The population of Ethiopia is still growing by 2.6% per annum mainly due to high fertility of 4.8 children per woman. Though increasing in the current decade, only about a quarter of married women used family planning methods in 2011. Though early childhood mortality diminished in recent years, this decline was not statistically significant in infant mortality. Levels and extent of reductions in the three components of population change and their relationships varied across different regions and by urban-rural setting in the country. Previous studies elsewhere showed relationship between population dynamics and health. Studies also revealed that intervention in one component of population change affects another component. A body of literature on insurance and replacement fertility response of childhood mortality were documented in least developing countries. Moreover, selection, disruption, adaptation, environmental theories had also documented the relationship between migration with fertility and under-five mortality. Migration might select people with different fertility behavior and childhood mortality experience compared to those without such behavior. If those with less number of children migrate, the fertility and child mortality of non-migrants in the place of origin would be inflated compared to those of the migrants. Among the latter group, the disruption due to migration might contribute to reduction in fertility or increase in early childhood mortality. Besides, the group might adapt the fertility behavior of the population in the area of destination. In this regard, this thesis aimed at measuring levels of and assessing relationships between fertility, contraception, under-five mortality and migration in the designated area of the study. It also tried to identify main proximate and distal factors of each of these components of population change in the context of the recently introduced village-based health extension program, reproductive health strategy and population policy in the densely populated Butajira District of South Central Ethiopia. Methods The study was hosted by the Butajira Demographic Surveillance System which is located about 135 kms from Addis Ababa in the southern direction. Qualitative and quantitative methods were employed in this study. The quantitative research used two data sources. The longitudinal surveillance database up to the end of 2008 was extracted to recruit study women of reproductive age for the cross-sectional study which aimed at measuring levels and identifying determinants of fertility, contraception and the unmet need of family planning. The database was also used to have a detailed insight into early childhood mortality and out-migration in the district. Standard data collection instruments of the INDEPTH-Network and Measure DHS were contextually adapted for the longitudinal database and the cross-sectional survey respectively. A priori focus group discussions were held to incorporate the community's terminologies and opinions. A total of 11,133 women of reproductive age were recruited from the surveillance database and 9,996 of them responded positively. Especially trained and experienced field staff collected the data. There was rigorous supervision. Data sources were managed by softwares having internal consistency checking mechanisms. Cleaning was done at desk. Serious anomalies were taken back to the field for reconciliation, while others were rectified by imputing values from logical flows in the questionnaire. Frequency distributions, cross-tabulations and graphical presentations were done. Event history analysis was used to calculate person time of exposure, incidence and prevalence rates using longitudinal data. Odds ratio along with the 95% confidence interval in binary logistic regression was used to determine association between covariates and the binary outcome of interest. In the case of fertility, Bongaart's model to measure the inhibition effects of proximate determinants and the incidence rate ratio in Poisson regression along with the 95% confidence interval was used to measure the association between fertility and covariates. Poisson regression was also used to measure associations of background characteristics with out-migration and under-five mortality. Assumptions of all the statistical models used in this study were checked. Results The total fertility rate of 5.3 children per woman was high and comparable to the rest of Ethiopia with rural-urban disparity (Highland, TFR=5.7, Lowland, TFR=6.6 and Urban, TFR=3.3). Postpartum infecundability due to breastfeeding (Ci=0.68) significantly deducted fertility from its biological maximum. The contribution of contraception (Cc-u=0.57, Cc-e=0.43) and nonmarriage (Cm-u=0.53, Cm-e=0.41) was important among urbanites and educated women. Abortion contributed a significant role to reduce fertility among school youth (Ca=0.76). The fertility incidence rate ratio was 1.38: 95% CI (1.27, 1.49) times higher among those married before their 15 birthday, 1.24: 95% CI (1.10, 1.39) times higher among uneducated, 1.95: 95% CI (1.84, 2.06) times higher among those families with large size, 1.67: 95% CI (1.59, 1.76) times higher with child death experience and 1.06: 95% CI (1.01, 1.13) times higher among women living in food-secured households compared to their counterparts. Against other findings, fertility was 1.09: 95% CI (1.04, 1.15) significantly higher among women with no child sex preference. Besides, migration status of women did not seem to predict their fertility levels (1.02: 95% CI (0.97, 1.07)). The contraceptive prevalence rate of 25.4%: 95% CI (24.2, 26.5) in Butajira District was comparable though unmet need of 52.4%: 95% CI (51.1, 53.7) was very high compared to national and regional estimates. Full stock out and absence of methods' mix, religion, complaints related to providers and methods, assumption of having proper diet, and optimum workload when using family planning methods were barriers of contraceptive use mentioned by study women in the area. The odds of contraception was 2.3: 95% CI (1.66, 3.18) times higher among urbanites, 1.99: 95% CI (1.38, 2.88) times higher among those completed secondary level of education and 1.5: 95% CI (1.12, 2.01) times higher among women whose partners completed secondary plus level of education, 1.3: 95% CI (1.13, 1.5) times higher among women with no experience of child death, 2.21: (1.8, 2.7) times higher among couples who discussed on contraception and 2.59: 95% CI (2.11, 3.17) times higher among women whose partners' support family planning use compared to their counterparts. Under-five mortality level of 29 per 1000: 95% CI (27.4, 31.8) in the District recorded over the 22 years of surveillance was low. The difference between infant mortality of 86.6 per 1000: 95% CI (77.4, 96.9) and child mortality of 19.2 per 1000: 95% CI (17.4, 21.3) was higher. Compared to their counterparts, the study also showed 0.85: 95% CI (0.79, 0.80) times lower under-five mortality among female children, 1.14: 95% CI (1.03, 1.25) times higher under five mortality among Muslim and 15.24: 95% CI (13.75, 16.89) times higher among minority Christian families, 1.31: 95% CI (1.04, 1.66) and 2.02: 95% CI (1.58, 2.59) times higher among rural highlanders and rural lowlanders respectively, 1.54: (1.43, 1.67) times higher among families owning oxen, and 1.92: 95% CI (1.66, 2.22) times higher among families owning houses and 2.4: 95% CI (1.89, 2.06) times higher among those living in rented houses and 2.13: 95% CI (1.79, 2.53) times higher in children living in houses roofed with thatched grass, and 1.46: 95% CI (1.26, 1.69) times higher among those living in the neighborhoods located 5-9 kilometers away from Butajira zonal hospital. The study also revealed high out-migration of 3.97 per 100 person years (3.93, 4.01) in the district. The risk of out-migration was 0.94: 95% CI (0.92, 0.96) times lower among females, 1.9: 95% CI (1.85, 1.96), 1.77: 95% CI (1.71, 1.82), 1.55: 95% CI (1.49, 1.62), 1.23: 95% CI (1.17, 1.29) or 2.82: 95% CI (2.66, 2.98), 1.29: 95% CI (1.26, 1.32), 4.71: 95% CI (4.56, 4.87), 1.18: 95% CI (1.15, 1.22), 1.58: 95% CI (1.52, 1.64) and 2.11: 95% (2.04, 2.18) times higher among teenagers, the youth, unmarried, primary school completes or above, Orthodox and minority Christians, urbanites, and those living in rented houses and owned by others compared to their respective counterparts. Some relationship between the three components of population change was also observed. There was statistically significant association between early childhood mortality and fertility (6.07: 95% CI (5.36, 6.87)). However, the association between fertility and migration status was not statistically significant (1.05: 95% CI (0.92, 1.19)). Neither was the association between underfive mortality and migration statistically significant (1.04: 95% CI (0.92, 1.19)). Conclusions and Recommendations Fertility was still high in the study community with high rural urban disparity. The most effective proximate determinant to deduct fertility from its biological maximum level was non-marriage due to disruption of marriage through migration of one of the partners. The contribution of contraception and non-marriage was also important among urbanites and educated women. Postpartum infecundability also significantly reduced fertility from its biological maximum in rural areas and among uneducated women. Abortion had also played an important role in reducing fertility among in-school youth. Delayed marriage, higher education, smaller family size, absence of child death in the family, and living in food-secured households were also significantly associated with small number of children. Besides, fertility was significantly higher among women with no child sex preference. However, migration status of women was not statistically significant. The contraceptive prevalence rate in Butajira District was still low, though unmet need was very high. Barrier to contraception in the area included, stock out and absence of preferred family planning methods, religion, complaints related to providers and methods, assumption of having proper diet, and optimum workload when using family planning methods. Significant predictors of contraception in the district included urban residence, women's and their partners' educational status, child death experience, couple's discussion on contraception, and partners' support. The magnitude of overall early childhood mortality levels in the district recorded over the 22 years of surveillance, though low compared to the national and regional level was still high. Infant mortality was higher than child mortality in the district. Under-five mortality was significantly higher among male children, families confessing Muslim and non-Orthodox Christian denominations, rural residents, families owning oxen, those having their own houses, families living in rent-free houses, households living in houses with roofs of thatched grass, and families living in neighborhoods located between 5-9 kilometers from the zonal hospital as compared with their counterparts. A high incidence of out-migration was observed in the district with higher level among males, teenagers, the youth, primary and secondary education or above completes, those not in marital unions, Christians, urbanites, and families in rented and owed houses compared to those in owned ones. This study had also showed statistically significant association between early childhood mortality and fertility. The association between fertility and migration was not statistically significant. Neither was the case between early childhood mortality and migration in the study area. We recommend that the ills of fast population growth and its consequences should be intensively informed to the public. Women must be encouraged to sustain the practice of extended breastfeeding. Efforts should also be exerted to increase contraceptive use in rural communities. Besides, in-school youth should be aware of post-abortion complications and youth friendly family planning methods to reduce fertility, maternal mortality and childhood mortality in the community. Longer years of women's education should be scaled up. Health systems in Butajira District and the capacity of staff should be strengthened. The Government should avail family planning methods with appropriate method mix and increase competence of providers on managing temporary side effects. More rigorous child and maternal health education should be channeled through village-based health extension workers. Household hygiene, antenatal care, immunization and facility based delivery in the district should be scaled up. More efforts should also be exerted to improve the quality of residential houses. An insurance scheme to care for the elderly should be put in place to bring about change in the behavior of families towards small family size. We suggest that local authorities need to facilitate local employment and housing opportunities for retaining young and educated people in their own areas, to safeguard the future well-being of the entire population
The population of Ethiopia is still growing by 2.6% per annum mainly due to high fertility of 4.8 children per woman. Though increasing in the current decade, only about a quarter of married women used family planning methods in 2011. Though early childhood mortality diminished in recent years, this decline was not statistically significant in infant mortality. Levels and extent of reductions in the three components of population change and their relationships varied across different regions and by urban-rural setting in the country. Previous studies elsewhere showed relationship between population dynamics and health. Studies also revealed that intervention in one component of population change affects another component. A body of literature on insurance and replacement fertility response of childhood mortality were documented in least developing countries. Moreover, selection, disruption, adaptation, environmental theories had also documented the relationship between migration with fertility and under-five mortality. Migration might select people with different fertility behavior and childhood mortality experience compared to those without such behavior. If those with less number of children migrate, the fertility and child mortality of non-migrants in the place of origin would be inflated compared to those of the migrants. Among the latter group, the disruption due to migration might contribute to reduction in fertility or increase in early childhood mortality. Besides, the group might adapt the fertility behavior of the population in the area of destination. In this regard, this thesis aimed at measuring levels of and assessing relationships between fertility, contraception, under-five mortality and migration in the designated area of the study. It also tried to identify main proximate and distal factors of each of these components of population change in the context of the recently introduced village-based health extension program, reproductive health strategy and population policy in the densely populated Butajira District of South Central Ethiopia. Methods The study was hosted by the Butajira Demographic Surveillance System which is located about 135 kms from Addis Ababa in the southern direction. Qualitative and quantitative methods were employed in this study. The quantitative research used two data sources. The longitudinal surveillance database up to the end of 2008 was extracted to recruit study women of reproductive age for the cross-sectional study which aimed at measuring levels and identifying determinants of fertility, contraception and the unmet need of family planning. The database was also used to have a detailed insight into early childhood mortality and out-migration in the district. Standard data collection instruments of the INDEPTH-Network and Measure DHS were contextually adapted for the longitudinal database and the cross-sectional survey respectively. A priori focus group discussions were held to incorporate the community's terminologies and opinions. A total of 11,133 women of reproductive age were recruited from the surveillance database and 9,996 of them responded positively. Especially trained and experienced field staff collected the data. There was rigorous supervision. Data sources were managed by softwares having internal consistency checking mechanisms. Cleaning was done at desk. Serious anomalies were taken back to the field for reconciliation, while others were rectified by imputing values from logical flows in the questionnaire. Frequency distributions, cross-tabulations and graphical presentations were done. Event history analysis was used to calculate person time of exposure, incidence and prevalence rates using longitudinal data. Odds ratio along with the 95% confidence interval in binary logistic regression was used to determine association between covariates and the binary outcome of interest. In the case of fertility, Bongaart's model to measure the inhibition effects of proximate determinants and the incidence rate ratio in Poisson regression along with the 95% confidence interval was used to measure the association between fertility and covariates. Poisson regression was also used to measure associations of background characteristics with out-migration and under-five mortality. Assumptions of all the statistical models used in this study were checked. Results The total fertility rate of 5.3 children per woman was high and comparable to the rest of Ethiopia with rural-urban disparity (Highland, TFR=5.7, Lowland, TFR=6.6 and Urban, TFR=3.3). Postpartum infecundability due to breastfeeding (Ci=0.68) significantly deducted fertility from its biological maximum. The contribution of contraception (Cc-u=0.57, Cc-e=0.43) and nonmarriage (Cm-u=0.53, Cm-e=0.41) was important among urbanites and educated women. Abortion contributed a significant role to reduce fertility among school youth (Ca=0.76). The fertility incidence rate ratio was 1.38: 95% CI (1.27, 1.49) times higher among those married before their 15 birthday, 1.24: 95% CI (1.10, 1.39) times higher among uneducated, 1.95: 95% CI (1.84, 2.06) times higher among those families with large size, 1.67: 95% CI (1.59, 1.76) times higher with child death experience and 1.06: 95% CI (1.01, 1.13) times higher among women living in food-secured households compared to their counterparts. Against other findings, fertility was 1.09: 95% CI (1.04, 1.15) significantly higher among women with no child sex preference. Besides, migration status of women did not seem to predict their fertility levels (1.02: 95% CI (0.97, 1.07)). The contraceptive prevalence rate of 25.4%: 95% CI (24.2, 26.5) in Butajira District was comparable though unmet need of 52.4%: 95% CI (51.1, 53.7) was very high compared to national and regional estimates. Full stock out and absence of methods' mix, religion, complaints related to providers and methods, assumption of having proper diet, and optimum workload when using family planning methods were barriers of contraceptive use mentioned by study women in the area. The odds of contraception was 2.3: 95% CI (1.66, 3.18) times higher among urbanites, 1.99: 95% CI (1.38, 2.88) times higher among those completed secondary level of education and 1.5: 95% CI (1.12, 2.01) times higher among women whose partners completed secondary plus level of education, 1.3: 95% CI (1.13, 1.5) times higher among women with no experience of child death, 2.21: (1.8, 2.7) times higher among couples who discussed on contraception and 2.59: 95% CI (2.11, 3.17) times higher among women whose partners' support family planning use compared to their counterparts. Under-five mortality level of 29 per 1000: 95% CI (27.4, 31.8) in the District recorded over the 22 years of surveillance was low. The difference between infant mortality of 86.6 per 1000: 95% CI (77.4, 96.9) and child mortality of 19.2 per 1000: 95% CI (17.4, 21.3) was higher. Compared to their counterparts, the study also showed 0.85: 95% CI (0.79, 0.80) times lower under-five mortality among female children, 1.14: 95% CI (1.03, 1.25) times higher under five mortality among Muslim and 15.24: 95% CI (13.75, 16.89) times higher among minority Christian families, 1.31: 95% CI (1.04, 1.66) and 2.02: 95% CI (1.58, 2.59) times higher among rural highlanders and rural lowlanders respectively, 1.54: (1.43, 1.67) times higher among families owning oxen, and 1.92: 95% CI (1.66, 2.22) times higher among families owning houses and 2.4: 95% CI (1.89, 2.06) times higher among those living in rented houses and 2.13: 95% CI (1.79, 2.53) times higher in children living in houses roofed with thatched grass, and 1.46: 95% CI (1.26, 1.69) times higher among those living in the neighborhoods located 5-9 kilometers away from Butajira zonal hospital. The study also revealed high out-migration of 3.97 per 100 person years (3.93, 4.01) in the district. The risk of out-migration was 0.94: 95% CI (0.92, 0.96) times lower among females, 1.9: 95% CI (1.85, 1.96), 1.77: 95% CI (1.71, 1.82), 1.55: 95% CI (1.49, 1.62), 1.23: 95% CI (1.17, 1.29) or 2.82: 95% CI (2.66, 2.98), 1.29: 95% CI (1.26, 1.32), 4.71: 95% CI (4.56, 4.87), 1.18: 95% CI (1.15, 1.22), 1.58: 95% CI (1.52, 1.64) and 2.11: 95% (2.04, 2.18) times higher among teenagers, the youth, unmarried, primary school completes or above, Orthodox and minority Christians, urbanites, and those living in rented houses and owned by others compared to their respective counterparts. Some relationship between the three components of population change was also observed. There was statistically significant association between early childhood mortality and fertility (6.07: 95% CI (5.36, 6.87)). However, the association between fertility and migration status was not statistically significant (1.05: 95% CI (0.92, 1.19)). Neither was the association between underfive mortality and migration statistically significant (1.04: 95% CI (0.92, 1.19)). Conclusions and Recommendations Fertility was still high in the study community with high rural urban disparity. The most effective proximate determinant to deduct fertility from its biological maximum level was non-marriage due to disruption of marriage through migration of one of the partners. The contribution of contraception and non-marriage was also important among urbanites and educated women. Postpartum infecundability also significantly reduced fertility from its biological maximum in rural areas and among uneducated women. Abortion had also played an important role in reducing fertility among in-school youth. Delayed marriage, higher education, smaller family size, absence of child death in the family, and living in food-secured households were also significantly associated with small number of children. Besides, fertility was significantly higher among women with no child sex preference. However, migration status of women was not statistically significant. The contraceptive prevalence rate in Butajira District was still low, though unmet need was very high. Barrier to contraception in the area included, stock out and absence of preferred family planning methods, religion, complaints related to providers and methods, assumption of having proper diet, and optimum workload when using family planning methods. Significant predictors of contraception in the district included urban residence, women's and their partners' educational status, child death experience, couple's discussion on contraception, and partners' support. The magnitude of overall early childhood mortality levels in the district recorded over the 22 years of surveillance, though low compared to the national and regional level was still high. Infant mortality was higher than child mortality in the district. Under-five mortality was significantly higher among male children, families confessing Muslim and non-Orthodox Christian denominations, rural residents, families owning oxen, those having their own houses, families living in rent-free houses, households living in houses with roofs of thatched grass, and families living in neighborhoods located between 5-9 kilometers from the zonal hospital as compared with their counterparts. A high incidence of out-migration was observed in the district with higher level among males, teenagers, the youth, primary and secondary education or above completes, those not in marital unions, Christians, urbanites, and families in rented and owed houses compared to those in owned ones. This study had also showed statistically significant association between early childhood mortality and fertility. The association between fertility and migration was not statistically significant. Neither was the case between early childhood mortality and migration in the study area. We recommend that the ills of fast population growth and its consequences should be intensively informed to the public. Women must be encouraged to sustain the practice of extended breastfeeding. Efforts should also be exerted to increase contraceptive use in rural communities. Besides, in-school youth should be aware of post-abortion complications and youth friendly family planning methods to reduce fertility, maternal mortality and childhood mortality in the community. Longer years of women's education should be scaled up. Health systems in Butajira District and the capacity of staff should be strengthened. The Government should avail family planning methods with appropriate method mix and increase competence of providers on managing temporary side effects. More rigorous child and maternal health education should be channeled through village-based health extension workers. Household hygiene, antenatal care, immunization and facility based delivery in the district should be scaled up. More efforts should also be exerted to improve the quality of residential houses. An insurance scheme to care for the elderly should be put in place to bring about change in the behavior of families towards small family size. We suggest that local authorities need to facilitate local employment and housing opportunities for retaining young and educated people in their own areas, to safeguard the future well-being of the entire population
Aus der Einleitung: Seit mittlerweile über 30 Jahren ist das zentralandine Land Bolivien Schauplatz des Konflikts um die Coca-Pflanze. Im weiten Spannungsbogen des Konflikts kollidieren die traditionelle, mythisch-spirituelle Weltsicht der Indios im Bezug auf die planta divina mit den Verwertungsinteressen der Spaß- und Konsumgesellschaften westlicher Prägung. Als Rohstoff für die Drogenproduktion international geächtet, erwachsen für Bolivien aus der exzessiven Coca-Produktion erhebliche politische, wirtschaftliche und gesellschaftliche Probleme. In diesem Zusammenhang lassen sich anhand des Coca-Kokain-Komplexes exemplarisch einige typisch entwicklungsgeografische Problemfelder nachzeichnen: - Die Wirtschaftsstrukturen rund um die Coca sind von reiner Ressourcenextraktion und dem Verbleib des allergrößten Teils der Wertsteigerung in den Konsumentenländern gekennzeichnet. Durch den Umfang der Coca-Kokain-Ökonomie entstehen für Bolivien zudem bei nur geringer Exportdiversifikation prekäre gesamtwirtschaftliche Abhängigkeiten vom Export eines Agrarprodukts und seiner Derivate. - Durch die weitgehende Illegalität dieses Sektors wird Bolivien international unter erheblichen politischen Druck gesetzt und damit die nationale Selbstbestimmung eingeschränkt. Darüber hinaus wird die nationale Souveränität infolge der nicht angemessenen Beteiligung Boliviens an Entscheidungsprozessen und der Intervention verschiedener nicht-bolivianischer Akteure unterminiert. - Die rein antidrogenpolitisch motivierte Stigmatisierung der Coca reflektiert nicht ihren traditionellen Stellenwert für die indianischen Gesellschaften und zeigt so die fortgesetzte Nicht-Anerkennung und Nicht-Achtung der Lebens- und Wirtschaftsweisen der bolivianischen Urbevölkerung. Diese Form kultureller Marginalisierung verweist auf die fortgesetzte politische, wirtschaftliche und gesellschaftliche Marginalisierung eines Großteils der autochthonen Bevölkerung. Im Rahmen eines neu aufkeimenden indianischen Selbstbewusstseins im Kampf um die indigene Emanzipation gewinnt dieser Umstand erheblich an gesellschaftlicher Brisanz und Sprengkraft. An diesen Gegebenheiten hat sich trotz eines über 20 Jahre währenden, intensiven Antidrogenkrieges nur wenig geändert. Die zahllosen antidrogenpolitischen Strategien können damit weitgehend als gescheitert angesehen werden. Die grundsätzlich veränderten politischen Konstellationen des Landes nach den Wahlen im Dezember 2005 leisteten jedoch einer gänzlich neuen Herangehensweise an die Problematik Vorschub, die insbesondere aus drei politischen Prämissen von Präsident und Regierungspartei herrührt: - der Rolle und Bedeutung von Morales als erstem indigenen Präsidenten Südamerikas; - der politischen Herkunft Morales' aus der Coca-Bauernbewegung; - der sozialistischen Ausrichtung der Regierungspartei. Vor diesem Hintergrund sind neue Untersuchungen, die sowohl die historischen Strukturen und Prozesse als auch mögliche aktuelle Veränderungen in den genannten Problemfeldern unter den veränderten politisch-ökonomisch-sozialen Vorzeichen analysieren, absolut notwendig. Durch die Ergebnisse solcher Studien wird es möglich, die Auswirkungen einer veränderten Coca-Politik zu vergleichen und zu bewerten. Eine theoretisch stringente Untersuchung, die sowohl die historischen als auch die aktuellen Entwicklungen des Coca-Kokain-Komplexes einbezieht, steht trotz der Fülle von Sekundärmaterial bisher noch aus. Die vorliegende Arbeit will in bescheidenem Rahmen einen Beitrag leisten, diese Lücke schließen zu helfen. Die Untersuchungen dieser Arbeit werden in den theoretischen Rahmen der Dependenztheorien eingebettet, da sie einen konsistenten Erklärungszusammenhang der oben genannten Problemfelder anzubieten scheinen. Gleichwohl soll im Hinblick auf die entwicklungstheoretische Debatte dieser Rahmen nicht allzu eng aufgefasst werden. Weder wird ein globaler Gültigkeitsanspruch postuliert, noch wird angenommen, dass alle Theoreme im konkreten Fall zwingend gleichermaßen zutreffend sein müssen. Vielmehr sollen sie als theoretisches Modell verstanden werden, das es ermöglicht, sich einem Verständnis des Zusammenhangs von Entwicklung mit Strukturen und Prozessen des Coca-Kokain-Komplexes anzunähern. Insofern handelt es sich also bei der Untersuchung um eine theoriegeleitete Studie, in der Aktualität und Gültigkeit modelltheoretischer Annahmen anhand eines konkreten Fallbeispiels überprüft werden sollen. Die konkreten Zielsetzungen dieser Arbeit sind mit Bezug auf die oben genannten Problemfelder: 1. den Coca-Kokain-Komplex und seine historische Genese im undogmatisch aufgefassten, dependenztheoretischen Rahmen darzustellen. 2. die inhärenten Strukturen und Prozesse des Coca-Kokain-Komplexes zu analysieren und im Bezug auf ihre Auswirkungen auf eine dependenztheoretisch verstandene Entwicklungskonzeption zu bewerten. Zur Untersuchung dieser Fragestellungen wurden anlässlich eines Forschungsaufenthaltes zwischen Februar und August 2008 intensive Recherchen durchgeführt. Dabei konnte neben der gezielten Untersuchungsarbeit ganz allgemein ein Bild vom Land und der Thematik gewonnen werden. Die Beantwortung der untersuchten Fragestellungen wird durch die Auswertung und argumentative Kontextualisierung der im Rahmen des Forschungsaufenthaltes gewonnenen oder anderweitig verfügbaren Sekundärmaterialien erfolgen. Konkret wurden folgende methodische Schritte durchgeführt: - Intensive Bibliotheksrecherche (Verzeichnis der besuchten Bibliotheken im Anhang.). - Ausgiebige Interviews mit Experten fast aller relevanten Bereiche (Verzeichnis der Interviews im Anhang.). - Zeitungsrecherche in deutschen, bolivianischen und anderen Tages-, Wochen- und Fachzeitungen. - Internetrecherche auf einschlägigen Seiten und in dort veröffentlichten Dokumenten. - Beschaffung öffentlichen und nicht-öffentlichen Daten- und Informationsmaterials. - Intensive teilnehmende Beobachtung der politischen und sozialen Prozesse im Land mit besonderem Fokus auf die Problematik der refundación (Neugründung) Bolivien und die Coca-Thematik. Im Verlaufe der Untersuchung stellte sich heraus, dass viele der notwendigen Daten nicht zu beschaffen oder sehr widersprüchlich waren. Dies liegt vor allem an folgenden Eigenheiten des Untersuchungsgegenstandes: Drogenhandel: Diese illegale Wirtschaftsaktivität nicht wird offiziell erfasst, sie hat per se das Bestreben, unentdeckt zu bleiben und verfügt über potente Schutzpatrone. Politischer Gehalt: Die Problematik ist explizit politisch gefärbt, die Datenhandhabung, -erfassung und -publizierung hat daher erhebliche politisch-ökonomische Konsequenzen, wodurch Daten nicht nur wissenschaftlich, sondern nach politischem Kalkül zu betrachten sind. Insuffizienz des bolivianischen Staates: Für eine adäquate, konsequente und transparente Handhabung der Thematik fehlen finanzielle, logistische, personelle und institutionelle Ressourcen. Geografische Schwierigkeiten: Durch die Lage der Anbaugebiete und Boliviens an sich wird die Kontrolle von Coca- und Drogenproduktion sowie deren Handel erheblich erschwert. In den Produktionsgebieten, aber auch in den größtenteils unerschlossenen Grenzgebieten ist der Staat in weiten Teilen nicht oder kaum präsent. Hinzu kommen die Bedeutung nicht-quantifizierbarer Sachverhalte in dependenztheoretischen Ansätzen sowie die angesichts der Komplexität der behandelten Problemstellungen sehr beschränkten Möglichkeiten einer angemessenen, vollständigen und tiefgehenden Analyse im Rahmen einer studentischen Magisterarbeit. Trotz des bedeutenden illegalen Anteils dieses Wirtschaftssektors soll hier betont werden, dass die Mechanismen des Handels auf dieses Gut wie auf jedes andere zutreffen. Die Illegalität führt lediglich dazu, dass Gewinnspannen höher ausfallen und politische und polizeilich-militärische Kontrollmaßnahmen mit einem ungestörten Handelsverlauf interferieren. Die Drogenkontrolle gliedert sich in vier Teilbereiche: - Prävention und Rehabilitation: Vorbeugung von Drogenkonsum und Wiedereingliederung ehemaliger Konsumenten; - Erradikation: Vernichtung von Pflanzen, die als Drogenrohstoff dienen können; - Interdiktion: polizeiliche Arbeit zur Unterbindung von Drogenproduktion und -handel sowie zugehöriger Delikte; - Alternative Entwicklung: produzentenbezogener Entwicklungsansatz zur Schaffung ökonomischer Alternativen zur Drogenpflanzenproduktion. Die Arbeit wird die genannten Fragestellungen vor dem geografischen Hintergrund Boliviens bearbeiten. Dazu muss eingeschränkt werden, dass ein konkreter räumlicher Bezug aufgrund der Problemstellung als Makroanalyse eines ursächlich internationalen Problemkomplexes nur bedingt gelten kann. Zentrale analytische Kategorien wie zum Beispiel Abhängigkeit können nur anhand des Abstraktums des politischen Raumes, beziehungsweise des Wirtschaftsraumes Boliviens erarbeitet werden. Ein konkret eingrenzbarer räumlicher Bezug ist hauptsächlich im Zusammenhang mit dem Coca-Anbau, den Erradikationsmaßnahmen und der Produktion von und dem Handel mit Drogen gegeben. Außerdem waren die sozialen Konflikte größtenteils an die Produktionsgebiete gebunden, wie auch die drogenkontrollpolitisch motivierten Maßnahmen der alternativen Entwicklung sich direkt auf Coca-Anbau- und Abwanderungsgebiete konzentrieren. Lediglich für diese Bereiche lässt sich die Analyse also gezielt räumlich abgrenzen. Der zeitliche Horizont der Untersuchung wird vom Gegenstand bestimmt. Eine organisierte, explizit international ausgerichtete Drogenproduktion entstand in Bolivien erstmals unter dem Diktator Hugo Banzer Suárez, der 1971 die Macht ergriff. Alle folgenden Entwicklungen sind bis ungefähr August des Jahres 2008 berücksichtigt. Daten zu Coca-Anbau und Wirtschaft lagen für 2008 noch nicht vor, sodass viele aktuelle Aspekte mit Bezug auf das Jahr 2007 dargestellt werden. Die Arbeit formuliert im ersten Abschnitt A den zugrunde liegenden Entwicklungsbegriff (A: 1). Nach der Darstellung der Dependenztheorien und ihrer Grundannahmen (A: 2.1) werden diese in der entwicklungstheoretischen Diskussion verortet (A: 2.2). Anschließend wird kurz die Auswahl dieses theoretischen Ansatzes begründet (A: 2.3). Der folgende Abschnitt B stellt die allgemeinen Rahmenbedingungen des bolivianischen Coca-Kokain-Komplexes vor. Nach der botanischen und physiologischen Charakterisierung des Coca-Blatts (B: 1.1 - 1.2) werden die Anbaugebiete vorgestellt (B: 1.3). Anschließend wird ein kulturhistorischer Überblick über die Verwendung der Coca im lateinamerikanischen und bolivianischen Kontext gegeben (B: 2). Darauf folgt die Darstellung der Problematik des weltweiten Kokainkonsums und -handels. Auch auf die Grundlagen der Kokain-Herstellung wird an dieser Stelle eingegangen (B: 3). Das abschließende Kapitel (B: 4) widmet sich der Beschreibung der geschichtlich-politischen, wirtschaftlichen und gesellschaftlichen Grundlagen des heutigen Boliviens. Der folgende Hauptteil der Arbeit (C) beschreibt die Entwicklung des Coca-Kokain-Komplexes in Bolivien. Dabei wird zunächst kurz auf historische Entwicklungen eingegangen (C: 1.1 - 1.2) und anschließend mit der Darstellung des UN-Einheitsabkommens zu Betäubungsmitteln die Grundlage der internationalen Drogenkontrolle vermittelt (C: 1.3). Anschließend werden die eigentlichen Entwicklungen des bolivianischen Coca-Kokain-Komplexes ausgeführt. Die Entwicklungen werden in drei Phasen eingeteilt. Die erste Phase markiert Entstehung und ersten Boom der bolivianischen Kokain-Ökonomie (C: 2). Ab 1987/88, dem Beginn der zweiten Phase (C: 3), wurde im Land durch die Schaffung eines umfangreichen rechtlichen und institutionellen Rahmens der Drogenkontrolle der Kampf gegen den Drogenhandel aufgenommen. In der letzten Phase hatte 2005 eine aus der Coca-Bauernbewegung stammende Regierung die Macht übernommen und es wurde versucht, neue und eigenständige Wege in der Coca-Politik zu gehen (C: 4). In dem abschließenden Analyseabschnitt D werden die Auswirkungen der historischen und aktuellen Entwicklungen des Coca-Kokain-Komplexes auf die dependenztheoretisch verstandene Entwicklungskonzeption untersucht.Inhaltsverzeichnis:Inhaltsverzeichnis: Einleitung1 ATHEORETISCHE EINBETTUNG6 1.Entwicklungsbegriff und Entwicklungsziele6 2.Entwicklungstheoretische Einbettung9 2.1Dependenztheoretische Grundaussagen und -annahmen9 2.2Die Dependenztheorien in der entwicklungstheoretischen Diskussion18 2.3Rechtfertigung der theoretischen Einbettung20 2.3.1Die Aktualität dependenztheoretischer Prämissen vor dem gewandelten Hintergrund des 21. Jahrhunderts20 2.3.2Dependenztheoretische Prämissen im bolivianischen Kontext22 BBOLIVIEN: RAHMENBEDINGUNGEN DES COCA-KOKAIN-KOMPLEXES23 1.Botanische Grundlagen und Einordnung der Anbaugebiete23 1.1Botanische Grundlagen23 1.2Physiologische Eigenschaften des Coca-Blattes24 1.3.Beschreibung der Anbaugebiete25 2.Kulturhistorischer Überblick über Nutzung und Verbreitung des Coca-Blattes29 2.1Coca in den präkolumbianischen Kulturen29 2.2Die aktuelle kulturelle und soziale Funktion der Coca in den indianisch geprägten Gesellschaften des bolivianischen Andenraums30 2.2.1Religiös-ritueller Gebrauch30 2.2.2Medizinischer Gebrauch31 2.2.3Sozialer Gebrauch31 2.3.4Aufputschender Gebrauch32 2.2.5Die Verbreitung traditioneller Coca-Nutzung in Bolivien32 3.Drogenkonsum und Drogenhandel34 3.1Kokainherstellung34 3.2Kokainkonsum in den USA, Europa und Lateinamerika35 3.3Internationaler Drogenhandel36 4.Politische, wirtschaftliche und gesellschaftliche Rahmenbedingungen in Bolivien37 4.1Abriss der jüngeren bolivianischen Geschichte seit der nationalen Revolution 195237 4.2Wirtschaftliche Kenndaten40 4.3Gesellschaftliche Kenndaten41 CDER COCA-KOKAIN-KOMPLEX IN BOLIVIEN42 1.Der Bedeutungswandel der Coca von der Konquista bis zum Drogenrohstoff42 1.1Kirche, Silber und Coca42 1.2Coca im Wandel veränderter Nutzungsmöglichkeiten44 1.3Das Einheitsabkommen zu Betäubungsmitteln der UNO 196145 2.1971-1987: Militärdiktatoren und Kokainmafia. Die Entstehung der bolivianischen Kokain-Ökonomie46 2.1Die Entstehung der Kokain-Ökonomie unter Banzer46 2.2Die Narcocracia49 2.3Nach der Demokratisierung51 2.3.1Migrationsbewegungen in den Chapare51 2.3.2Militarisierung und soziale Konflikte53 2.3.3Alternative Entwicklung56 3.1987-2005: Der Krieg gegen die Drogen. Bolivianische Drogenkontrollpolitik unter US-amerikanischen Vorzeichen58 3.1Internationaler Rahmen der Drogenkontrollpolitik58 3.1.1Multilaterale Übereinkünfte58 3.1.2Grundlagen US-amerikanischer Drogenkontrolle im Ausland59 3.1.3Bilaterale Verträge62 3.2Antidrogenstrategien in Bolivien64 3.2.1Der 'Plan trienal' und die Gründung der bolivianischen Drogenkontrollinstitutionen64 3.2.2Das Gesetz 100865 3.2.3Bolivianische Ansätze66 3.2.4Die Opción Cero und der Plan für die Würde68 3.2.5Der Niedergang US-amerikanisch-bolivianischer Ansätze der Drogenkontrolle70 3.2.6Militärisch-polizeiliche Interdiktionsmaßnahmen72 3.3Soziale Widerstandsbewegungen73 3.4Alternative Entwicklung76 4.2005-2008: Der bolivianische Weg. Entwicklung mit Coca79 4.1Die politische Situation Boliviens nach der Wahl 200579 4.2Eckpfeiler der neuen Coca-Politik81 4.2.1Normativer Rahmen81 4.2.2Neuerungen im institutionellen Rahmen84 4.3Umsetzung und Einschätzung85 DDER BOLIVIANISCHE COCA-KOKAIN-KOMPLEX IM LICHTE DEPENDENZTHEORETISCHER MODELLVORSTELLUNGEN89 1.Grundlagen: Das Einheitsabkommen von 1961 und die revalorización der Coca89 2.Wirtschaft91 3.Politik98 4.Sozialer Kontext102 5.Entwicklung104 Schlussbetrachtung und Ausblick106 Anhang111 Verzeichnis der besuchten Bibliotheken112 Verzeichnis der Interviews113 Abbildung 1: Nährwertvergleich von 100g Coca-Blättern mit 50 pflanzlichen lateinamerikanischen Nahrungsmitteln117 Karte 1: Coca-Anbau in Bolivien, 2007118 Karte 2: Coca-Anbau in den Yungas und Apolo, 2007119 Karte 3: Coca-Anbau im Chapare, 2007120 Tabelle 1:Prävalenzen des Kokainkonsums 2007 oder letztes verfügbares Jahr in ausgewählten Ländern und Regionen121 Tabelle 2: Prävalenzen des Crack- und pasta base-Konsums 2007 in ausgewählten Ländern121 Tabelle 3: Coca-Anbau und Erradikation in Bolivien 1970 - 2008, nach Regionen122 Abbildung 2: Coca-Anbau und Alternativer Anbau im Chapare 1976 - 2003124 Tabelle 4: Bolivien: Coca-Kokain-Ökonomie 1980125 Tabelle 5: Bolivien: Coca-Kokain-Ökonomie 1993126 Tabelle 6: Bolivien: Coca-Kokain-Ökonomie 2007127 Literaturverzeichnis129Textprobe:Textprobe: Kapitel 4.3, Umsetzung und Einschätzung: Da der normative und institutionelle Rahmen der Coca-Politik der MAS-Regierung erst vor relativ kurzer Zeit festgeschrieben wurde, sind die konkrete Umsetzung und Auswirkungen derselben noch schwer zu erfassen oder zu bewerten. Insgesamt sorgen die fundamental geänderte Regierungspolitik, aber auch der Ausschluss der USAID aus dem Chapare Ende Juni 2008, sowie die Ausweisung des US-Botschafters Goldberg nach dem von Morales mit 63% der Stimmen gewonnenen referendum revocatorio Ende August 2008 für ein grundsätzlich verändertes Entwicklungspanorama in diesem Bereich. Revalorización: Die Neubewertung des Coca-Blatts konnte intern durch die Aufnahme in die neue Verfassung, sowie die Verabschiedung des PND und die veränderte Ausrichtung der Estrategia de Lucha Contra el Narcotráfico y Revalorización de la Hoja de Coca weitestgehend umgesetzt werden. Auf internationaler Ebene ist die angestrebte Neubewertung der Coca hingegen ungleich schwieriger umzusetzen. Das Projekt auf diplomatischer Ebene voran zu treiben sind der Außenminister David Choquehuanca und der Vizeminister des Viceministerio de Defensa Social y Sustancias Controladas (VDS-SC), Felipe Cáceres beauftragt, die beide über wenig diplomatische Erfahrung verfügen. Konkret ist bisher nur ein relativ erfolgloser Vorstoß gemacht worden. In den relevanten internationalen Politik- und Machtstrukturen spielt Bolivien eine nur untergeordnete Rolle. Die Änderung der Einheitskonvention ist ein langwieriger und komplizierter diplomatischer Prozess. Zur gänzlichen Herausnahme der Coca aus der Liste I müsste ein Plenarsbeschluss auf UN-Ebene erreicht werden. Aber auch für andere, geringfügigere Änderungen müsste mindestens ein Beschluss von circa 30 Staaten getroffen werden. Es ist extrem unwahrscheinlich, dass es Bolivien gelingen wird, eine solche Allianz zu schmieden: Die USA und – bisher – die EU stehen einem solchen Projekt ablehnend gegenüber. Gleichzeitig haben sie ausreichend Einfluss, dass auch andere Länder in ihrem Sinne abstimmen. Die beiden anderen Coca-produzierenden Ländern Peru und Kolumbien verweigern sich dem Projekt ebenfalls. Die Anbauflächen in diesen Ländern sind wesentlich größer, der traditionelle Konsum wesentlich geringer. So existiert einerseits keine Bolivien vergleichbare breite Verankerung der Coca in der lokalen Kultur, während andererseits die Probleme des organisierten Drogenhandels in beiden Ländern in politischer, wirtschaftlicher und sozialer Hinsicht wesentlich eklatanter sind. Für die Nachbarstaaten Chile, Argentinien und Brasilien stellt das bolivianische Kokain eine erhebliche Gesundheits- und Sicherheitsbedrohung dar. Im südamerikanischen Kontext ist folglich nur eine Unterstützung von Seiten Venezuelas und Ecuadors zu erwarten. Im globalen Kontext versucht Bolivien neue Allianzen als geostrategischen Gegenentwurf zur US-Hegemonie zu schmieden. In diesem Zusammenhang könnte das Projekt der revalorización Unterstützung durch Länder wie China, Nordkorea oder Südafrika erfahren, mit denen, wie auch mit den engen lateinamerikanischen Verbündeten Venezuela, Kuba und Ecuador Verhandlungen über den Handel mit alternativen Coca-Produkten für Verwendungen im medizinischen oder Nahrungsmittelbereich geführt wurden. Große Hoffnungen werden von Bolivien in die regelmäßige Revision des Wiener Abkommens gesetzt, die im Frühjahr 2009 ansteht. Kontrolle des Drogenhandels: Bei der Kontrolle des Drogenhandels ist Bolivien seit 2005 deutlich effektiver geworden. Gegenüber 2005 sind die Beschlagnahmungen um 55,6% gestiegen, während die Flächen im gleichen Zeitraum nur um 13,8% zunahmen. Bis zum August des Jahres 2008 war schon mehr Kokain und Base als im gesamten Vorjahr beschlagnahmt worden (17,94 t). Dennoch ist die absolute Zunahme des Coca-Anbaus auf zuletzt (2007) 28 900 ha bedenklich. 2007 wurden 62,11% der Yungas-Coca und nur 4,22% der Chapare-Coca auf den legalen Märkten Villa Fatima und Sacaba gehandelt (vergl. Tab. 6 (Anhang)). Damit erhöhte sich die potenzielle Kokain-Produktion in Bolivien von 2006 auf 2007 um 11% auf 104 t. Die wichtigste Coca-Anbauregion sind heute die Yungas (19 800 ha). Dort verschiebt sich der Coca-Anbau zunehmend in die tieferen, tropischen Lagen (La Asunta, Palos Blancos), wo höhere Erträge erzielt werden und infolge der spontanen Kolonisationsprozesse die staatliche Kontrolle noch nicht greift. Auch die Drogenproduktion ist heute nicht mehr an die Anbau-Gebiete gebunden. Insgesamt zeigt aber die gesteigerte Effektivität, wie auch die Zusage sich 2009 mit 16 Mio. US-$ erstmalig an der Finanzierung der Interdiktion in nennenswertem Maßstab zu beteiligen den Willen und die Fähigkeit der Regierung Morales gegen Drogenhandel und -produktion auf dem nationalen Territorium vorzugehen. Control social und cato-Regelung: Das Konzept der control social stellt ein effektives Instrument zur Kontrolle und Regulierung des Coca-Anbaus auf kooperativer, konfliktfreier Basis dar. Die Regierung wertet die Produzenten deutlich auf, indem sie nicht mehr nur als Objekt, sondern auch als Partner der Anbaukontrolle begriffen werden. Das Konzept der geteilten Verantwortung wird in dieser Hinsicht auch auf den Bereich Staat-Zivilgesellschaft ausgeweitet. Gleichzeitig wird die Rolle und Bedeutung der cocalero-Organisationen als regionale Verwaltungsinstitutionen anerkannt. Sie haben gegenüber ihren Mitgliedern erhebliche Durchsetzungs- und Kontrollmacht. Die Strafen (Lizenzverlust, Flächenverlust, Ausschluss aus der Gemeinschaft) sind effektive Abschreckungsmechanismen, die auf den traditionellen Sozial- und Wirtschaftsstrukturen der Anbaugebiete basieren. Durch das Konzept kann die racionalización von Coca-Feldern durchgeführt werden, ohne die hohen sozialen Kosten der erzwungenen Erradikation zahlen zu müssen. Obwohl von Zwangsmaßnahmen abgesehen wurde und kooperative Kontrollmechanismen in Zusammenarbeit mit den cocaleros angewendet wurden, konnten 2006 (6 073 ha) und 2007 (6 269 ha) die internationalen Erradikationsverpflichtungen erfüllt werden. Die cato-Regelung ermöglichte die Legalisierung der Lebensgrundlage eines Großteils der Chapare-Bauern. Ein cato erlaubt bei legaler Vermarktung ein jährliches Einkommen von knapp 1 400 US-$, das damit höher als das durchschnittliche PKE und deutlich über dem ländlichen landwirtschaftlichen Durchschnittslohn von 347 US-$ im Jahr liegt. Beide Regelungen haben wesentlich zur Befriedung der Anbaugebiete beigetragen und ermöglichen die Gestaltung der weiteren Coca-Politik auf einer legalen und kooperativen Basis. Auf dieser Grundlage kann ein neues Vertrauensverhältnis zwischen Staat und Produzenten aufgebaut werden, das dem geteilten Interesse der verminderten Drogenproduktion nur förderlich sein kann. Transformación productiva: Hauptprojekt der transformación productiva ist die Industrialisierung der Coca, anhand der bedeutendere Mehrwertgewinne erzeugt werden könnten. In Planung sind dafür aktuell drei Fabriken zur Herstellung von Coca-Tees. Darüber hinaus existieren viele und innovative Ideen und Ansätze, aber es ist in diesem Fall fraglich, ob ein ausreichender Markt in Bolivien zur Verfügung steht. Die bisher hergestellten alternativen Coca-Produkte haben keine besondere Akzeptanz in der bolivianischen Bevölkerung gefunden. Weitere Probleme ergeben sich aus dem Finanzierungsbedarf solcher Projekte. Auch Fachpersonal ist womöglich nicht ausreichend vorhanden. Über Absichtserklärungen ist der Ansatz der produktiven Transformation bisher nicht hinausgekommen. Dass, wie angestrebt, 4 000 ha Coca durch die industrielle Weiterverarbeitung im Land absorbiert werden könnten, erscheint ohne den Zugang zu Auslandsmärkten illusorisch. Alternative Entwicklung: Im Bereich alternative, beziehungsweise integrale Entwicklung gibt es bisher kaum Fortschritte. Insbesondere der Ausschluss der USAID aus dem Chapare und die befristete Arbeit in den Yungas beeinflussen die zukünftige Entwicklungen stark. Für die Regierungsprojekte besteht weiterhin Finanzierungsbedarf, der noch nicht geklärt werden konnte. Die mit der integralen Entwicklung beauftragte DIGPROCOCA ist bisher noch ausschließlich mit der Erfassung und Rationalisierung von Coca-Flächen beschäftigt.
Como ya hemos sugerido hace un par de semanas atrás, el carácter anárquico de los asuntos internacionales constituye un punto de partida fundamental y necesario para el estudio de las relaciones internacionales, en tanto disciplina. Partir desde allí, no sólo es importante porque representa un gran cambio del "principio ordenador" del sistema (de un orden jerárquico, como el doméstico, a uno horizontal o descentralizado, como el internacional), sino porque también se encuentra irradiando continuamente fuerzas e incentivos que afectan con profundidad el comportamiento a largo plazo de los actores internacionales. Estas fuerzas e incentivos, como lo destacara Kenneth Waltz (1), no determinan mecánicamente el comportamiento individual de los estados, pero sí constriñen y moldean ciertos patrones de comportamiento a lo largo del tiempo. Una forma de estudiar el papel de estas fuerzas, si nos abocamos al estudio de la guerra y la paz, es analizar el llamado "dilema de seguridad". En este ensayo, presentaré brevemente en qué consiste este "dilema" y cuál es su importancia a la hora de abordar no sólo las causas de la guerra, sino también las condiciones para la paz.La idea de un "dilema de seguridad", propuesta originalmente por John H. Herz en 1950, generó una revisión profunda en los estudios de seguridad de la disciplina ya que por primera vez se logró demostrar convincentemente que el fenómeno de la recurrencia de la guerra a través de los siglos no puede explicarse sólo mediante la referencia a estados expansionistas, con ansias de conquista, ambiciosos territorialmente, o "revisionistas absolutos"; sino que, además de ello, el tipo decontexto de seguridad en el cual se encuentran los estados juega un papel sumamente importante.(2)Así, por ejemplo, el dilema de seguridad nos ayuda a comprender cómo incluso cuando los estados no pretenden individualmente hacer la guerra entre sí, el frágil contexto de desconfianza, de inseguridad y de incertidumbre, y sobre todo de miedo —junto al factor fundamental de la ausencia de una autoridad política central— es suficiente como para que la guerra pueda abrirse camino de forma recurrente. En otras palabras, la anarquía internacional es una "causa permisiva" de la guerra, o una causa indirecta, porque no provoca el inicio específico de ninguna guerra o conflicto internacional, pero sí permanece impávida frente a ello, no erigiendo ningún tipo de obstáculo o desincentivo a la ocurrencia del conflicto.La condición anárquica del sistema genera incertidumbre, la cual da lugar a la desconfianza, que también provoca un profundo dilema según el cual aquellas personas que toman decisiones en nombre de un estado nunca pueden estar "100% seguros" de si sus cálculos sobre las intenciones futuras de los demás son correctos. Todo ello compele a los estados a desconfiar y a competir (necesariamente) en aras de proveerse seguridad, y prevalecer.(3)Como lúcidamente explica Martin Wight, "[t]he fundamental cause of war is not historic rivalries, nor unjust peace settlements, nor nationalist grievances, nor competitions in armaments, nor imperialism, nor poverty […]. The fundamental cause is the absence of international government; in other words, the anarchy of sovereign states. […] In such a situation, mutual distrust is fundamental, and one power can never have an assurance that another power is not malevolent". Y concluye: "Consequently, with the best will in the world no power can surrender any part of its security and liberty to another power".(4)O como el mismo Herz lo ha expresado: a través de los siglos, siempre que han existido sistemas sociales anárquicos en donde las unidades que los conforman son asimismo las instancias últimas de resolución de sus disputas,"there has arisen what may be called the 'security dilemma' of men, or groups, or their leaders. […] Whether man is by nature peaceful and cooperative, or domineering and aggressive, is not the question. […] Groups or individuals living in such a constellation must be, and usually are, concerned about their security from being attacked, subjected, dominated, or annihilated by other groups or individuals. Striving to attain security from such attack, they are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others. This, in turn, renders the others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst. Since none can ever feel entirely secure in such a world of competing units, power competition ensues, and the vicious cycle of security and power accumulation in on".(5)Esta situación, por su parte, se asemeja a lo que el historiador británico Herbert Butterfield llamó "miedo hobbesiano", o "trágico elemento del conflicto humano".(6) Al igual que Herz, él comprendía que desde una visión con perspectiva, el historiador goza de la capacidad de ver fríamente los sucesos y tiene el desafío de entender cómo el contexto anárquico en el cual los estados existen es la principal fuente por la que el conflicto puede, en primera instancia, emerger una y otra vez. Por ejemplo, dice Butterfield: "The central fact [.] is a certain predicament, a certain situation that contains the elements of conflict irrespective of any special wickedness in any of the parties concerned [.]. In historical perspective we learn to be a little more sorry for both parties than they knew to be for one another". Y así, concluye Butterfield: "Here is the absolute predicament and the irreducible dilemma [.] here are the ingredients for a grand catastrophe. The greatest war in history could be produced without the intervention of any great criminals who might be out to do deliberate harm in the world".(7)Sin embargo, a pesar del pesimismo al cual fácilmente pudiera llevar esta comprensión del dilema, la historia demuestra claramente que la cooperación y el mantenimiento de la paz sigue siendo posible, aún bajo los efectos de la anarquía.(8)Esta es otra de las comunes confusiones de la literatura. Básicamente: la creencia en que allí donde existe un dilema de este tipo no puede existir la paz o diversos tipos de orden (¡incluso por períodos prolongados de tiempo!). Es, además, esta misma confusión la que lleva —erróneamente— a creer que sólo es posible hablar de "zonas de paz", como actualmente se hace en Sudamérica, a través de la eliminación (más que nada intelectual) del "dilema de seguridad".Ciertamente, la situación de "continua competencia" implícita en la concepción realista de la política internacional no significa que la guerra tenga lugar todo el tiempo y en todo lugar. El dilema de seguridad puede ser mitigado (aunque aún nunca ha sido resuelto), y ello puede incluso generar períodos de paz que a veces alcanzan muchos años de duración. El Concierto Europeo, por ejemplo, creado por las potencias europeas luego de la derrota de Napoleón, es uno de esos casos. Pero justamente es este mismo ejemplo el que sirve para comprender el verdaderodilema: si bien es posible la cooperación y la paz bajo anarquía, y más allá del corto o largo período por el que ello se prolongue, la competencia y el conflicto revertirán en el largo plazo todo esfuerzo cooperativo. Sin la comprensión de estos elementos, es imposible entender cómo es que aún los más fuertes ejemplos de cooperación entre los estados, a lo largo de los siglos, ulteriormente han dejado de existir.De todas formas, si bien el dilema puede ser atenuado o mitigado en el tiempo —aunque no sin gran dificultad—, el mismo no puede ser trascendido de una manera sencilla, ya sea a través de la creación de instituciones o por actos de conciencia individuales.(9) Como tan claramente lo explica Butterfield: "The supporters of the new diplomacy, which has emerged since the opening of the epoch of world-wars, like to tell us that the whole problem we have been discussing does not exist, because it ought not to exist. In any case, there is no Chinese puzzle at all, they say, for, whatever the issue might be, we could easily dispose of it by referring it to a conference or sending it to the United Nations. Against these specialists in wishful thinking it must be asserted that the kind of human predicament which we have been discussing is not merely so far without a solution, but the whole condition is a standing feature of mankind in world-history. [.] And if the issue which divides the world at a given moment were referred to a conference table, then, though many good things might be achieved, we should not have eliminated the predicament which was most crucial—we should merely find it transplanted into the bosom of the conference itself".(10)A la luz de esta discusión, se hace imprescindible para todo aquel abocado al estudio de la seguridad internacional, el comenzar no sólo con adquirir un profundo respeto y comprensión del carácter anárquico de las relaciones internacionales, sino también por analizar los efectos que el dilema de seguridad ejerce por sobre los estados. Un punto central para todo estudiante de estos asuntos es no ceder jamás a la complacencia intelectual de lo que prediquen sus teorías predilectas y, en su lugar, seguir buscando formas inteligentes de mitigar y construir orden en un tan precario, endeble e indiferente contexto como es el de la política internacional.(1) Ver Kenneth N. Waltz, El Hombre, el Estado y la Guerra (Buenos Aires: Nova, 1959); y Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, ma: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979).(2) Ver Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma", pp. 157-180. Ver también Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?", en Frankel, ed., Realism: Restatements and Renewal, pp. 90-121.(3) Una buena explicación de la interconexión entre estos elementos puede encontrarse en Stephen Van Evera, "The Hard Realities of International Politics",Boston Review,Vol. 17, No. 6 (November–December 1992), p. 19; y Mearsheimer,Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2001), cap. 1.(4) Martin Wight, Power Politics, ed. por Hedley Bull y Carsten Holbraad (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, riia), pp. 101-2.(5) Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma", World Politics, Vol. 2, No. 2 (January, 1950), p. 157.(6) Ver Herbert Butterfield, History and Human Relations (London: Collins, 1951), pp. 21, 22, 16, 20. En su Power Politics, Wight también se refiere a esta condición como "Hobbesian predicament", p. 142., o "Hobbesian fear", por ejemplo: "Wars are fought for many different causes […] But all particular causes of war operate within the context of international anarchy and the Hobbesian fear", p. 102.(7) Butterfield, History and Human Relations, pp. 15, 17.(8) Ver Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma", World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-214; Charles L. Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited", World Politics, Vol. 50, No. (October 1997), pp. 171-201; Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help", en Frankel, ed., Realism: Restatements and Renewal, pp. 122-63; Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays in International Politics (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962); Marc Trachtenberg, "The Problem of International Order and How to Think About It", The Monist, Vol. 89, No. 2, pp. 207-31; y Trachtenberg, "The Question of Realism: An Historian's View", Security Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Autumn 2003), pp. 156-94. Para dos importantes críticas y reformulaciones, cfr.Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias"; y Helen Milner, "The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique", Review of International Studies Vol. 17, No. 1 (January 1991): pp. 67-85.(9) Ver Butterfield, History and Human Relations, pp. 27-28.(10) Butterfield, History and Human Relations, pp. 31-2. *Tesista de la Maestría en Estudios Internacionales, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos Aires, Argentina
Notre travail poursuivait deux objectifs essentiels: mettre au point d'une part un système de collecte et d'analyse d'observations compatible avec l'activité journalière du praticien et, à partir de la banque de données ainsi constituée procéder d'autre part à une étude comparée chez la vache laitière et viandeuse, de l'influence des facteurs individuels et d'environnement sur les pathologies puerpérales et du post-partum ainsi que sur la fertilité et la fécondité. La première partie de notre travail (Chapitre 1: Introduction générale) a été dévolue à une analyse exhaustive au travers des données de la littérature des facteurs responsables des problèmes de reproduction. Ils peuvent se répartir en deux catégories: les facteurs individuels d'une part et les facteurs collectifs d'autres part. Au nombre des premiers il faut citer l'âge, la génétique, le niveau de production laitière, le type de vêlage, la gémellité, la mortalité périnatale, la rétention placentaire, la fièvre vitulaire, l'involution cervicale et utérine, les infectioins du tractus génital et l'activité ovarienne au cours du postpartum. A l'inverse les facteurs collectifs font davantage référence au troupeau qu'à l'individu. Ils concernent le choix d'une politique de première insémination, la détection des chaleurs, le moment de l'insémination, la nutrition, la saison, le type de stabulation, la taille des troupeaux et les caractéristiques sociologiques de l'éleveur. Cette revue de la littérature nous a permis de constater la grande diversité des effets observés à l'encontre des facteurs étudiés d'une part et le manque habituel d'harmonisation concernant les méthodes d'évaluation de ces effets. Deux chapitres de notre travail ont été consacrés à la présentation du logiciel de gestion de la reproduction GARBO. Celui-ci comprend deux aspects différents au demeurant complémentaires. Le premier plus propédeutique est basé sur le suivi mensuel de reproduction (Chapitre 2). Le second plus analytique comporte l'analyse mensuelle mais surtout annuelle des performances et pathologies de la reproduction (Chapitre 3). Au travers de différentes listes d'intervention, le programme assure le suivi sanitaire et zootechnique de chaque individu femelle depuis l'âge de 14 mois ou depuis son dernier vêlage jusqu'à la confirmation de la gestation ou de la réforme. Il contribue ce faisant à réduire les périodes de non reproduction. Parce qu'il fournit au vétérinaire une anamnèse physiologique, pathologique et thérapeutique, il lui permet d'affiner son diagnostic et de prendre en connaissance de cause une décision thérapeutique appropriée. Le programme a déjà fait l'objet de nombreuses améliorations, fruit de son expérimentation sur le terrain. Puisqu'il ne peut y avoir de gestion sans quantification, l'évaluation des performances de reproduction représente le second aspect au demeurant essentiel d'une démarche préventive de la reproduction. D'une manière générale, nous avons cherché à optimiser et à actualiser au maximum les données disponibles au sein de chaque troupeau. La mise au point d'un bilan de reproduction a été illustrée par la comparaison des performances enregistrées en 1992 dans 3 systèmes d'élevage, le premier ne comportant que des animaux viandeux allaitants de race Blanc Bleu Belge (n = 20). le second (n = 45) que des animaux laitiers de race Holstein Frisonne ou Pie Rouge et le troisième (n = 39) qualifié de mixte rassemblant des animaux viandeux traits ou allaitants de race Blanc Bleu Belge et des animaux de race laitière. Cette étude comparative est la première du genre et peut servir de référence au clinicien pour l'interprétation des performances de troupeau de sa clientèle. Cette étude comparée nous a permis d'identifier plusieurs faits. Quelle que soit la spéculation, les exploitations présentent de larges différences dans les performances moyennes de reproduction. Cette observation traduit vraisemblablement davantage les capacités différentes des éleveurs à gérer leur potentiel de reproduction que les différences liées à la race ou au type de production laitière ou viandeuse. Elle se trouve confirmée par le fait qu'au sein de chaque spéculation, certains troupeaux atteignent pour les différents paramètres étudiés, les valeurs considérées comme optimales. La fécondité des génisses exprimé par l'âge du premier vêlage est comparable quel que soit le type de spéculation allaitante (28 mois), mixte (29 mois) ou laitière (29 mois). Moyennant le respect de certains conditions sanitaires et nutritionnelles, il apparaît que la race viandeuse Blanc Bleu Belge est aussi précoce que les races laitières. La fécondité des vaches exprimée par le délai nécessaire à l'obtention d'une gestation est meilleure dans les troupeaux laitiers (111 jours) qu'allaitants (125 jours), les troupeaux mixtes présentant une situation intermédiaire (117 jours). Ce fait résulte essentiellement d'une première insémination plus tardive dans les troupeaux allaitants (84 jours) que mixtes (76 jours) ou laitiers (73 jours), suite à une période d'anoestrus plus prolongée identifiée indirectement par l'intervalle entre le vêlage et la première chaleur détectée par l'éleveur et respectivement égale en moyenne à 79, 67 et 59 jours dans les troupeaux allaitants, mixtes et laitiers. En effet, les trois spéculations présentent une fertilité comparable qu'elle soit exprimée par le pourcentage de gestation en première insémination (45 %) ou par le nombre d'inséminations nécessaires à l'obtention d'une gestation (troupeaux allaitants: 2.4, mixtes: 2.5 et laitiers: 2.3). La qualité de la détection des chaleurs caractérise les trois types de spéculation. Enfin, les troupeaux laitiers présentent une fréquence plus élevée de pathologies puerpérales (rétention placentaire et fièvre vitulaire) et du post-partum (métrites, kystes ovariens) que les élevages allaitants ou mixtes). Dans le chapitre 4, nous avons cherché à décrire la fréquence des pathologies puerpérales et du postpartum et à en identifier les facteurs de risque individuels ou d'environnement chez la vache viandeuse et laitière. Ont ainsi été étudiées la rétention placentaire, la fièvre vitulaire, l'involution utérine, les infections utérines et les kystes ovariens. Les valeurs fréquentielles observées (Tableau 59) sont les premières du genre pour les conditions d'élevage que nous connaissons. A ce titre, elles ont valeur de référence. Les pathologies puerpérales telles que la rétention placentaire et la fièvre vitulaire sont plus fréquentes chez la vache laitière que chez la vache viandeuse. La vache laitière se caractérise par ailleurs par une plus grande fréquence de retard d'involution utérine et de kystes ovariens que la vache viandeuse. L'infection du tractus génital constitue la pathologie dominante et sa manifeste avec la même fréquence dans les deux spéculations. D'une manière générale, la proportion de vaches atteintes par une ou plusieurs pathologies est plus élevée dans la spéculation laitière que viandeuse. TABLEAU 76 : FRÉQUENCE COMPARÉE DES PATHOLOGIES PUERPÉRALES ET DU POST-PARTUM CHEZ LA VACHE LAITIÈRE ET CHEZ LA VACHE VIANDEUSE. Pathologies Laitier Viandeux % n % n Rétention placentaire 4.4 7367 3.5 12235 Fièvre vitulaire 4.4 7367 0.05 12235 Retard d'involution utérine 21-50 jours 18.7 3690 13.9 6042 Infections du tractus génital Post-partum 36.5 4856 29.0 6084 21-50 jours 19.4 2791 19.4 3847 Kystes ovariens Post-partum 16.5 3363 6.9 4746 21-50 jours 9.5 3168 2.9 5155 Une fois quantifiée la fréquence des pathologies dans les deux spéculations, nous avons cherché à en identifier les facteurs de risque par la méthode des Odds Ratio et de la régression logistique. Certains se sont avérés être communs aux deux spéculations pour une pathologie donnée. Ainsi, l'âge de l'animal contribue à augmenter le risque de rétention placentaire et de retard d'involution utérine, la réduction de la longueur de la gestation celui de la rétention placentaire et la césarienne celui de l'infection utérine. De même, la gémellité augmente le risque de rétention placentaire et d'infection du tractus génital alors que la rétention placentaire et le retard d'involution utérine favorisent l'infection du tractus génital dont la présence augmente le risque de retard d'involution utérine. A l'inverse, nous avons constaté un effet plus spécifique de certains facteurs en fonction de la spéculation surtout en ce qui concerne la rétention placentaire et la fièvre vitulaire chez la vache laitière ce qui laisse en présumer une pathogénie commune. La saison du vêlage influence davantage le risque d'une pathologie chez la vache laitière que chez la vache viandeuse. Ce fait reflète peut-être l'effet indirect de la production laitière à l'origine d'un métabolisme différent. Sur le plan pratique, il est intéressant de distinguer deux types de facteurs. Les uns sont davantage inhérents à l'animal. Ils sont par conséquent moins directement modifiables . Qualifiés de "marqueurs de risque", ils concernent le numéro de lactation, la longueur de la gestation, le nombre de veaux et la saison du vêlage. D'autres peuvent davantage être considérés comme des "facteurs de risque "proprement dit dans la mesure ou ils peuvent faire l'objet d'une attitude préventive ou curative de la part du vétérinaire. Ainsi chez la vache viandeuse le recours à la césarienne sera préféré au vêlage réalisé par traction pour diminuer la fréquence du retard d'involution utérine. Un suivi thérapeutique anti-infectieux de cette intervention chirurgicale ainsi que de la rétention placentaire sera de nature à diminuer la fréquence des infections du tractus génital et à favoriser la qualité de l'involution utérine. Chez la vache laitière, la prévention de la fièvre vitulaire et une meilleure détection du vêlage contribueront à réduire l'incidence de la rétention placentaire directement ou indirectement par la diminution de la mortalité néonatale. Ce faisant, le risque d'infection utérine sera réduit et ainsi la fréquence du retard d'involution utérine s'en trouvera diminué ce qui contribuera à réduire le risque de kystes ovariens. Le chapitre 5 a été consacré à l'étude comparée chez la vache laitière et viandeuse de la fertilité et de la fécondité ainsi que de leurs facteurs de risque individuels ou d'environnement. La fertilité et la fécondité ont été analysées respectivement par le pourcentage de gestation en première insémination et par l'intervalle entre le vêlage et l'insémination fécondante. Les pathologies puerpérales et du post-partum étudiées exercent d'une manière générale peu d'effet direct sur ces deux paramètres. En effet, chez la vache laitière, le pourcentage de gestation en première insémination ne se trouve diminué que par la rétention placentaire et par la présence d'une infection du tractus génital 41 à 50 jours après le vêlage tandis que la fièvre vitulaire est la seule pathologie à avoir une influence négative sur l'intervalle entre le vêlage et l'insémination fécondante. Il faut sans doute voir dans cette constatation l'effet positif exercé indirectement par la mise en place d'un suivi mensuel de reproduction. Celui-ci offre en effet au praticien la possibilité d'un dépistage et par conséquent d'un traitement précoce des pathologies rencontrées. Par ailleurs, il est possible que ces pathologies contribuent davantage à augmenter le risque de réforme de l'animal que celui d'infertilité ou d'infécondité. Au vu de notre étude, l'amélioration du pourcentage de gestation en première insémination constitue une priorité essentielle chez la vache laitière mais plus encore chez la vache viandeuse. Elle peut être espérée chez la première en évitant le recours à la césarienne, en prévenant la rétention placentaire qui prédispose aux infections du tractus génital, en évitant d'inséminer l'animal avant le 50ème jour du post-partum et en agissant sur les facteurs susceptibles de réduire l'anoestrus du postpartum Chez la vache viandeuse de race Blanc Bleu belge, la césarienne constitue un "mal nécessaire". La réduction de la fertilité qu'elle entraîne est le prix à payer mais non un obstacle à la politique de sélection viandeuse de plus en plus intensive menée dans cette spéculation. Le recours à des conditions optimales pour sa réalisation qu'elles soient de nature chirurgicales ou hygiéniques doit permettre de réduire les complications péritonéales et par conséquent à améliorer le pourcentage de gestation en première insémination. Nos résultats nous incitent par ailleurs à postposer après le 70ème jour du post-partum le moment de la première insémination chez la vache viandeuse et à ne pas recommander l'utilisation de spirales vaginales pour l'induction de la première chaleur après le vêlage. Sans doute, il serait intéressant d'étudier l'impact de solutions alternatives telles que la politique d'un sevrage précoce sur la réapparition rapide d'une activité ovarienne après le vêlage, facteur pouvant contribuer à réduire l'utilisation de traitements inducteurs. L'influence des variables antérieures est pratiquement nulle dans les deux spéculations à l'exception toutefois de la fièvre vitulaire chez la vache laitière. Cette observation devrait inciter le praticien a tenir compte du passé métabolique de l'animal pour décider du traitement préventif des animaux à risque.
A 2018 report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in partnership with computer security company McAfee, estimated that cybercrime costs the world almost $600 billion or .8% of the global Gross Domestic Product (CSIS, 2018, p. 4). In response to this booming element of transnational crime, states, private sector entities, non-governmental organizations, and individual citizens have sought to implement systems for the investigation, prosecution, and restitution of these crimes. One such solution is the development and enactment of international law. On December 27, 2019, the General Assembly of the United Nations passed Russia-led resolution A/74/401, entitled "Countering the use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes (United Nations, 2019, Countering the use)." Vehemently opposed by Western states such as the United States, the resolution approved the establishment of a committee of experts to evaluate the potential for an international cybercrime treaty (United Nations). While international cooperation of this kind is commendable, Western states and human rights groups have professed concerns that the vague language of the resolution has the potential to erode the human rights protections afforded to citizens under international law (Hakmeh & Peters, 2020). The purpose of this paper is to identify the human rights concerns of Russia's proposed United Nations resolution and analyze the obligations the international community has to uphold relevant human rights protections while balancing international cooperation necessitated by international law and legal norms. The first section of this paper provides historical background on the relationship between cyber issues like cybercrime and international law. ; Winner of the 2020 Friends of the Kreitzberg Library Award for Outstanding Research in the College of Graduate and Continuing Studies Graduate category. ; Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 1 International Law & the Cyber Domain: Assessing the Human Rights Concerns of Cyber Legislation GD520 International Law and the International System Dr. John Becker Norwich University College of Graduate and Continuing Studies Kathryn R. Lamphere 23 May 2020 Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 2 Introduction A 2018 report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in partnership with computer security company McAfee, estimated that cybercrime costs the world almost $600 billion or .8% of the global Gross Domestic Product (CSIS, 2018, p. 4). In response to this booming element of transnational crime, states, private sector entities, non-governmental organizations, and individual citizens have sought to implement systems for the investigation, prosecution, and restitution of these crimes. One such solution is the development and enactment of international law. On December 27, 2019, the General Assembly of the United Nations passed Russia-led resolution A/74/401, entitled "Countering the use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes (United Nations, 2019, Countering the use)." Vehemently opposed by Western states such as the United States, the resolution approved the establishment of a committee of experts to evaluate the potential for an international cybercrime treaty (United Nations). While international cooperation of this kind is commendable, Western states and human rights groups have professed concerns that the vague language of the resolution has the potential to erode the human rights protections afforded to citizens under international law (Hakmeh & Peters, 2020). The purpose of this paper is to identify the human rights concerns of Russia's proposed United Nations resolution and analyze the obligations the international community has to uphold relevant human rights protections while balancing international cooperation necessitated by international law and legal norms. The first section of this paper provides historical background on the relationship between cyber issues like cybercrime and international law. International Cyber Law Background The cyber domain is often presented as another realm, a world that exists outside of the mostly tidy borders the international community has used to separate themselves. Aligning with Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 3 this view is the notion that cyberspace cannot be regulated because it expands beyond the traditional idea of territorial sovereignty (Kanuck, 2010, p. 1573). These ideas raise two concerns over the identification and prosecution of cybercrime. The first concern is the conflict between "cybercrime, which is global in scale, and police activities that are confined to national borders (Cangemi, 2004, p. 166)." The conflict arises in the very structure of the Internet, which "can be characterized as a multitude of individual, but interconnected, electronic communications networks (Zekos, 2008, p. 30)." This interconnectedness has created a grey area within the legal system, where no one entity has regulatory control over what happens in that area. The second concern is far more technical and highlights the transient nature of information and data (Cangemi, 2004, p. 166). The source of information can be easily masked to hide its actual location, and data "may be amended, moved, or altered in a few seconds (p. 166)." The speed in which data travels presents a significant hurdle to the legal and law enforcement mechanisms typically used to investigate crimes. As Cangemi notes, this creates "an appreciable risk that the evidence of cyber-offences will disappear" long before implementing the required resources (p. 166). Nevertheless, despite these concerns, "nation-states do strive to exercise their sovereignty over cyberspace (Kanuck, 2010, p. 1573)." The physical elements of cybercrime, such as the location of the people perpetrating the crimes or the location of the hardware used to execute the crimes, are used as a connecting link to allow governments "to address cyber conflicts involving both state and nonstate actors as matters to be resolved by sovereign powers under their respective legal systems (p. 1573)." When evidence moves beyond territorial borders, states seek to invoke bilateral or international action to further pursue the crime. This model follows the same formula that society developed over time, whether it be in stopping crimes such as international drug trafficking or heinous acts of terrorism. The international community is well-Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 4 versed in this cycle, and the "nature of the international legal system affords this sovereign-centric approach primacy under the United Nations (U.N.) Charter regime (p. 1573)." If the international community is content in continuing to use this cycle, then "international legislation and action are essential to combat the phenomenon" of cybercrime (Pocar, 2004, 27). The essential requirement of international involvement and negotiation has rung true in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, as the international community takes steps to evolve international law to include cyber issues, specifically cybercrime. The 1980s introduced international consultation on cybercrime by multiple organizations. In 1983, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) commissioned a two-year study focusing "on the possibility of harmonizing and internationalizing national cybercrime laws (Brenner, 2012, p. 133)." OECD later published a report in 1986 summarizing the results of the study and recommending countries criminalize certain cybercrimes. In 1985, the Council of Europe convened its own study, which involved a four-year focus on "the legal issues raised by cybercrime (p. 133)." In 1997, the Council of Europe convened another study tasked with "the drafting of a cybercrime treaty that would harmonize national laws dealing with cybercrime offenses and investigations (p. 133). In 2001, the study's efforts came to fruition in the creation of the Convention of Cybercrime. Also referred to as the Budapest Convention, the international treaty entered into law in July 2004 with the principle objective of "pursuing a common criminal policy aimed at the protection of society against cybercrime, especially by adopting appropriate legislation and fostering international co-operation (Council of Europe, 2001, Preamble)." As of 2018, 29 states have ratified the treaty, but the rapid development of technology has resulted in the convention becoming outdated, leaving governments and organizations calling for a new treaty (Murphy, 2018, p. 549) (Shackelford, 2014, p. 312). Russia's 2019 United Nations resolution is the latest attempt to modernize international cyber Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 5 law and has received much adulation despite its vague, concerning language and human rights implications. The next section of this paper addresses human rights and provides an overview of states' obligations to this arena as members of the international community. Human Rights & the International Community Modern international human rights law begins with the first article of the Charter of the United Nations (UN), which dictates that one of the purposes of the UN is to "achieve international cooperation…in promoting and encouraging "respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion (Buergenthal, 2006, p. 785)." While the Charter provided minimal specificity as to what "respect for human rights" entailed, this provision and others within the Charter catalyzed a new international perspective on human rights. In joining the United Nations, members inherently accepted "the proposition that the Charter had internationalized the concept of human rights (p. 787)." Furthermore, the Charter insinuated that "states were deemed to have assumed some international obligations relating to human rights (p. 787)." Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter cemented the beginnings of these obligations, requiring member states to "take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of purposes" such as promoting "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all (United Nations, 1945, Article 55, 56)." The specificity of human rights became more overt when the United Nations devoted the UN Commission on Human Rights to the task of drafting non-legally-binding human rights instrument. In December 1948, the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (Murphy, 2018, p. 402). Composed of thirty articles, the declaration instituted vital human rights and eventually "served as a template for numerous subsequent treaties on human rights (p. 404)." As a result, the Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 6 Universal Declaration on Human Rights "has come to be accepted as a normative instrument in its own right (Buergenthal, 2006, p. 787)." Both documents uphold two pedestals of traditional international law as it pertains to human rights. The first pedestal retains responsibility for "the treatment by one state of another's nationals, an area known as state responsibility for injury to aliens (p. 389)." Although addressed at the state level, this notion asserts that individuals are afforded certain protections when in another state. The second pedestal, advanced by scholars such as Hugo Grotius, focuses on "the protection of persons against the acts of their own governments (p. 389)." It is this pedestal that introduces what is now known as humanitarian intervention, or the "idea of state intervening to protect the other state's nationals (p. 389)." Together, both the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration are "considered to spell out the general human rights obligations of all UN member states," of which there are now 193 (Buergenthal, 2006, p. 787) (Murphy, 2018, p. 59). Each international legal instrument has lent itself to the creation of international institutions dedicated to monitoring "compliance by the states parties with the obligations imposed by these instruments (Buergenthal, 2006, p. 788)." Such institutions include entities like the UN Human Rights Council and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (p. 788). Together, the instruments and institutions "laid the normative foundation of the contemporary international human rights revolution" and "influenced, in part at least, the contents of the legal norms under which international criminal tribunals operate today (p. 791)." The criticality of these elements to the international system, particularly as it pertains to international law, is justification for using each as measuring tools with which to judge the new UN cyber-focused resolution objectively. The third section of this paper will assess the purpose of the resolution and explain the supporting argument for its contents. Supporting Arguments & Analysis of A/74/401 Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 7 In order to truly understand the intent of international laws, it is crucial to develop an understanding of the stances actors take concerning the specific issues at hand. This understanding is of particular importance when discussing Resolution A/74/401 and the underlying views of cyberspace. Two opposing perspectives lie at the heart of debates surrounding the cyber domain and Internet governance and center around the notion of sovereignty. The first perspective is that "many governments are attempting to exert sovereignty in cyberspace in the same way as they do in physical domains (Nocetti, 2015, p. 111)." For these governments, the dominance of private sector institutions within cyberspace and "the unfettered internet access of their fellow citizens" are causes of concerns (p. 111). This sentiment is particularly true within the Russian government. Under its traditional views of governance, Russia "conceives of cyberspace as a territory with virtual borders corresponding to physical state borders, and wishes to see the remit of international laws extended to the internet space (p. 112)." Furthermore, Russia's domestic fears of an open Internet fuel its international concerns. Russia sees the Internet as "politically disruptive because it enables citizens to circumvent government-controlled 'traditional media (p. 113).'" It aligns this perspective "with the inherently authoritarian nature of the Russian regime (p. 114)." Russia's negative perception of the Internet as it is today ultimately lends itself to Russia's ideal mechanism of perpetuating its belief that "global internet governance is envisioned as an issue of high politics in which states - and the interstate balance of power-play – play an essential role (p. 116, 117)." Under this mechanism, it is little wonder that Russia has led international legal initiatives to refine control over the Internet since the Council of Europe's enactment of its Convention on Cybercrime. In a Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release following the General Assembly's adoption of Resolution A/74/401, Russia proclaimed that the "resolution shows that the world community urgently needs to develop a universal, comprehensive, and open-ended convention Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 8 on countering cybercrime (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019)." The adopted resolution's language appears to align with this projected intent from Russia. The resolution stresses "the need to enhance coordination and cooperation among States in combating the use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes" and notes "the importance of the international and regional instruments in the fight against cybercrime (United Nations, 2019, Countering the Use)." In order to fulfill these objectives, the resolution establishes an "intergovernmental committee of experts, representative of all regions" that will "elaborate a comprehensive international convention on countering the use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes (United Nations, 2019)." Remarks of supporting nations support this appearance of cohesion. The representative from Nicaragua indicated the resolution would address cybercrime "in a more representative, democratic and transparent manner, taking into account the individual circumstances of developing and developed countries (Third Committee, 2019, Meetings Coverage)." China echoed this support, stating the resolution "is conducive to filling legal gaps in international cooperation (Third Committee)." At the same time, Belarus declared that "international cooperation is vital in investigating and combating cybercrime (Third Committee)." At face value, the resolution is a gesture of goodwill, a written contract to pursue options to disrupt cybercrime that will benefit all states. However, Russia's press release takes these notions a step further, realigning its message to its traditional view of international politics. It notes, "the resolution proposed by Russia essentially enhances states' digital sovereignty over their information space and ushers in a new page in the history of global efforts to counter cybercrime (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019)." Furthermore, the press release dictates that the "convention must be based on the principles of respecting state sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs (2019)." There are two Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 9 essential points within this statement that require further analysis. The first is the reassertion of the authoritarian construct with which Russia chooses to view cyberspace. In a press release initially dedicated to lauding the necessity of international cooperation, Russia simultaneously defaults to its traditional views of the international community and advocates for a "digital Westphalia (Nocetti, 2015, p. 117)." In recognizing sovereignty, Russia insinuates that the international community will successfully legislate mechanisms that will reduce cybercrime. A quick review of the supporting states in favor of the resolution upholds Russia's authoritarian views (United Nations, 2019, Countering the Use). In addition to China, Nicaragua, and Belarus, countries like Iran, Syria, Venezuela, Cuba, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are only some of the 88 Member States of the General Assembly who voted to adopt the resolution. Unsurprisingly, these states also abide by similar authoritarian perspectives on international law and sovereignty. China, for example, maintains a "comprehensive, multidimensional system that governs Internet infrastructure, commercial and social use as well as legal domains (Liang & Lu, 2010, p. 105)." This system supports "Internet censorship" and "China's single-party political system and its heavy intervention in Internet development (p. 105)." Given the nature and history of these states' political systems and methods of governance, the sudden focus on international cooperation generates questions of the underlying goals that may hide behind the official demands of the resolution. The second point requiring acknowledgment is the additional re-emphasis of sovereignty while also emphasizing non-interventionist beliefs in discussing non-interference in internal affairs. The resolution itself makes no mention of sovereignty or internal affairs beyond assisting countries with improving "national legislation and frameworks and build the capacity of national authorities" to deal with cybercrime (United Nations, 2019, Countering the Use). Despite the lack of language on this topic, the leading state on this initiative, Russia, felt the need Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 10 to emphasize its sovereignty in a press release about the resolution (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019). Once again, Russia gives the impression that there may be a hidden desire layered within the words of the resolution. Additionally, the concept of non-interference within the international system is not without exceptions. The most critical exception being suspicion of human rights violations. As previously stated, humanitarian intervention and protecting citizens from their own government is a staple of international human rights law (Murphy, 2018, p. 389). Therefore, while non-interference in domestic matters is undoubtedly an essential tenet of international law, the resolution cannot call for international cooperation to combat cybercrime and simultaneously ignore the international cooperation required to maintain peace and security (United Nations, 1945, Charter of the United Nations). The next section of this paper will address these obligations to cooperation as it pertains to human rights while also highlighting the opposing arguments against Resolution A/74/401. Opposing Arguments for A/74/401 & Analysis of Human Rights Concerns The first perspective at the heart of the cyber domain debates, as described previously, is modeled after authoritarian beliefs and government control. The second perspective, modeled after a more Western approach to governance, is the belief of a free and open Internet that should remain decentralized and that "the best regulatory system is one that develops organically (Shackelford, 2013, p. 53)." A free Internet is more firmly the belief of the United States. This idea introduces the initial context necessary to understand the United States' opposition to the Russian-led cybercrime resolution. Even before the rapid development of the Internet, American foreign policy internalized the notion of "free flow of information internationally as an important element of national security (McCarthy, 2011, p. 92)." Former Secretary of State George Schultz argued that the free flow of information "undermined the Soviet Union and authoritarianism (p. 92, 93)." At its earliest beginnings, the Internet was a product of American ingenuity and, as a Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 11 result, built with a bias for "American libertarianism (p. 93)." In the present, the West has developed this concept in the "context of freedom expression, protection of intellectual property rights, and national security (Powers & Jablonski, 2015, p. 3)." As former Secretary of State Clinton asserted, the United States and other Western nations support the "freedom to connect" in opposition to efforts by states such as China, Iran, and Russia to create state-level information infrastructures designed for censorship (p. 3). The historical rivalry and disagreement between the two states on information, particularly as it pertains to cyberspace, only further roots the United States' opposition to the new United Nations cybercrime resolution. In its statement to the United Nations during the 49th & 50th meetings of the Third Committee, the United States expressed disappointment "with the decisions of the sponsors of this resolution to bring it to the Third Committee (United States Mission to the United Nations, 2019)." Contrary to the resolution's focus on cooperation, the United States' proclaimed the resolution would "drive a wedge between Member States and undermine international cooperation to combat cybercrime at a time when enhanced coordination is essential (United States Mission to the United Nations)." Furthermore, the United States asserted Russia's actions in introducing the resolution essentially bypass the "expert-driven, consensus-based process and therefore is not in line with their precedent (United States Mission to the United Nations)." Other Western states appear to agree with the United States assertions, as states such as the United Kingdom, Australia, France, Republic of Korea, and Germany composed part of the 58 Member States who opposed the adoption of the resolution (United Nations, 2019, Countering the Use). In a manner similar to the states in favor of the adoption, some opposed states made remarks in agreement with those of the United States during the Third Committee. Finland, on behalf of the European Union, remarked that "there is no consensus on the need for a new international instrument to fight cybercrime" and that the draft "represents a duplication of resources (Third Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 12 Committee, 2019, Meetings Coverage). Canada and Australia presented similar sentiments, remarking that "the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime is an important baseline for international cooperation" and that the new resolution "seeks to undercut consensus and will diminish existing global efforts that are already delivering results (Third Committee, 2019)." There is one remaining argument against the new cybercrime resolution: the potential that the document's vague language will create an environment where human rights will be more easily violated if left unchecked (Hakmeh & Peters, 2020). In a letter to the United Nations General Assembly, 37 organizations and six individuals expressed their concern for human rights protections as they pertain to the cybercrime resolution (Association for Progressive Communications (APC), 2019, Open Letter, p. 4). The first concern is a lack of clarity surrounding the scope of the "use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes (APC, p. 1)." If left undefined, the language in the resolution arguably "opens the door to criminalising ordinary online behaviour that is protected under international human rights law (APC, p. 1)." If steps to do so were taken as a result of the new resolution, they would be in direct violation of the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights; who stated in 2011 that "human rights are equally valid online as offline (Shackelford, 2019, p. 168)." The second concern offered by non-government entities is the increasing trend in "criminalising ordinary online activities of individuals and organisations through the application of cybercrime laws (APC, 2019, Open Letter, p. 1, 2)." The letter even goes so far as to quote the UN Special Rapporteur over these concerns, that the "surge in legislation and policies aimed at combating cybercrime has also opened the door to punishing and surveilling activists and protestors in many countries around the world (APC, p. 2)." If used in such a manner, these initiatives, in addition to the UN cybercrime resolution, are in direct violation of the Charter of United Nations and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. Within the Charter of the United Nations, efforts to Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 13 restrict or punish opposition elements such as activists or protestors violates Articles 55 and 56, which requires states to cooperate with the UN in achieving the organizations' purposes such as promoting human rights (United Nations, 1945, Article 55, 56). The Universal Declaration on Human Rights provides more specific language with which to attribute potential violations. The open letter notes that legislation of this kind is used to "criminalise legitimate forms of online expression, association and assembly through vague and ill-defined terms that allow for arbitrary or discretionary application (APC, 2019, Open Letter, p. 2)." Immediately, legislation that allows for criminalization of these elements is in direct violation of Articles 18, 19, and 20, which declare "all persons have a right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and assembly (Murphy, 2018, p. 402)." Furthermore, violations such as these also violate article two, which guarantees people "the right to life, liberty, and security" and dictates that "these rights are to be held without discrimination of any kind (Murphy, p. 402, 403)." Upholding these rights within cyberspace continues to fall in line with the Western perspective on the Internet. As McCarthy quotes, "the Internet is arguably the greatest facilitator for freedom of expression and innovation in the world today (McCarthy, 2011, p. 94)." The status of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights as "legitimate norms within the international system" permits this interpretation and application of international law to future resolutions (p. 94). If states are signatories to the declaration, any future adoption of any resolution must adhere to the principles and freedoms guaranteed by it. Resolution A/74/401 does refer to human rights protections, "reaffirming the importance of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the use of information and communication technologies (United Nations, 2019, Countering the Use)." However, the resolution's open language is in direct contradiction to this promise, if not clarified. As the open letter indicates, "simply reaffirming the importance of respect for human rights" is "insufficient to safeguard human rights while Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 14 countering cybercrime (APC, 2019, Open Letter, p. 2)." The final section of this paper recommends additional actions that may further unify opposing entities on this resolution while simultaneously addressing all human rights concerns. Recommendations The Russian-led supporters of the resolution and the United States-led opposition are unified in one common element, at least in writing. The element is that consensus and international cooperation are vital in addressing cybercrime (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019) (United States Mission to the United Nations, 2019). This notion is in concert with the Council of Europe, who remains the only entity to successfully orchestrate an international cybercrime treaty (Council of Europe, 2004, Convention on Cybercrime). In 2001, the Council of Europe postulated that "solutions to the problems posed must be addressed by international law, necessitating the adoption of adequate international legal instruments" that can "ensure the necessary efficiency" required to combat cybercrime (Pocar, 2004, p. 28). If the international community determines that another cybercrime treaty is required within the intergovernmental committee of experts authorized by Resolution A/74/401, then the new treaty should consider the aims of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (United Nations, 2019, Countering the Use). In doing so, the United Nations should strive to create a "basic framework for the establishment by contracting states of domestic substantive and procedural laws" in a manner that allows states to "cooperate expeditiously with one another (Pocar, 2004, p. 30)." If successful, the United Nations will be able to "establish procedures for relevant international relations" and provide "forms of cooperation between national judicial authorities as many interact with each other both swiftly and efficiently (p. 31)." Furthermore, the necessity of these requirements is supported by the very nature of the "the world-wide dimension of the Internet," Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 15 which "implies that its illegal use and related offenses must prompt responses and concerted efforts from all relevant domestic and international authorities (p. 34)." The non-governmental organizations' open letter to the United Nations supports the need for cooperation but takes it one step further than the states themselves. In its current structure, the Internet is a public-private endeavor, with private entities dominating cyberspace (Nocetti, 2015, p. 111). The present language of the United Nations cybercrime resolution allows for an intergovernmental committee of experts. However, it does not expand on the actual composition of the committee (United Nations, 2019, Countering the Use). Noting that Russia and other authoritarian regimes prefer non-government entities to use the government as a proxy for communication, it can be inferred that a Russia-led resolution intends the committee to be comprised of only government entities (p. 117). The open letter rightly points out that collaboration on cyber issues must expand beyond state cooperation. Addressing cybercrime is "necessarily a multi-stakeholder endeavour" that "requires government officials and experts, members of the technical community, civil society, the private sector, and scientific and research institutions (APC, 2019, Open Letter, p. 4)." An assessment of this viewpoint reveals that a committee dedicated to combatting cybercrime cannot rely on government expertise alone. In order to accurately reflect the composition and requirements of a private-public Internet, all discussions surrounding this resolution should involve both private and public entities. Therefore, the committee should be reformed to more accurately reflect the Internet's users. In doing so, the United Nations breaches the divide between authoritarian and more democratic governments, further increasing cooperation on this resolution. However, increased cooperation through a broader, inclusive committee and implementation of lessons learned from the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime will not ensure that the future convention successfully resolves the resolution's weaknesses. In Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 16 modern-day, the international system emphasizes international human rights more than ever before, as "this branch of international law has experienced phenomenal growth over the past one hundred years (Buergenthal, 2006, p. 807)." This growth has contributed to the "growing political impact of human rights on the conduct of international relations and the behavior of governments (p. 807)." If real success is desired within international governance, then the committee established under the "Countering the use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes" resolution must account for human rights protections when determining the requirements of the "comprehensive international convention (United Nations, 2019, Countering the Use)." As the representative from Costa Rica during the 49th and 50th meetings of the Third Committee, "the international community must protect and observe fundamental freedoms, including the right to privacy (Third Committee, 2019, Meeting Coverage)." Until there is consensus on "sensitive topics such as…State responsibility to prioritize and protect human rights," the future proposed convention will fall short of its goal of achieving complete international ratification (Third Committee). Conclusion As cyberspace expands in conjunction with the rapid advancement of technology, the fear of the unknown drives further division between already opposing states in the international system. Resolution A/74/401 is the latest testament to the evolution of politicization within Internet governance. In addressing a topic that impacts every Internet-accessible region of the world, the resolution simultaneously magnifies the opposing perspectives of states as it pertains to sovereignty within the cyber domain. Furthermore, it reignites the protracted debate over whether or not human rights obligations addressed in such documents as the Charter of the United Nations or Universal Declaration on Human Rights are legally binding. Preventing further polarization requires both an acknowledgment of a fracturing international system of Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 17 governance and a proposed solution to address the issue. While state-centric governance provides legitimacy and the potential for a higher allocation of resources dedicated to protecting the Internet, increased sovereignty also "risks sacrificing innovation, complicates the regulatory environment of cyberspace, and may threaten a positive vision of cyber peace (Shackelford, 2013, p. 50)." These risks are why an alternative method to an intergovernmental committee must develop in response to the resolution. This method should integrate a multi-stakeholder construct to more fully recognize the competing impacts of cybercrime and fairly address the allegations of human rights infringement. One such method is polycentric governance, a system composed of "diverse organizations and governments working at multiple levels" in order to "increase levels of voluntary cooperation or increase compliance with rules established by governmental authorities (p. 330)." Individually, each organization or type of government faces its own unique hurdles. Together, they "contribute to a governance regime that is multi-level, multi-purpose, multi-type, and multi-sectoral in scope that could complement the top-down governance model increasingly favored" by states such as Russia or China (p. 331). Implementing polycentric governance to more equitably debate the appropriate response to international cybercrime will create an international community willing to consider the developing convention. In doing so, the environment will be better suited to determining whether or not the international system can leverage international law to investigate and prosecute cybercrime. Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 18 References Association for Progressive Communications (APC). (2019). Open Letter to UN General Assembly: Proposed international convention on cybercrime poses a threat to human rights online. Retrieved from https://www.apc.org/sites/default/files/Open_letter_re_UNGA_cybercrime_resolution_0.pdf Brenner, S. (2012). Cybercrime and the Law: Challenges, Issues, and Outcomes. Northeastern University Press. Retrieved from https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/norwich/reader.action?docID=1085118&ppg=124 Buergenthal, T. (2006). The Evolving International Human Rights System. The American Journal of International Law, 100(4), 783-807. Retrieved from https://www-jstor-org.library.norwich.edu/stable/pdf/4126317.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ae4ea9f31648cbd83f8f97bc7dae8e67a Cangemi, D. (2004). Procedural Law Provisions of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime. International Review of Law Computers & Technology, 18(2), 165-171. Retrieved from https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/5272830680 Center for Strategic & International Studies & McAfee. (2018). Economic Impact of Cybercrime – No Slowing Down. Retrieved from https://www.csis.org/analysis/economic-impact-cybercrime Council of Europe. (2004). Convention on Cybercrime. Retrieved from https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/185 Hakmeh, J. & Peters, A. (2020). A New UN Cybercrime Treaty? The Way Forward for Supporters of an Open, Free, and Secure Internet. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/blog/new-un-cybercrime-treaty-way-forward-supporters-open-free-and-secure-internet Kanuck, S. (2010). Sovereign Discourse on Cyber Conflict Under International Law. Texas Law Review, 88, 1571-1597. Retrieved from https://www.law.upenn.edu/institutes/cerl/conferences/cyberwar/papers/reading/Kanuck.pdf Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 19 Liang, B., & Lu, H. (2010). Internet Development, Censorship, and Cyber Crimes in China. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 26(1), 103–120. Retrieved from https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/5322181473 McCarthy, D. (2011). Open Networks and the Open Door: American Foreign Policy and the Narration of the Internet. Foreign Policy Analysis, 7(1), 89-111. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. (2019, December). Press Release on the UN General Assembly Vote on the Russian Draft Resolution on Countering Cybercrime. Retrieved from https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3988579 Murphy, S. (2018). Principles of international law (3rd edition). West Academic Publishing. Nocetti, J. (2015). Contest and Conquest: Russia and Global Internet Governance. International Affairs, 91(1), 111-130. Retrieved from https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/5721220595 Pocar, F. (2004). New Challenges for International Rules Against Cyber-Crime. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 10(1), 27-37. Retrieved from https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/5649374698 Powers, S. & Jablonski, M. (2015). The Real Cyber War: The Political Economy of Internet Freedom. University of Illinois Press. Retrieved from https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/903245891 Shackelford, S. J. (2013). Managing Cyber Attacks in International Law, Business, and Relations: In Search of Cyber Peace: Vol. Revised Edition. Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/882104883 Shackelford, S. (2019). Should Cybersecurity Be a Human Right? Exploring the "Shared Responsibility" of Cyber Peace. Stanford Journal of International Law, 55(2), 155–184. Retrieved from https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/8185136062 United Nations General Assembly. (1945). Charter of the United Nations. Retrieved from https://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/index.html United Nations General Assembly. (2019). Countering the use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes. Retrieved from https://www.undocs.org/A/74/401 United Nations Third Committee. (2019, November). Meetings Coverage Seventy-Fourth Session, 49th & 50th Meetings. Retrieved from https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/gashc4284.doc.htm United States Mission to the United Nations. (2019, November). Statement on Agenda Item 107 'Countering the use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes.' Retrieved from https://usun.usmission.gov/statement-on-agenda-item-107-countering-the-use-of-information-and-communications-technologies-for-criminal-purposes/ Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 20 Zekos, G. (2008). Electronic State Sovereignty. The Icfai University Journal of Cyber Law, 7(4), 30-60.
This report consists of two parts: Part 1 presents a review of recent economic developments and a macroeconomic outlook. Part 2 focuses in greater depth on a special, selected topic relevant to Malawi's development prospects. This report focuses on agricultural risk management. Malawi is now set to suffer a second year of poor harvests due to the effects of a drought that is sweeping Southern Africa. This drought has had a serious impact both on the economy and on food security, requiring a major humanitarian response. The current situation underscores Malawi's serious need to improve the resilience of the agricultural sector and to develop a better system of risk management. With the country expected to continue to face climate-induced shocks into the future, it is vital that the Government considers how best to mitigate the impact of such shocks. In 2015 Malawi recorded a GDP growth rate of just 2.8 percent, with this low rate the result of both adverse weather conditions and macroeconomic instability. Flooding in southern districts followed by a countrywide drought resulted in a contraction in agricultural production. Maize, the key crop in terms of food security, recorded a 30.2 percent year-on-year drop in production. As a result, an estimated 2.8 million people (17 percent of the population) were unable to meet their 2015/16 food requirements.
The difficulty of pursuing a conventional market-oriented development strategy in the Palestinian territories led in the early part of the 2000s to a second-best reliance on public sector employment and wage bill expansion to boost aggregate demand. The main objective of this Programmatic Public Expenditure Review (PER) is to inform policy and institution-building efforts of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and its donor partners about improving the sustainability of public expenditures and the efficacy and efficiency in the provision of essential public services.In particular, this PER aims to provide an assessment of public revenue and expenditure policies offering specific policy and institutional measures to reduce the size of the Palestinian territories fiscal deficit and make it more sustainable.The fiscal situation of the Palestinian Authority is not sustainable.The difficult fiscal situation facing the Palestinian Authority today results from a unique confluence of challenges.As this report will argue, there is considerable further scope for reforms that would raise additional tax revenues, and reduce expenditures without compromising the quality of public services or negatively impacting public welfare.However, the PER notes that there are limits to what can be achieved by PA fiscal policy alone.The PER is organized as follows: Chapter one provides an overview of recent macroeconomic and fiscal developments; it also contains a brief assessment of priority fiscal policy issues facing the PA, and serves as an introduction to the in-depth analysis of the issues that follow in subsequent chapters. Chapter two analyzes the factors driving the size of the PA's wage bill, and shows how these can be tackled. Chapter three reviews expenditures in the public health sector. Chapter four analyzes the Palestinian public pension system, and looks into how its sustainability can be assured. Chapter five assesses the quality of intergovernmental fiscal transfers, including net lending transfers. Chapter six reviews the way in which public investment projects are planned and implemented, and identifies steps to improve investment quality. Further details on health and pensions are provided in the annexes.
The longstanding "cash versus food" debate has received renewed attention in both research and practice. This paper reviews key issues shaping the debate and presents new evidence from randomized and quasi-experimental evaluations that deliberately compare cash and in-kind food transfers in ten developing counties. Findings show that relative effectiveness cannot be generalized: although some differences emerge in terms of food consumption and dietary diversity, average impacts tend to depend on context, specific objectives, and their measurement. Costs for cash transfers and vouchers tend to be significantly lower relative to in-kind food. Yet the consistency and robustness of methods for efficiency analyses varies greatly.
This report summarizes findings from an allocative efficiency and financial commitment analysis conducted for the Government of Zambia by the World Bank and the University of New South Wales. It uses Optima, a mathematical model of HIV transmission and disease progression. Optima is a population-based and flexible model, which provides a formal method of optimization and determines optimal allocations of HIV resources across numerous HIV programs, target populations, and funding levels. It also provides epidemic, investment scenario and financial commitment analysis.
El Salvador is the smallest country in Central America, and one of the most densely populated in the world. El Salvador is among the countries most affected by weather-related events and other hazards, incurring annual losses of around 2.5 percent of GDP. Worldwide, it ranks second highest for risk exposure to two or more hazards and highest for the total population at a relatively high risk of mortality. Furthermore, climate change is expected to increase the frequency and severity of weather, related events. The new Administration is committed to making El Salvador more 'productive, educated, and safe' by promoting inclusive growth and resilience. The World Bank Group's (WBG) proposed new CPF intends to promote inclusive growth and to foster resilience, with a focus on policy levers that could contribute to break the vicious circles in a sustainable manner. The proposed CPF is aligned with the Government's priorities and informed by the WBG's recent SCD. To strengthen the mutually-reinforcing foundations of inclusive growth, the proposed WBG engagement would support objectives which seek to: (i) build capacity to create safer communities for economic development; (ii) improve secondary-school attainment; (iii) enhance youth employability and skills; and (iv) increase access to finance. To foster sustainability and resilience, the proposed CPF seeks to: (v) promote the efficiency of public spending; and (vi) build capacity to manage disasters and environmental challenges. Taking into account the challenges faced by El Salvador, the WBG wishes to provide a modest but catalytic role through the implementation of these six objectives.
This engagement note provides a snapshot of financial development in the countries of the GulfCooperation Council (GCC), Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and identifies key areas of the financial sector reform agenda where the World Bank Group (WBG) through the Finance Markets Global Practice (FMGP) can provide its support, in particular through the provision of analytical services and advisory (ASA). A key challenge for GCC countries is to diversify their economic structures, increase the role of the private sector, improve the efficiency of the government and reform the educational system and the labor market. This is essential to create employment opportunities for a young and growing domestic population. In this context, the development of an efficient, stable and inclusive financial sector is a policy objective in itself and a necessary conduit to a more diversified and productive economic system. Against this backdrop, this engagement note suggests that improving the quality of financial intermediation in GCC economies is a balancing act between enhancing access and preserving stability. Accordingly, it detects and discusses several areas of engagement for WBG which are consistent with the financial sector reform agenda of the region. In particular, based on the expertise and delivery capacity of WBG, particularly of FMGP, this engagement note suggests that WBG target ASA in the following areas: (i) financial infrastructure, particularly insolvency regimes, creditor rights and payment and settlement systems; (ii) banking competition; (iii) government debt capital market development, including sukuk; (iv) credit guarantee schemes for SMEs; and (v) macro prudential supervision.
The Republic of Congo (Congo) boasts numerous assets that can be harnessed to build a strong and robust economy. These assets are oil, ore such as iron and potash, arable lands, and a young population. Congo is the fourth largest oil producer among West and Central African countries, both in total production (260,000 barrels per day) and production per capita terms. In addition, the country is endowed with substantial iron and potash that are yet to be exploited; it has a vast arable lands that could be useful for agricultural development; and the country boasts a young population, which, if well-educated, could be a dynamic labor force helping to spur economic growth.
Using a new and representative data set of Chinese household finance, this paper documents household access to and costs of finance, along with their correlates. As in most developing countries, informal finance is a crucial element of household finance, and wealth tends to be associated with better access to formal and informal finance. Better financial knowledge shifts loan portfolios toward formal sources relative to informal ones. Connections to the Communist Party are associated with significantly better access to finance in rural areas but not in urban areas. A larger social network is positively associated with access to informal finance. Controlling for household characteristics, rural residents pay interest rates on loans similar to urban residents. Younger residents pay higher rates, while households on firmer economic footing face lower rates. Taking financial classes and college education is associated with higher interest rates for urban residents, suggesting perhaps that financial knowledge coincides with greater demand for credit in areas with more economic opportunity. Overall, the findings suggest that Chinese residents face dual credit markets, with the poor, young, those with poor financial knowledge, and those with larger family sizes relying much more on informal finance, while others are better able to access formal finance.
The health equity and financial protection reports are short country-specific volumes that provide a picture of equity and financial protection in the health sectors of low-and middle-income countries. Topics covered include: inequalities in health outcomes, health behavior and health care utilization; benefit incidence analysis; financial protection; and the progressivity of health care financing. Ghana's government is committed to improving equity and financial protection in the health sector. In 2005, the Government of Ghana amended its growth and poverty reduction strategy report to include a new target in the country's development: to reach middle income status by the year 2015 (Republic of Ghana 2005). Ghana's Minister of health has called attention to the role that health plays in economic development and has placed equity in both access and delivery of health services as a top priority for reaching middle income status (Ministry of health 2007). Ghana spends 8.1 per cent (2009) of its gross domestic product (GDP) on health. This is greater than the spending levels in other lower middle-income countries in Africa, which spend an average of 5.8 per cent (2009) of their GDP on health. Ghana provides free health services for certain vulnerable groups, such as children under five, people over 70, and pregnant women. In addition, immunization and services to combat certain communicable diseases are provided free of charge.
