinea- Bissau cannot be overemphasized. We reiterate our call for all stakeholders in Guinea-Bissau to respect and to comply with the Agreement in addressing their differences and the challenges facing their country. We urge them to create conditions for the holding of legislative and presidential elections in 2018 and 2019, respectively. All parties should also refrain from actions or statements that could escalate tensions and incite violence. It is indeed vital that the security and armed forces of Guinea-Bissau continue to uphold the country's Constitution and desist from interfering in the political and institutional crisis. Those who continue to obstruct the implementation of the agreement must be given clear signals that their actions will not be tolerated. In that regard, we commend the role of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the high-level delegation it dispatched to Guinea-Bissau two weeks ago. We support its decision on restoring democratic governance and ensuring respect for the rule of law in Guinea Bissau, as endorsed by the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council communiqué issued today. The Council should reinforce the decision by ECOWAS and the African Union and convey a clear and united message to all the parties in this regard. We believe the concerted efforts by ECOWAS, the African Union, the United Nations and other relevant partners continues to be indispensable to finding a durable solution to the political crisis in Guinea-Bissau. We express our support to UNIOGBIS for its continued provision of necessary support to Guinea- Bissau, with the objective of resolving the current political impasse and creating an environment for of dialogue among all of the country's actors. Accordingly, we fully agree with the recommendation of the Secretary General that the current UNIOGBIS mandate be extended for another year, until 28 February 2019. Finally, we echo the appeal of the AU Peace and Security Council for financial support towards the continuation of the mandate of the ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau — whose mandate has been extended to 31 March — until the necessary training of the national security forces of Guinea-Bissau is completed. I wish to conclude by supporting the draft press statement proposed by Côte d'Ivoire, and express our readiness to work closely on the draft resolution that will renew the UNIOGBIS mandate. Mrs. Gueguen (France) (spoke in French): I thank Mr. Modibo Touré, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau, for his clear and precise briefing, which reminds us of just how critical this point is for Guinea-Bissau. I also thank Ambassador Mauro Vieira for his efforts as Chair of the Guinea-Bissau configuration of the Peacebuilding 14/02/2018 The situation in Guinea-Bissau S/PV.8182 18-04195 9/20 Commission and for his insistent appeal for support to regional initiatives and for respect for the electoral cycle in Guinea-Bissau. France is concerned about the non-implementation of the Conakry Agreement since October 2016. The Agreement, which provides for the appointment of a consensus Prime Minister, has remained a dead letter, even though it provides a plan to resolve the conflict. This political impasse has consequences on the ground. There have been several clashes between the police and opposition political parties. Respect for human rights is also not assured in Guinea-Bissau. The latest developments on the ground show that the authorities of Guinea-Bissau no longer hesitate to limit the freedom of assembly and the right to protest. The establishment of a robust compliance framework with regard to respect for public freedoms is an essential precondition to the resolution of the crisis in Guinea-Bissau. We therefore call upon the international community to be particularly vigilant in that regard. Due to the risk of a deterioration in the political and security situation, it is high time for all parties to honour their commitments to reach national consensus, all the more so because the window of opportunity is narrowing, as legislative elections are slated for this spring. In that regard, it is particularly important to ensure that the legislative and presidential time table is adhered to. I would like to emphasize three essential points with regard to the renewal at the end of the month of the madate of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS). First, we must increase our support for regional initiatives. In that regard, France welcomes the ongoing efforts of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), especially the work of the ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau and the recent adoption of the sanctions list of people obstructing the implementation of the Conakry Agreement. That is an important step forward and a clear sign to the relevant local actors. We are convinced that the solution to the conflict will require consultation among local actors and the international community. In that connection, the group of five international partners based in Guinea-Bissau, which comprises the African Union, the European Union, the United Nations, ECOWAS and the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries, provides a special coordination platform that ought to be supported. Secondly, it is crucial for the Security Council to fully assume its role in resolving the current political impasse in Guinea-Bissau. The Council should increase pressure on local actors, particularly President Vaz, and should direct the parties in Guinea-Bissau to shoulder their responsibilities. Sanctions were adopted in 2012 through resolution 2048 (2012), and additional measures could be taken in conjunction with those taken by ECOWAS. Thirdly, it is essential to renew the mandate of UNIOGBIS, which ends 28 February, and thereby signal the commitment of the United Nations to continuing to participate in the process of resolving the conflict. We should also contemplate restructuring UNIOGBIS following an assessment of the impact of its activities on the ground. It is time for the parties in Guinea-Bissau to move from words to action. Their commitments must now give way to concrete action. Mr. Meza-Cuadra (Peru) (spoke in Spanish): My delegation welcomes the holding of this meeting and thanks Mr. Modibo Touré, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea- Bissau, for his briefing. We also thank Ambassador Mauro Vieira for his commitment and leadership as Chair of the Guinea-Bissau configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission. Peru is monitoring with concern the situation in Guinea-Bissau. Despite efforts by the international community and regional organizations to reach a solution to the political crisis, little progress has been made in the implementation of the Conakry Agreement, concluded in October 2016. We would like to make three main points. First, Peru deems the successful holding of 2018 and 2019 elections to be crucial to achieving sustainable peace. In that regard, we are concerned about the nomination of a Prime Minister who does not enjoy consensus among all parties, as called for in the Conakry Agreement. That undermines the credibility of the Government. Additionally, four of the members of the National Electoral Commission, including its President, could not be nominated for the National Assembly, which has not convened since S/PV.8182 The situation in Guinea-Bissau 14/02/2018 10/20 18-04195 January 2016. Such conditions complicate the holding of legislative elections slated for May. That is why we believe it is necessary and urgent for all parties to resume inclusive dialogue with a view to implementing the commitments undertaken. We welcome the efforts of the Economic Community of West African States, which include imposing sanctions on those who obstruct the implementation of the Conakry Agreement, in line with regional rules and regulations. We believe that it is important to increase the participation of women and youth in the necessary dialogue and subsequent elections. That is why we highlight the efforts of the Women's Facilitation Group, which seeks to increase the participation of women in the country's political processes. Secondly, we are concerned that, despite the current relative stability, a stalled political process could lead to renewed violence and rampant crime, especially considering that the country is vulnerable to threats such as terrorism, organized crime and human trafficking. In that connection, we highlight the launching of the Network of National Human Rights Defenders. As the Secretary-General noted in his report (S/2018/110), reform is needed in this area, including strengthening the armed forces and the professionalization of the police. Similarly, we call for full respect for the fundamental right to freedom of expression in Guinea-Bissau. Thirdly, with regard to socioeconomic development, we would like to highlight the fact that, although the World Bank has reported economic growth of 5 per cent over the past year, it should be borne in mind that such growth is primarily attributed to the country's main exports being sold at a higher price on the international market. Nonetheless, a country whose poverty rate is approximately 70 per cent is socially and economically vulnerable. That is why we believe that peacekeeping and peacebuilding require greater investment in social development, and in particular in Peacebuilding Fund projects aimed at empowering women and young people, promoting national reconciliation and strengthening the judiciary. We underscore the importance of ensuring the predictability and stability of the Fund's financing. We also believe that it is important that the activities promoted by the Peacebuilding Fund be coordinated with the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) and the United Nations country team. In conclusion, we support the renewal of the UNIOGBIS mandate for an additional year, in line with the recommendation of the Secretary-General. We thank the Economic Community of West African States, the African Union, the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries, the European Union and other international actors committed to assisting Guinea-Bissau for their valuable efforts. Mr. Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): At the outset, on behalf of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, let me thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Guinea- Bissau and Head of Mission for the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS), Mr. Modibo Touré, and his team for the detailed and important briefing on the situation in Guinea-Bissau. We also thank Mr. Mauro Vieira, Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations, in his capacity as Chair of the Guinea-Bissau configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission, for his briefing, in which he underscored the configuration's commitment to the various initiatives in Guinea-Bissau. The Republic of Equatorial Guinea has followed very closely and with great interest the developments in the political and institutional crisis in Guinea-Bissau. It has paid even closer attention since the country joined the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries (CPLP) in 2014, and now that Equatorial Guinea chairs the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2048 (2012), concerning Guinea-Bissau. In my capacity as Chair of the 2048 Committee, I would like to voice our concern about the deadlock in the peace process in Guinea-Bissau, which is hindering the country's national reform programme, thereby threatening to undermine progress in the country since constitutional order was restored in 2014. Equatorial Guinea lauds the commitment and considerable effort made, as well as the human and financial resources made available by international multilateral partners, in particular the Guinea- Bissau group of five, comprising the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the CPLP, the European Union and the United Nations. Undoubtedly, the synergy among international actors with regard to the issue in Guinea-Bissau attests to the desire and willingness of the international community to find a peaceful and 14/02/2018 The situation in Guinea-Bissau S/PV.8182 18-04195 11/20 consensus-based solution in the interests of Guinea- Bissau. The Conakry Agreement must continue to be the fundamental reference for national political actors. The Agreement not only outlines the appointment of a Prime Minister who is trusted by the President of the Republic, but whose appointment is the result of consensus among all national stakeholders. The Republic of Equatorial Guinea has taken note of the rejection of the appointment of Mr. Augusto Antonio Artur Da Silva by ECOWAS and the main political actors in Guinea-Bissau, in particular of the two main political parties — the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde and the Partido para a Renovação Social. Given the lack of consensus surrounding the appointment of the Prime Minister, the Republic of Equatorial Guinea calls upon all political actors in the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, including the President of the Republic, as well as the leaders of the two main political parties, to work together to form an inclusive Government that would create the right conditions ahead of upcoming legislative elections to be held later this year, and presidential elections in 2019. The Republic of Equatorial Guinea supports the electoral calendar as outlined in the country's Constitution. That is why the Republic of Equatorial Guinea believes that an international support mechanism for the electoral process should be put in place for the purpose of updating the electoral rolls and assisting the Independent National Electoral Commission to effectively shoulder its responsibility, and with all other preparations that would allow for the holding of transparent, democratic elections whose results would put a definitive end to the political maze the country has had to navigate over the past few years. The extension of the mandate of UNIOGBIS is a key element in resolving the crisis. As announced, ECOWAS has decided to extend the mandate of the ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau until 31 March. The actions of the United Nations must be part of that undertaking. The Security Council's vote, scheduled for 27 February, must allow the Mission to be extended for a year or more, until presidential elections are held in 2019. The Republic of Equatorial Guinea believes that international partners should continue to focus primarily on mediation, good offices, dialogue and direct negotiations as the only viable paths to breaking the current political and institutional deadlock. The most recent report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Guinea-Bissau and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (S/2018/110) concludes that the population's latent frustration with an uncertain political environment could foster instability and crime. Equatorial Guinea reiterates its gratitude to the defence and security forces that have chosen to adopt a neutral, republican position. Therefore, we urge all political actors in Guinea-Bissau to put the interests of the country and its people, love of State and their responsibility above all other considerations so as to create the right conditions for the holding of free, fair and transparent elections. Stability in the country must not be disassociated from economic recovery. In that regard, we welcome the support of the Guinea-Bissau configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission, through the Peacebuilding Fund, in financing various multisectoral projects. The Republic of Equatorial Guinea will take part in good offices and negotiations. Equatorial Guinea, as a member of the CPLP and Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2048 (2012), concerning Guinea- Bissau, will support and take initiatives that it believes are necessary to assist in efforts under way to find a solution to the situation in the brotherly country of Guinea-Bissau. Mr. Skoog (Sweden): I would like to begin by thanking the Special Representative of the Secretary- General, Mr. Modibo Touré, for his briefing. I commend him and his team for the valuable work being undertaken in support of the people of Guinea-Bissau. Let me also extend my thanks to the Permanent Representative of Brazil, Ambassador Mauro Vieira, in his capacity as Chair of the Guinea-Bissau configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission. As Ambassador Vieira mentioned his country's long-standing relations with Guinea-Bissau, I thought that I would take this opportunity to point out that Sweden recognized Guinea-Bissau in 1974, and we began supporting General Assembly resolution 2911 (XXVII), concerning its self-rule, in 1968. In the 1970s and 1980s, Guinea-Bissau was one of our largest development partner countries. There is therefore a deep and historic friendship between Sweden and the people of Guinea-Bissau, and it is in that spirit of friendship that we are engaging in support for Guinea- Bissau in meeting its current complex challenges. S/PV.8182 The situation in Guinea-Bissau 14/02/2018 12/20 18-04195 Moreover, we welcome the opportunity to draw upon the strategic advice of the Peacebuilding Commission and its longer-term perspective, which are essential for sustaining peace in Guinea-Bissau. The activities financed by the Peacebuilding Fund to that end are also important. An integrated approach from the United Nations family in Guinea-Bissau can contribute positively to overcoming peacebuilding challenges. Accordingly, we welcome the efforts outlined in the report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/110). We are concerned by the ongoing and increasingly protracted political crisis in Guinea-Bissau. A lack of progress in resolving the stalemate undermines peacebuilding efforts and is holding the country's social and economic development hostage. Resolving the crisis is therefore a prerequisite for the consolidation of peace in the country. The six-point Bissau road map and the Conakry Agreement remain the only legitimate way forward, and must be implemented. The appointment of a consensus Prime Minister, as stipulated in the Agreement, is essential. National leaders must live up to their commitments and meet their responsibilities. We strongly commend the efforts of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to mediate among the parties to find a solution to the political crisis. ECOWAS is playing an essential role on behalf of the region, and we welcome its continued efforts to reach a consensual implementation of the road map and Conakry Agreement. We welcome the ECOWAS decision to impose sanctions on those impeding the Agreement's implementation. It is important that the international community fully support regional efforts in a concerted and coherent manner. In that regard, we welcome the statement issued yesterday by the African Union in support of ECOWAS, including regarding sanctions. Long-term peace and security in Guinea-Bissau will be achieved only when the root causes of the conflict are addressed. Constitutional reform, reconciliation and political dialogue, strengthening the rule of law through strong and inclusive institutions, and ensuring equal access to economic opportunities are all critical in that regard. It is also essential that all parts of society have their voices heard. In particular, ensuring the full and effective participation of women is crucial. We agree with the Secretary-General that the promotion of, and respect for, human rights is fundamental to sustaining peace and ensuring long-term stability and development in Guinea-Bissau. We echo the Secretary- General's call on national authorities to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms and to refrain from any further acts that undermine the rule of law. Let me also take a moment to welcome the military's neutrality and its posture of non-interference in the political process. Concerning the role of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS), it has a crucial role to play in coordinating international efforts to support Guinea-Bissau, not least of which is supporting preparations for the holding of elections. There is a need to immediately refocus the Office's resources where they can be used most effectively, particularly with regard to resolving the political deadlock and supporting the electoral process so that it moves forward. We strongly support the Office's work to strengthen women's participation as active peacemakers in resolving the political crisis, including by encouraging women's mediation efforts. We welcome in particular that the integration of gender-sensitive perspectives into the work of UNIOGBIS and the United Nations country team has been accorded the highest priority by the United Nations in Guinea- Bissau. We look forward to hearing more about how that process is being taken forward. During the Peacebuilding Commission's meeting on Guinea-Bissau on Monday this week, all key actors, including Guinea-Bissau, expressed the view that the Secretary-General's recommendation for a one-year extension of the UNIOGBIS mandate should be authorized. A one-year extension would allow for longer-term planning and more effective support for the implementation of the Conakry Agreement and the holding of elections. The political crisis in Guinea-Bissau has gone on for far too long. It is now time to move forward with the full implementation of the Conakry Agreement and preparations for the holding of inclusive elections. The international community, together with the region, must stand ready to support the country on its path towards long-term peace and development. Mr. Clay (United Kingdom): I thank Special Representative of the Secretary-General Touré and Ambassador Vieira for their informative briefings. The situation in Guinea-Bissau is concerning. It is not the first country in the world to experience a political impasse, but it is a country that continues to emerge from the serious instability and violence 14/02/2018 The situation in Guinea-Bissau S/PV.8182 18-04195 13/20 of its recent past. The political impasse has prevented progress on reforms that are critical to addressing key conflict risks in Guinea-Bissau. The situation is only likely to become more volatile as we move towards elections. We have already seen violent confrontations between demonstrators and police, and witnessed worrying efforts to curb political freedoms. Economic growth is at risk, and a serious deterioration in stability would be deeply damaging for development and human rights. The illicit economy and transnational organized crime risk becoming further entrenched, with global implications. More broadly, instability in Guinea- Bissau would affect the wider region, which over the past year has been, for the most part, the site of positive political progress. The United Kingdom welcomes the leadership shown by the West African region, particularly through the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). It has shown persistence and patience. This is a crisis that began in 2015. It brokered the Conakry Agreement 15 months ago. It has agreed to countless communiqués and published innumerable statements. It has sent numerous high-level delegations to Guinea- Bissau, including three over the past six months alone. But those most responsible for Guinea-Bissau's crisis have responded with stubborn refusal to give ground and find compromise. Therefore, it is understandable that the region's patience has worn thin. ECOWAS has now been driven to impose sanctions against individuals deemed responsible for impeding the implementation of the Conakry Agreement. The African Union Peace and Security Council has endorsed that move. The United Kingdom supports the ECOWAS decision, and we urge the Security Council and the entire international community to remain united in support of ECOWAS efforts. We also believe that it is important to recognize the bold efforts of civil society in Guinea-Bissau to resolve the crisis. In particular, the mediation efforts launched by the Women's Facilitation Group were an encouraging initiative, and we welcome the support given to them by the United Nations. As set out in resolution 2343 (2017), political support for efforts towards the implementation of the Conakry Agreement should be a priority for the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea- Bissau. The key next step remains the appointment of a consensus Prime Minister so that preparations can proceed for legislative elections in 2018, as per the country's Constitution. As we open discussions on its renewal, the United Kingdom will focus on ensuring that the Mission's mandate responds to today's political reality on the ground, that it is realistic and that it is focused on the highest priority needs. Guinea-Bissau's people watched the country emerge from a period of instability but then found their hopes for democracy obstructed by a political knot that their own leaders tied. Support from the region and the international community to prevent the country from backsliding further will not succeed until those who tied the knot untangle it. We hope that good sense, compromise and the commitment to Guinea-Bissau's future will prevail. Ms. Wronecka (Poland): First of all, I thank Special Representative of the Secretary-General Modibo Touré and Ambassador Mauro Vieira, Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations, in his capacity as Chair of the Guinea-Bissau configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission, for their useful briefings. Poland is following with growing concern the current situation in Guinea-Bissau. We support the efforts of the international community aimed at peacefully resolving the political crisis in the country. We therefore call on all political and civil society actors, regardless of their personal differences and ambitions, to engage in dialogue in a spirit of compromise. In that context, we take note that the army is not interfering in the political process. The implementation of the 2016 road map and the Conakry Agreement is crucial to maintaining peace and stability in the country. We appeal to the Guinea- Bissau authorities to complete their implementation and carry out the parliamentary elections scheduled for May in a peaceful atmosphere that guarantees political pluralism and impartiality. We think that women and young people should be included in all decision-making structures related to security sector reform, the national reconciliation process and institution-building. In this regard, we urge the Guinea-Bissau authorities to ensure the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of speech and information. Poland commends the important role of the Peacebuilding Commission in Guinea-Bissau in promoting good governance, political dialogue and national reconciliation. We also welcome the significant S/PV.8182 The situation in Guinea-Bissau 14/02/2018 14/20 18-04195 financial support of the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) under the PBF Immediate Response Facility. Since the PBF began its activities, Poland has provided financial support to the Fund. Poland also supports the efforts of the Economic Community of West African States Mission in Guinea- Bissau (ECOMIB) as it is an important factor in reaching consensus solutions and cooperation. The decision of the ECOWAS Heads of State and Government, published on 4 February, imposing sanctions on those responsible for non-implementation of the Conakry Agreement is a step towards holding responsible those who are impeding a peaceful, consensus solution to the crisis. Due to the fragile security situation in the country, the presence of ECOMIB is most important. In this regard, we welcome the decision to extend ECOMIB's mandate until the end of March. Its role is essential, especially in view of the upcoming legislative elections. The mandate of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) expires at the end of this month. The United Nations should remain engaged in efforts towards peace in the country and support ECOWAS efforts to resolve the political crisis. In conclusion, Poland encourages all the parties in Guinea-Bissau to engage in dialogue. We also express our full support for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Modibo Touré. We look forward to the upcoming UNIOGBIS mandate renewal. Mr. Umarov (Kazakhstan): We commend Special Representative of the Secretary-General Modibo Touré and Ambassador Mauro Vieira for their comprehensive briefings on the situation in Guinea-Bissau, and extend our full support for their commitment to facilitating a political solution to the crisis. Kazakhstan is deeply concerned by the protracted political stalemate in the country. We join others in calling on all stakeholders to engage in an inclusive political dialogue and immediately implement the Conakry Agreement and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) road map to end the deadlock and restore institutional viability. It is therefore necessary to avoid differing interpretations of the Agreement. We commend the mediation efforts of ECOWAS, under the leadership of Presidents Faure Gnassingbé of Togo and Alpha Condé of Guinea, as well as by the other members of the group of international partner organizations on Guinea-Bissau. We have taken note of the decision of ECOWAS to impose targeted sanctions on those obstructing the implementation of the Conakry Agreement. We express hope that this decision will contribute to finding a solution to the crisis and strengthen democratic institutions and capacity-building for State organs. We welcome the extension until April of the mandate of ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB), which plays a crucial role in ensuring stability in Guinea-Bissau, and urge international partners to continue supporting ECOMIB. The importance of peacebuilding, good offices and coordination efforts of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau cannot be underestimated. We therefore support the Secretary-General's recommendation to renew the mission's mandate for one more year. We also agree with his proposal to assess the mission, should the political impasse continue. We note the importance of holding legislative and presidential elections according to the constitutional time frame, and call on international partners to provide the necessary technical, logistical and financial support for the electoral process. The current political crisis may further fuel transnational organized crime, drug trafficking and terrorist activities. Therefore, increased national engagement and international support are critical to enhancing and extending reforms in the security, judicial and law enforcement sectors. In addition, the most effective measures must be sought to ensure the country's stability and resilience by increasing support for the education and health sectors, as well as the existing development plans, including Terra Ranka and the United Nations peacebuilding plan. In conclusion, we welcome the active engagement of the Women's Facilitation Group, and impress upon the national authorities the importance of ensuring the participation of women and young people in the political process at every stage and at all levels. Mrs. Gregoire Van Haaren (Netherlands): I would like first of all to thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Modibo Touré, and the Permanent Representative of Brazil, Mr. Mauro Vieira, who spoke in his capacity as Chair of the Guinea- Bissau country configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), for their briefings. 14/02/2018 The situation in Guinea-Bissau S/PV.8182 18-04195 15/20 For years now, Guinea-Bissau has been marked by a protracted political crisis. In a region characterized by increasing attention to and respect for the rule of law, human rights and democracy, Guinea-Bissau continues to be out of step, as indicated once again in the latest report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/110). In the light of this, the Kingdom of the Netherlands wishes to underscore the following three points with regard to the situation in Guinea-Bissau. First, the Conakry Agreement of 2016 and the six-point road map should remain the basis for a political solution in Guinea-Bissau, and its provisions should honoured. Secondly, the diplomatic and political efforts of the region through the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) deserve the steadfast support of the United Nations, and particularly the Security Council. Thirdly, the role of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) in the country at this critical juncture, with elections around the corner, is as important as ever. It is therefore imperative that its mandate be extended. First, with respect to the Conakry Agreement, almost a year and half has passed since the Agreement was concluded. The Kingdom of the Netherlands reiterates the centrality of the Agreement in peacefully resolving the current crisis, and urges the parties to abide by its contents. It is clear that an important roadblock with regard to its implementation is the appointment of a consensus Prime Minister. The need for this appointment has become increasingly urgent. With parliamentary elections on the horizon, it is imperative that these elections be held in a timely, transparent and inclusive manner. Secondly, with regard to support for ECOWAS, while the past six months were mainly characterized by the same intransigence as in previous reporting periods, concerted action and increased pressure on the part of the region, and ECOWAS in particular, could actually lead, when given the necessary support, to tangible progress in resolving the Bissau-Guinean crisis. Yesterday's decision of the African Union Peace and Security Council to support the efforts of ECOWAS is a case in point. The Secretary-General rightly observes in his report that the continuing efforts of ECOWAS to resolve the crisis are commendable. The Kingdom of the Netherlands would like to clearly point out that it supports and endorses ECOWAS mediation efforts and its imposition of sanctions. We welcome the ECOWAS unified action and believe that the presence of the ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau is vital to the stability of Guinea-Bissau. ECOWAS has shown before that, when united, it has the ability to act as the region's power broker, for example as it did in The Gambia. Like it did then, the Council should firmly support ECOWAS in taking up this role and responsibility, as it should in the case of any other regional organization in Africa that takes the lead in maintaining peace and security in the region. My third point is that ECOWAS cannot do this alone. We commend the African Union and the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries for their collaboration with the European Union and for the support they have brought and the constructive role they play. From the report of the Secretary General, it is evident that UNIOGBIS plays a vital role in Guinea- Bissau. With legislative elections scheduled for 2018 and presidential elections in 2019, the role of UNIOGBIS is more crucial than ever. We therefore call for a renewal of its mandate for no less than one year, in addition to allowing for longer-term planning, including setting more concrete priorities for the mission and making adaptations to meet specific needs. UNIOGBIS's convening power in Bissau remains essential, as will be its role in ensuring peaceful, free and democratic elections in Guinea-Bissau, as well as a smooth post-election process. Renewing the mandate for less than 12 months would send the wrong signal. In conclusion, sustained pressure to implement the Conakry Agreement, the maximum possible support to ECOWAS's ongoing efforts and measures and UNIOGBIS's continued support to the political process will be crucial factors in ending the deadlock in Guinea- Bissau, particularly in the light of the constitutionally mandated elections. Mr. Inchauste Jordán (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): We appreciate the report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/110) presented by Mr. Modibo Touré, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS), and the briefing by Ambassador Mauro Vieira of Brazil in his capacity as Chair of the Guinea- Bissau configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission. There has been no significant progress or visible improvement in the situation in Guinea-Bissau, where the general instability seems almost impervious to S/PV.8182 The situation in Guinea-Bissau 14/02/2018 16/20 18-04195 change, thereby jeopardizing the full implementation of the Conakry Agreement, which is unquestionably the fundamental framework for a peaceful solution to the crisis and for achieving sustainable and lasting peace there. In our view, the negative effects are likely to exacerbate matters if the parties cannot definitively condemn sectarian interests and contribute effectively to the mediation efforts and good offices of the relevant international, regional and subregional organizations. Bolivia firmly repudiates any action that could destabilize or jeopardize the ongoing dialogue and reconciliation process that has been established with the participation of all the parties concerned. We urge that the agreements be definitively consolidated in line with the inclusive national dialogue, which would enable Government members, the political parties represented in the National Assembly and every sector of civil society to arrive at a consensus and implement the agreements constructively through a legitimate commitment to achieving a lasting political and social solution whose sole aim is benefiting the people of Guinea-Bissau, in strict respect for their sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. We acknowledge the active participation of the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States and its Mission in Guinea- Bissau, the European Union, the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries and UNIOGBIS, through its Special Representative, and their ongoing efforts to achieve a rapprochement between the conflicting parties. We believe that UNIOGBIS's work, focused on initiatives aimed at creating opportunities for dialogue and facilitating cooperation in the security and political sectors with the goal of forming an inclusive Government, must be reinforced. It will be crucial to increase the Office's capacity to use peaceful means to deal with the crisis if it is to have more effective and efficient results. We therefore support the recommendation in the Secretary-General's report that the mission's mandate be renewed for another year. We also commend the work being done by the Guinea-Bissau configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission, appropriately chaired by Brazil, and we emphasize the importance of strengthening its coordination, information exchange and active collaboration with the Security Council, in accordance with the relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. We continue to encourage the initiative of the Women's Forum for Peace. The efforts of women in Guinea-Bissau to achieve a political solution shows that a gender perspective and female participation in mediation and dialogue at all levels are essential. In conclusion, we would like to reiterate once again that in a time of political, institutional and social crisis, ensuring the welfare of the population and especially its most vulnerable sectors should be the overriding interest guiding Guinea-Bissau on a path to permanent stability. Mr. Zhang Dianbin (China) (spoke in Chinese): China would like to thank Special Representative Touré and Ambassador Vieira, Chair of the Guinea-Bissau configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission, for their briefings. The situation in Guinea-Bissau has been generally stable in recent months, but it will still require all the parties to work together to meet each other halfway if they are to resolve the political impasse peacefully and as soon as possible. China hopes that the parties in Guinea-Bissau will consider the country's interests, intensify their dialogue and communication in order to bridge differences quickly, implement the Conakry Agreement as soon as possible, form an inclusive Government and resume nation-building efforts. Meanwhile, the international community should continue to follow the situation in Guinea-Bissau. China will continue to support the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau in exercising its good offices and conducting mediation efforts under Mr. Touré's leadership, with the aim of coordinating international support for Guinea-Bissau, promoting political dialogue and advancing the country's economic and social development. The international community should continue to support regional and subregional organizations such as the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States and the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries in their role as mediators, while maintaining respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Guinea-Bissau and supporting the countries of the region in settling African issues through African means. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Mr. Modibo Touré, Special Representative of the Secretary-General, for his briefing on the evolving political situation in Guinea- Bissau. We take note of the report of the Secretary- 14/02/2018 The situation in Guinea-Bissau S/PV.8182 18-04195 17/20 General (S/2018/110) and the briefing by Mr. Mauro Vieira, Permanent Representative of Brazil and Chair of the Guinea-Bissau configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission. Russia supports the efforts of the United Nations, the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries to normalize the situation in Guinea-Bissau, which is undergoing a prolonged political, social and economic domestic crisis. We are concerned about the lack of tangible progress in implementing the Conakry Agreement. We want to emphasize how crucial the Agreement is to mitigating the political hostility and reducing Guinea- Bissau's potential for conflict. We urge the country's executive and legislative representatives to focus on forming an inclusive Government, introducing reforms, especially in the security sector and the Constitution, and increasing their joint efforts to prepare for parliamentary and presidential elections. It will be vital to strengthen the constitutional order and the rule of law and resolve the accumulating socioeconomic issues. We are pleased that the country's political forces continue to act with regard for the law and that the military has remained neutral. We have taken note of the ECOWAS communiqué of 4 February on imposing targeted sanctions on 19 members of Guinea-Bissau's political elite. Regarding the possibility of imposing similar measures based on the provisions of Security Council resolution 2048 (2012), we would like to point out that the resolution's main aim was restoring constitutional order, which in practical terms was achieved several years ago now. The result is that the resolution's sanctions measures are very outdated. In our opinion its listing criteria have little to do with Guinea-Bissau's current political situation, and in any case would not be usable against participants in the political process who are acting within the law. We are compelled to conclude that the opinions of the Secretary-General's report on the security sector situation give the impression that things have been left unsaid. It would have been more logical to discuss how the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) is implementing the provisions of its mandate with regard to building Guinea-Bissau's capacity to combat transnational crime and drug trafficking, after describing the actual state of affairs in those areas. In general, given the overall situation in Guinea- Bissau, we are willing to consider the Secretary- General's proposal to extend UNIOGBIS's mandate. However, we believe that the Special Representative should focus not only on helping the people of Guinea-Bissau emerge from their political deadlock and preparing for the parliamentary elections in May but also on effectively addressing the root causes of the problems in Guinea-Bissau, which lie in its Constitution's structural contradictions. If the work of constitutional reform is not completed by the start of the next electoral cycle, the country risks encountering the same problems with the new parliament and President. The President (spoke in Arabic): I shall now make a statement in my capacity as representative of Kuwait. At the outset, I join other Council members in thanking the Special Representative of the Secretary- General, Mr. Modibo Touré, for his valuable briefing. I would also like to express my appreciation to Ambassador Mauro Vieira for his briefing as the chief of Guinea-Bissau Configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission. We commend their efforts to support security, stability and socioeconomic development in Guinea-Bissau. We have been following the recent political developments there and regret the fact that none of the provisions of the Conakry Agreement have been implemented since signing it in October 2016. It is unacceptable that there has so far been no appointment of Prime Minister who enjoys consensus by the relevant two parties, which is critical to implementing other items of the Agreement. The situation in Guinea-Bissau differs from other cases before the Security Council in having no security aspects. Unfortunately, however, the impasse has lasted more than a year, and it is the people of Guinea-Bissau who are suffering the consequences. In that regard, we commend the steps that the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has taken to advance the political process, including measures for the imposition of sanctions on those obstructing the implementation of the Conakry Agreement, as well as the decision to extend the mandate of its Mission in Guinea-Bissau until the end of March. We want to emphasize the relevance of the role of such regional organizations in resolving regional issues. The efforts of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) S/PV.8182 The situation in Guinea-Bissau 14/02/2018 18/20 18-04195 deserve support, since it is dealing with a difficult and complicated political situation. However, we hope that it will be able to make progress during the coming period with respect to conducting legislative elections this year and presidential elections next. The legislative and presidential elections, to be held in 2018 and 2019 respectively, must take place within the specific time frame. We therefore call on the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau, along with all stakeholders in Guinea- Bissau, such as the European Union, the African Union, ECOWAS and the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries, to spare no efforts towards that end. We also call on the Government of Guinea-Bissau to ensure its citizens' full participation in the elections, as well as security and freedom of expression and assembly for all. The cooperation between UNIOGBIS and civil-society organizations in promoting and developing the role of women in Guinea-Bissau is very positive. We hope that UNIOGBIS will make a greater effort to guarantee the full participation of all components of the society, especially women and young people, in the next political process and will continue to promote other aspects of its mandate until the current impasse is resolved. In conclusion, we reiterate the importance of the Conakry Agreement as the basic reference for resolving this political crisis in Guinea-Bissau, and the efforts of ECOWAS and President Alpha Condé of Guinea to advance the political process in order to maintain the security and stability of Guinea-Bissau and the region. We stand ready to cooperate with Côte d'Ivoire in preparing a draft resolution for the extension of the UNIOGBIS mandate, in response to a request by the Secretary-General. We also support the issuance of a Press Statement to clarify the unified position of the Council regarding the situation in Guinea-Bissau. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. I give the floor to the representative of Guinea-Bissau. Mr. Delfim da Silva (Guinea-Bissau) (spoke in French): I thank you, Mr. President, for inviting my delegation to the Security Council table and for giving me the floor. I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate your country, Kuwait, on its assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of February. We wish you success in your work. I would like to thank Mr. Modibó Touré, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Guinea- Bissau, for his presentation today of the report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/110). I would also like to thank Ambassador Mauro Vieira of Brazil once again for his constructive statement on behalf of peacebuilding and constitutional and democratic order in Guinea-Bissau. And I would like to express our gratitude to all the Ambassadors of States members of the Security Council for their attention to my country, Guinea-Bissau. The political crisis in Guinea-Bissau did not begin with the signing of the Conakry Agreement in October 2016, but much earlier. The Conakry Agreement represents a step in the right direction for resolving the crisis by consensus. In the past 15 months, the two main parties — the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) and the Party for Social Renewal (PRS) — have repeatedly and publicly expressed their disagreement on a crucial point of the Agreement, which is having consensus on choosing a candidate for the post of Prime Minister. If a consensus was reached, the agreed candidate would then be appointed by the President of the Republic, in line with the Constitution. The PAIGC states that there was such a consensus in Conakry. The PRS, for its part, affirms that there was not. Fifteen months later, the lack of consensus has prevented the appointment of a Prime Minister, which must be consensus-based. How can the President appoint a consensus Prime Minister without, at the very least, the prior agreement of the two largest political parties? In short, the crisis over the consensus is really what has paralysed the Conakry Agreement and is prolonging the stalemate in the 15-month political crisis in Guinea-Bissau. The question is how to overcome the crisis concerning the consensus. Some believe that the imposition of sanctions will be conducive to it. We are not sure of that. Sanctions are unlikely to defuse a crisis and can even be counterproductive. It is important to bear in mind that while it is easy to adopt sanctions, it is much more difficult to impose a consensus. In any case, continuing to seek a solution to the crisis is clearly the most important thing that we must do. We need a compromise solution, a credible name, a person whose academic, political and professional 14/02/2018 The situation in Guinea-Bissau S/PV.8182 18-04195 19/20 background can bring about such a compromise. We need someone who, without being the favourite candidate of the PAIGC or the PRS, has a background that would enable him to bring the parties together and thereby reach a compromise. The recent appointment to the post of Prime Minister of a PAIGC leader, the engineer Artur Silva, a former Minister of four Government departments — Fisheries, Defence, Education and Foreign Affairs — suggests that he is the right person to help bring about such a compromise. Moreover, after his appointment, Silva was re-elected to the higher bodies of the PAIGC, its Central Committee and Political Bureau — at the party's most recent congress, which ended a few days ago, proving that he has earned the political confidence of the party's most important bodies. Prime Minister Silva has already held working meetings in Bissau, which I would say are encouraging, with all the parties to the Conakry Agreement — the Ambassadors of Nigeria, Senegal, China, the Gambia and the representative of the Economic Community of West African States in Guinea-Bissau. Finally, through the appointment of a senior PAIGC leader, justice can be done to the party that won the last legislative elections. But above all, there will be no losers, since the PRS will be guaranteed strong representation in a Government of inclusion. This is not a zero-sum game. Under this principle of compromise, which allows a certain degree of flexibility regarding the principle of consensus, there will undoubtedly be a winner — my country, Guinea-Bissau. In conclusion, I reiterate our thanks to the members and want to assure the Council that Guinea-Bissau will continue to count on their support in these difficult times for the sake of civil peace, political stability and solidarity. The President (spoke in Arabic): I now give the floor to the representative of Togo. Mr. Kpayedo (Togo) (spoke in French): I would first like to thank you, Mr. President, for the opportunity to address the Council once again on the situation in Guinea-Bissau, in my capacity as Coordinator of the Ambassadors of the member countries of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) that are accredited to the United Nations. I also want to thank the Secretary-General of the United Nations for his report on the situation in Guinea- Bissau (S/2018/110), presented today by Mr. Modibo Touré, his Special Representative, whom we welcome here, along with his team, and whose briefing has provided us with a thorough picture of the situation in that country. Lastly, I would like to thank Mr. Mauro Vieira for his commitment and efforts in his capacity as Chair of the Guinea-Bissau configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission. Since it began, the crisis in Guinea-Bissau has continued to be a source of great concern for the Heads of State of West Africa, who are therefore sparing no effort to arrive at a favourable and lasting outcome. This issue has been on the agenda of every recent meeting of our subregional organization's Summit. In my last statement to the Council in August (see S/PV.8031), I discussed the trampling of the implementation of the Conakry Agreement, which led to the possibility of having recourse to the ECOWAS sanctions. Since then, the impasse is still there, despite the proposal for a new road map by President José Mário Vaz at the conclusion of the fifty-second Ordinary Session of Authority of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS, held in Abuja on 16 and 17 December 2017, and reaffirmed in Addis Ababa at the ECOWAS Extraordinary Session held on 27 January, on the margins of the 30th Ordinary Session of the African Union Assembly. In that regard, the President-in-Office of ECOWAS, Mr. Faure Essozimna Gnassingbé, in consultation with his peers, dispatched a mission of the ministerial sanctions committee to Guinea-Bissau on 31 January and 1 February 2018, led by Mr. Robert Dussey, Togo's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Cooperation and African Integration. Its purpose was to assess the progress made by the parties to the crisis in implementing the Agreement and to report to the ECOWAS Heads of State on the potential consequences if the stalemate persisted. Following that report, the Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS, in view of the fact that no significant progress has been seen in the implementation of the Conakry Agreement despite ongoing mediation and calling on all of Guinea-Bissau's political leaders to show their sense of responsibility and respect for their country's Constitution through a frank and inclusive dialogue, decided to activate the sanctions mechanisms against individuals and organizations that are hindering a settlement of the crisis, with the aim of promoting the restoration of democratic governance and respect for the rule of law in Guinea-Bissau. As a result, 19 political figures have been subject to sanctions since 4 February, in accordance with our S/PV.8182 The situation in Guinea-Bissau 14/02/2018 20/20 18-04195 decision 01/2018, on individual sanctions designed to promote the restoration of democratic governance and respect for the rule of law in Guinea-Bissau. The list is not exhaustive,and the monitoring committee for the implementation of sanctions — composed of Togo, Guinea and the ECOWAS Commission — therefore reserves the right to revise it as the situation on the ground changes. Here I should point out, as the representative of Côte d'Ivoire noted earlier, that these sanctions were established through ECOWAS's Supplementary Act of 17 February 2012 concerning sanctions regimes against Member States that do not honour their obligations to the Community, and are based on article 45 of the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. They include suspended participation in Community activities, and a travel ban and financial assets freeze for those listed and their families, wherever they may be. The sanctions cannot be effectively implemented without the assistance of the United Nations and other multilateral and regional organizations. In that regard, I would like to take this opportunity to call for multifaceted support to ECOWAS in implementing these measures, which we hope will help to create an atmosphere conducive to the restoration of dialogue among the people of Guinea-Bissau, with a view to resolving this political and institutional impasse, which has lasted too long. In conclusion, I would once again like to invite all the parties to the Guinea-Bissau crisis to show a spirit of compromise, responsibility and openness to a peaceful, negotiated and lasting solution to this dispute, which hampers development efforts in the country and therefore in the entire subregion, which is still dealing with persistent security challenges. The meeting rose at 5 p.m.
Over the past two decades, community-based approaches to project delivery have become a popular means for governments and development agencies to improve the alignment of projects with the needs of rural communities and increase the participation of villagers in project design and implementation. This paper briefly summarizes the results of an impact evaluation of the National Solidarity Program, a community-driven development program in Afghanistan that created democratically elected community development councils and funded small-scale development projects. Using a randomized controlled trial across 500 villages, the evaluation finds that the National Solidarity Program had a positive effect on access to drinking water and electricity, acceptance of democratic processes, perceptions of economic wellbeing, and attitudes toward women. Effects on perceptions of local and national government performance and material economic outcomes were, however, more limited or short-lived.
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At first sight, the strategic documents produced by the EU since the early 2000s make for a tedious reading. Brilliantly written as they may be (and some are), they inevitably boil down to a list of security priorities and principles for action. Still, there is more to them than just that. Especially if read in sequence, these documents tell a quite interesting story: that of a Union of states struggling to keep pace with a rapidly deteriorating environment.From liberal champion to would-be geopolitical power In 2003, the European Security Strategy depicted a safe, prosperous and confident EU eager to take on greater responsibilities for bringing security and stability abroad through the promotion of liberal norms, democracy and multilateralism.[1] Fast-forward thirteen years and such lofty ambitions had morphed into the more prosaic concern, espoused by the 2016 Global Strategy,[2] about protecting the EU from the effects of an increasingly unstable neighbourhood.[3] North Africa, the Middle East and Eastern Europe had all experienced profound political turmoil, violence and outright conflict. "Principled pragmatism" replaced "effective multilateralism" as the ostensibly organising principle of EU foreign and security policy.[4] A few years later, the EU's discourse was all about the need to "speak the language of power"[5] in a world in which competitive geopolitics had made a dramatic comeback.[6] By the early 2020s the United States and China had completed their journey from uneasy partners to systemic rivals, the Middle East was fraught with interstate enmities, and Russia's war of conquest in Ukraine had precipitated Europe into a second Cold War. In the 2022 Strategic Compass, the prevailing theme was the reduction of EU vulnerabilities to the political use of interdependencies, including through strategic partnering with like-minded countries.[7] While the international landscape darkened, the EU experienced a series of internal shocks – the Eurozone crisis (2010-12), the surge in refugee flows (2015-16) and Brexit (2016). They signalled or reinforced historically high levels of contestation of EU rules and policies, which were reflected in the growing popularity of nationalist and Eurosceptic forces.[8] In recognition of the scarce appetite for further integration, EU strategic documents put much emphasis on the need for the EU to rely also on the national assets of individual member states.The limits of EU foreign and security policy The EU strategic documents all point to a resolve to get ahead of the curve and promote a proactive approach to international security challenges. They consequently advocate a more joined-up EU foreign, security and defence policy. Yet, this goal has largely remained aspirational. The hard reality is that the EU struggles to create greater synergies between member states, integrate EU and national assets across a variety of policy areas, and coordinate engagement with external players. Its poor record in managing conflicts and crises – from Libya and Syria to Israel-Palestine – painfully attests to that. This is not to say that the EU has been reduced to a passive bystander of the many crises and conflicts that impinge on its security. On the contrary, over the years the EU has devised a number of measures, some quite creative, to cope with the constraints imposed on its foreign and security policy by rising multipolar competition, the fragmentation of states and regional governance, and internal divisions rooted in domestic expediency.[9] For example, the promotion of multilateral formats has enabled the EU to reduce the constraining effect of multipolar rivalries on its crisis management efforts. Examples are the United Nations-sanctioned multilateral contact group on the management of the nuclear issue with Iran[10] or the EU's attempts at promoting international law-based solutions to territorial disputes in the South China Sea.[11] Confronted with the multiple challenges emanating from fragmented states and regions, the EU has engaged conflict parties selectively on limited issues of shared concern (an example would be the deal with Venezuela's government to send in an EU election monitoring mission).[12] To circumvent internal blockages, the EU has sometimes delegated major conflict management responsibilities to EU institutions (as was the case on Kosovo so as to avoid embarrassment to the five member countries that do not recognise Kosovo's independence to be directly involved) or to small groups of states (as was the case with the Franco-German Normandy format for managing the conflict in Ukraine until 2022[13] or the aforementioned group on Iran, originally promoted by France Germany and the UK). These forms of mitigation of contextual challenges have enabled the EU to carve out room for action in spite of systemic and internal constraints. Results have been disappointing, however. Even when it made progress – brokering peace talks between Serbia and Kosovo or contributing to the multilateral deal that checked Iran's nuclear plans – its successes remained temporary and subjected to reversal. After all, Serbia is as opposed to recognising Kosovo's secession as it was sixteen years ago and the Iran nuclear deal collapsed following the unilateral US withdrawal from it in 2018.The case for reforming EU foreign and security policy The measures mentioned above can counter individual contextual factors separately, but are much less effective in the face of the interplay of multipolar rivalry and regional fragmentation, which feed off each other in a vicious cycle that then impacts the ability of EU member states to find lasting consensus. The conclusion is in the absence of institutional reform, the EU's capacity for action in international security is likely to remain modest or shrink. According to a recent poll conducted in six European countries in the context of the EU-funded JOINT project, the public is inclined to support or oppose a more integrated EU foreign and security policy based more on arguments detailing the advantages or disadvantages of it rather than political ideology or party affiliation.[14] It follows that a political space exists for reinforcing the widespread but now still shallow support for a stronger Europe in security and defence, if political entrepreneurs manage to articulate a convincing vision that the public can share. Provided EU leaders manage to combine personal investment with political acumen, change is achievable. To be sure, such a change would not lead to a fully unified foreign and security policy, which remains outside the realm of possibilities. Still, it would considerably strengthen the EU's capacity for international action.Reforming EU foreign and security policy In an optimal but still plausible scenario, qualified majority voting replaces unanimity in most instances, including the adoption of sanctions and the deployment of military missions abroad (although states can still opt out). The High Representative is given authority not just over foreign and defence policy but also neighbourhood policy, development cooperation and humanitarian aid. The defence pillar of the EU is empowered with the formalisation of a Defence Council, the creation of a directorate general for defence within the Commission and the upgrade of the European Parliament sub-committee on defence into a fully-fledged committee. Common procurement, development and production are bolstered by greater contributions to the European Defence Fund and the European Defence Industry Programme. A military headquarters is established, capable of planning and carrying out a relatively large operation (involving up to 10,000 units from multinational joint forces) in non-permissive environments. The enlargement process is reformed so as to keep incentivising alignment with EU policies. Candidate countries get the right to participate in EU decision-making processes in the policy areas where alignment is compliant and gain access to related EU funds, which they get proportionally to the level of compliance. Reform also extends to energy, especially with the adoption of a special toolbox to absorb sudden supply and price shocks, which includes measures of automatic solidarity. The EU also expands its economic statecraft panoply with standardised inbound and outbound investment screening mechanisms and centralised oversight of compliance with export controls and sanctions. Finally, a reformed EU has much deeper pockets thanks to at least a doubling of the EU's budget – thanks to increased national contribution and EU own resources – and an expanded borrowing authority of the Commission.An autonomous actor, not a "geopolitical" power This reformed EU is better at facing multipolar pressures in the management of crises and conflicts because it has more assets to engage in sustained competition. It is also more able at confronting the multiple challenges emanating from regional fragmentation thanks to the fact that it has empowered the High Representative with authority over different foreign policy portfolios. Problems of internal contestation are attenuated by qualified majority voting, even though member states continue to strive for consensus. In this regard, majority voting works as an accelerator of deliberative processes: it incentivises member states to negotiate with a view to finding an agreement so as not to run the risk of being outvoted. This reformed EU has shifted towards greater autonomy in power competition, making multilateralism more of a choice than a necessity. While still Atlanticist and reliant on NATO for territorial defence, it can act more autonomously in crises. This capability allows it to cope with a partial US disengagement from Europe. The systemic incentives towards policy convergence among member states transforms the EU into a more homogenous actor in international security, with EU foreign and security policy taking precedence over national ones. The reformed EU, while not a geopolitical pole, has become an autonomous collective power.Riccardo Alcaro is JOINT Coordinator and Research Coordinator and Head of Global Actors programme at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI).[1] Council of the European Union, European Security Strategy. A Secure Europe in a Better World, Brussels, Publications Office of the EU, 2009, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2860/1402.[2] European External Action Service (EEAS), Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy, Brussels, Publications Office of the EU, 2016, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2871/9875.[3] Agnès Levallois et al., "Regional Fragmentation and EU Foreign and Security Policy", in JOINT Research Papers, No. 3 (November 2021), https://www.jointproject.eu/?p=639.[4] EEAS, Shared Vision, Common Action, cit., p. 16.[5] Josep Borrell, "Embracing Europe's Power", in Project Syndicate, 8 February 2020, https://prosyn.org/UZNbi12.[6] Assem Dandashly et al., "Multipolarity and EU Foreign and Security Policy: Divergent Approaches to Conflict and Crisis Response", in JOINT Research Papers, No. 6 (December 2021), https://www.jointproject.eu/?p=697.[7] Council of the EU, A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, 14 March 2022, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/410976_en.[8] Marianna Lovato et al., "The Internal Contestation of EU Foreign and Security Policy", in JOINT Research Papers, No. 1 (September 2021), https://www.jointproject.eu/?p=516.[9] Riccardo Alcaro and Hylke Dijkstra, "Re-imagining EU Foreign and Security Policy in a Complex and Contested World", in The International Spectator, Vol. 59, No. 1 (March 2024), p. 1-18, https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2024.2304028.[10] Riccardo Alcaro, "Weathering the Geopolitical Storms: The Ever-elusive Success of EU Policy towards Iran", in The International Spectator, Vol. 59, No. 1 (March 2024), p. 98-119, https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2023.2273852.[11] Zachary Paikin, "Multipolar Competition and the Rules-based Order: Probing the Limits of EU Foreign and Security Policy in the South China Sea", in The International Spectator, Vol. 59 No. 1 (March 2024), p. 161-178, https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2023.2280598.[12] Anna Ayuso et al., "Constraints, Dilemmas and Challenges for EU Foreign Policy in Venezuela", in The International Spectator, Vol. 59, No. 1 (March 2024), p. 140-160, https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2023.2289647.[13] Kristi Raik et al., "EU Policy towards Ukraine: Entering Geopolitical Competition over European Order", in The International Spectator, Vol. 59, No. 1 (March 2024), p. 39-58, https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2023.2296576.[14] Davide Angelucci et al., "Public Opinion and the European Foreign and Security Policy: Is there a Risk of Politicisation?", in JOINT Research Papers, No. 25 (April 2024), https://www.jointproject.eu/?p=2067.
The state governance model is established by Constitution. In the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, there is a separate section dedicated to local self-governance and its management, that shows not only the state's recognition of local self-governance, but also the principles of local self-governance mentioned in the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania. There are sixty separate territorial administrative units in Lithuania, which are guaranteed the right of self-governance, which is implemented by municipal councils elected during secret elections.After the first direct elections of mayors held on March 1, 2015, even in sixteen municipalities (Birštonas municipality, Druskininkai municipality, Ignalina district municipality, Jonava district municipality, Kaunas district municipality, Lazdijai district municipality, Marijampolė municipality, Neringa municipality, Pagėgiai municipality, Palanga municipality, Pasvalys district municipality, Rietavas municipality, Šakiai municipality, Šalčininkai municipality, Vilkaviškis district municipality, Vilnius district municipality) one of the political parties or political organizations (movements) in the municipalities and districts of Lithuania won an absolute majority, which further emphasizes the importance of securing the rights of the minority (opposition).The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania has also noted that taking into account the fact that the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania implies the defense of the parliamentary minority, the minimum requirements for the protection of the opposition of the Lithuanian parliament, as well as the fact that the recognition of parliamentary opposition is an essential element of pluralistic democracy. The Statute of the Lithuanian parliament (Seimas) may establish guarantees of opposition activities: certain places and positions in the committee, opposition leader status, initiation of work places and commissions, etc. The systematic appraisal of the provisions of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania shows that the obligation to form in each municipality the Control Committee, the Anti-Corruption and Ethics commissions, whose candidacy is delegated by the municipal council's opposition, is one of the ways provided by the legislator to ensure the minority rights recognized in pluralistic democracy in self-governance.As there are 60 separate territorial administrative units (municipalities) in the Republic of Lithuania, in which there is a different demographic and political situation, different regulation of municipal councils, composition of municipal councils, therefore different management traditions are formed in them. In the absence of a sufficient definition of minority rights of municipal councils, which ensure the possibilities of opposition activities, the medium develops into oligarchic tendencies. The poor control of decisions taken by municipal councils and administrative actions as well as a flawed legislative framework make it possible to form situations in which the democratic values and the protection of individual rights and freedoms are threatened.The abundance of the problems of the legal regulation of municipalities is indicated by the fact that since 1994, the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania has been amended even 124 times. In the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania (25th October 1992), a separate section is devoted to local selfgovernance and its management. This is understood as the importance given by the state to self-governance, as an independent state of governance, which unconditionally depends on legal regulation. Therefore, this article overviews the gaps in the legal regulation and the political problems that affect the principles of democracy and the system of leverage and balance between the majority of municipal councils and minorities in the local selfgovernance of the Republic of Lithuania.In each municipal council, the presence of an opposition (minority) is not only a normative phenomenon, but also a necessary expression of democracy. In essence, the opposition has two main functions: firstly, this does not allow one party to entrench and curtails government selfishness as well as helps to maintain the constitutional model of governance. Secondly, because the political decisions are not perfect, the opposition points out the mistakes and shortcomings of the governance. Opposition works as an instrument to restrict governance and cultivate social peace.Depending on the subject matter, the aim and objectives of the research paper,the document analysis methodwas used for data collection and analysis. Data sources are as follows: National legislation, European Union and international legal acts, rulings of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania, current Case law, related scientific works, and official statistical indicators.The method of systematic analysisis applied in complex examination of legal norms and relevant jurisprudence in the aspect of ensuring the rights of minority municipal councils.The monitoring methodwas used in making proposals for the improvement of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania. The author of the article has accumulated practical experience in the area of legal regulation of local selfgovernance of the Republic of Lithuania, starting from 2011 until now as a member of the municipal council.The method of summarizingwas used to summarize the collected and analyzed research data and to formulate conclusions and suggestions. ; Savivaldybių teisinio reguliavimo problemų gausą rodo vien tai, jog nuo 1994 m. Lietuvos Respublikos vietos savivaldos įstatymas keistas ir pildytas net 124 kartus. 1992 m. spalio 25 d. Lietuvos Respublikos Konstitucijoje vietos savivaldai ir jos valdymui skirtas atskiras skirsnis. Tai suprantama, kaip skiriama svarba savivaldai Valstybės kontekste, kaip savarankiškos valdžios funkcionavimui, kuri besąlygiškai priklauso nuo teisinio reguliavimo. Todėl šiame straipsnyje apžvelgiamos teisinio reguliavimo spragos ir politinio pobūdžio problemos, sąlygojančios demokratijos principų bei svertų ir atsvarų sistemos tarp savivaldybių tarybų daugumos ir mažumos LR vietos savivaldoje neužtikrintumą.
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As much as COVID-19 is a health and economic crisis, at its core, it is also a governance crisis.
NDI President Derek Mitchell and new Director of Democratic Governance Kristen Sample delve into ways governments and the international community have risen (or not) to meet the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic.
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Derek Mitchell: As we all continue to shelter in place and respond to the colossal health and economic crisis that is COVID-19, we must not forget that at its core, pandemics are as much a result of governance failure as any failure of healthcare or health system. Since working to support democratic processes, institutions and governance around the world is what NDI does for a living, we thought it useful to delve into the role governance has played in the COVID-19 pandemic with NDI's experience in more than 50 countries around the world serving as a guide. Welcome to DemWorks. My name is Derek Mitchell, president of the National Democratic Institute. To discuss all this with me in this podcast, I'm joined by NDI's new director of democratic governance, Kristen Sample. Kristen Sample: Thank you so much Derek. DM: Kristen just joined us on March 1. She brings more than 20 years of democratic governance experience with her to NBI having advised and evaluated programs at UN Women, UN Democracy Fund, the Open Society Foundation, Global Partners, Governance and International IDEA. Kristen is an expert on countering corruption, legislative strengthening in the nexus of gender and politics and she has led projects focused on the impact of democratic reform on economic development and citizen security. At a moment when the global crisis in governance is at the center of international conversation, at least before the pandemic push pause, we are thrilled to have Kristen aboard to look at that issue with fresh creativity here at NBI. So welcome Kristen to your very first DemWorks podcast. KS: I'm really pleased to have the opportunity to speak with you today on such important issues. DM: So we'll speak about the crisis of governance but also the pandemic factor as well. But I do want to start with this global governance crisis that has sort of preceded this. This is a broader overhang. We've seen all over the world popular demonstrations over the past year and more and everywhere from Moscow to Managua, to Hong Kong, to Khartoum, to Algeria, to Istanbul, to Paris. You can go on and on. And what it represents is a frustration with the quality of governance. Democracy somehow is not delivering for people. And I want to hear your thoughts on that. It's a moment of turmoil certainly. People will look at this and say, "Well, democracy is failing," but it's more than democracy that this is happening. It's a general quality of governance question that I think actually provides an opportunity. So let me just ask your thoughts on that first off, Kristen. KS: Yeah. Thanks so much for that question, Derek. I think that NDI, since we have officers or programs spanning every region of the world basically in more than 50 countries, we're in a very good position to be able to take the pulse of what's happening in the different countries. In fact, we have been conducting surveys every two weeks of our country programs to get a sense of what's happening on the ground and we've received some very interesting signals that I'm really happy to be able to share with you today. On the one side, we are saying that in many countries governments are responding very seriously, in very concerted ways to the health crisis. I mean in more than two thirds of the countries. The governments in the countries where we work are closing nonessential businesses in over 60%, they are communicating in ways, having very intensive communication campaigns that really are reaching all citizens. But when it comes to the democracy side, when it comes to implementing that response and pursuing a response that's consistent with democratic principles and norms and values and institutions, we are seeing some troubling developments at the same time. For instance, the number of governments by our account, over 40% of the governments in the countries where we work are declaring emergency powers and it's clear that this is an extraordinary situation that requires extraordinary measures, but in many cases these emergency powers are inconsistent with democratic principles. They are not linked to the crisis. There is no provision for legislative oversight or in many cases, these have no sunset class, so there's no time limit and these are simply open-ended. And link to that and linked in many cases to these emergency powers, emergency decrees, we're seeing an uptick also in threats to fundamental freedoms. For instance, nearly half of our countries are reporting that there are measures in place where governments are repressing non-state media who are critical of the government's response to the pandemic and that in some cases, again, almost 50% of our countries, there are measures in place where governments are limiting space for civil society to engage in political actions. Another factor that I'd like to highlight too is while we're all distracted by the pandemic and while people are at home and perhaps with less access to information and less direct contact with government, there are also signals that many governments are using this as an opportunity to diminish anti-corruption controls. So that means that in some cases economic response packages or healthcare delivery is taking place with less transparency and less openness, which as you can imagine is a risk in terms of making sure that those resources are actually getting where they need to be. And all of this, all of the stresses, the frustration and these concerns of course also have impacts when it comes to citizen trust, interpersonal trust citizen trust of the government and also we're seeing greater potential for civic unrest and a deteriorating security environment. So all together, I hate to start with such a pessimistic view, but I think it is important again, through the networks that we have, the relationships that we have with political and civic actors on the ground, to convey the seriousness of the situation and to make sure that we're always communicating that well, this response requires really drastic measures. These measures need to be consonant of course, with the principles of democratic governance. DM: Right. It fits into this broader competition of narratives that occurred even before the pandemic began, where China or Russia saying, "Look, authoritarian governments are more efficient in providing services. We do this stuff better. Democracy is messy." And they're able, as you say, to take advantage of this moment when people are looking for strong central control to make that case and to both do that rhetorically but also through provision of services. And then it's not just those major countries. You'll have folks whether it's Hungary or Poland or you just go around the world, they're postponing elections. They are shutting down civil society, they're settling scores with adversaries. They're constraining public debate, saying that those things are luxuries during a time of crisis and that gives them an opportunity then as you said, for not just power grabs, but resource grabs and money grabs and they say, "Look, these are extraordinary times. They require extraordinary measures." And the concern is that these extraordinary measures will be permanent, that they'll say you need us to be surveilling people. So this is a challenge for certainly those who do democracy work and for folks inside these countries. But I think the broader question of security, we'll talk about that maybe a little bit later, but it's interesting what we're seeing on the ground as you say. You do a lot of work in the legislative sphere, you have a lot of background on that. How legislatures are particularly important. Civil society is too, but just focusing on legislature's role as a check and balance against executive overreach, can you talk about from the NDI experience or your other observation, how legislatures are being challenged, how they're dealing with this moment, how they're adapting to deal with the COVID-19 moment. KS: Yeah, absolutely. So I'm so glad you brought this point up. The first challenge that I'd highlight is this risk that the legislative branch is getting sidelined. In a crisis like this, the executive branch is generally front and center. Their role is clearly understood by citizens. Head of state might be the one out there doing daily press briefings or a health minister communicating medical reports. And there's this sense of emergency that as I sort of alluding to before, it seems to empower the executive branch. And unfortunately that seems to be, in many cases, at the expense of the legislative power. And additionally, another challenge and another reason that legislatures are perhaps getting crowded out or sidelined is simply that, the coronavirus, by it's dynamic, it's not socially compatible. And since parliaments are these multi-member bodies that have more diffuse operations, more diffuse leadership and that involve hundreds of different people, it's simply just a challenge to assemble a large group of people together, bring them together and keep them front and center in this crisis. So if that first challenge is making sure that people just keep in mind that legislatures matter and the legislatures are able to exert their rights and their authority, I'd say that the second challenge of course is just how do parliaments, legislatures operate in a virtual world. Politicians are by nature, they like to shake hands, they like to get out on the street, they need to be in touch with their constituents. And there are so many challenge involved in this current world that we have where we should all be social distancing. So looking across the world where we work, their parliaments are adopting different measures. Some of them are using social distancing restrictions like reducing the number of MPs in sessions. Others are moving to remote voting, remote deliberations. And then others are not meeting at all, which of course is quite terrible. And in those cases where legislatures have been dissolved or have been suspended for long periods of time. We are working too, as you were saying, as NDI closely with parliaments in a number of countries to try to do those adaptations to the rules of procedures so that they're able to continue meeting in session and continue deliberating and continuing exercising oversight. For instance, we have connected parliamentarians in Colombia with parliamentarians in Ecuador. We have virtual sessions to learn from Ecuador's experience in adopting a regulation for the implementation of virtual session and teleworking. So we are trying to connect parliamentarians across countries to understand how some parliaments have been moving forward in terms of remote procedures and how that's going for them. And two more challenges. One I'd highlight is that oversight role that we've been talking about. And from the same survey that we conducted with our country programs, we found that in 59% of the countries, checks and balances have been weakened, have deteriorated under the pandemic. And this is happening at such an unfortunate time when there's so many policy measures that need to be approved and put in place. If we just take the issue of debt policy for instance, I saw a statistic from the Westminster Foundation that more than 80 countries have already requested emergency aid from the IMF. I mean these countries are struggling of course to meet different types of fiscal obligations and they are desperate for cash in order to ramp up health services and put in place economic measures. And so these governments are taking on debt obligations, debt burns that are going to have far reaching impacts and long lasting impacts that should really be approved by the legislative branch and include monitoring and reporting. And that's not always the case in most of these instances. DM: So you just say it's a very dangerous time and folks are adapting procedurally, but there are really implications to this longterm, including for security. And I think we'll get to that after the break. For more than 35 years, NDI has been honored to work with courageous and committed pro-democracy activists and leaders around the world to help countries develop the institutions, practices and skills necessary for democracy's success. KS: Welcome back. Derek, I've heard you speak to the issue of authoritarian systems and how they're operating in this crisis and that the authoritarian nature in itself makes health crises more likely. And you've also said in some of your speeches and some of the conversations we've had that it's not a coincidence that the pandemic started in China and I'd really like to hear from your expertise, your deep background on China specifically. Can you explain to listeners why that is? Why there is that connection? DM: Well, as I said at the top, this is not just a health crisis, it's a governance crisis. It's a factor of governance both in the prevention of the pandemic and the response to it. We talked so far mostly about the response, how we're responding to the pandemic, but the core of the pandemic is a failure of governance. The difference between a local health crisis that is contained and a pandemic lies in the ability of a political system to respond to that early challenge quickly and effectively. And that requires both government and civic action. And if you're going to deal with this crisis early, it requires both. To do that, you have to act swiftly. You have to have widespread testing and contact tracing. You need critical support from citizens. In order to do all that and to ensure that that happens, you have to have basic civic trust. Closed societies routinely fail that test of having that civic trust and that rapid action for some very practical reasons. When a government suppresses a free flow of information, when it fails to empower independent civic institutions, when it's too insecure to convey bad news candidly, doesn't feel that it has a political legitimacy, therefore, it's insecure to convey bad news. When its data can't be trusted because it's opaque, when its officials are afraid to speak truth to power or communicate inconvenient truths to their superiors or act decisively, absent waiting for some strict orders from the very center and they can't move quickly, the result can be deadly. It turns what is a local health issue into a pandemic so it crosses borders. It becomes not just a problem for one country but for all others. So democratic governance is very, very practical and once again in this regard, transparent, accountable, inclusive, responsive, open governments is essential to crisis response but it's also essential to prevent the crisis from emerging to begin with. And it is a matter of national security. This highlights frankly what many of us have known all along, that this is not just nice but has very practical national security effects. And as we just talked earlier, the irony is that just as the world needs more open democratic societies to prevent future crises and deal with the current one, there are opportunistic politicians who are closing political and civic space. That I think is a very practical reason why that closed societies cause these pandemics. KS: I think that all of those points that you've been raising in terms of the threats and the vulnerabilities are so important for us to keep front and center. At the same time, here in NDI, as you know, is we're very keen to make sure that there are also opportunities to elevate the many examples around the world where governments are acting democratically and effectively in response to the crisis and they're framing and working with citizens in ways that are absolutely consistent with democratic values and principles. And so I do want to showcase some of those. I think it's received a lot of press around the world how New Zealand, for instance has reacted, and I read this week that New Zealand is perhaps one of the very first countries to have been able to successfully eliminate COVID. They have no new COVID cases. And it's a case that really stands out for the way that the prime minister has been able to deliver information in a very clear, compassionate, inclusive way, a way that's very grounded in science of course, and transparent. And at the same time where the legislature has had an important role developing a parliamentary select committee that's providing scrutiny of the government's response. The government has also been very affirmative there I think, in terms of issues of freedom of information and media freedom and has said that they would not slow down, for instance, their commitment to responding to requests for information during the crisis. So there's certainly the case of New Zealand, which is so interesting and it's shown such early success, but there are other places around the world too where specific measures taken by the government I think have been so positive and far reaching. Uruguay comes to mind for instance. We see so many cases where authoritarian leaders are using this crisis to be able to settle scores as you were saying, or to act in a very partisan fashion. But in Uruguay, the president convened all of the former presidential candidates to give a joint press conference to send a powerful message of unity and to show that across the party divide, they were working together to develop responses. Taiwan also really stands out for its cross party coordination, the transparent communications they've had, the very creative efforts that the government has put in place there, I think they've called it humor, not rumor. A campaign to share facts in real time to counter disinformation, to manage fear. So there aren't many cases out there as I was saying, of governments that are responding effectively and in ways that are building that citizen trust that you were mentioning. DM: Yes. And then a further one, another democracy that's a leading democracy, probably the first out of the gate is South Korea. They did exactly what was necessary. People are looking at that example, a democratic example. They didn't sacrifice rights at all. They obviously had very strong controls at times of the society, but it took very swift action. They did widespread testing, contact tracing and they worked with civil society and is shown over and over that civil society is probably one of the most important factors. It's not simply a government driven thing that makes a response success. Civil society serves as a very efficient force multiplier for government. We saw that in Katrina, hurricane Katrina. We see it's proved over and over that it really is effective in getting the word out and messaging. Ensuring is like in Taiwan through their civic tech community, they're sort of hackers. They're young citizens, who themselves in a voluntary fashion, formed a community. They were viewed as allies and partners not alienated from the government. And that partnership has been a success in Taiwan, has been a success in South Korea and is essential for a success. And that means that governments need to be open, need to be transparent, they need to see society as partners. So this is absolutely critical. KS: Yeah. And I just want to add on the South Korea example. I'm so glad you brought that up because South Korea held elections during the pandemic on April 15, they had national assembly lessons and they were actually able to organize those elections in a way that was seen as very transparent, that was very consistent with electoral integrity and they had higher levels of turnout than in previous elections, which is pretty amazing. And there's so many countries around the world that are facing elections in 2020. I think the way that South Korea was able to do it with a very intensive communication campaign as you were speaking again to their transparency of communication, they had expanded early voting measures in place. They had home voting, they had very comprehensive safeguards for people to be able to vote in person. So even organizing an election in a time that seems so difficult and so challenging, I think that as you were saying, democracies like South Korea are showing that there is a way forward. DM: Right. And I think we can learn some lessons from that as well. There are groups, including NDI has been at the center of this, of putting together documents that say here are the election integrity guidelines for this moment, that democracy should not be sacrificed at the alter of crisis response, that elections need to move forward if they can be done in the right way and if they need to be postponed, it's postponed within a certain timeframe and only during a period of high crisis. So there are principles here where democracy can continue to move forward. It makes the society stronger, it builds that civic trust that's important for crisis response. But we need to... You can walk and chew gum at the same time at this moment. So I'm glad we were able to talk about some of these democratic examples. KS: Absolutely. And I will be right back after this quick message. You can hear more from other democracy heroes by listening to our DemWorks podcast available on iTunes and SoundCloud. DM: Welcome back with Kristen Sample. Of course you're new to NDI, but you know NDI very well and it's a fundamental principle everywhere that nations will only succeed when societies are fully inclusive, where they don't leave anybody behind. They enable all to contribute equally. That means women, that means young people, that means traditionally marginalized groups, LGBT communities, et cetera. It's just plain logic that if you leave anybody behind, that you're not going to get the most out of your citizen when you're going to hold your country back, and yet we are witnessing negative impacts toward these populations during this COVID-19 moment. Kristen, can you speak to this, explain what's going on here and why it matters? KS: Sure, absolutely. I mean obviously this crisis isn't occurring in a vacuum. It's occurring in a context where across the world, across all countries, there are already this array of existing intersecting inequalities where some people were coming into this crisis already in a disadvantaged place. And then the pandemic itself has differentiated impacts that affect women and other marginalized groups disproportionately. I'll just give a few examples. I mean lockdown for women who are living in relationships of power imbalance and of abuse perhaps, lockdown for them means locked in, with an abusive partner. And for instance our survey of country offices that I was referring to previously, in 66% of our countries, there seems to be an increase in sexual and gender based violence since the pandemic. In 15% of those countries, it's a significant increase. Of course these women might be locked in in vulnerable situations and then at the same time have less access to government resources, government support. So that's one example. Others, people with disabilities for instance, who have always struggled to access health services, transportation in an equitable fashion, you can imagine that that lack of access and the differentiated impact of the pandemic on them is life threatening in some cases. There are digital divide concerns, people in rural areas or women, other marginalized groups who may have less access to information, to resources. There are real concerns also and cases around the world where this pandemic is being exploited by anti migrant hate groups for instance, who try to link movement and migration to the origin of the virus. Or in some cases, for instance in Africa and some of the countries where we work, media outlets are perpetuating stereotypes against people with albinism for instance, and placing the blame for the virus on them. So there are so many challenges around making sure that people have access to resources, people are safe and that we are able to convey and support a message of social cohesion and solidarity instead of the divisions that we're seeing pop up around the world. I think that in our case, for instance in Indiana, what we're trying to do is reinforce the need for inclusive decision-making, making sure for instance, that women are involved in decision making and other marginalized groups are involved in decision making and representation and in these deliberation bodies, making sure that the policymaking is taking into account these vulnerabilities and these different differentiated needs. And also the government messaging is inclusive, getting to everybody and it's supporting the social cohesion messaging and solidarity messages. DM: And again, this is critical for the crisis response, pandemic response. I mean COVID-19 doesn't discriminate. Whoever has it, whoever is vulnerable or subject will get it and it will spread to the society writ large. So if you're not inclusive, if you're excluding folks, if politicians then see that there is an opportunity here as some politicians will to divide and conquer, to play on fear. Or spoilers from the outside may see that there are opportunities if they're divided societies, to create tensions that then require or enable them to negotiate the deal that you want to make or promote corruption within the society. There are all kinds of ways this makes societies less stable, less secure, and affects the development and certainly the response to crises. So this is not just a nice thing, it's not just a human rights thing. This is fundamentally important to national security, international security and to everything that we're seeking to achieve through democracy. KS: Absolutely. And I think along the things I'd really like to hear from you too, Derek, in terms of how you see along the lines of this being an international crisis that includes the whole world, that joins us all although we are in very different places. How you see role NDI's role in supporting that cross border cooperation and solidarity and having the international community come together? DM: Given that authoritarians are claiming their model is unique for this moment, we have to be out there making our case. But in terms of our specific adaptations that we are doing, we are working in places like Ethiopia to ensure that the public opinion surveys are necessary invents of their postponed elections or continue forward, but can be done virtually. That we can adapt legislative rules of procedure in places that need it to allow for remote voting and continue the legislative process to ensure that election integrity is maintained. As I mentioned earlier, there are certain principles and established accepted international principles for when and how to postpone elections, how to hold them during moments of crisis. And we put together crisis response kits that can be used. It's called the practical toolkit for politicians during a pandemic that can help political parties figure out how to do crisis management or help the government put together crisis communication. So a lot of things that can be done internally and done across different countries that ensure the solidarity is still there, the momentum for democracy is still there. The expectation that democratic norms are sustained in this moment so that the headlines are not simply roll back authoritarian opportunism, that massive surveillance, all the things that people may succumb to because of fear during crisis, that there is an alternative voice and it says it doesn't have to be like that. Or if it does have to be like that now, it doesn't have to continue to be like that indefinitely and that there are some standards by which these things are being imposed. So that international norm setting at this moment, it's probably more important than ever to do and we are trying to do at national level. We're trying to do it across different countries to ensure that there is not a vacuum to which the authoritarian voice moves and has free open season for its own values. It goes across, I think, a lot of different countries. And Kristen, I'd be interested in your thoughts from your perspective of governance, how that's working. KS: I think that there's a real role for the international community to play. And I wanted to highlight that too in what you're saying because these challenges are so vast that clearly we have to work together on people to people exchanges and supporting lesson sharing. And so I do think that there's an absolute role for the international community playing in terms of getting out the messages of that democracy is not a luxury, it's not something that could be put into a coma or put on hold while we're all sheltering, that it's something that has to be reaffirmed on a daily basis. And so I do think that countries also have to, in addition to standing firm, standing on their own ground on democratic principles, they also have to be willing to promote and expand those democratic principles across borders, especially to counter those liberal influences that you were referring to earlier, that in some cases are, really transmitted and increased through disinformation campaigns or phony PR campaigns that need to be called out of course by all actors. DM: Thanks again, Kristen for joining me in conversation about how democracies can best meet the challenges of COVID and how NDI with its global partners are meeting the moment. KS: Thank you, Derek. DM: I'd also like to say thank you to our listeners. To learn more about NDI or to listen to other DemWorks podcasts, please visit our website at www.ndi.org. Thanks very much.
World map of Coronavirus (Covid-19)
19. Governance is Key During COVID-19? (w/ Kristen Sample) Posted 6 days ago
Democracy (General), COVID-19 Podcast NDI Listen democracy
With the opening of the Internet to the public, in 1994, a new alternative journalistic offer emerged around the world. On the initiative of experienced and recognized professionals, these news websites are part of a common ideological and democratic project: the Internet Media Dreamin'. It represents the dream of rehabilitating a journalism committed to democratic interests and citizens, which has been perverted over the years by the economic logic of the market. To achieve this, these dreamers' adhere to the public cyberspace, as well as to its promises of citizen empowerment, deinstitutionalization of the public debate, and freedom of information sharing. For them, the Internet is more than a technology: it is a solution that would allow them to circumvent a hegemonic information environment. Focusing on the process of reconfiguration of the journalistic landscape, this PhD thesis questions the ability of the online alternative offer to break with the institutional hierarchies of information, by proposing media spaces that promote a polyphonic citizen expression. This initial questioning is developed from three perspectives: 1) the individual and their citizen and media action; 2) the media and their communication positioning in the public debate; and 3) media structures and journalistic practices.Our study panel is composed of 50 news pure plays from Brazil and from France: a global one with editions in each of the two countries, and 48 alternative national projects. For its treatment, we implemented a thematic content analysis based on data collected through information monitoring conducted between 2016 and 2019, and 31 semi-structured interviews with content producers involved in the projects studied. Inspired by the method of media information gender analysis established by Patrick Charaudeau (1997, 2006, 2011), we analyzed the discourse of two "event-theme" articles (Soulages, 2002): women's condition and presidential elections of 2017 in France and 2018 in Brazil. To carry out this study, 3,147 texts were collected using manual and automatic methods, then processed according to the positions and the engagement levels of the speakers, according to two axes: enunciative postures and discursive points of view. To structure our discussions, this thesis is organized in two parts, which refer to the temporal evolution of the ideological and media development of alternative online journalistic projects. The first part, entitled "In Dreams", reveals a theoretical and empirical problematization of three ideological and democratic projects, that we call Internet Dreamin', Media Dreamin' and Internet Media Dreamin '. Then "In flesh and blood" aims to ponder about the incarnation process of the Internet Media Dreamin' in and by the social body. For this, we develop three chapters based on the tensions established by alternative journalism producers regarding the dominant journalistic models: 1) bourgeois and citizen voice; 2) homogeneous and heterogeneous information; 3) dependent and independent media. In addition to these theoretical and empirical contributions, this thesis aims to propose a methodology for the constitution of discursive cartography, eliciting the degree of commitment of the media offer. ; Avec l'ouverture d'Internet au public, en 1994, une nouvelle offre journalistique alternative naît à travers le monde. À l'initiative de professionnels expérimentés et reconnus, ces sites d'information s'inscrivent dans un projet idéologique et démocratique commun : l'Internet Media Dreamin'. Ils rêvent de réhabiliter un journalisme engagé dans les intérêts démocratiques et citoyens, qui a été perverti au fil des années par des logiques économiques de marché. Pour ce faire, les dreamers' adhèrent au cyberespace public, ainsi qu'à ses promesses d'autonomisation citoyenne, de désinstitutionnalisation du débat public et de liberté du partage informationnel. Internet est pour eux bien plus qu'une technologie : c'est une solution qui leur permettrait de dribbler un environnement informationnel hégémonique. Portée sur le processus de reconfiguration du paysage journalistique, cette thèse interroge la capacité de l'offre alternative en ligne à rompre avec les hiérarchies institutionnalisées de l'information, en proposant des espaces médiatiques qui favorisent l'expression citoyenne polyphonique. Ce questionnement initial est décliné en trois perspectives de réflexion : 1) l'individu et son action médiatique citoyenne ; 2) les instances médiatiques et leur positionnement communicationnel dans le débat public ; et 3) les structures médiatiques et les pratiques journalistiques. Notre panel d'étude est composé par 50 pure players d'information du Brésil et de la France : un média global ayant des déclinaisons dans les deux pays étudiés et 48 projets alternatifs nationaux. Pour son traitement, nous avons mené une analyse de contenus thématique à partir des données récoltées lors de veilles documentaires réalisées entre 2016 et 2019, et de 31 entretiens semi-directifs menés auprès des producteurs de contenus inscrits dans les projets étudiés. Inspirés par le dispositif d'analyse de genre d'information médiatique établi par Patrick Charaudeau (1997, 2006, 2011), nous avons procédé à l'analyse de discours de publications selon deux « thèmes-événements » (Soulages, 2002) : la condition féminine et les élections présidentielles de 2017 en France et de 2018 au Brésil. Pour la réalisation de cette étude, 3 147 textes ont été récoltés à l'aide de méthodes manuelles et automatiques, puis traités à partir du positionnement et des degrés d'engagement des locuteurs selon deux axes : postures énonciatives et points de vue discursifs. Pour structurer nos discussions, notre thèse est organisée en deux parties, renvoyant à la temporalité évolutive du développement idéologique et médiatique des projets journalistiques alternatifs en ligne. La première partie, intitulée « en Rêve », révèle une problématisation théorique et empirique de trois projets idéologiques et démocratiques que nous avons convenu d'appeler Internet Dreamin', Media Dreamin' et Internet Media Dreamin'. Ensuite « en Chair et en Os » est dédiée à l'incarnation de l'Internet Media Dreamin' dans et par le corps social. Pour cela, nous développons trois chapitres structurés à partir des tensions établies par les producteurs d'information alternatifs par rapport aux modèles journalistiques dominants : 1) voix bourgeoise et citoyenne ; 2) information homogène et hétérogène ; 3) dépendance et indépendance médiatique. En plus des discussions théoriques et empiriques, cette thèse a pour ambition de proposer une méthodologie pour la constitution des cartographies discursives, révélatrices du degré d'engagement de l'offre médiatique.
With the opening of the Internet to the public, in 1994, a new alternative journalistic offer emerged around the world. On the initiative of experienced and recognized professionals, these news websites are part of a common ideological and democratic project: the Internet Media Dreamin'. It represents the dream of rehabilitating a journalism committed to democratic interests and citizens, which has been perverted over the years by the economic logic of the market. To achieve this, these dreamers' adhere to the public cyberspace, as well as to its promises of citizen empowerment, deinstitutionalization of the public debate, and freedom of information sharing. For them, the Internet is more than a technology: it is a solution that would allow them to circumvent a hegemonic information environment. Focusing on the process of reconfiguration of the journalistic landscape, this PhD thesis questions the ability of the online alternative offer to break with the institutional hierarchies of information, by proposing media spaces that promote a polyphonic citizen expression. This initial questioning is developed from three perspectives: 1) the individual and their citizen and media action; 2) the media and their communication positioning in the public debate; and 3) media structures and journalistic practices.Our study panel is composed of 50 news pure plays from Brazil and from France: a global one with editions in each of the two countries, and 48 alternative national projects. For its treatment, we implemented a thematic content analysis based on data collected through information monitoring conducted between 2016 and 2019, and 31 semi-structured interviews with content producers involved in the projects studied. Inspired by the method of media information gender analysis established by Patrick Charaudeau (1997, 2006, 2011), we analyzed the discourse of two "event-theme" articles (Soulages, 2002): women's condition and presidential elections of 2017 in France and 2018 in Brazil. To carry out this study, 3,147 texts were collected using manual and automatic methods, then processed according to the positions and the engagement levels of the speakers, according to two axes: enunciative postures and discursive points of view. To structure our discussions, this thesis is organized in two parts, which refer to the temporal evolution of the ideological and media development of alternative online journalistic projects. The first part, entitled "In Dreams", reveals a theoretical and empirical problematization of three ideological and democratic projects, that we call Internet Dreamin', Media Dreamin' and Internet Media Dreamin '. Then "In flesh and blood" aims to ponder about the incarnation process of the Internet Media Dreamin' in and by the social body. For this, we develop three chapters based on the tensions established by alternative journalism producers regarding the dominant journalistic models: 1) bourgeois and citizen voice; 2) homogeneous and heterogeneous information; 3) dependent and independent media. In addition to these theoretical and empirical contributions, this thesis aims to propose a methodology for the constitution of discursive cartography, eliciting the degree of commitment of the media offer. ; Avec l'ouverture d'Internet au public, en 1994, une nouvelle offre journalistique alternative naît à travers le monde. À l'initiative de professionnels expérimentés et reconnus, ces sites d'information s'inscrivent dans un projet idéologique et démocratique commun : l'Internet Media Dreamin'. Ils rêvent de réhabiliter un journalisme engagé dans les intérêts démocratiques et citoyens, qui a été perverti au fil des années par des logiques économiques de marché. Pour ce faire, les dreamers' adhèrent au cyberespace public, ainsi qu'à ses promesses d'autonomisation citoyenne, de désinstitutionnalisation du débat public et de liberté du partage informationnel. Internet est pour eux bien plus qu'une technologie : c'est une solution qui leur permettrait de dribbler un environnement informationnel hégémonique. Portée sur le processus de reconfiguration du paysage journalistique, cette thèse interroge la capacité de l'offre alternative en ligne à rompre avec les hiérarchies institutionnalisées de l'information, en proposant des espaces médiatiques qui favorisent l'expression citoyenne polyphonique. Ce questionnement initial est décliné en trois perspectives de réflexion : 1) l'individu et son action médiatique citoyenne ; 2) les instances médiatiques et leur positionnement communicationnel dans le débat public ; et 3) les structures médiatiques et les pratiques journalistiques. Notre panel d'étude est composé par 50 pure players d'information du Brésil et de la France : un média global ayant des déclinaisons dans les deux pays étudiés et 48 projets alternatifs nationaux. Pour son traitement, nous avons mené une analyse de contenus thématique à partir des données récoltées lors de veilles documentaires réalisées entre 2016 et 2019, et de 31 entretiens semi-directifs menés auprès des producteurs de contenus inscrits dans les projets étudiés. Inspirés par le dispositif d'analyse de genre d'information médiatique établi par Patrick Charaudeau (1997, 2006, 2011), nous avons procédé à l'analyse de discours de publications selon deux « thèmes-événements » (Soulages, 2002) : la condition féminine et les élections présidentielles de 2017 en France et de 2018 au Brésil. Pour la réalisation de cette étude, 3 147 textes ont été récoltés à l'aide de méthodes manuelles et automatiques, puis traités à partir du positionnement et des degrés d'engagement des locuteurs selon deux axes : postures énonciatives et points de vue discursifs. Pour structurer nos discussions, notre thèse est organisée en deux parties, renvoyant à la temporalité évolutive du développement idéologique et médiatique des projets journalistiques alternatifs en ligne. La première partie, intitulée « en Rêve », révèle une problématisation théorique et empirique de trois projets idéologiques et démocratiques que nous avons convenu d'appeler Internet Dreamin', Media Dreamin' et Internet Media Dreamin'. Ensuite « en Chair et en Os » est dédiée à l'incarnation de l'Internet Media Dreamin' dans et par le corps social. Pour cela, nous développons trois chapitres structurés à partir des tensions établies par les producteurs d'information alternatifs par rapport aux modèles journalistiques dominants : 1) voix bourgeoise et citoyenne ; 2) information homogène et hétérogène ; 3) dépendance et indépendance médiatique. En plus des discussions théoriques et empiriques, cette thèse a pour ambition de proposer une méthodologie pour la constitution des cartographies discursives, révélatrices du degré d'engagement de l'offre médiatique.
With the opening of the Internet to the public, in 1994, a new alternative journalistic offer emerged around the world. On the initiative of experienced and recognized professionals, these news websites are part of a common ideological and democratic project: the Internet Media Dreamin'. It represents the dream of rehabilitating a journalism committed to democratic interests and citizens, which has been perverted over the years by the economic logic of the market. To achieve this, these dreamers' adhere to the public cyberspace, as well as to its promises of citizen empowerment, deinstitutionalization of the public debate, and freedom of information sharing. For them, the Internet is more than a technology: it is a solution that would allow them to circumvent a hegemonic information environment. Focusing on the process of reconfiguration of the journalistic landscape, this PhD thesis questions the ability of the online alternative offer to break with the institutional hierarchies of information, by proposing media spaces that promote a polyphonic citizen expression. This initial questioning is developed from three perspectives: 1) the individual and their citizen and media action; 2) the media and their communication positioning in the public debate; and 3) media structures and journalistic practices.Our study panel is composed of 50 news pure plays from Brazil and from France: a global one with editions in each of the two countries, and 48 alternative national projects. For its treatment, we implemented a thematic content analysis based on data collected through information monitoring conducted between 2016 and 2019, and 31 semi-structured interviews with content producers involved in the projects studied. Inspired by the method of media information gender analysis established by Patrick Charaudeau (1997, 2006, 2011), we analyzed the discourse of two "event-theme" articles (Soulages, 2002): women's condition and presidential elections of 2017 in France and 2018 in Brazil. To carry out this study, 3,147 texts were collected using manual and automatic methods, then processed according to the positions and the engagement levels of the speakers, according to two axes: enunciative postures and discursive points of view. To structure our discussions, this thesis is organized in two parts, which refer to the temporal evolution of the ideological and media development of alternative online journalistic projects. The first part, entitled "In Dreams", reveals a theoretical and empirical problematization of three ideological and democratic projects, that we call Internet Dreamin', Media Dreamin' and Internet Media Dreamin '. Then "In flesh and blood" aims to ponder about the incarnation process of the Internet Media Dreamin' in and by the social body. For this, we develop three chapters based on the tensions established by alternative journalism producers regarding the dominant journalistic models: 1) bourgeois and citizen voice; 2) homogeneous and heterogeneous information; 3) dependent and independent media. In addition to these theoretical and empirical contributions, this thesis aims to propose a methodology for the constitution of discursive cartography, eliciting the degree of commitment of the media offer. ; Avec l'ouverture d'Internet au public, en 1994, une nouvelle offre journalistique alternative naît à travers le monde. À l'initiative de professionnels expérimentés et reconnus, ces sites d'information s'inscrivent dans un projet idéologique et démocratique commun : l'Internet Media Dreamin'. Ils rêvent de réhabiliter un journalisme engagé dans les intérêts démocratiques et citoyens, qui a été perverti au fil des années par des logiques économiques de marché. Pour ce faire, les dreamers' adhèrent au cyberespace public, ainsi qu'à ses promesses d'autonomisation citoyenne, de désinstitutionnalisation du débat public et de liberté du partage informationnel. Internet est pour eux bien plus qu'une technologie : c'est une solution qui leur permettrait de dribbler un environnement informationnel hégémonique. Portée sur le processus de reconfiguration du paysage journalistique, cette thèse interroge la capacité de l'offre alternative en ligne à rompre avec les hiérarchies institutionnalisées de l'information, en proposant des espaces médiatiques qui favorisent l'expression citoyenne polyphonique. Ce questionnement initial est décliné en trois perspectives de réflexion : 1) l'individu et son action médiatique citoyenne ; 2) les instances médiatiques et leur positionnement communicationnel dans le débat public ; et 3) les structures médiatiques et les pratiques journalistiques. Notre panel d'étude est composé par 50 pure players d'information du Brésil et de la France : un média global ayant des déclinaisons dans les deux pays étudiés et 48 projets alternatifs nationaux. Pour son traitement, nous avons mené une analyse de contenus thématique à partir des données récoltées lors de veilles documentaires réalisées entre 2016 et 2019, et de 31 entretiens semi-directifs menés auprès des producteurs de contenus inscrits dans les projets étudiés. Inspirés par le dispositif d'analyse de genre d'information médiatique établi par Patrick Charaudeau (1997, 2006, 2011), nous avons procédé à l'analyse de discours de publications selon deux « thèmes-événements » (Soulages, 2002) : la condition féminine et les élections présidentielles de 2017 en France et de 2018 au Brésil. Pour la réalisation de cette étude, 3 147 textes ont été récoltés à l'aide de méthodes manuelles et automatiques, puis traités à partir du positionnement et des degrés d'engagement des locuteurs selon deux axes : postures énonciatives et points de vue discursifs. Pour structurer nos discussions, notre thèse est organisée en deux parties, renvoyant à la temporalité évolutive du développement idéologique et médiatique des projets journalistiques alternatifs en ligne. La première partie, intitulée « en Rêve », révèle une problématisation théorique et empirique de trois projets idéologiques et démocratiques que nous avons convenu d'appeler Internet Dreamin', Media Dreamin' et Internet Media Dreamin'. Ensuite « en Chair et en Os » est dédiée à l'incarnation de l'Internet Media Dreamin' dans et par le corps social. Pour cela, nous développons trois chapitres structurés à partir des tensions établies par les producteurs d'information alternatifs par rapport aux modèles journalistiques dominants : 1) voix bourgeoise et citoyenne ; 2) information homogène et hétérogène ; 3) dépendance et indépendance médiatique. En plus des discussions théoriques et empiriques, cette thèse a pour ambition de proposer une méthodologie pour la constitution des cartographies discursives, révélatrices du degré d'engagement de l'offre médiatique.
The 1970 AAPOR Conference was held May 21-24 at the Hotel Sagamore, Lake George, NY. It was chaired by Irving Crespi. An introductory note is presented by Ronald Gatty & John P. Robinson, Proceedings Ed's. The AAPOR Award for Exceptionally Distinguished Achievement was given to Archibald M. Crossley. The Presidential Address was given by Robert T. Bower (Bur of Soc Sci Res, Inc, Washington, DC), & entitled CAVEAT VENDITOR: SOME OBSERVATIONS ON RESEARCH SPONSORS AND PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS. It discusses 3 variants of client perspective in PO res & their relationship to professional norms-the adversary, with his interest in manipulative potentials & lack of interest in high technical standards; the soc action program official, who raises problems for res'ers in protecting the interests of their R's; & the proprietor who inhibits the full & free exchange of survey results. It is held that further attempts must be made to gain some consensus on standards in PO res. In THE IM- PACT OF THE SURVEY METHOD ON THEORY, abstracts of the following papers are given: Robin M. Williams, Jr (Cornell U, Ithaca, NY), 'Sociology and the Survey Method'; Albert G. Hart (Columbia U, New York, NY), 'Impact of Survey Research on Economic Theory'; Norman Bradburn (Nat'l Opinion Res Center, Chicago, Ill), 'Survey Research and Psychological Theory.' In COMMUNICATIONS THEORY REVISITED, the following are presented: Herbert E. Krugman, 'Electroencephalographic Aspects of Low Involvements: Implications for the McLuhan Hypothesis'; Clark Leavitt, 'Classic Models of Communications Effects and Innovations in these Models'; Bruce H. Westley (U of Kentucky, Lexington), 'Communications Theory and General Systems Theory: Implications for Planned Change.' In PUBLIC OPINION DATA AND OTHER REALITIES: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, the following are presented: Alfred O. Hero, Jr, 'American Public Opinion Versus Official US Foreign Policy: 1936-68'; Michael A. Rappoport, 'Trends in American Political Behavior'; Daniel Yankelovich, 'The Wrong Enemy.' In OPINION AND MARKET RESEARCH IN DEVELOPING NATIONS (WAPOR SESSION), papers are given by: Fred G. Burke (State U of New York, Buffalo), 'Some Grass Roots Attitudes Affecting Political and Social Integration in East Africa'; George M. Gaither, 'Research into Attitudes Toward the Free Enterprise System in Latin America'; Michel Hoffmann (Marcomer S. A., Paris, France), 'Recent Research in Western Africa.' In TOWARD RESPONSIBILITY IN THE REPORTING OF OPINION SUR- VEYS, the following presentations are made: Lucien Nedzi (Congressman, 14th District, Mich), 'Will Legislation Help?'; Philip Meyer (Russell Sage Foundation, New York, NY), 'The Journalist: Friend or Foe?'; Mervin D. Field, 'Response: The Researcher's View.' In TOWARD A THEORY OF PUBLIC OPINION, papers are presented by M. Brewster Smith (U of Chicago, Ill), 'Some Psychological Perspectives on the Theory of Public Opinion'; Sidney Verba (U of Chicago, 111), 'The Impact of Public on Policy'; TRACKING SOCIAL CHANGE: Richard Maisel (New York U, NY), 'Subjective Social Indicators: The Measurement of Well-Being'; Victor D. Beardsley, 'Monitoring the Environment through Community Leaders'; Lawrence Bloomberg (US Bur of the Budget, Washington, DC), 'Social Indicators: Their Past, Present, and Future'; Howard Baumgartel (U of Kansas, Lawrence), 'A Survey Approach to Measuring the Penetration of Modern Management Practices in India.' In CONSUMER ATTITUDES AND BUYING INTEN- TIONS AS AIDS TO MARKETING FORECASTING AND GOV- ERNMENT POLICIES (WAPOR SESSION), the following are included: Gordon Heald (London Business Sch, England), 'The Use of Consumer Attitude and Buying-Intentions Data as an Aid to Government Policymaking'; Wim de Jonge, 'Price Expectations and Time to Buy'; Jay Schmiedeskamp (U of Michigan, Ann Arbor), 'Understanding Why Consumer Attitudes and Expectations Change.' NEW DIRECTIONS IN ELECTION RE- SEARCH, includes: Robert C. Sorensen, 'Social Invention in Political Polling: An Urban Case History'; Samuel Lubell, 'The Hidden Crisis in American Politics'; William R. Klecka (Northwestern U, Evanston, Ill), 'The Use of Political Generations in Studying Political Change'; Derek W. Urwin (Yale U, New Haven, Conn), 'Persistence and Change in Western Party Systems, 1945-1968.' A section entitled, STUDENT AWARD PAPERS presents: Charles K. Atkin (U of Wisconsin, Madison), 'Reassessing Two Alternative Explanations of De Facto Selective Exposure'; Gary A. Mauser (U of California, Irvine), 'A Structural Approach to Predicting Patterns of Electoral Substitution'; Philip Palmgreen (U of Kentucky, Lexington), 'A Daydream Model of Communication: The Effect of Daydreaming on Message Reception and Comprehension.' NEW DIRECTIONS IN ANALYTICAL MODELS, ineludes: Russel Haley, 'Marketing Implications of the Perceptual Screen'; F. Gerald Kline, Marshall J. Graney, & Dennis K. Davis (U of Minnesota, Minneapolis), 'Mass Communication Theory and Nonmetric Models'; Leonard S. Kogan (City U of New York, NY), 'Multivariate Methods and Attitude Research.' BLACKS IN AMERICA TODAY: POLITICS, EDUCA- TION, AND CONSUMER BEHAVIOR, contains: Edith Arlen, 'Social Psychological Themes in Negro Life Styles'; Walter Reichman & Marguerite Levy (City U of New York, NY), 'Academic Motivation of College Discovery Program Students and Regular Matriculants in Community Colleges of the City University of New York'; Robert T. Riley & Thomas F. Pettigrew (Harvard U, Cambridge, Mass), 'Sources of White Support for Hatcher, Stokes, and Bradley.' RECENT RESEARCH IN IN- TERVIEWING, presents: Regina Loewenstein & Andre A. O. Varma (Columbia U, New York, NY), 'Effect of Interaction of Interviewers and Respondents in Health Surveys'; Fansayde Calloway (Nat'l Opinion Res Center, Chicago, Ill), 'Interviewers Wanted: No Experience Necessary'; Andre Laurent (U of Michigan, Ann Arbor), 'Memory and Information Retrieval in the Interview.' In NEW PERSPECTIVES IN CROSS- CULTURAL RESEARCH, the following are included: D. F. Haythorne, et al (U of Alberta, Calgary), 'Cross-National Differences in Reported Health Behavior'; Richard W. Brislin (Western Washington State Coll, Bellingham), 'Cross Cultural Attitude Measurement'; Alexander Szalai, 'The Timing of Everyday Activities in Twelve Countries'; F. B. Waisanen & Hideya Kumata (Michigan State U, East Lansing), 'Functional Literacy in Comparative Perspective.' YOUTH IN AMERICA TODAY: POLITICS, CIGARETTES, AND DRUGS, contains: Michael Maidenberg & Philip Meyer (Russell Sage Foundation, New York, NY), 'The Berkeley Rebels: Five Years Later'; Seymour Lieberman, 'Cigarette Smoking and the Teenager'; Eric Josephson (Columbia U, New York, NY), 'Adult Perceptions of Youthful Drug Behavior'; Ann F. Brunswick (Columbia U, New York, NY), 'Black Adolescents: Some of Their Self-Attitudes and Expectations of Life.' A brief report of the Annual Advisory AAPOR Business Meeting concludes the Proceedings. M. Maxfield.
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The horrific atrocities perpetrated by Hamas on Israelis and the humanitarian crisis unfolding in Gaza amid Israel's response have rightfully focused policymakers on what needs to be done to respond to the immediate crisis and prevent further tragedy. Unfortunately, some of the calls for action from Congress risk increasing humanitarian suffering and further punishing ordinary civilians. This includes reckless calls by Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) and others to expand the war to Iran, which would further embroil Americans, Israelis, and Iranians alike in more senseless bloodshed.Less bombastic, but also unwise, are calls from Senate Republicans, and a handful of Democrats facing challenging elections next year, for the U.S. to renege on the recent agreement that freed five Iranian-American hostages by "freezing" Iran's access to $6 billion held in Qatari banks that can only be used for humanitarian purchases of food and medicine.These calls reflect a fundamental misunderstanding regarding these funds and, if implemented, would likely violate exemptions in U.S. law that food, medicine, and humanitarian goods cannot be subjected to sanctions.The bulk of the funds originate from a 2018 Trump administration decision to grant short-term waivers for South Korea to continue to purchase Iranian oil. The funds expended for those purchases were deposited in restricted accounts within South Korea. Under existing sanctions exemptions, Iran could theoretically have used these funds to purchase non-sanctioned humanitarian goods within South Korea. However, due to practical complications, including concerns by South Korea of potentially running afoul of additional U.S. sanctions, the funds in this account remained largely untouched. As a result, the Biden administration used this as leverage to get something in return — the freeing of American dual nationals from Iran.The U.S. did not "unfreeze the funds." Rather, the U.S. allowed the money to be transferred to banks in Qatar, where they remain frozen, as they were in South Korea, for any use other than for humanitarian purchases. As a result, lawmakers who propose the funds be "frozen" are implying that they should be blocked from being used to purchase food and medicine, despite humanitarian exemptions built into U.S. law.U.S. officials have noted that these funds are being tightly monitored by the Treasury Department and can only be expended on legitimate humanitarian goods like food and medicine. Yet partisan critics of the prisoner release rapidly seized on the horrific events in Israel to falsely claim these funds were used to finance the attacks, forcing Biden administration officials to correct the record.This week, Secretary of State Antony Blinken made this point crystal clear, stating, "Not a single dollar from that account has actually been spent to date. And in any event, it's very carefully and closely regulated by the Treasury Department to make sure that it's only used for food, for medicine, for medical equipment." This matches earlier statements clarifying that the U.S. is closely watching how the funds are spent.As U.S. Deputy National Security Advisor Jon Finer explained in August, "the reason we can be confident" that the funds will only be used for humanitarian purchases "is that the U.S. Treasury Department has oversight over all of the funds in this account, and we'll be able to monitor any transactions that they are used for to make sure that they're used for the proper purposes…we are going to be very carefully monitoring and using very careful oversight, again, through the Treasury Department to make sure it's used the way it's intended."Beyond the unprecedented cancellation of humanitarian exemptions, blocking these funds would renege on yet another rare diplomatic agreement with Iran. This would render any diplomacy with Iran exceptionally difficult for Biden's remaining time in office, including on critically important issues like hostages, regional security, and the nuclear program. The Trump administration did untold damage to U.S. credibility by reneging on the multilateral 2015 nuclear deal with Iran struck under the Obama administration. This gave hardliners in Iran the upper hand in advocating against restoring the far-reaching nonproliferation accord under Biden, helping ensure Iran's nuclear program is on the cusp of weapons production today. As a result of this historically self-defeating foreign policy decision, a regional spillover of the conflict in Israel could now have nuclear dimensions.Reneging on a hostage deal would double down on this error and further diminish U.S. diplomatic credibility, and Biden's credibility in particular, with a range of adversarial nations. This would undoubtedly make it much more difficult to get Americans home safely from a host of places — including potentially Gaza. Biden has rightly made getting Americans home a priority -— including from Russia, Venezuela, Iran and other nations. It would be a major error to diminish that track record and convey a lack of seriousness that the U.S. will follow through to get its people home to safety. Diplomatic options to free wrongfully detained Americans will be even more difficult, if not fully taken off the table.Additionally, this knee jerk reaction seems to dismiss out of hand any possibility of determining whether Iran could conceivably be an interlocutor for getting hostages freed from Hamas. George H.W. Bush administration officials credited Iran with playing a critical role in securing the eventual release of American and other foreign hostages held for years by Iran-backed Hezbollah in Lebanon. Slamming the door on Iranian funds in Qatar risks removing one of the few levers that Biden can pull to secure freedom for Americans.While Iran offers material support for Hamas and has done so for quite some time, it appears that Tehran did not have a direct role in Hamas's decision to launch the attack in Israel. This makes it all the more important for policymakers to take time to understand the situation and consider how rapid shifts in U.S. policy could backfire amid a fast-moving situation. While it is understandable that some policymakers would speak rashly while emotions are running high, decision-making requires clear thinking. Rather than kneejerk reactions that risk backfiring, members of Congress should give the administration space to uphold its prior agreements with Iran and leave no stone unturned to secure freedom for Americans and move toward a ceasefire and just peace.
