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Matsumoto, Hwang, and Frank [2012a. Emotions expressed in speeches by leaders of ideologically motivated groups predict aggression. Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression. doi:10.1080/19434472.2012.716449] provided evidence that the verbal expression of anger, contempt, and disgust by leaders of ideologically motivated groups when talking about their archrival opponent outgroups is associated with subsequent political aggression. That study was limited in two ways, first because it only analyzed emotions expressed in text, and second because it analyzed only text excerpts that directly mentioned the outgroups. In this study, we remedied both limitations by analyzing emotions nonverbally expressed by leaders in videos, and by comparing both outgroup and non-outgroup mentions. Leaders of groups that eventually committed acts of aggression expressed significantly more anger, contempt, and disgust when talking about their archrival opponent outgroups than when not talking, whereas there was no such difference for acts of resistance. These findings reinforced the potentially important role of anger, contempt, and disgust in the escalation to political aggression. Adapted from the source document.

Can an insecure regime use nuclear diversion to address its eroding domestic legitimacy? This article argues that facing a domestic legitimacy crisis, a regime might opt to "rally round the nuclear flag" to survive. Theoretically, I argue that, compared with conventional diversion, nuclear diversion is less susceptible to structural restraints, has a unique symbolic value that could aid in coping with an acute legitimacy crisis, and spans a host of diversionary strategies as it ascends the escalation ladder, both before and after acquiring the bomb. The theory is examined empirically via Iranian nuclear policy. I argue that facing a deepening legitimacy crisis, the Iranian regime, throughout Ahmadinejad's tenure, has been increasingly drawing on nuclear diversion to boost public support and that, if the legitimacy crisis lingers, the regime may opt to further employ diversionary nuclear strategies, most of which require a viable "nuclear latency," rather than actual military nuclear capability.Related Articles
Ripberger, Joseph T., Thomas M. Rabovsky, and Kerry G. Herron. 2011. "." Politics & Policy 39 (): 891‐923. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2011.00327.x/abstract


Kane, John, and Haig Patapan. 2010. "." Politics & Policy 38 (): 589‐610. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2010.00250.x/abstract


Darvich, Djamchid, and W. R. Campbell. 1982. "." Southeastern Political Review 10 (): 37‐87. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.1982.tb00034.x/abstract
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Kurzman, Charles. 2009. "." . July 18. http://chronicle.com/article/Social‐Science‐on‐Trial‐in‐/48949/


. 2011. "." . February 24. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world‐africa‐12570279

According to forty year's worth of research, dissent always increases repression whereas state coercive behavior has a range of different influences on dissident activity. If the outcome of government action is uncertain, why do authorities continue to apply repression? We explore this "puzzle of repressive persistence" using official records of U.S. government activities against the Republic of New Africa, a Black Nationalist organization active in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In particular, we investigate three proposed answers to the puzzle: repression is effective but in a way not currently considered; repression functions by mechanisms not hitherto considered by quantitative researchers; or those who use repression are not actually interested in eliminating dissent. We find that persistence in this case can be attributed to: 1) a long-term plan to eliminate challengers deemed threatening to the U.S. political-economy and 2) the influence of particular agents of repression engaged in a crusade against Black radicals. Both factors increased the likelihood of continued coercion despite short-term failure; indeed such an outcome actually called for additional repressive action. These insights open up a new area of research for conflict scholars interested in occurrence, persistence and escalation. Adapted from the source document.

Border Games -- Contents -- Preface to the Third Edition -- 1. The Escalation of Border Policing -- 2. Creating the Clandestine Side of the Border Economy -- 3. The Escalation of Drug Control -- 4. The Escalation of Immigration Control -- 5. Escalation in a New Security Landscape -- 6. Escalation in a New Political Landscape -- 7. Endless Escalation? Border Policing Trajectories -- Notes -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Y -- Z.

In India, the alternative dispute resolution forums are being encouraged, but the cardinal question of how to determine the most appropriate dispute resolution forum amongst Negotiation, Mediation, Arbitration and Litigation to resolve the dispute remains unanswered. This paper proposes a model containing six parts to answer this fundamental question. First part will involve understanding the emergence and transformation of client's dispute through the process of naming, blaming and claiming. This process even though essential, is often neglected. Second part will explain about understanding the client's expectation from the case. Third part will demonstrate evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the client's case by conducting a financial, reputational, organizational, personal, and legal risk analyses. This part will also explain the importance of framing a Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement and Worst Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement with the help of a case study. The benefit of evaluating the strength and weaknesses of the case, and framing a Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement and Worst Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement will also be covered in this part. Fourth part will include defining the client as a 'repeat player' or a 'one shotter' which will significantly affect the choice of appropriate dispute resolution forum. Fifth part will explain about the tiered dispute resolution process and escalation clause. Last part will emphasize that even though concept of 'vanishing trial' is becoming popular, cases which have the potential of setting precedents and rules for public good must be resolved through litigation. The paper will conclude by explaining the circumstances in which a particular dispute resolution process is suitable.