Suchergebnisse

This study outlines the initial challenge presented by the HIV/AIDS epidemic, describes Djibouti's response, reviews the results achieved and the enabling factors in curbing the spread of the epidemic, and identifies remaining challenges. Between 2002 and 2008, HIV prevalence among young pregnant women aged 15-24 was reduced from 2.7 percent to 1.9 percent and among sentinel surveillance groups from 2.5 percent to 1.9 percent. HIV prevalence among tuberculosis patients was reduced from an estimated 22 percent to 12 percent. Condom use during last intercourse outside marriage increased from 27 percent to 55 percent and reached 95 percent among sex workers. Among the general population, awareness of HIV/AIDS increased to 95 percent and knowledge about transmission and prevention rose to 50 percent. Political commitment, engagement of community and religious leaders, rigorous communication, social marketing and the provision of an integrated package of medical and social services, and donor harmonization were among the key factors that contributed to the achievement of these results. Despite these impressive results in a relatively short period, Djibouti still has to address several challenges and consolidate program gains, but most importantly, funds are being mobilized from government resources to sustain the national AIDS control program.

 I am not sure that the past month's headaches and insomnia are due to the challenges of thinking about the Israel-Palestine conflict, but I am going to use that as my intro to this effort to think through this stuff.Usual caveats apply: I am not a political theorist or moral philosopher, I am not an expert on the conflict itself.  Oh, and I was raised Jewish and the education I got at Hebrew school did not adequately present the realities of the past.  I did take one Mideast politics course in college, and I did spend one week on an amazing and amazingly depressing tour of Israel and Palestine with a bunch of other academics four years ago.One of the conversations that disturbed me most this past week was when a rabbi I met on that trip     responded to my criticisms of Israel's attack upon the hospital.  He asked what is the right way to attack a group using a hospital as a shield (and as a trap), and my answer was simplistic: don't.  I get that he and some of my relatives feel as if there are unfair standards being applied to Israel.  And I absolutely get that anti-semitism is on the rise in the US, Canada, and Europe, although I wonder how much of this pro-Palestinian and how much of this opportunist far right folks using this moment (something to discuss another day).  But Israel is fucking up in a major way here, and I want to think through why I think that, and why it is legitimate to criticize Israel at this moment of crisis.  Oh, and one more caveat: Hamas is more evil.  It is bad to target the civilians of the adversary, but it is even worse to deliberately endanger one's own civilians.  Netanyahu has indirectly engaged Israelis by empowering Hamas and by diverting troops to protect expansionist (irredentist!) settlers, leaving communities close to Gaza essentially unguarded.  So, even as I criticize Israel, I am not apologizing for or supporting Hamas.  I want Hamas to be defeated, but in the right way.  More on that below.So, I am starting with first principles:Everyone is deserving of self-determination: Jews, Palestinians, Ukrainians, Taiwanese (oops), Quebecois, etc.  Violence is bad, so it should only be used proportionately.Just because someone did something in the past, such as mass bombing of cities, does not legitimate folks using the same strategy today.  The bible speaks of laws of war that we generally find abhorrent--there has been progress in our moral stances and also in our strategic understanding.  The best way to provide people with self-determination is democracy.  It is better, in my humble opinion, that infinite secession where every group has its own state, because the act of secession or partition will probably increase the grievances of some groups that are left behind. Quebec's separatism had a very small burst of violence largely because Quebecois could and did exert power via voting to get damn near everything they wanted. Not everything, but all the stuff that might have been worth fighting for.One state from sea to river with all Palestinians and all Jews sharing one state with heaps of religious and other rights .... would be cool, but, well, Jews want a Jewish state since bad things have happened in democracies where other groups have more votes.  Alternatively, a single state where Jews have rights and Palestinians don't is inherently problematic and wrong--the apartheid label feels icky but when you run a massive open-air prison with no end in sight, it is hard to think of it in any other way.  I have believed for quite some time that Israeli Jews faced a choice--Israel could remain a theocratic state or it remain a democracy, but not both.  Some of my relatives have said that the Arab countries should welcome the Palestinians.  The thing is: the Palestinians think they are a people, the Arab countries think the Palestinians are a people, and since nationalism is intersubjective, Jews can't wish away Palestinian identity.  However, Netanyahu can use the Israeli military to destroy many symbols that resonate with Palestinian identity, and that gets us to the g word.Threatening a second nabka, which would expel the Palestinians from the occupied territories would be ethnic cleansing.  If the Palestinians were to win and push the Jews out, that too would be ethnic cleansing.  And it would not be legitimate even if one considers all Jews to be settlers-colonizers.  We can't unwind history with heaps of bloodshed and call it justice.  Anyhow, I try to avoid using the word genocide because it is very fraught.  In the past, did Canadians practice genocide against its Indigenous peoples. Yeah.  Now?  I'd say no, as state policies are not aimed at reducing or eliminating these peoples, even if bad policies continue and are harmful.  But I can see why some folks may argue this and I probably need more info to take a clearer stance.Is Israel engaged in genocide right now?  It is using lots of violence to reduce the population of Palestinians in Gaza.  It is not proportionate, and it is not well aimed at achieving military objectives, two of the requirements for the just use of force. Israel is making Gaza uninhabitable. While Israel has not been all that strategic/deliberate--this is mostly about revenge since 10/7--the way force has been used is suggestive--to solve the Gaza problem by getting rid of the residents.  That has some echoes, doesn't it?So, the hospital: Hamas had some stuff based at the hospital?  Does that make it either a legitimate (morally speaking) or sound (strategically speaking) target?  No.  Most of the folks at the hospital had limited agency--they neither voted for Hamas nor had power to remove Hamas, nor much ability to leave.  So, one should not target many vulnerable civilians if the aim is to kill a few Palestinian leaders.  With that specific campaign over, we are learning that the Israelis never had the best intelligence about the threat posed by those in the hospital, which is now a trend--Israeli intelligence failure.  Would it be legitimate and smart to hit the hospital if it had a ticking weapon of mass destruction?  Sure.  Anything short of that?  Not so much.  The Hamas use of human shields is ... a TRAP!  And the Israelis walked right into it.  War is, as they say, politics by other means, and so the Israelis lost big time on the world stage by attacking a hospital  Their strategic communications about all of this has been awful.  International support matters for both sides, and Israel surrendered whatever moral authority and international support it gained on October 7th, much like the US gave up all of the goodwill from 9/11 by attacking Iraq.  Jews are upset because Hamas is not getting as much criticism, and that is for a few reasons.  One is that countries are siding with the Arab world due to strategy or convenience or cheap oil or whatever.  Another is that Hamas being evil is baked in.  It has been held to a lower standard because it is a terrorist group.  Palestinians in Europe and North America support Hamas and cheer on Israeli defeats, including, alas, the attacks on kids.  Jews in Israel and elsewhere are cheering on violence against Palestinians.  Both are wrong--both because the people of both sides deserve human dignity and because the attacks are not going to achieve anything.  We hold Israel to a higher standard because it is a democracy and it is the more powerful side, which means, yes, it has more responsibility.One of the ingredients of just war is whether an attack is actually going to accomplish something.  If you repeatedly use violence with little expectation of changing the situation, that is morally problematic--revenge, for instance, is not a legitimate justification for the use of violence. If some violence can avert more violence and end a conflict, then it is more just (and more sound from a tactical or strategic standpoint).  Ukraine has a morally superior position for continuing the war because Russia has abused those who have been on their side of the lines.  Violence, targeted at Russian troops and Russian military assets, is legitimate and also strategically sound.  Russian attacks on Ukrainian hospitals and other civilian locations is not.  And no, I am not saying Russia and Israel are morally equivalent... but I am saying that Israel's actions are positioning Israel closer to Russia.  And who would want that?  During the insurgencies of the 2000's, scholars and American military folks came to the same conclusion, more or less: that the best way to win (or at least not lose) a counter-insurgency effort is to minimize civilian casualties.  These casualties would undermine the war effort--not just by creating more insurgents--the family and friends of those killed-but also by undermining the legitimacy of the Irag and Afghan governments.  So, a policy of "courageous restraint" was enunciated, although I am not sure how well it was observed.  The basic idea is that if you want to attack a certain military leader or target, and there  are a bunch of kids or other non-combatants present, you wait for a better time.  Indeed, our rules of engagement for air attacks often lead to hitting targets at night when buildings are not as occupied.The point here is that there are ways to deal with a hospital that may have some "bad guys" in it.  Leveling it is not one of them.   Which leads to the question of a cease-fire.  I don't always support cease-fires (I am clearly not a pacifist), as it make give one side a big advantage.  In the case of Russia-Ukraine, a ceasefire with Russia on Ukrainian land would be bad because it would allow Russian to continue to abuse the Ukrainians and it would potentially create a semi-frozen conflict that limits Ukraine's ability to free its territory and enable Russia to fuck with Ukraine in a variety of ways.  In this case?  I think with so many civilians in harm's way, and with a cease-fire perhaps giving time for Israelis to think about what they are doing (like following Netanyahu), it might lead to a better, more humane outcome.  Would Hamas benefit from a cease-fire?  Probably, but so would Israel.  This all has avoided the big questions: what should Israel's objectives be?  Because you can't have a strategy unless you know what the goal is. If the objective is a one-state Israel with the occupied territories full of folks having no rights and no access to power, then buckle up for unending conflict.  Eradicating Hamas should not be an end to itself because removing one organization from the territories will not change the fundamental challenge of two peoples living in this area between river and sea. Removing the Palestinians from Gaza might be the objective now, and, if so, that is horrifying.Until October 7th, Israel focused on tactics to perpetuate the status quo: deterrence by punishment.  Or to put in pop culture terms, the strategy that Sean Connery told Kevin Costner in the Untouchables: they came with a knife, you come with a gun.  They send your guy to the hospital, you send their guy to the morgue.  I will always remember a conversation I had with a retired Israeli special ops general while our group was at the Golan Heights.  He was being critical of Obama for not hitting harder than the US got hit by various attacks.  That Israel's tactic was always to escalate a bit, to hit harder than have been hit.  And I basically asked: how has that worked to end the threat to Israel and stop the violence.  Maybe it was kind of working for Israel, but that ended on October 7th, when Hamas decided it was not just willing to take Israel's punishment for an attack that was far more aggressive and damaging to Israelis than previous ones, but actually eager for that punishment.  Deterrence only works if the costs of punishment are both credible and greater than the costs of the status quo.  To Hamas, they apparently felt the Abraham Accords and other moves were more threatening than getting shellacked by Israel.  Maybe their own domestic political game needed as much distraction as Netanyahu did/has.  Anyhow, it was a limited strategy since it was mostly kicking the can down the road and had episodes of violence priced in.  It may still be working with Hezbollah, but mostly because Hezbollah is in no shape to get into a war with Israel with Lebanon being such a mess (I am guessing here).  But the days of deterring Hamas are gone, so what now?Eradicating Hamas?  Not so easy.  Israel should be doing cost/benefit calculations of the various ways to attack Hamas, which would, yes, mean not attacking hospitals.  I think Israel's old strategy was and is the best option: after the Munich Olympics, Israel went out and targeted each person responsible for that attack and, as far as I recall, killed most of them.  Israel can do the same here with Hamas's leadership--they might miss a few, but better to miss a few awful Hamas leaders than to kill a lot of civilians.  This, of course, requires patience, which Netanyahu does not and cannot have, given the precarity of his political position.And this gets to the one of the key problems: Israelis have voted for various far right parties that have trapped Israel into more and more dangerous paths.  Making Israel more theocratic may be good for the Orthodox, but it is bad for the economy and for the political system.  Destroying the possibility of a two-state solution not only angers Palestinians but reduces bargaining options and exit strategies.  Putting corrupt, awful Netanyahu back into power again and again undermines Israel's democracy, its legitimacy, its military, and its security.  And ultimately its future.I am so angry and frustrated not because this is a hard situation, but because it didn't have to be this bad, it didn't have to be this way.  Netanyahu and the parties backing him have made things worse.  My anger towards Hamas is baked in--never democratic, always autocratic, always determined to wipe Israel from the map.  I never had any hope for that organization.  I had some hope for the Palestinian Authority until I visited Israel and got a better understanding of its limits.  But I had some hope that Israel would see the trap so visibly set in front of it and not hop into it so enthusiastically.  It is hard to kill one's way through a counter-insurgency, it is both wrong and counter-productive to kill so many civilians along the way.  As a scholar who used to study ethnic conflict, I understand that it is hard to end these kinds of disputes.  But I also understand that conflicts end, that violence is not inevitable--that it is a choice.  And as a scholar of civil-military relations, I am so glad I never studied Israel.I am not sure if any of this is coherent, but I am just trying to think through this situation.  Do I feel any better now that I have spewed my thoughts here?  Not really.   

This study focuses on the Lebanon position in the aftermath of Syrian conflict, including the main aspects of Lebanese Foreign Policy. It includes regional and foreign interference in Lebanese affairs that intentionally led to the instable situation in the country. Briefly includes Domestic/foreign factors longstanding by geopolitical aspects that determine Lebanon political vacuum and current sectarian division. Moreover, Refugee crisis and sectarian challenges aggravated the Lebanese crisis, since they are a consequence of Syrian conflict, our case of study. The thesis is divided in three main chapters. Firstly, the analysis of both Realism and Liberalism under the Security concept in the main theories of I.R,. From defining the security studies framework that impacted the definition of security in World politics, the conceptualization of security and securitization theory is analysed. In Realism theory, I decided to focus on Structural Realism: Defensive and Offensive realism, and in Liberalism I overtook collective security, democratic Peace theory and state institutions cooperation through complex independence theory announced by Keohane and Nye. In the same part, I included an overview of Middle East region, geographical and regional aspects and strengthened the case of Lebanon (description, strategic location, and ethnical-political characterization, economical and demographic aspects). Secondly, the analysis of the Historical perspective of Lebanon since independence till Syrian uprisings 2011 will be presented. It includes as well one page about Ottoman domination in Lebanon, and it is important to understand how Lebanon and Syria were connected in the Past. Two main divisions are visible in the organization of the second Chapter. Fırst, the Lebanese events during Cold War period such the Presidencies since Independence until the Civil War and from Civil War to internationalization of Security broadly back the 1990s. Second, Lebanon after Cold War Era it marked regional changes that could change Lebanon situation, such 2000 Israel Withdrawal during Ehud Barak government, Hezbollah-Israeli War 2006, 2005 Syrian withdrawal and Cedar Revolution, elections 2005, 2009 and 2011, rise of Hezbollah into Lebanese politics and Iran as main interventionist in penetrated state, 2008 conflict between 14 and 8 March coalitions. Thirdly, the effects of Arab uprisings and the Syrian war on Lebanon's local, regional, security and political aspects are analysed. After the Syrian crisis, I addressed the approach to Syrian and Lebanese foreign policies, but Lebanon and Lebanon's political situation has always been my priority. Both the Lebanese government's refugee issue and the factors that led to the instability of the Syrian war are address. In addition, the governments of Mikati and Salam, the continuity of the political paralysis, The "Hezbollah Factor" also discussed the possibility of further disagreements within the 2013 Lebanese Government, worsening interventions caused by sectarian tensions, and the creation of hope for change with the election of Michael Aoun in 2016. The regional direction and security aspects of the Middle East Region and Lebanon are also important here. The most important issue here is that regional and foreign alliances, such as the US, EU or UN, exalt the active role of regional actors rather than global actors. At the same time, relations with Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, Saudi Arabia, and the international community, Lebanon, which have the capacities to make decisions about Lebanon are mention. As a result, it is almost impossible to reject the Saudi Tehran Competition, which is a major contributor to the deep sectarian division, especially during the Lebanese Civil War. The Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon has worsened the crisis both in Syria and in Lebanon, causing security and politics irregularities; the attitudes of Lebanese refugees have been analyze in this context. Sectarian difficulties, vulnerable groups, UN role and Lebanese authorities should be call for legal status renewal. The Arab uprising in Syria had significant implications in its neighbors. The case of Lebanon is exceptional concerning the effect of regional politics in the Middle East. The political cleavages between Sunni-Shiite communities aggravated the Lebanese situation. At the outset of the Syrian conflict in March 2011, the Lebanese government of Najib Mikati adopted an official position of dissociation, with the aim of maintaining a neutral policy towards Middle East conflictual crisis. Nonetheless, Syria conflict reflected intensively inside the two main alliances that fight each other to take advantage and affirm their proper interests in the region. The Sunni March 14 coalition has to support the rebels against Assad regime and opposed to the Iranian leaning Hezbollah movement, dominated by 8 March coalition. The political instability in Lebanon aggravated with the Syrian refugee crisis that inclusively affects Lebanon foreign policy making. Sectarian politics in Lebanon affects the State institutions. As well, the regional and foreign powers' actions lead to the insecurity ambiance in Lebanese Territory. The connection with Syria and Iran is evidentially growing and Lebanese Foreign policy is far from being neutral in the whole region. Particularly, since the beginning of Syrian Civil War, the security apparatus and border control policy has been the main priorities to the Lebanese Government. The 2013 Hezbollah intervention in the War and the postpone elections resulted on the civilians discontentment and demanded the implementation of strong policy towards security borders and political instability. Lebanon case differs from the other States in Middle East for various reasons. It is important to consider the political and cultural background that transformed Lebanon, from a stable to a conflictual State in last century. Nowadays, Lebanon is facing many challenges on both domestic and foreign ambiances. The most relevant constraint facing in the country is the Syrian refugee crisis, very caused by the large influx of Syrian crisis that had significant effects on the political, economic and security levels. Nonetheless, Lebanon still serves as a bargaining ship for most of strong States in the region. The Saudi-Iran Rivalry as well, despite of defining their focus on Syria, Iraq and Yemen, continued to support the Lebanese political groups in order to take control and assume a preponderant role in the region. Lebanon is emerging as a model country in the Middle East, where different denominational communities live together. The difference of this country from the other countries of the region is that the communities should share the state administration in line with their sectarian identities. This heterogeneity in Lebanon's social structure and the conflicts of religious communities that have sustained heterogeneity in the past have also deeply affected community-state relations and as a result they have continued to exist as a state in the geography of the Middle East, one of the most problematic regions in the world, Political crisis, political, assassinations and armed conflicts have always been known and international politics has never fallen on the agenda. It forms a small Swiss prototype in the Middle East. Looking at the history of Lebanon, not only the intervention of foreign powers, but the fact that the social structure of the country itself depends on sectarian differences, gives the region a different meaning. Throughout the history of modern Lebanon, a relationship of community-state relations has become a force of power and power between communities. In the history of the country, the struggles for power symbolized political ideas such as class and different nationalisms, and these movements made the compromise between the communities negatively. These political ideals affect the members of the sectarian communities and in this case they accelerated the conflict processes by fostering competition between sects. On the other hand, the Sects do not show homogeneous properties in themselves. Within any sectarian structure, some ideological and the conjuncture criteria have laid the groundwork for the emergence of different political foci and have triggered sectarian divisions within themselves. The marginalization of the sects is seen in groups which are once in the same sect and who, over time, have shifted their religious preferences to another direction. The dominant groups have faced the oppression of the sects who have broken away from the new sects formed and also therefore sought a balance by cooperating with the communities that share the same sectarian thought among the other communities. In Lebanon, both Lebanon's foreign policy and the various politics are analysed under the dimensions of social and political division. Lebanon is neither a liberal democracy nor an authoritarian government. The Lebanese system is already facing both political and religious groups. The Lebanon influence of the geopolitical situation in the Middle East is important, since it both a strategic region and a part a failure State. Lebanon situation is different from the other countries in the region. Lebanon is a country with a state. However there is no State organization. During the post-independence political period, 'zuama': they used State Institutions to compete with each other for patronage. They use and develop their own individual powers within their own sects. Regarding foreign pressures, both the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Pan-Arabism movement have led to the weakening of Lebanon's foreign policy. At the same time, this work analyzes the main lines of Lebanon foreign policy. Regional and International countries are involved in Lebanese affairs. After expanding its power base, the supporting state affects the shaping of the Lebanese political orientation to support its national interests. On the other hand, the Lebanese armed forces are also divided into sectarian lines, and the army is politically weak due to military failure. ; Bu çalışma, Lübnan Dış Politikası'nın ana hususları da dâhil olmak üzere Suriye ihtilafının ardından Lübnan'ın pozisyonuna odaklanmaktadır. Ülkede istikrarsız duruma yol açan Lübnan ilişkilerinde bölgesel ve yabancı müdahaleleri içermektedir. Kısaca Lübnan siyasi boşluğunu ve mevcut sekter bölünmeyi belirleyen jeopolitik yönlerden uzun süredir iç ve dış faktörleri içermektedir. Ayrıca, Mülteci krizi ve mezhepsel zorluklar, Lübnan krizini şiddetlendirdi, çünkü bunlar Suriye ihtilafının bir sonucu, bizim çalışma durumumuzdur. Tez üç Ana bölümden oluşmaktadır. İlk bölüm, hem Realizm hem de Liberalizm olan Uluslararası iliksilerinin temel teorilerindeki güvenlik kavramı çalışır. Dünya siyasetinde güvenlik tanımını etkileyen güvenlik çalışmaları çerçevesini tanımlamaktan, güvenlik ve menkul kıymetleştirme teorisinin kavramsallaştırılması analiz edilmektedir. Realizm teorisinde Yapısal Gerçekçiliğe: Savunma ve Saldırgan Gerçekçiliğe odaklanmaya karar verdim ve Liberalizm'de Keohane ve Nye tarafından açıklanan karmaşık bağımsızlık teorisi aracılığıyla kolektif güvenlik, demokratik Barış teorisi ve devlet kurumları işbirliğini üstlendim. Aynı bölümde, Orta Doğu bölgesi, coğrafi ve bölgesel yönleriyle ilgili genel bir bakış açısıyla Lübnan örneğini güçlendirdim. İkinci olarak, Lübnan'daki Suriye ayaklanmalarına kadar bağımsızlıktan bu yana tarihi perspektifi 2011. Lübnan'daki Osmanlı egemenliğine dair bir sayfa da içeriyor ve Lübnan ile Suriye'nin geçmişte nasıl bağlandığını anlamak önemlidir. İkinci bölümün organizasyonunda iki ana bölüm görülebilir. Birinci, Soğuk Savaş döneminde Lübnan olayları; İç savaşa ve İç Savaş'tan 1990'lı yılların sonuna kadar Güvenlik uluslararalılaşmasına kadar bağımsızlık gösteren başkanlıklar; Ikinci, Soğuk Savaş Döneminden sonra Lübnan (Lübnan'ın durumunu değiştirebilecek bölgesel değişiklikler oldu. Bu türden 2000 İsrail'in Ehud Barak hükümeti sırasında geri çekilmesi, Hizbullah- İsrail Savaşı 2006, 2005 Suriye'nin çekilmesi ve Sedir Devrimi, 2005, 2009 ve 2011 seçimleri, Hizbullah'ın Lübnan siyasetine ve İran'a nüfuz eden devlet müdahalecisi olarak yükselmesi, 2008 çatışması 14 ve 8 Mart koalisyonları da çalışır. Üçüncü olarak, Arap ayaklanmalarının ve Suriye savaşının Lübnan'daki yerel, bölgesel, güvenlik ve politik yönleri üzerindeki etkisi çalışılmıştır. Suriye krizinin ardından Suriye ve Lübnan dış politikalarına yaklaşımı ele aldım, ancak Lübnan ve Lübnan siyasi durumunu her zaman önceliğim olmuştur. Hem Lübnan hükümetinden mülteci sorunu, hem de Suriye savaşına karşı kararsızlıklara yol açan faktörler ele alınmıştır. Ayrıca, Mikati ve Salam hükümetlerinin, Lübnan'ın politik paralizini/çıkmazı/baskılarının sürekliliği; "Hizbullah Faktörü'nün" 2013'te Lübnan Hükümetinde içinde daha fazla anlaşmazlıklara yol açarak mezhepsel gerginliklere sebep olarak müdahaleleri daha da kötüleştirmesi ve 2016'da Mişel Avn'un seçilmesiyle birlikte değişimin umudunun oluşması da ele alınmıştır. Orta Doğu Bölgesi ve Lübnan'ın bölgesel yönü ve güvenlik yönleri de burada önemli olmaktadır. Buradaki en önemli husus, bölgesel ve yabancı ittifakların, örneğin ABD, AB veya BM gibi, küresel aktörler yerine bölgesel aktörlerin aktif rolünü yüceltmeleridir. Aynı zamanda Lübnan'la ilgili kararları alabilecek kapasitede olan İran, Suriye, Hizbullah, Suudi Arabistan, ve uluslararası toplumun Lübnan ile ilişkilerine değinilmiştir. Sonuç olarak, bölgesel çatışma durumunun, özellikle de Lübnan İç Savaşı sırasında meydana gelen, derin sekter bölünmeye büyük ölçüde katkıda bulunan Suudi Tahran Rekabeti'ni reddetmek neredeyse imkânsızdır. Lübnan'daki Suriyeli mülteci krizi, hem Suriye'de, hem de Lübnan'da krizi daha da kötüleştirmiştir, güvenlikte ve siyasette düzensizliklere sebep olmuştur; bu bağlamda Lübnanlı mültecilerin tutumları analiz edilmiştir. Temel olarak mezhepçi zorluklar, savunmasız gruplar, BM rolü ve Lübnan makamlarının yasal statü yenilenmesi için çağrıda bulunması gerekmektedir. Suriye'deki Arap ayaklanmasının komşuları için önemli etkileri vardı. Lübnan davası, Ortadoğu'daki bölgesel politika konusunda istisnai bir durumdur. Sünni-Şii toplulukları arasındaki siyasi bölünmeler Lübnan'daki durumu kötüleştirdi. Mart 2011'de, Suriye ihtilafının başlangıcında, Lübnanlı Najib Mikati hükümeti Ortadoğu ihtilafına karşı tarafsız bir politikanın sürdürülmesi amacıyla resmî bir ayrışma tutumunu benimsedi. Bununla birlikte Suriye çatışması, birbiriyle savaşan iki ana ittifakın içinde, bölgedeki uygun çıkarlarını onaylamak ve onlardan emin olmayı yoğun bir şekilde yansıtıyordu. Sünni 14 Mart koalisyonu, Esad rejimine karşı isyancılara destek vermeli ve 8 Mart koalisyonunun egemen olduğu İran'ın yaslandığı Hizbullah hareketine karşı çıkmalı. Lübnan'daki siyasi istikrarsızlık ve onu daha da kötüleştiren Suriye mülteci krizi, Lübnan dış politika sürecini kapsamlı bir şekilde etkilemiştir. Lübnan'daki mezhepçi politikalar devlet kurumlarını etkilemektedir. Aynı zamanda, bölgesel ve dış güçler, Lübnan Bölgesi'nde güvensiz ortamlara yol açmaktadır. Suriye ve İran'la olan bağlantı bariz bir şekilde büyümekte ve Lübnan dış politikası tüm bölgede tarafsız olmaktan çok uzakta olduğu görülmektedir. Özellikle Suriye İç Savaşı'nın başlamasından bu yana, güvenlik aygıtı ve sınır kontrol politikası Lübnan Hükümeti'nin başlıca öncelikleri olmuştur. Savaşta 2013 Hizbullah müdahalesi ve erteleme seçimleri sivillerin hoşnutsuzluğunu sağladı ve güvenlik sınırları ve siyasi istikrarsızlığa karşı güçlü politikaların uygulanmasını talep ettirmişlerdi. Lübnan vakası, çeşitli nedenlerle Orta Doğu'daki diğer Devletlerden farklıdır. Geçtiğimiz yüzyılda Lübnan'ı istikrarlı bir devletten çatışan bir devlete dönüştüren politik ve kültürel arka planı dikkate almak önemlidir. Bugünlerde Lübnan hem iç hem de dış ortamlarda birçok zorlukla karşı karşıya karlılar. Ülkede karşılaşılan en önemli kısıtlama, Suriye krizinin, siyasi, ekonomik ve güvenlik düzeylerinde önemli etkilere sahip olan büyük Suriye krizinin neden olduğu Suriye krizidir. Bununla birlikte, Lübnan hala bölgedeki güçlü devletlerin çoğu için bir pazarlık çipi olarak hizmet ediyor. Suudi-İran Rekabeti de, Suriye, Irak ve Yemen'e odaklanmasına rağmen, bölgeyi kontrol altına almak ve bölgeye hâkim bir rol üstlenmek için Lübnanlı siyasi grupları desteklemeye devam etti. Lübnan, Ortadoğu'da farklı mezhebi toplulukların bir arada yaşamlarını sürdürdüğü model bir ülke olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Bu ülkenin diğer bölge ülkelerinden farkı toplulukların devlet yönetimini kendi mezhebi kimlikleri doğrultusunda paylaşmış olmalarıdır. Lübnan'ın toplumsal yapısındaki bu heterojenliği ve söz konusu heterojenliğin sürekliliğini sağlayan dinsel toplulukların çatışmaları da toplum–devlet ilişkilerini derinden etkilemiş ve bunun sonucunda bölgede modern anlamda ulus devlet olamadan dünyanın en sorunlu bölgelerinden biri olan Ortadoğu coğrafyasında devlet olarak varlığını sürdürebilmiştir. Sürekli olarak siyasi kriz, siyasi, suikastlar ve silahlı çatışmalarla adını duyurarak uluslararası politikada gündemden hiç düşmemiştir. Ortadoğu'da küçük bir İsviçre prototipi oluşturmaktadır. Lübnan tarihine bakıldığında sadece dış güçlerin müdahalesi değil, ülkenin kendi içerisindeki sosyal yapısının mezhep farklılıklarına dayanması, bölgeye ayrı bir anlam kazandırmaktadır. Modern Lübnan tarihi boyunca toplum–devlet ilişkileri bir bakıma topluluklar arası güç ve iktidar mücadelesi haline gelmiştir. İktidar mücadeleleri ise ülke tarihinde sınıfsal ve farklı milliyetçilikler gibi politik düşüncelerce simgeleşmiş ve bu akımlar topluluklar arası uzlaşmayı olumsuz kılmıştır. Bu politik idealar mezhebi topluluklardaki üyeleri etkilemekte ve bu durumda mezhepler arası rekabeti körükleyerek çatışma süreçlerini hızlandırmıştır. Diğer taraftan Mezheplerde kendi içinde homojen özellikler göstermemektedir. Herhangi bir mezhebi yapı içinde ideolojik ve konjonktürel bazı kıstaslar farklı politik odakların ortaya çıkmasına zemin hazırlamış ve mezheplerin kendi içindeki bölünmeleri tetiklemiştir. Mezheplerde ötekileştirme, bir zamanlar aynı mezhep içinde olup zamanla dinsel tercihlerini başka bir yöne kaydıran gruplarlarda görülmektedir. Hâkim mezhebi topluluklar içinden kopmalarla oluşan yeni mezhepler koptukları mezheplerin baskılarıyla karşılaşmışlar ve bu yüzden diğer topluluklar içinde aynı mezhebi düşünceyi paylasan topluluklarla işbirliği yaparak bir denge arayışına girmişlerdir. Lübnan'da toplumsal ve siyasal bölünmüşlüğün boyutlarını ve dış politika arasında hem Lübnan'ın dış politikası nedir, hem de çeşitli politikaları analiz etmektedir. Lübnan ne bir liberal demokrasi, ne de otoriter bir hükümettir. Lübnan sistemi zaten hem siyasi, hem de dini gruplarla karşılaşmaktadır. Ortadoğu'da jeopolitik durumunun Lübnan etkisi önemlidir, hem stratejik bölge hem boşluk ülkedir. Diğer bölge ülkelerden farklı olarak durumu görmektedir. Lübnan, devlete sahip olan bir ülkedir. Fakat devlet örgütü bulunmamaktadır. Bağımsızlıkta sonrası siyası düzen döneminde, 'zuama': devlet kurumlarını patronaj için birbirleriyle rekabet etmek için kullanıyorlar. Kendi bireysel güçlerini, kendi mezhepleri içinde kullanılır ve geliştirirler. Dış baskılarla ilgili olarak hem Arap-İsrail çatışması, hem de Pan-Arapçılık hareketi, Lübnan dış politikasının zayıflanmasına yol açmıştır. Aynı Zamanda, bu çalışma Lübnan'ın Temel Dış Politikasının Ana Hatları analiz eder. Bölgesel ve Uluslararası ülkeler Lübnan işlerine karışıyor. Güç-üssü genişledikten sonra, destekçi devlet, Lübnan siyasi yöneliminin ulusal çıkarlarını desteklemek için şekillenmesini etkilemektedir. Öte yandan, Lübnan silahlı kuvvetleri da mezhep çizgilerine bölünmüştür ve ordu siyasette zayıftır, bu da askeri başarısızlıktan kaynaklanmaktadır.

From the introduction: The last two years mark a turning point in public perception of human-induced climate change as a problem of global importance. The widespread acceptance that 'most of the observed increase in globally-averaged temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas [GHG] concentrations' has increased political pressure on governments to reduce GHG emissions. At the same time, rising oil prices have made the reduction of dependence on energy imports and diversification of the energy mix strategic imperatives for many countries around the world. While governments worldwide are confronted with this dual challenge, it is of special relevance to China. On the one hand, China has recently become the world's largest emitter of CO2, accounting for 24% of global annual CO2 emissions. China is therefore one of the most important players to effectively mitigate global warming and pressure from governments around the world on China to join emission reductions efforts is mounting. On the other hand, energy demand is growing exponentially and China is increasingly relying on energy imports to satisfy energy needs. Worried that growing dependency on energy imports may be accompanied by foreign-policy and economic pressures that might threaten national security as well as social and political stability, China has implemented a number of policies to address this issue ranging from policies to save energy and reduce energy intensity, to the diversification of oil supply sources and routes, the support of equity oil overseas acquisitions and the build up of strategic oil reserves to the diversification of the energy portfolio. In line with the objective to diversify the composition of the energy mix, China's leadership is increasingly realizing the need to reduce emissions and support renewable energy development. At a recently held Politburo study session, President Hu Jintao exclaimed: 'Our task is tough, and our time is limited. Party organisations and governments at all levels must give priority to emission reduction and bring the idea deep into people's hearts". To address the issue of energy security, the Chinese government has adapted a two-pronged approach. While measures to promote energy savings and efficiency curb the increase in energy demand, the support of renewable and nuclear energy reduces dependency on energy imports and contributes to the broadening of the foundation of energy supply. This study focuses on China's renewable energy policy and the development of wind energy in China in particular. Commitment by the highest levels of government and a host of favourable policies have triggered a boom in renewable energy in China, especially in the wind power sector. A major step in the development of renewable energy in China has been the Renewable Energy Law that came into effect in January 2006. In addition, the government has set ambitious targets for energy intensity reduction, and share of renewable energy of primary energy consumption. China is on the way to become the world leader in renewable energies. In 2007, investment in renewable energies in China amounted to approximately US$ 12 billion, second only to Germany. In terms of installed renewable energy capacity, China leads the world with 151 GW of installed capacity, largely due to the widespread utilization of hydropower for electricity generation. According to a report by the United Nations Environmental Programme, China is the world's leading manufacturer of solar cells, with an estimated annual production capacity of 3.000 MW. China's wind power market was the third biggest worldwide in 2007 and growth rates continue to exceed expectations. In 2009, China is expected to take the lead as the largest manufacturer of wind turbines. Hydro power represents the most important source of renewable energy in China and plays an important part in the power generation portfolio, most notably since the construction of the Three Gorges Dam. Hydro capacity is expected to double to 290 GW until 2020, but concerns about the social and environmental impact of large-scale hydro power are becoming stronger. Although China is the world's leading solar manufacturer, installed solar photovoltaic power capacity amounts to a mere 0.01% of total power generation capacity (80 MW, approx. 50% of which are off-grid). Solar power equipment is produced almost exclusively for export. Considering China's enormous energy demand and the pace of its growth, deployment of solar photovoltaic power is not viewed as a first-rate solution to satisfy China's energy needs, since it features high costs and low efficiencies compared to other renewables like hydro or wind power. While China does not have significant amounts of solar PV capacity, it is the biggest market for solar thermal systems for heating and hot water supply with 64,5% of global capacity, amounting to 68 GW. Biomass covers 13% of primary energy demand, mostly used in rural households for heating and cooking. In 2007, only 0,28% of power generation capacity were fuelled by biomass. The government plans to expand biomass capacity from 2 to 30 GW by 2020. Despite the impressive progress of recent years, renewable energies - excluding hydro - only contribute less than 1% to China's electricity supply and the skies above China's urban areas continue to be shrouded by smog. Since coal-fired power generation accounts for 82,9% of total electricity supply, it is no surprise that half of China's emissions are attributable to power generation. With electricity demand growing rapidly alongside the economy, dependency on coal as the major source for power generation is likely to persist. However, as the most important source of renewable energy next to hydro, and growth of installed capacity constantly accelerating, peaking at about 130% in 2007, wind power is one of – if not the – most promising option on China's path towards diversification of the energy mix. In recent years wind power has become a mainstream source of renewable energy excelling with mature technology and power generation costs almost competitive with conventional power sources, providing a viable alternative to coal as a source of electricity generation. In 2005, just before the development of wind power started to pick up pace, the China Wind Power Training and Research Project (CWPP) of the German Development Cooperation (GTZ) saw its inception, with the aim of improving the conditions for sustained development of wind power in China. Primary objective of CWPP is the support of sustained long-term wind power development in China. To attain this goal CWPP supports the improvement of technical capabilities of private and government institutions and organizations through activities in the fields of wind power training, technical support and research. The project's engagement ranges from training of technicians in charge of operation and maintenance (OM) at wind farms to the introduction and localisation of software vital to wind resource assessment. These capacity building activities are complemented by wind power information services as well as policy advice to relevant government institutions. The CWPP activities and the indicators measuring its success are based on an analysis of framework conditions in 2003/2004. However, since then the general conditions for wind power in China have changed drastically due to policy changes inducing exponential growth of the industry. While from 2000 to 2005 total installed capacity grew at an average rate of 31%, it more than doubled in the last two years. Newly installed capacity increased at an even faster rate averaging 156% annual growth from 2005 till 2007. In light of the boom in the Chinese wind power sector, it is imperative to realign project activities with actual market conditions on the basis of an up-to-date assessment of the current situation and future outlook. This analysis of the wind power sector in China in 2008 will serve as a basis for the review of current CWPP activities with the aim of developing recommendations for adaptations where deemed necessary. Content Methodology: The study is divided into seven chapters. Subsequent to the introduction, the global development of wind power, its major drivers and trends are discussed briefly serving as a backdrop to the study. The third chapter introduces CWPP and its activities along with the current status of project implementation. The fourth and fifth chapter form the main body of this study. Beginning with the current picture of energy supply and demand, the fourth chapter goes on to introduce the relevant government authorities in charge of Chinese renewable energy policy. Since the basis for wind power development is government support, a detailed examination of renewable energy policy in China is given. The policies governing the wind power sector are reviewed in order to explore the origins of the current boom of the wind power industry. The fifth chapter offers an in-depth discussion of wind power in China, including wind power potential, current status of the market and future development as well as the situation with regards to wind power equipment manufacturers and project developers. In the sixth chapter, major determinants that have the potential to negatively affect the perspectives of wind power development in China are identified and discussed. As a conclusion, chapter seven offers recommendations for the realignment of CWPP activities according to the actual needs of the market. A series of expert interviews was conducted within the scope of the study. The experts interviewed included representatives of relevant government authorities, foreign and domestic wind turbine manufacturers, component suppliers, project developers, industry associations, universities, research institutes, consultancies, CDM agencies and environmental organizations. These interviews serve as a supplement to the evaluation of secondary literature and online sources so as to guarantee the timeliness and validity of information in the study. In cooperation with the China Electric Power Research Institute (CEPRI) and the Chinese Wind Energy Association (CWEA) the need for wind power-specific training and education for wind power equipment manufacturers and power generation companies was assessed through two separate surveys. In addition, two polls were conducted among wind turbine and component manufacturers at the China Wind Energy Exhibition 2008 in Shanghai and the Wind Power Asia 2008 in Beijing. These polls helped to identify the major challenges for the wind sector's future development in China and contributed to the assessment of the current situation with regard to human resources and qualification.Inhaltsverzeichnis:Table of Contents: 1.INTRODUCTION7 1.1BACKGROUND7 1.2CONTENT METHODOLOGY9 2.THE GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT OF WIND POWER10 2.1DEVELOPMENT OF THE GLOBAL WIND POWER MARKET10 2.2DRIVERS AND TRENDS OF WIND POWER DEVELOPMENT12 3.THE GTZ CHINA WIND POWER PROJECT17 4.ENERGY POLICY IN CHINA19 4.1ENERGY SUPPLY AND DEMAND19 4.2RELEVANT PLAYERS IN ENERGY POLICY MAKING22 4.3RENEWABLE ENERGY AND WIND POWER POLICY25 4.3.1THE CONCESSION PROGRAMME AND ORIGINS OF WIND POWER PRICING25 4.3.2THE RENEWABLE ENERGY LAW29 4.3.3INVESTMENT CONDITIONS FINANCIAL INCENTIVES33 5.WIND POWER IN CHINA39 5.1WIND ENERGY RESOURCE CHARACTERISTICS AND DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL39 5.2CURRENT STATUS OF DEVELOPMENT42 5.3MARKET FORECAST45 5.4WIND TURBINE MANUFACTURERS47 5.5WIND TURBINE COMPONENT SUPPLIERS55 5.6PROJECT DEVELOPERS55 5.7PROJECT ECONOMICS56 6.POTENTIAL PITFALLS FOR WIND POWER DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA58 6.1POLICY59 6.2HUMAN RESOURCES60 6.3WIND FARM PERFORMANCE LACK OF TRANSPARENCY63 6.4GRID INTEGRATION64 7.RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE GTZ CHINA WIND POWER PROJECT67 7.1WIND POWER EDUCATION TRAINING68 7.2RD AND TECHNOLOGICAL CAPACITY BUILDING70 7.3INFORMATION SERVICES71 7.4FINAL REMARKS73 Bibliography72Textprobe:Text Sample: Chapter 6.1, Potential Pitfalls for Wind Power Development in China: Wind power in China faces a series of adverse outer influences at present. Most of these are not expected to constitute insurmountable barriers to wind power development, but will impact the pace of development nonetheless. The financial crisis on Wall Street that has spread to financial markets around the world, spurs serious worries of a global economic downturn. The renewable energy sector is hit particularly hard by a deterioration of investor confidence, since many observers assume that renewable energy development same as environmental concerns will be shelved until the economies show signs of recovery. The wind industry in China will not be exempt from negative effects of the crisis. Since raising capital will prove difficult in this situation, planned IPOs will be moved back and investments may be deferred. The fall in oil prices in fear of a recession contributes to increase the discrepancy in profitability between conventional power and renewable energy projects (decrease the relative competitiveness of renewables). The rise in coal prices and the credit squeeze further draws liquidity from the market for project development. Rising prices in raw materials drive the increase in wind turbine prices. However, wind power development in China also faces a series of challenges of intrinsic nature. The tremendous pace at which the Chinese wind power sector has been evolving entails an inherent risk of undesirable developments. Reports of wind turbines not performing as expected or even collapsing, lack of due diligence in planning of wind farms, serial production errors in turbines, the counterfeiting of components. These incidents are often portrayed as isolated, but may be representative of greater erroneous trends in the industry. Government regulation will be essential in addressing the issues at stake and preventing them from becoming fundamental barriers to future wind power development. Policy: As mentioned before, government renewable energy and wind power policy have been the single most important driver for wind power development around the world. This is also true for China. A combination of wind power development targets, mandatory market share requirements, economic incentives and protective policies have created a burgeoning wind power market and a thriving domestic industry. Nevertheless, in order to prevent a bust from following the boom, a few adjustments of the policy framework are necessary in order to provide for sustained wind power development. Restrictive government policies, particularly with regard to wind power pricing and foreign investment, pose a serious barrier to the exploitation of a diverse set of investment sources for wind power development in China. Obstructive regulations for FDI, especially with regard to debt financing and CDM project ownership, serve as deterrents for foreign investors. Modes for participation in the regulatory process are unclear, as are rights to appeal regulatory decisions. The lack of a clear pricing policy guaranteeing secure and attractive profit margins for wind power projects has kept many potential investors at bay. Limited access to proper financing and insurance further discourages private and foreign investors. The development of a competitive power sector is also impeded by the dominance of state-owned power generators, who retain strong and often opaque links to state funds, while their levels of profit, subsidies and cross-subsidisation are undisclosed. The government has largely recognized the challenge to open up the market to private and foreign investors. Movement towards further improvement of the policy framework governing wind power is visible. Recently, the government has been addressing many of the most important barriers impeding wind power development. Wind power pricing policy has been slowly moving towards a more predictable and lucrative system of fixed feed-in tariffs. Government action has been taken to alleviate deficiencies regarding reliable wind resource data and the innovation capability of the domestic industry. According to some observers, CDM regulations are expected to be loosened in favour of foreign investors. Still, a number of challenges remain to be addressed, demanding government guidance in order to facilitate sustained, long-term development of wind power in China: - Enforce efforts to provide adequate wind power education and training programmes to ease the human resource deficit. - Establish strong mandatory wind turbine certification standards and support capacity building in the field of turbine testing, in order to ensure turbine quality/reliability and in the long-run improve global competitiveness of the domestic wind industry. - Facilitate smooth grid integration of wind power by: - strengthening the national power grid and interregional transmission capacity, taking into consideration the integration of wind power in the design of grid expansion plans by establishing management regulations and technical specifications to integrate wind power into grid planning; - mapping out comprehensive wind power development plans on national and provincial level in consultation with the grid companies, taking into account construction of other power generation capacity, (interregional) transmission capacity as well as the specific requirements of wind power grid integration; - redoubling research efforts with regard to the analysis of the influence of extensive deployment of wind power on the operation and management of the power grid, intensifying studies on accurate wind power forecasting to allow for effective dispatch of power and establishing a national grid code for wind turbines to ensure maximum electricity output of wind farms. - Tweak FDI, CDM and wind power policies to allow for more diversity in investment and enhance the efficiency of the power sector by creating a fair and open market. Clarify wind power pricing policies and facilitate access to government subsidized bank loans. - Increase transparency within the wind industry and power sector, e.g. with regard to information on wind farm energy output and turbine availability, in order to facilitate competition and intra-industry learning processes, enable timely identification of challenges and build investor confidence. Information transparency is also necessary to improve energy demand and (wind power) supply forecasts and thus provide for proper dispatch of power plants.

Biogas production from anaerobic digestion of organic resources can potentially contribute to a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions in several sectors and can play a central role in both the bioeconomy and the circular economy. Several European countries have political goals to increase biogas production and to increase the amount of manure to anaerobic digestion. The treatment method is, however, known to be costly and the markets for biogas and for digestate are immature. There is a need for a better understanding of how the biogas value chains should be designed to minimise environmental impacts while at the same time achieving profitability for the actors. In Norway the most common substrates for biogas production are sewage sludge and organic waste from households and industry. Manure is identified as the substrate with the greatest theoretical biogas potential, but there are currently few plants utilising manure. Until recently, biogas in Norway has mainly been applied to generate heat, where a large share has been utilised internally at the plant or in surrounding buildings. In the last few years, however, several new and existing plants have invested in upgrading equipment to produce biomethane for use as a fuel in the transport sector. The most common treatment of the digestate, which is a co-product from anaerobic digestion, is to dewater it and use the dry fraction as a soil improvement product, while the wet fraction is sent to waste water treatment. A few new plants do, however, deliver liquid digestate to agriculture as a biofertiliser. The objective of this thesis has been to make a contribution towards knowledge regarding ways of optimising Norwegian biogas value chains to reduce environmental impacts, by developing models that can provide decision support. The aim is to suggest improvements to the regulatory systems and the preconditions for further development of the biogas industry in Norway. Systems theory and system analysis methodology was applied, and three different domains were assessed: environmental impacts, economy of the actors in the value chain and policies. The case studies were limited to the substrates organic waste from households (food waste) and manure from cattle and pigs. In the economic assessment, only the annual results for the biogas plants and cattle and pig farms were calculated. Four scientific papers were developed as part of this PhD thesis. In the first paper, life cycle assessment methodology and generic results were presented for the BioValueChain model. The model was developed to be able to evaluate the environmental impacts of different options for biogas value chains. In the second paper, environmental assessment was combined with economic assessment of large scale biogas plants for four different value chain configurations. In addition, the most profitable option was used as a reference to calculate the incentives necessary to make the most preferable option in terms of reduction of environmental impacts as profitable as the reference. A comparative assessment of biogas value chains in Norway and Denmark was carried out in Paper 3. Denmark has implemented an end-use support of biogas through a feed-in tariff, while Norway provides investment support and support for farmers per tonne manure delivered to a biogas plant. The objective was to evaluate the effect of different regulatory systems. This was achieved by defining a Norwegian and a Danish biogas value chain, and calculating the costs and income. In addition, the economic results were calculated for the Norwegian value chain when assuming Danish conditions, and vice versa. In paper 4 the methodology of an optimisation model for the use of manure resources for anaerobic digestion in one region was described, and the model was employed to perform a case study on 50 farms in one region in Norway. The model calculated the economic profit for farmers and the greenhouse gas emissions for three options: no biogas production, farm scale biogas production and centralised biogas production. The results in this PhD work showed that the amount of organic waste and manure used for anaerobic digestion should be increased to reduce environmental impacts. The most preferable option for the use of biogas is as a fuel for transport to substitute diesel, and the best use of the digestate is as a fertiliser in agriculture as a substitute for mineral fertiliser, which requires a high level of sector integration in the value chain. To obtain a maximal reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, efforts should be made to avoiding diffuse emissions and reducing emissions from the storage of digestate. The economic calculations showed that large-scale biogas plants in general lack economic incentives to include the agricultural sector in the value chain. Inclusion of the transport sector is the most profitable option for use of biogas only for the largest scale biogas plants and for those who are able to sell biomethane for a high price. The most profitable option regarding the management of manure for cattle and pig farms was the supply of manure to a centralised biogas plant and the return of the digestate as biofertiliser. This was, however, dependent on the agreement between the farm and the biogas plant. As a result of the newly introduced support per tonne manure sent to biogas production, investment in a small scale biogas plant can also be profitable for most cattle and pig farms, all though the majority of farms in Norway would struggle to find a good use for the biogas on the farm. This indicates that the current barriers to increased use of manure resources for biogas production are not principally economic. The current support system has contributed to an increase in biogas production. Based on the assessments performed as part of this thesis, however, some recommendations were made to improve the framework conditions of an optimised biogas production in Norway, to reduce environmental impacts and achieve the political objectives. While the exemption from CO2 tax and road fee has contributed to an increased use of biogas in the transport sector, an increase in the taxes for fossil fuels could contribute to making upgrading of the gas the most profitable option for most large-scale biogas plants. Raising the importance of the environmental aspects in public procurements would enhance the role of biogas in achieving the political objectives of obtaining fossil free public transport and in the reduction of environmental impacts from waste treatment. In addition, it is important to consider measures that motivate large scale plants to use manure as a substrate and deliver digestate to agriculture. An increase in the knowledge regarding the economy of farm scale biogas production in a Norwegian context would make the results from the economic assessment more robust and reduce the risk for farmers in making the investment. These include knowledge with regard to the start-up and operation of small scale plants to avoid unforeseen costs. Political instruments that encourage the development of technology for cheaper small scale upgrading solutions could further reduce the greenhouse gas emissions, as would the use of raw biogas in tractors and other agricultural equipment currently using fossil fuels. In some regions, this could also be achieved by implementing regional development plans for farm scale production with piping infrastructure and centralised upgrading. These measures could promote an increase in the amount of manure for biogas production The work carried out as part of this thesis has shown that models combining environmental life cycle assessment and economic cost assessments can serve as decision support and can make a valuable contribution to policy development. The results are, however, highly dependent on the quality of the data used and the level of detail in the models. In order to increase the robustness of the results, there is a need for more research into the quantification of emissions from the storage and spreading of digestate, and ways in which they can be reduced. In addition, there is a need for a greater understanding of the properties of digestate as a fertiliser, such as the fertilising effect, carbon storage and other contributions to soil quality. More research should also be carried out on the emissions from dewatering and composting of digestate, and its use as a substitute for peat. Furthermore, the cost assessments could be expanded to also to include the economy of the actors in the transport sector and the farmers receiving digestate. ; Biogassproduksjon fra anaerob utråtning av organiske ressurser kan potensielt bidra til reduksjon av klimagasser i flere sektorer og kan spille en viktig rolle i både bioøkonomien og sirkulærøkonomien. Flere europeiske land har politiske målsetninger om å øke biogassproduksjon og øke mengden gjødsel til anaerob behandling. Behandlingsmetoden er derimot kjent for å være kostbar, og markedene for biogass og biorest er umodne. Det er behov for en bedre forståelse av hvordan verdikjedene bør utformes for å minimere miljøbelastningene samtidig som man oppnår lønnsomhet for aktørene. I Norge er de vanligste substratene for biogassproduksjon kloakkslam og organisk avfall fra husholdninger og industri. Gjødsel er identifisert som substratet med det høyeste teoretiske biogasspotensialet, men det er foreløpig få biogassanlegg som bruker gjødsel som råvare. Inntil nylig har biogass i hovedsak blitt brukt til å generere varme, hvor en stor andel har blitt brukt internt i anleggene eller til å varme opp bygninger i nærheten. I løpet av de siste årene har derimot flere nye og eksisterende anlegg investert i oppgradering og produserer biometan til bruk i transportsektoren. Den vanligste behandlingen av bioresten, som er et biprodukt fra den anaerobe behandlingen, er å avvanne den og bruke den tørre fraksjonen som et jordforbedringsprodukt og sende vannfasen til renseanlegg. Noen få nye anlegg leverer derimot den flytende biorest til lanbruket som biogjødsel. Hensikten med denne avhandlingen har vært å bidra til økt kunnskap om hvordan norske biogass verdikjeder bør optimaliseres for å redusere miljøbelastninger ved å utvikle modeller som kan gi beslutningsstøtte. Målet er å foreslå forbedringer av virkemiddelapparatet og forutsetningene for videre utvikling av biogassindustrien i Norge. Systemteori og systemanalyse-metodikk ble brukt, og tre ulike aspekter ble analysert: miljøpåvirkninger, økonomien til aktører i verdikjeden og politikk. Casestudiene er begrenset til substratene organisk avfall fra husholdninger (matavfall) og gjødsel fra storfe og gris. I økonomianalysene ble kun det årlige resultatet til biogassanlegg og storfe- og grisegårder analysert. Fire vitenskapelige artikler ble utviklet som en del av avhandlingen. I den første artikkelen ble livsløpssmetodikk og generelle resultater for BioValueChain-modellen presentert. Modellen ble utviklet for å muliggjøre evaluering av miljøpåvirkninger fra ulike alternativer for biogass verdikjeder. I den andre artikkelen ble miljøanalyser kombinert med økonomiberegninger for storskala biogassanlegg for fire ulike verdikjede-konfigurasjoner. I tillegg ble det mest lønnsomme alternativet brukt som referanse til å beregne hvilke insentiver som er nødvendig for at den mest gunstige løsningen med tanke på reduksjon miljøbelastninger, blir like lønnsom som referansen. En komparativ analyse av biogass verdikjeder i Norge og Danmark ble gjennomført i Paper 3. Danmark har implementert støtteordninger for sluttbruk av biogass gjennom en feed-in tariff, mens Norge tilbyr investeringsstøtte og støtte til gårder per tonn gjødsel levert til biogassanlegg. Hensikten var å undersøke effekten av ulike virkemiddelsystemer. Dette ble utført ved å definere en norsk og en dansk biogass verdikjede og beregne kostnadene og inntektene. I tillegg ble de økonomiske resultatene beregnet for den norske verdikjeden under danske forutsetninger, og vice versa. I Paper 4 ble metodikken til en optimaliseringsmodell for bruk av gjødselressurser i en region til biogassproduksjon beskrevet, og modellen ble brukt til å gjennomføre en casestudie på 50 gårder i en region i Norge. Modellen beregnet årlig økonomisk resultat for gårdene i regionen og utslipp av klimagasser for tre alternativer: ingen biogassproduksjon, biogassproduksjon på gårdsanlegg og sentralisert biogassproduksjon. Resultatene i PhD-arbeidet har vist at organisk avfall og gjødsel i større grad bør benyttes til biogassproduksjon for å redusere miljøbelastninger. Den beste løsningen for bruk av biogassen er som drivstoff slik at biogassen kan erstatter diesel, og den beste løsningen for bruk av biorest er som biogjødsel i landbruket til å erstatte mineralgjødsel, noe som krever et høyt nivå av sektorintegrering i verdikjeden. For å oppnå maksimal reduksjon av klimagassutslipp, bør det fokuseres på å redusere diffuse utslipp og å redusere utslipp fra lagring av biorest. Økonomiberegningene vise at storskala biogassanlegg mangler generelt økonomiske insentiver for å inkludere landbrukssektoren i verdikjeden. Inkludering av transportsektoren er kun det mest lønnsomme alternativet for anlegg over en viss skala eller for anlegg som får en høy pris for den oppgraderte gassen. For storfe og grisegårder er det mest lønnsomme alternativet med tanke på gjødselhåndtering å levere gjødsel til et sentralt biogassanlegg, og å få bioresten i retur. Denne konklusjonen er svært avhengig av avtalen mellom gården og biogassanlegget. Takket være den nylig introduserte støtten per tonn gjødsel til biogassanlegg, kan investering i et gårdsanlegg også gi økonomisk overskudd for bonden, til tross for vanskeligheter med å finne et godt bruksområde for gassen. Dette gir en indikasjon på at barrierene for å øke mengden gjødsel til biogassproduksjon på det nåværende tidspunkt ikke i hovedsak er økonomiske. Det eksisterende virkemiddelapparatet har bidratt til en økning i biogassproduksjonen. Basert på analysene som er utført i denne avhandlingen kan det likevel gis noen anbefalinger til forbedringer i rammevilkårene for en optimalisert biogassproduksjon i Norge, for å redusere miljøpåvirkningene og for å oppnå de politiske målsetningene. Unntak fra CO2-avgift og veiavgift har sannsynligvis bidratt til en økning i bruk av biogass i transportsektoren. En ytterligere økning i avgiftene for fossile drivstoff vil sannsynligvis medføre at oppgradering blir den mest lønnsomme løsningen for de fleste storskala biogassanlegg. Et økt fokus på viktigheten av miljøaspekter ved offentlige innkjøp kan bidra til å oppnå de politiske målsetningene for fossilfri kollektivtransport og reduksjoner av miljøbelastninger fra avfallshåndtering. I tillegg er det viktig å vurdere virkemidler som kan motivere storskalaanlegg til å bruke gjødsel som substrat og levere biorest til landbruket. En økt forståelse for økonomien til gårdsanlegg under norske forhold vil gjøre resultatene fra de økonomiske beregningene mer robuste og redusere risikoen for bønder som ønsker å investere. Dette inkluderer kunnskap om oppstart og drift av småskalaanlegg for å unngå uforutsette utgifter. Politiske virkemidler som legger til rette for utvikling av teknologi for billigere småskala-oppgradering kan redusere klimagassutslippene ytterligere. Det samme kan bruk av rågass i traktorer og annet landbruksutstyr, som på det nåværende tidspunkt bruker fossilt drivstoff. I noen regioner kan det være aktuelt å lage en regional plan for biogassproduksjon med rørnett og sentralisert oppgradering. Disse tiltakene vil kunne bidra til å øke mengden gjødsel til biogassproduksjon. Arbeidet som er gjennomført i forbindelse med denne avhandlingen har vist at modeller som kombinerer livsløpsanalyser og økonomiberegninger kan bidra med beslutningsstøtte og kan gi verdifulle innspill til politikkutforming. Det er likevel viktig å være oppmerksom på at resultatene er svært avhengig av kvaliteten på datagrunnlaget og detaljnivået til modellene. For å øke robustheten til resultatene er det behov for mer forskning på kvantifisering av utslipp fra lagring og spredning av biorest, og reduksjon av disse utslippene. Det er i tillegg behov for en bedre forståelse av egenskapene til biorest som et gjødselprodukt, slik som gjødseleffekt og karbonlagringseffekt og andre bidrag til jordkvalitet. Det er også behov for mer kunnskap om utslipp fra avvanning og kompostering av biorest og på erstatning av torv. Videre kan kostnadsberegningene med fordel utvides til å inkludere aktørene i transportsektoren og gårder som mottar biorest. ; publishedVersion

[eng] The accelerated impact of human activities is causing increasing damages to the Earth's life support systems. Consequently, the policy-making and scientific communities have advocated the urgent need for a change towards the sustainable use of natural resources and ecosystems. This thesis deals with the institutional conditions necessary for that change in coupled social-ecological systems, through an in-depth case study: the Doñana region, an estuarine social-ecological system affected by intricate water resources and wetland conservation problems located in the Guadalquivir Estuary (south-west Spain). In particular, I focus on the need for transitions from command-andcontrol schemes towards more flexible, participatory and adaptive approaches to policy and decision making: specifically, adaptive governance and adaptive management. For this purpose, I address three interrelated questions of broad research interest, using a theoretical framework that combines elements from resilience and institutional path dependence theories. The first question has implications for the implementation of participatory processes in the course of transitional designs towards adaptive governance and management, while the other two have implications at a theoreticanalytical level. The first research question focuses on assessing the usefulness of an action-research program aimed at introducing adaptive management tenets at the research-management interface of the Doñana region (Chapter 4). The program, which paralleled an adaptive restoration in the context of the hydro-ecological restoration project Doñana 2005, combined a formalised process of networking, interviews, focus groups and System Dynamics techniques that proved useful to engage and build trust among a wide range of actors who finally participated in two adaptive management workshops. The participation of stakeholders and agencies entrenched in long-standing conflicts and power struggles up to that date was considered a major success of the program. During the workshops, the participants collaboratively developed a set of policy recommendations, offering potential avenues to improve the research-management interface, water resources management and wetland conservation practices in the Doñana region and Guadalquivir Estuary. The action-research program was supported by preparatory research aimed at analysing the practices of, and learning from, best-in-class practitioners on adaptive management from British Columbia (Canada), where this approach was first conceived and implemented on a large scale (Chapter 3). Such preparatory research, which was based on a document review, interviews and a final workshop at the University of British Columbia (Vancouver), revealed that adaptive management has cycled, during the last four decades, through alternate phases of theoretical development, practical implementation and feedback, to which many scholars and practitioners have contributed. In particular, the workshop allowed current opportunities and constraints for the testing and implementation of adaptive management in Canada to be elicited, based on the direct, on-the-ground experience of practitioners and analysts. The results of that research provided the grounds and support for the strategic development of the action-research program in the Doñana region. The preliminary identification, during the action-research program, of major rigidities within Doñana's institutional framework and management agencies triggered the second part of the thesis, which addressed, through institutional analysis, the two additional research questions mentioned above. The second research question of the thesis focuses on enhancing the understanding of the roots of institutional rigidity in maladaptive social-ecological systems. Institutional rigidity that hinders change and smothers innovation represents a major constraint for adaptive governance and adaptive management. Therefore, to facilitate potential transitions towards more sustainable social-ecological systems characterised by adaptive approaches to decision-making, it is of utmost importance to understand and explain the origins of such institutional rigidity. In Chapter 5, by constructing a historical pattern, I identify the existence of a rigid institutional regime for water resources management and wetland conservation in the Doñana region, and explain, through a first theoretical iteration, the mechanisms underlying the genesis, amplification and persistence of such institutional rigidity. My explanation has two distinguishable parts: on one side, the deep-historical genesis of the regime at a critical juncture in the 19th century; and on the other side, the formation and continuity of the regime up to the last decades of the 20th century, despite its dysfunctionality for coping with crises and its inability to harmonise wetland conservation, water management and economic development. The historical pattern confirms that the Doñana's regime has followed a path-dependent dynamic, largely characterised by the historical recurrence on the application of command-andcontrol schemes. In a seeming paradox, these schemes, instead of driving the regime towards an efficient outcome, led to the formation of a rigid institutional regime that drove the Doñana region into a sub-optimal systemic rigidity trap. This rigid outcome may be theoretically qualified as contingent, for it defies the traditional expectations of neoclassical economics that lie at the logical core of the concept of institutional path dependence. The third research question of the thesis focuses on the explanatory potential of entrepreneurship and discourses, in their relationship with political-economic interests and power, as factors contributing to shape outcomes in local social-ecological systems. In particular, I discussed the explanatory potential of those factors, when the core logic of path dependence (composed by the mainstream principles of neoclassical economics) fails to predict observed outcomes in historical, evolutionary perspective, and qualifies such outcomes as contingent. In Chapter 6, I undertake a second theoretical iteration that re-examines the historical explanatory pattern developed in Chapter 5, in order to show how the Doñana's rigid outcome can be understood as more predictable. In particular, I argue that three mechanisms constituted necessary and sufficient conditions for the transformational process that led to the Doñana's rigid outcome: (1) a contextual political-discursive mechanism that mobilised power top-down and signalled increasing returns to actors downstream of the institutional regime; (2) the operation of increasing returns and self-reinforcing mechanisms bottom-up; (3) an endogenous entrepreneurial component that acted as a mechanism for action in an environment of extreme uncertainty. In the general discussion of the thesis (Chapter 7), I make the case for systematising the role of discourses and entrepreneurship factors, in their relationship with politicaleconomic interests and power, into the analysis. I argue that such systematisation contributes significantly to diminishing the degree of contingency associated to the Doñana's rigid outcome. More generally, my discussion deals with contingency as a property of the path dependence concept that can be modulated in explanations of institutional dynamics. This type of advancements could inform future policy and institutional designs for successful transitions towards adaptive governance and management in social-ecological systems, hence improving the prospects for the sustainable use of natural resources and ecosystems. Enriching the knowledge gathered during the action-research program with the in-depth analysis of institutional constraints rooted in historical factors, allowed a number of potential avenues to be identified that may aid the transition towards adaptive governance and management in the Doñana region (Chapter 9). It also allowed an informed speculation to be made about the potential role of action-research programs such as the one described in this thesis, to comply with (and complement) the requisites for public participation and social learning of European Union legislation: notably, the Water Framework Directive (Chapter 7, Section 7.4). ; [spa] El impacto acelerado de las actividades humanas está causando el aumento de los daños a los sistemas de soporte vital de la Tierra. En consecuencia, gestores y científicos gestores han defendido la necesidad urgente de un cambio hacia el uso sostenible de los recursos naturales y los ecosistemas. Esta tesis trata sobre las condiciones institucionales necesarias para dicho cambio en sistemas socio-ecológicos, a través de un estudio de caso en profundidad: la región de Doñana, un sistema socio-ecológico afectado por problemas complejos en términos de recursos hídricos y conservación de humedales, situado en el Estuario del Guadalquivir (suroeste de España). En particular, en esta tesis me centro en la necesidad de transiciones desde estrategias de mando y control hacia enfoques más flexibles, participativos y adaptativos para la elaboración de políticas y la toma de decisiones: específicamente, gobernanza adaptativa y gestión adaptativa. Para ello, abordo tres preguntas de interés de investigación, amplias e interrelacionadas, utilizando un marco teórico que combina elementos de las teorías de dependencia de la trayectoria institucional y la resiliencia. La primera pregunta tiene implicaciones para la implementación de procesos de participación en el curso del diseño de transiciones hacia la gobernanza y la gestión adaptativas, mientras que las otras dos tienen implicaciones a nivel teórico-analítico. La primera pregunta de investigación se centra en la evaluación de la utilidad de un programa de investigación-acción cuyo objetivo fue introducir principios de gestión adaptativa en la interfaz investigación-gestión de la región de Doñana (Capítulo 4). El programa, que se desarrolló paralelamente a una restauración adaptativa en el contexto del proyecto de restauración hidro-ecológica Doñana 2005, combina un proceso formalizado de networking, entrevistas, grupos focales y técnicas de Dinámica de Sistemas, que demostró ser útil para fomentar la confianza entre un amplio rango de actores que finalmente participaron en dos talleres de gestión adaptativa. La participación de partes interesadas y organismos que se habían visto anteriormente envueltos en situaciones conflictivas y disputas de poder fue considerada un gran éxito del programa. Durante los talleres, los participantes desarrollaron en colaboración una serie de recomendaciones de política, ofreciendo posibles vías para mejorar la interfaz investigación-gestión, la gestión de los recursos hídricos y la conservación de humedales en la región de Doñana y el Estuario del Guadalquivir. El programa de investigación-acción fue apoyado por una investigación preparatoria dirigida a analizar y aprender de las prácticas de profesionales líderes en gestión adaptativa de la Columbia Británica (Canadá), donde este enfoque fue concebido e implementado por primera vez a gran escala (Capítulo 3). Dicha investigación preparatoria se basó en una revisión documental, entrevistas y un taller final en la Universidad de la Columbia Británica (Vancouver), y reveló que la gestión adaptativa ha completado varias fases alternas de desarrollo teórico, aplicación práctica y retroalimentación durante las últimas cuatro décadas, a las que muchos académicos y profesionales han contribuido. En particular, el taller permitió extraer lecciones sobre oportunidades y limitaciones actuales para la implementación y evaluación de la gestión adaptativa en Canadá, basadas en la experiencia directa de profesionales y analistas sobre el terreno. Los resultados de esa investigación sirvieron de base y apoyo para el desarrollo estratégico del programa de investigación-acción en la región de Doñana. La identificación preliminar de importantes rigideces en el marco institucional y las agencias de gestión de Doñana durante el programa de investigación-acción, motivó la segunda parte de la tesis, la cual abordó las dos preguntas de investigación adicionales mencionadas anteriormente, mediante análisis institucional. La segunda pregunta de investigación de la tesis se centra en mejorar la comprensión de las raíces de la rigidez institucional en sistemas socio-ecológicos maladaptativos. La rigidez institucional representa un obstáculo importante para la gobernanza y gestión adaptativas, ya que impide el cambio y dificulta la innovación. Por lo tanto, para facilitar potenciales transiciones hacia sistemas socio-ecológicos más sostenibles caracterizados por enfoques adaptativos para la toma de decisiones, es de suma importancia entender y explicar los orígenes de la rigidez institucional. En el Capítulo 5, a través de la construcción de un patrón histórico, identifico la existencia de un régimen institucional rígido para la gestión de los recursos hídricos y la conservación de los humedales en la región de Doñana, y explico, a través de una primera iteración teórica, los mecanismos subyacentes a la génesis, amplificación y persistencia de tal rigidez institucional. Mi explicación tiene dos partes diferenciadas: por un lado, la génesis histórica profunda del régimen en una coyuntura crítica en el siglo XIX; y por otro, la formación del régimen y su continuidad hasta las últimas décadas del siglo XX, a pesar de su disfuncionalidad para hacer frente a las crisis y su incapacidad para armonizar la conservación de humedales, la gestión del agua y el desarrollo económico. El patrón histórico confirma que el régimen institucional de Doñana ha seguido una dinámica dependiente de la trayectoria, ampliamente caracterizada por la aplicación recurrente de estrategias de mando y control a lo largo de la historia. En una aparente paradoja, estas estrategias, en lugar de conducir al régimen hacia un resultado eficiente, llevaron a la formación de un régimen institucional rígido que condujo la región de Doñana a una trampa subóptima de rigidez sistémica. Este resultado rígido puede ser calificado por la teoría como contingente, ya que desafía las expectativas tradicionales de la economía neoclásica que yacen en el núcleo lógico del concepto de dependencia de la trayectoria institucional. La tercera pregunta de investigación de la tesis se centra en el potencial explicativo del emprendimiento y los discursos en su relación con los intereses político-económicos y el poder, como factores que contribuyen a la formación de sistemas socio-ecológicos a nivel local. En particular, centro mi discusión en el potencial explicativo de estos factores, cuando la lógica base de la dependencia de la trayectoria (compuesta por los principios dominantes de la economía neoclásica) fracasa en predecir los resultados observados desde una perspectiva evolutiva histórica, calificando estos resultados como contingentes. En el Capítulo 6, emprendo una segunda iteración teórica que reexamina el patrón explicativo histórico desarrollado en el Capítulo 5, con el fin de mostrar como el régimen institucional rígido Doñana puede entenderse como más predecible. En particular, sostengo que tres mecanismos constituyeron condiciones necesarias y suficientes para el proceso de transformación que llevó a la rigidez en Doñana: (1) un mecanismo político-discursivo contextual que movilizó el poder desde arriba hacia abajo e indicó rendimientos crecientes a los actores de los niveles operacionales del régimen institucional; (2) el funcionamiento de los rendimientos crecientes y mecanismos de auto-refuerzo de abajo hacia arriba; (3) un componente endógeno de emprendimiento que actuó como mecanismo de acción en un entorno de incertidumbre extrema. En la discusión general de la tesis (Capítulo 7), presento argumentos para la sistematización, en el análisis, de los discursos y el emprendimiento en relación con factores político-económicos y de poder. Sostengo que tal sistematización contribuye significativamente a disminuir el grado de contingencia asociado a la rigidez en Doñana. Más en general, mi discusión trata sobre la contingencia como una propiedad del concepto de dependencia de la trayectoria que se puede modular en explicaciones sobre dinámica institucional. Este tipo de avances podría informar futuras políticas y diseños institucionales para una transición exitosa hacia la gobernanza y la gestión adaptativas de los sistemas socio-ecológicos, y, por lo tanto, para incrementar la posibilidad de gestionar los recursos naturales y los ecosistemas de forma más sostenible. El enriquecimiento del conocimiento adquirido durante el programa de investigaciónacción con el análisis en profundidad de las limitaciones institucionales arraigadas en factores históricos, permitieron la identificación de una serie de posibles vías que pueden ayudar a la transición hacia la gobernanza y la gestión adaptativas en la región de Doñana (Capítulo 9). Asimismo, este enriquecimiento permitió una especulación informada sobre el papel potencial de programas de investigación-acción como el que se describe en esta tesis, para cumplir con (y complementar) los requisitos para la participación pública y el aprendizaje social de la legislación de la Unión Europea – en particular, la Directiva Marco del Agua (Capítulo 7, Sección 7.4).

Länsimaisissa demokratioissa äänestäjien yhteiskuntaluokka ja koettu luokka-asema ovat perinteisesti selittäneet heidän puoluevalintojaan. Tätä äänestyspäätöksiä selittävää toimintamallia, eli omaan yhteiskuntaluokkaan liittyvän puolueen äänestämistä, kutsutaan luokkaäänestämiseksi. Luokkaäänestämistä painottavissa teorioissa yhteiskuntaluokkia pidetään merkittävimpänä poliittisena jakolinjana. Länsimaisissa monipuoluejärjestelmissä myös poliittiset puolueet ovat syntyneet tältä pohjalta. Nykyisillekin puoluejärjestelmille merkitykselliseksi poliittiseksi jakolinjaksi yhteiskuntaluokat muodostuivat jo teollisessa vallankumouksessa, joka synnytti vastakkainasettelua työtä tekevän ja omistavan väestönosan välillä. Jakolinja oli niin voimakkaasti kansalaisia erotteleva, että se synnytti nopeasti yhteiskuntaan erilaisia poliittisia järjestöjä etenkin työväestön keskuuteen. Tällä tavoin ammattiliitot, sosiaalidemokraattiset sekä sosialistiset puolueet saivat alkunsa. 1980-luvulle tultaessa yhä useammat tutkimukset osoittivat, että äänestäjien luokka-aseman vaikutus heidän vaalikäyttäytymiseensä oli heikentynyt. Erityisesti tämä trendi liittyi työväenluokkaisiin äänestäjiin. Heidän ammattiasemansa katsottiin menettäneen asteittain merkitystään vaaleissa tekemiin puoluevalintoihinsa. Yhteiskunnan rakennetasolla trendiä on selitetty työntekijäammattien vähenemisellä teollistuneissa demokratioissa. Esimerkiksi Suomessa työntekijäammattien osuus kaikista ammateista on pienentynyt lähes 20 prosenttiyksikköä 1970-luvulta 2010-luvulle tultaessa. Luokkaäänestämisen laskun on esitetty liittyvän puoluekentän pirstoutumiseen, yhteiskunnan uudelleenjärjestäytymiseen ja laajamittaisiin rakenteellisiin muutoksiin länsimaissa. Globalisaatiokehitys, koulutustason nousu, työelämän lisääntynyt epävakaus sekä väestön ikääntyminen ovat yleisimpiä yhteiskunnan rakennetason muutoksia, jotka ovat väistämättä muuttaneet myös poliittista kenttää. Vaikka luokkaäänestäminen on vähentynyt, osa tutkimuksista on suhtautunut havaintoihin sen vähenemisestä varauksellisesti. Varsinkaan Pohjoismaiden vaaleissa työväenluokkaisuuden ei ole katsottu menettäneen samassa suhteessa merkitystään äänestyspäätöksiä selittävänä tekijänä verrattuna muihin länsimaisiin demokratioihin. Lisäksi yhteiskunnan rakenteelliset muutokset sekä niiden seuraukset ja luokkaäänestämisen yleinen väheneminen ovat motivoineet tutkijoita tarkastelemaan äänestäjien luokka-asemia myös subjektiivisesta näkökulmasta. Subjektiivisesta näkökulmasta kiinnostuneet tutkijat ovat tyypillisesti keskittyneet analysoimaan äänestäjien luokka-asemia heidän luokkasamastumisensa kautta. Luokkasamastumisella tarkoitetaan yhteiskuntaluokkaa, johon henkilö kokee itse lähinnä kuuluvansa. Tämä väitöstutkimus tuottaa luokkaäänestämisen näkökulmasta uutta tietoa suomalaisten työväenluokkaisten äänestäjien äänestyskäyttäytymisestä, arvoista ja asenteista sekä heidän puoluevalinnoistaan Suomessa 2000-luvulla. Tarkoitan nyt ja myös jäljempänä 2000-luvulla vuosituhannen vaihteesta alkanutta aikaa. Tutkimus on saanut alkunsa kahdesta 2000-luvun suomalaisia äänestäjiä sekä suomalaista puoluejärjestelmää koskevasta havainnosta. Ensimmäinen havainto koskee luokkasamastumista. Merkittävä osa suomalaisista äänestäjistä kokee 2000-luvulla samastuvansa johonkin yhteiskuntaluokkaan siitä huolimatta, että yhteiskuntaluokkien on esitetty hiipuvan ja menettävän merkitystään. Toinen havainto koskee suomalaista puoluejärjestelmää ja siinä 2000-luvulla tapahtuneita merkittäviä muutoksia. Tästä hyvänä esimerkkinä voidaan mainita vuoden 2011 eduskuntavaalit, joissa iso joukko työväenluokkaisia äänestäjiä siirtyi Suomen Sosialidemokraattisen Puolueen (SDP) takaa Perussuomalaisten (PS) kannattajiksi. Tämä tutkimus tuo nämä kaksi erillistä havaintoa yhteen tutkimalla työnväenluokan äänestämisen mekanismeja 2000-luvun Suomessa sekä luokkakongruenssin että äänestäjien arvojen ja asenteiden näkökulmasta. Tavoitteena on selvittää, kuinka työnväenluokkaiset äänestäjät äänestävät 2000-luvun Suomessa. Tutkimusongelma nojaa tapaan analysoida äänestäjien luokka-asemia kahdesta näkökulmasta. Se tarkoittaa objektiivisen luokka-aseman, eli ammatin, ja subjektiivisen luokka-aseman, eli luokkasamastumisen, tarkastelemista samanaikaisesti. Näiden kahden luokka-asemaa mittaavan muuttujan yhteyttä nimitetään tässä tutkimuksessa joko luokkakongruenssiksi tai inkongruenssiksi riippuen siitä, ovatko ne toisiaan vastaavat vai eivät. Tutkimus muodostaa kolme erillistä työväenluokkaryhmää. Ryhmistä ensimmäinen on "perinteinen työväenluokka" ( traditional working class ), joka koostuu työntekijäammateissa toimivista, jotka samastuvat työväenluokkaan. Ryhmä "ammatillinen työväenluokka" ( occupational working class ) koostuu työntekijäammateissa toimivista, jotka samastuvat alempaan keskiluokkaan, keskiluokkaan tai ylempään keskiluokkaan. Kolmanteen ryhmään, "ideologiseen työväenluokkaan" ( ideological working class ) kuuluvat ei- työntekijäammateissa toimivat, jotka kuitenkin samastuvat työväenluokkaan. Lisäksi tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan näiden kolmen ryhmän arvoja ja asenteita, joiden merkitystä viimeaikainen tutkimus on painottanut puoluevalintojen taustalla. Tutkimusaineistoina käytetään kansallisten eduskuntavaalitutkimusten kyselyaineistoja (FNES) vuosilta 2003–2019. Tutkimuksen analyysi on kolmivaiheinen. Ensimmäinen analyysiluku keskittyy löytämään tekijöitä, jotka selittävät luokkakongruenssia ja inkongruenssia tutkimuksen kolmen työnväenluokkaryhmän keskuudessa. Tulosten mukaan lapsuudenkoti, koulutustaso ja puolison ammatti ovat merkittävimmät tekijät, jotka selittävät sekä luokkakongruenssia että inkongruenssia. Ennen kaikkea työväenluokkainen lapsuudenkoti nousee esiin merkittävimpänä työväenluokkaan samastumista selittävänä tekijänä. Tutkimuksen toinen analyysiluku tarkastelee sitä, missä määrin kolme työväenluokkaryhmää eroavat toisistaan arvoiltaan ja asenteiltaan. Toisin sanoen luku analysoi sitä, missä määrin luokkakongruenssi ja luokkainkongruenssi vaikuttavat arvoihin ja asenteisiin. Tulokset osoittavat, että kolme työväenluokkaryhmää eroavat jossain määrin toisistaan sekä sosioekonomisilta että sosiokulttuurisilta arvoiltaan ja asenteiltaan. Ideologinen työväenluokka ( ideological working class ) erottuu kahdesta muusta ryhmästä vasemmistolaisemmalla sosioekonomisella orientaatiollaan. Lisäksi ammatillinen työväenluokka ( occupational working class ) on sosiokulttuuriselta orientaatioltaan kolmesta työväenluokkaryhmästä konservatiivisin. Kaikki kolme ryhmää ovat selvästi enemmän EU-kriittisiä kuin EU-myönteisiä verrattuna muihin äänestäjiin. Tutkimuksen kolmas analyysiluku tuo yhteen kaksi aiempaa analyysilukua. Se tarkastelee luokkakongruenssin ja luokkainkongruenssin sekä arvojen ja asenteiden vaikutusta työväenluokkaryhmien puoluevalintoihin. Kokoava analyysi soveltaa polkumallia ja tutkii, missä määrin luokkakongruenssi ja luokkainkongruenssi vaikuttavat suoraan työväenluokkaisten äänestäjien puoluevalintoihin, tai missä määrin vaikutus on epäsuora äänestäjien arvojen ja asenteiden kautta. Tulokset osoittavat, että työväenluokkaisten äänestäjien puoluevalinnat ovat moniulotteisia, eikä niitä voi enää 2000-luvulla kuvailla pelkästään perinteisiksi luokka-puolue-siteiksi. Tästä huolimatta SDP ja Vasemmistoliitto ovat yhä 2000-luvulla puolueita, joille työväenluokkaiset äänestäjät antavat ääniään. Nämä työväenluokan ääniä perinteisesti keränneet puolueet ovat saaneet haastajia Perussuomalaisten ohella muistakin puolueista. Työväenluokkaisten äänestäjien puoluevalintoja ohjaavat myös heidän arvonsa ja asenteensa. Perinteisesti työväenluokkaäänestämiseen liitetty vasemmistolainen sosioekonominen orientaatio, on kuitenkin tulosten valossa yhä harvemmin löydettävissä työväenluokan äänestyspäätösten taustalta. Tulosten valossa mihinkään työväenluokkaryhmään kuuluminen yhdistettynä sosioekonomiseen orientaatioon ei lisää todennäköisyyttä äänestää mitään tarkasteltua puoluetta. Arvoista ja asenteista EU-kriittisyys yhdistettynä mihin tahansa työväenluokkaryhmään erottuu selvästi useimmiten puoluevalintoja selittävänä tekijänä. Tämän lisäksi konservatiivisen sosiokulttuurisen orientaation havaitaan lisäävän todennäköisyyttä äänestää Suomen Keskustaa tai Perussuomalaisia ammatillisen työväenluokan ( occupational working class ) keskuudessa. Kyse on sellaisista työväenluokkaisista äänestäjistä, jotka toimivat työntekijäammateissa, mutta samastuvat alempaan keskiluokkaan, keskiluokkaan tai ylempään keskiluokkaan. Kaiken kaikkiaan tulokset osoittavat, että perinteistä työväenluokkaäänestämistä ilmenee yhä edelleen 2000-luvun Suomessa, mutta työväenluokan äänet jakautuvat useamman puolueen kesken. SDP:n ja Perussuomalaisten ohella työväenluokka antaa 2000-luvulla äänensä niin Vihreälle Liitolle, Vasemmistoliitolle kuin Suomen Keskustallekin. Keskeinen löydös on, että Perussuomalaiset onnistuu kilpailemaan kaikkien kolmen tutkimuksessa muodostetun työväenluokkaryhmän äänistä. Täten työväenluokkaryhmien siirtyminen Perussuomalaisten äänestäjiksi ei juurikaan riipu heidän koulutustasostaan, ammatistaan tai luokkasamastumisestaan. Tulokset osoittavat myös, että kesällä 2017 tapahtuneesta sisäisestä kahtiajaostaan huolimatta Perussuomalaiset on puolueena kyennyt jatkamaan tätä trendiä. Vaikka EU- kriittisyys linkittyy myös muiden puolueiden äänestämiseen työväenluokkaisten äänestäjien keskuudessa, Perussuomalaiset on epäilemättä onnistunut kanavoimaan EU-kriittiset äänet taakseen. Äänestäjien luokka-asemien perusteellinen ja moniulotteinen analysointi tarjoaa tärkeää uutta tietoa luokkaäänestämisen malleista ja mekanismeista. Tämän tutkimuksen kontribuutio laaja-alaiseen luokkaäänestämistä käsittelevään tutkimukseen piilee nimenomaan sen soveltamassa kaksiulotteisessa lähestymistavassa työväenluokkaisen aseman määrittelemiseen. Lisäksi tutkimus yhdistää kaksiulotteisen näkökulman arvoihin ja asenteisiin. Tutkimuksen keskeinen argumentti on, että mikäli jokin kolmesta tekijästä – objektiivinen luokka-asema, subjektiivinen luokka-asema tai äänestäjän arvot ja asenteet – jätetään pois tarkastelusta, luokkaäänestämisen keskeiset mekanismit jäävät pimentoon. Tulevaisuuden luokkaäänestämistä tarkastelevien tutkimusten on tärkeää ottaa huomioon nämä kaikki kolme tekijää. ; Traditionally, voters' class positions have determined their party choices in Western democracies. At the same time, social class has been considered being the most significant political cleavage of which political parties have conventionally emerged in the West-European multi-party systems. Class cleavage has emerged from the industrial revolution based on the labour market confrontation between workers and owners. The cleavage has been so divisive and has resulted in the formation of various political organisations especially at the worker-side. Meanwhile, Labour Unions, Social Democratic (SD) parties and socialist parties were formed. Since the late 1980s, numerous studies have claimed that voters' class has become an irrelevant determinant of electoral behaviour. This trend has been related to working-class voters, whose occupational position is regarded becoming gradually a weaker predictor of their voting behaviour than in the past. At the macro level, this weakening trend has been explained by a decline in the relative proportion of the working class. The share of blue-collar employees has decreased significantly in the past few decades in advanced industrialised democracies. For example, in Finland, the share of blue-collar employees has decreased by almost 20 percentage points from the 1970s to the 2010s. The declines in class voting have been linked to the political parties' disintegration, reconfiguration of society, and large-scale societal change in the Western world. Globalisation, the rising level of education, unstable working-life conditions, and the ageing population have been the most common societal explanations for the change in the political sphere. Despite the relative decrease, some previous studies have indicated that the working class is still relevant and has not lost its significance as a determinant of voting behaviour to same extent in the Nordic countries as in other Western democracies in the 21st century. Moreover, the societal change, its consequences, and declining trends in class voting have motivated scholars to consider the subjective approach to voters' class positions. Typically, scholars who have focused on the subjective approach, i.e., class identification, have considered the declining trend in class voting more carefully. This study aims to provide new knowledge on the Finnish working class' voting behaviour, party attachment, and attitudinal orientations from the perspective of class voting in 21 st century Finland. It originates from two observations on the Finnish electorate and party system in the 21 st century. The first observation relates to the continued significance of class identification among the Finnish electorate. Considerable majority of eligible voters identify with a specific social class, despite ongoing debates over the decreasing significance of social classes to voting preferences. The second observation relates to the notable changes, which have occurred in the Finnish party system in the 21 st century. A good example of this is a large share of working-class voters who switched from the SDP to the Finns Party in the 2011 parliamentary election. This study integrates these two separate observations together by studying the mechanisms of working-class voting from the perspective of class (in)congruence and voters' attitudinal orientations. As such, the study discovers how the working-class votes in 21st century Finland. The research problem is built on analysing working-class voting from the perspective of a two-dimensional approach to voters' class positions, i.e., class (in)congruence. The study formulates three groups of working-class voters by considering voters' occupation and class identification. The first group, the traditional working class , consists of blue-collar employees with working-class identification. The second group, the occupational working class, is blue-collar employees who do not have working-class identification, but they identify with the lower-middle, middle, or upper-middle class. The third group, the ideological working-class, consists of those who are not blue-collar employees by their occupation but have working-class identification. In addition, the study considers the working-class voters' attitudinal orientations, the significance the previous research has highlighted with regard to determining voting decisions in the 21 st century. The datasets used for the analyses are the 2003-2019 Finnish National Elections Studies (FNES). The first part of the study's threefold analysis focuses on finding factors that explain class incongruence and congruence among the three working-class groups. The results show that class of the childhood home, the level of education, and spouse's occupation are the most significant factors that explain both class incongruence and congruence. Above all, working-class childhood home is the most significant factor that explains working-class identification. The second analysis examines the extent to which three working-class groups differ from each other based on their attitudinal orientations, i.e., the extent that class (in)congruence affects attitudinal orientations. The results show that the three working-class groups differ from each other by their socioeconomic and sociocultural orientations. The ideological working-class is more leftist based on their socioeconomic orientation than the traditional or the occupational working class. In addition, the results show that the occupational working class has a more conservative sociocultural orientation than the traditional and ideological working class. From the outcome of the results, all three working-class groups have more opposing attitudes towards the EU than other voters. The third analysis combines the previous analyses and examines the extent that party choices among the Finnish working-class voters are influenced by the class (in)congruence and the voters' attitudinal orientations. Moreover, the last analysis aims to discover the extent the class (in)congruence affects directly working-class voters' party choice or indirectly via the working-class voters' attitudinal orientations. The findings indicate that the working-class' voting patterns are multidimensional and cannot be defined as simple class-party ties in 21 st century Finland. The traditional left-wing parties, the SDP, and the Left Alliance, are still parties, to which working-class voters give their votes in general. This study shows that the party choices of the Finnish working class is determined by their attitudinal orientations. In spite of this, the leftist socioeconomic orientation, which is traditionally linked to working-class voting, is increasingly less common determinant of party choice among the Finnish working class. The results show that belonging to a particular working-class group and having a particular socioeconomic orientation do not increase the likelihood of voting any of the six parties under study. Instead, there can be distinguished an indirect effect on party choice, which goes via opposing attitudes towards the EU among each working class group. In addition, belonging to the occupational working class has an indirect effect on voting both for the Centre Party and the Finns Party via conservative sociocultural orientation. Overall, the results indicate that traditional working class voting still occurs in 21 st century Finland, but the votes of the working class tend to be shared between several parties. Along with the SDP and the Finns Party, Finnish working-class voters give their votes to the Green League, the Left Alliance, and the Centre Party. One important finding is that the Finns Party is, however, able to compete for the votes of the working class among each of the three working-class groups. The party can gather support from all working-class groups despite their class identification, occupation, or level of education. The findings also show that despite the split of the Finns Party in June 2017, the split fails to reduce the party's popularity among the working-class voters. Moreover, the EU criticism has moved working-class voters closer to the Finns Party. While the opposing views about the EU have been linked to voting for the other parties as well, the Finns Party has undoubtedly managed to channel particularly these types of votes among the working-class voters. The findings show that working-class voting still occurs in 21 st century Finland revealing that when a comprehensive approach is applied to the voters' class positions, important knowledge on the patterns and mechanisms of class voting is provided. The study contributes to the vast literature on class voting by applying a two-dimensional approach to voters' class positions and combining it with the voters' attitudinal orientations. If one of the three factors—objective class-position, subjective class-position, and attitudinal orientations—is not examined, then the essential mechanisms of class voting remain undiscovered. Future class-voting studies should consider all subjective class indicators, the voter's occupation, and voters' attitudinal orientations.

IN CROATIAN: Okrugli stol Mreža naselja u umreženom društvu: društvene i prostorne promjene u nekim tranzicijskim zemljama održan je 2. lipnja 2006. godine u Institutu za društvena istraživanja u Zagrebu. Organizirala ga je grupa za istraživanje prostora, sela i grada iz IDIZ-a vezujući ga uz znanstvenoistraživački projekt Sociološki aspekti mreže naselja u kontekstu tranzicije (2002.-2005.). Navedeni projekt i okrugli stol realizirani su uz novčanu potporu Ministarstva obrazovanja, znanosti i športa RH. Okrugli stol bio je podijeljen na dva tematska dijela. U prvom dijelu, pod nazivom Mreža naselja u umreženom društvu, raspravljalo se o tematskom broju Sociologije sela (169/2005.) s radovima na temu Sociologijski aspekti mreže naselja, proizišlim iz spomenutoga projekta. U drugom dijelu otvorena je diskusija na temu Akteri društvenih promjena u prostoru i to kako u Hrvatskoj tako i u nama susjednim tranzicijskim zemljama, Sloveniji i Srbiji. Iz Slovenije su sudjelovali i izlagali prof dr. Zdravko Mlinar i dr. sc. Marjan Hoćevar (obojica iz Ljubljane), a iz Srbije dr. sc. Ksenija Petovar, dr. sc. Sreten Vujović, dr. sc. Miodrag Vujošević (svi iz Beograda) i dr. sc. Ljubinko Pušić (iz Novog Sada). Iz Hrvatske su, uz sudionike iz Instituta za društvena istraživanja u Zagrebu, bili pozvani izlagači iz nekoliko institucija - Filozofskog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, Instituta društvenih znanosti "Ivo Pilar" iz Zagreba, Studijskog centra za socijalni rad Pravnoga fakulteta Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, Ministarstva zaštite okoliša, graditeljstva i prostornog uređenja, te nekih drugih institucija. U spomenutom tematskom broju Sociologije sela objavljena su dva podskupa radova koji se odnose na fenomen umreženoga društva (networked society) i mrežu naselja (settlements network). Prvi podskup čine radovi proizišli iz znanstvenoistraživačkog projekta Sociološki aspekti mreže naselja u kontekstu tranzicije u kojem je objavljeno pet izvornih znanstvenih radova troje istraživača - Alije Hodžića, Dušice Seferagić i Milana Župančića. Drugi podskup sadrži pet predmetno srodnih tekstova šestoro inozemnih autora - Marjana Hočevara i Zdravka Mlinara iz Slovenije, Ksenije Petovar i Ljubinka Pušića iz Srbije, te Zorana Roce i Marije de Nazare Oliveira Roca iz Portugala. Skup je otvorila dr. sc. Dušica Seferagić i njime koordinirala u suradnji s mr. sc. Alijom Hodžicern. U uvodnim izlaganjima sudjelovali su i mr. sc. Alija Hodžić i Antun Petak (obojica iz Zagreba - IDIZ), koji su iznijeli iscrpna izvješća o rezultatima projekta. Zatim je slijedilo izlaganje dr. sc. Ljubinka Pušića (Novi Sad) o teorijskom diskursu i o stanju u Srbiji i Vojvodini u vrijeme tranzicije te promjenama u urbanim i ruralnim prostorima u njima. Milan Župančić (Zagreb - IDIZ) iznio je stanje u ruralnim sredinama Hrvatske u proteklom vremenu. Na temu umreženosti prostora govorili su i mr. sc. Anđelina Svirčić Gotovac (Zagreb - lDIZ) (ukratko je izložila problematiku svoga magistarskog rada o kvaliteti života u zagrebačkoj mreži naselja), te dr. sc. Marjan Hoćevar (Ljubljana) (o globalizacijskim uvjetima unutar postojećih mreža naselja u Sloveniji). Nakon izlaganja u prvom tematskom dijelu nastavljena je plodna diskusija u kojoj su sudjelovali brojni sudionici - Ivan Cifrić, Sreten Vujović, Zdravko Mlinar, Jasenka Kodrnja, Dušica Seferagić, Miodrag Vujošević, Ksenija Petovar, Ljubinko Pušić, Alija Hodžić . Najzanimljivija su bila teoretska izlaganja i diskusije o prostorno-socijalnom diskursu (Pušić, Vujović, Vujošević, Cifrić, Hodžić .) u kojima se dovode u pitanje dosadašnji pristupi prostoru "zapadno-centričnog tipa" te zastarjelo poimanje podjele na ruralno i urbano, s obzirom da su stvarne promjene u prostoru pokazale prožimanje tih dvaju prostora, pa onda i kategorija kojima se više ne mogu objasniti nova zbivanja u prostoru. VI Drugi dio okruglog stola na temu Akteri društvenih promjena u prostoru potaknut je prijedlogom istraživačkog projekta što ga je grupa za prostor, selo i grad IDIZ-a podnijela Ministarstvu znanosti, obrazovanja i športa Republike Hrvatske, ali i prethodnim istraživanjima koja pokazuju da je društveni prostor poprište sučeljavanja i kompeticija različitih aktera za postizanjem određenih ciljeva. U novom kontekstu akteri su svi subjekti koji svojim djelovanjem i interaktivnošću utječu na društvene promjene i razvoj određenog prostora, od lokalne i regionalne sredine do nacionalne i globalne razine. Oni utječu na upotrebu prostora, društveno strukturiranje, prostornu i socijalnu pokretljivost, na naseljenost i naseljsku morfologiju. U svome djelovanju različiti akteri koriste i različite resurse, izvore moći i kompetencije. Hrvatska je (kao i ostale tranzicijske zemlje) nagl koji, pod utjecajem neoliberalizma podliježu deregulaciji, otvorenosti, te društvenoj i prosto moj fleksibilnosti. Na djelu je troces u kojemu raste utjecaj globalnih aktera, a smanjuje se utjecaj državnoga rguliranja na različitim razinama prostorne organizacije društva. To se na lokalnoj razini najviše manifestira kroz sučeljavanje tradicionalnoga i modernoga što je Jjedno izazov i za domaće aktere da se uključe u globalizacijske trendove. Pritom nužno dolazi i do novoga restrukturiranja u prostoru pri čemu će brže napredovatilgradovi i regije koje se svojim intelektualnim kapitalom i informatičkom osposobljenošću mogu efikasnije uključivati u globalno i hijerarhijski umreženo društvo (Castelis, Soja, Sassen), U prostoru postoji snažna koncentracija financijske moći, infprmacija i kulturnog kapitala, pogotovo u megagradovima i svjetskim metropolarna, što ne isključuje i djelovanje prodornijih lokalnih aktera u urbanoj i ruralnoj ~Iredini (Mendras), Stoga bi ciljevi budućih istraživanja trebali biti prepoznavanje r zličitih tipova aktera koji svojim djelovanjem i interaktivnošću formiraju nove obli e društvene strukture, te promjene u prostoru, funkcioniranju grada, sela i lokalne zajednice. Prvo izlaganje na ovu temu iznio je prof. dr. sc. IZdravko Mlinar o brojnim teoretskim pristupima koji se bave akterima i strukturama u fizičkom i virtualnom prostoru. Naveo je niz primjera, oslanjajući se najviše na slučaj Kopra. Zatim je slijedilo izlaganje dr. sc. Sretena Vujovića o podjeli i utjecaju različitih aktera u urbanim prostorima Srbije danas. Dr. sc. Ksenija Petovar govorila je o brojnim uzurpacijama i malverzacijama u prostoru te negativnostima što ih sa sobom donose, također na primjeru Srbije. Dr. sc. Anka Mišetić iznijela je specifičan primjer iz hrvatske ruralne mreže naselja, kroz istraživanje o stanju u selima Lonjskog polja kao dijela europske i svjetske mreže naselja. I drugi dio okruglog stola izazvao je burnu diskusiju brojnih sudionika - Miodrag Vujošević, Ljubinko Pušić, Sreten Vujović, Dušica Seferagič, Anđelina Svirčic Gotovac, Zdravko Mlinar, Alija Hodžić, Marjan Hočevar, Antun Petak . Referati i diskusije o analiziranim fenomenima pokazali su sličnosti i različitosti u trima zemljama - Sloveniji, Hrvatskoj i Srbiji, u europskom i u globalnom kontekstu. Slovenija je visokourbanizirana zemlja, s najvišim standardom života stanovništva. Teza M. Hočevara o sklonosti Slovenaca ruralnom načinu života može se propitati ali i objasniti urbaniziranošču cijelog njezina prostora, fizičkom dostupnošcu svih urbanih dobara te izvrsnim prometnim vezama među naseljima. Hrvatska ima piramidainu mrežu naselja, sa Zagrebom kao metropolom na vrhu, ima tri makroregionalna centra (Split, Rijeka i Osijek), s većim brojem srednjih gradova te mnogo manjih gradova i sela; potonji ne pokazuju razvojne potencijale, što zbog politike centralizacije što zbog inertnosti lokalnih aktera. Srbija je u cjelini oslonjena na glavni grad, Beograd, koji još uvijek privlači najviše stanovnika Srbije te Bosne i Hercegovine, dok provincija propada. Uz Beograd, ističe se još samo Novi Sad, kao glavni grad Vojvodine, premda je Vojvodina više urbanizirana od uže Srbije. Kvaliteta života, posebno u Beogradu, pokazuje velike nejednakosti potencirane neregularnim neoliberalnim ponašanjem aktera u prostoru. Slična, ali blaža konstatacija odnosi se i na Zagreb. Pitanje mreže naselja u trima navedenim tranzicijskim zemljama ovisi o stupnju njihove opće društvene razvijenosti ali i o različitim koncepcijama razvoja prostora: policentričnosti u Sloveniji, piramidalnosti u Hrvatskoj, te monocefalnosti u Srbiji. Cilj ovoga skupa bio je potaknuti daljnju suradnju medu istraživačima iz zemalja koje su, kako se ovdje i pokazalo, dijelile slične probleme i sličnu tranzicijsku sudbinu, a potom ušle u grube neoliberalne sustave. Svaka od prisutnih zemalja specifična je na svoj način, te je namjera sudionika okruglog stola bila osvijetliti postojeću situaciju u njima, aktualizirajuči pri tom problematiku umreženosti prostora odnosno društva u cjelini. --- IN ENGLISH: The round table Settlements network in a networked society: Social changes and changes in regional space in some transitional countries took place on the 2nd of June 2006 at the Institute for Social Research in Zagreb. The round table was organized by the Group for research of the regional space, village and town from the Institute that associated it with their own research project: Sociological aspects of the settlements network in the context of transition (2002 - 2005). The said project and the round table were subsidized by the Ministry of Science, Education and Sports. The round table was divided into two parts. The first part The Settlements Network in the Networked Society included the discussion on the speciai theme edition (169/2005) Sociology of Viliage Sociological Aspects of the Settlements Network resulting out of this project, while the second consisted of the discussion on Protagonists of Social Changes in Regional Space in Croatia and in our neighboring transitional countries such as Slovenia and Serbia, as well. The participants from Slovenia were professor Zdravko Mlinar (Ljubljana), Ph.D. and Marjan Hoćevar, Ph.D. (Ljubljana) and from Serbia Ksenija Petovar, Ph.D. (Belgrade), Sreten Vujović, Ph.D. (Belgrade), Miodrag Vujošević, Ph.D (Belgrade) and Ljubinko Pušić, Ph.D. (Novi Sad). Besides the participants from the Institute for Social Research in Zagreb, the participants from some other institutions were also invited - from the Faculty of Philosophy, Institute of Social Sciences "Ivo Pilar" from Zagreb, University Study Center for Social Work at the Law Faculry in Zagreb and Ministry of Environmental Protection, Physical Planning and Construction and also some individuals. OI Two groups of papers related to the phenomenon of networked society and the settlements network were published in the special theme edition Sociology of Village =Sociological Aspects of Village Network. The first group consists of the papers resulted from the said research project Sociological aspects of the settlements network in the context of transition where were published five original papers made by three authors - Alija Hodžić, Dušica Seferagić and Milan Župančić. Another group consists of five topically related papers by six foreign authors - Marjan Hočevar and Zdravko Mlinar from Slovenia, Ksenija Petovar and Ljubinko Pušić from Serbia and Zoran Roca and Maria de Nazare Oliveira Roca from Portugal. The conference was opened and coordinated by Dušica Sefaragič, Ph.D. and Alija Hodžić, MD. Alija Hodžić, MD (Zagreb, Institute for Social Research) and Antun Petak (Zagreb, Institute for Social Research) o also made the keynote speeches with detailed reports on the project and its results, After that followed the reports by Ljubinko Pušić, Ph.D. (Novi Sad) on the situation in Serbia and Voivodina in the period of transition and changes in urban and rural spaces there. Milan Župančić (Zagreb, Institute for Social Research) presented the situation in the past years in Croatia from the aspects of the rural milieu. After that Andelina Svirćić Gotovac, MD (Zagreb, Institute for Social Research) made ashort presentation of her MD thesis on the quality of life in the Zagreb settlements network and Marjan Hočevar, Ph.D. (Ljubljana) spoke about globalization conditions within the existing settlements network in Slovenia and in the world context. The first topically related part was followed by a creative discussion in which many speakers and participants took part (Cifrić, Vujović, Mlinar, Kodrnja, Seferagić, Vujošević, Petovar, Pušić, Hodžić and others), The most interesting presentations and discussions were those on the socio - regional space discourse (Pušić, Vujović, Vujošević, Cifrić, Hodžić and others) that question the past approach es to the regional space "of Western- centric type" and an obsolete concept of division between rural and urban, having in mind that the real changes in the regional space have shown the interpenetration of these spaces and of categories as well which can not explain the new occurrences in the regional space any more. The second part of the round table with the ma in topic Protagonists of Social Changes in the Regional Space was incited by a research proposal of the Group for the regional space, village and town of the Institute for Social Research in Zagreb to the Ministry of Science, Education and Sports, and it was also based on previous researches that have shown that social space is the arena of confrontations and competitions of various protagonists aiming at achieving certain goa ls. In the new context the protagonists are all those entities that by their acting and interacting affect social changes and development in a certain space, from the local and regional rnilieu to the national and global level. They influence using the space, social structuring, spatial and social mobility, population density and morpbology of the settlements. Different protagonists use different resources, sources of power and competences. Croatia has been (as well as other countries in transition) suddenly affected by globalization processes, which, under the influence of neoliberalism, set forth the requirements of deregulation, openness, and social and spatial flexibility. The presumption is that we are facing right now a process of an increasing influence of global protagonists and a diminishing impact of govemmental regulation at various levels of spatial organization of society. At the local level it is manifested the most through the confrontation of the traditional and modem and this is a challenge for different local protagonists to join the trends of globalization. This inevitably leads to the new restructuring in the regional space. The towns and regions that, with the ir intellectual capital and IT competence, can integrate into a global and hierarchically networked society (Castells, Soja, Sassen), will advance quicker. There is a strong concentration of financial power, information, culturai capital in the megapolises and world metropolises, but this does not necessary exclude the activities of some more penetrating 10- cal protagonists in the urban and rural area (Mendras). This is the reason why the objective of future researches should be the recognition of the different types of the protagonists that by their acting and interacting create new forms of social structure, changes in the space, functioning of town, village and local community. The subject matter of the first presentation by professor Zdravko Milinar, Ph.D. (Ljubljana) comprised the various theoretic approaches dealing with the protagonnists and structures in the physical and virtual space. He quoted many examples, with a stress on the city of Koper. After that Sreten Vujović, Ph.D. (Belgrade) spoke about a division and influence of different protagonists in urban areas today on the case of Serbia. Ksenija Petovar, Pb.D. spoke about many so-called usurpations and malversations in the space and the negativities that they bring, also on the case of Serbia. Anka Mišetić, Ph.D. (Zagreb, Ivo Pilar Institute) presented a specific exarnple from the Croatian rural settlements network on the research of the present situation in the villages of Lonjsko polje as a part of the European and world settlements network. The second part of the round table also set off an ardent discussion of many participants - Miodrag Vujoševič, Ljubinko Pušić, Sreten Vujović, Dušica Seferagić, Andelina Svirčić Gotovac, Zdravko Mlinar, Alija Hodžić, Marjan Hočevar, Antun Petak etc. The presentation and discussions showed the similarities and differences of the three countries: Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia (which have also existed before) in a European and global context. Slovenia is a highly urbanized country with the highest standard of living. The thesis of M. Hočevar of an inclination of the Slovenians to a rural way of life can be questioned but also explained by the urbanization of the whole territory, physical availability of all urban goods and excellent traffic connections. Croatia has a pyramidal settlements network with Zagreb as the metropolis on top, three macro-regional centers, a number of medium-size towns and many small towns and numerous smail villages. The latter don't show the developmental potentials due to the centralization policy and the inertness of local protagonists as well. Serbia is by and large leaned on its capital Belgrade that stiil attracts the most of the inhabitants from Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the provinces are decaying. Besides Belgrade, only Novi Sad stands out as the capital of Voivodina, although Voivodina is more urbanized than Serbia proper ("narrower" Serbia). The quality of life, especiaily in Belgrade, shows huge disparities intensified by irregular and neoliberal doings of the protagonists in the regional space. The similar but less emphasized statement can be applied to Zagreb as well. The question of the settlements network in the three above mentioned transitional countries depends on the degree of the ir general social development but also on various concepts of development of the regional space: policentricity in Slovenia, pyramidality in Croatia and monocephality in Serbia. We hope that this conferenee will help the future cooperation of the scholars from the countries that, as it was seen here, shared the similar problems and similar transitional destiny and after that entered the rough neoliberal systems. Each of the present countries is specific in its own way, so the intention is to explain the present situation in them and make the problems of the networked space, respectively, current society as a whole, actual.

En Colombia, el feminicidio es un tipo penal cerrado, en cuya estructura de delito autónomo, el legislador determinó, según el artículo 2° de la Ley Rosa Elvira Cely LREC, que el sujeto pasivo es la mujer cis, considerada así desde lo biológico, en razón de su sexo de nacimiento. En la jurisprudencia colombiana, cometer feminicidio es causar la muerte a una mujer, necesariamente motivada "por su condición de ser mujer o por motivos de su identidad de género, móvil que hace parte del tipo dolo calificado" (Sentencia C-297 de 2016). Según Ramos de Mello (2015), en el feminicidio "el Estado es incapaz de garantizar la vida de las mujeres, de respetar sus derechos humanos, de actuar con legalidad y de hacerse respetar, de buscar y administrar la justicia, de prevenir y erradicar la violencia que ocasiona"; mientras que, las teorías sociológicas consideran al feminicidio como un crimen de Estado (Legarde, 2008) o como violencia sexual sistemática, propia de las relaciones de poder: social, cultural (machismo, patriarcado), política y económica, dominantes (Monárrez, 2009). En la LREC, el legislador no definió con precisión que el sujeto pasivo en el delito de feminicidio allí consagrado, podría extenderse a personas transgénero, concepto general que para la CIDH de la OEA constituye una denominación básica para designar a "aquellas personas cuya identidad de género u orientación sexual es diferente de las expectativas basadas en características físicas sexuales o en el sexo que les fue asignado al momento del nacimiento" (CIDH-OEA, 2015); los modelos o estereotipos sociales establecen disimilitudes en la sociedad, aunque la perspectiva antropológica del rol de mujer trans (travesti, transexual y transgénero), no necesariamente está vinculada a procedimientos médico-quirúrgicos para la reasignación de sexo, sino a la construcción de la identidad de género (Cano-Caballero, 2010). En la sociedad contemporánea, existen grupos de personas LGBTI, considerados vulnerables por su diversidad sexual, quienes no tienen regulados sus derechos de identidad jurídica en la legislación nacional, a pesar que la comunidad jurídica internacional se los haya reconocido en razón o por su condición de género (CIDH, 2015); situación que los expone al prejuicio que a su vez los hace objeto de violencia y estigmatización (Ramos-Salcedo & González-Mauricio, 2015). De otra arista, el orden social en los Estados no está organizado estructuralmente para dar prioridad y adaptar procesos pertinentes con identidad de género o sexual, por lo cual deberían ser considerados como "construcción del cuerpo social como eje de transversalidad para la culturización y la difusión de información, para que la sociedad contemporánea, respete y asimile un proceso más inclusivo, que genere mayor atención hacia el cuerpo distinto, presente en la persona" (Cedeño & Cedeño, 2018). En Colombia, los derechos de las personas LGBTI no solo son irrespetados, sino que además no le son garantizados a plenitud, dado que, las autoridades de tipo judicial y administrativa, "anteponen el estereotipo o prejuicio al momento de aplicar la legislación o por una actitud omisiva desconocen las precarias e infravaloradas condiciones y estigmatización social" (Colombia Diversa, 2020); debido quizá a que el sistema está cimentado sobre la base del binarismo de género, invisibilizando a las mujeres trans y desconociendo la realidad de personas con género no binario. Aunque la Corte Constitucional colombiana ha sentado jurisprudencia a través de múltiples sentencias en materia de derechos de parejas del mismo sexo, en el país persiste la discriminación homofóbica por razones de orientación sexual e identidad de género, registrándose en forma continua, la vulneración a los derechos humanos y fundamentales como la integridad personal, la libertad, la intimidad, la libertad de expresión, a pesar de las normas y las Organizaciones No Gubernamentales que trabajan por su garantía. Transcurridos dos decenios del siglo XXI, estos derechos de las personas transgénero siguen siendo ignorados y como personas humanas, "marginados y discriminados por una sociedad que le niega la existencia de una identidad de género propia de las personas trans, el derecho de igualdad sin distinción de sexo o género, sin exclusión" (Cardona-Cuervo, 2016; Godoy, 2019). El no reconocer de forma incluyente a la persona trans, mediante política pública o legislación más precisa, desatiende la valoración social, la identidad de género no normativa y la identidad jurídica, siendo un condicionamiento que conlleva a la incorrecta imputación como homicidio agravado, al tipo penal de feminicidio cuyo sujeto pasivo es la mujer-adolescente trans. En esta tesis se desarrolla una investigación sociojurídica tipo analítica y comparada, dado su método de análisis interseccional de contenido, basado en fuentes de doctrina, jurisprudencia y política criminal, así como del derecho comparado con países de Latinoamérica en cuya legislación se incluya el tipo penal de feminicidio delimitando su unidad de análisis a adolescente transgénero y el sintagma gnoseológico se desarrolla mediante tratamiento multidimensional e interdisciplinar, con tres categorías analíticas abordadas desde la antropología social, psicología, derecho y ciencia forense; para determinar la construcción social e identidad jurídica como mujer-adolescente transgénero, necesaria para proponer su inclusión taxativa como sujeto pasivo en la LREC. Desde lo procesal-penal, se propone el protocolo de actuación médico forense y se incorporan los elementos socio-jurídicos incidentes que, como mecanismo judicial se requieren direccionar para una efectiva imputación en el proceso de investigación criminal del feminicidio transgénero. Desde lo académico, el problema jurídico y su solución, se abordan desde el conocimiento interdisciplinario y transdisciplinario en las áreas de Antropología, Derechos Humanos, Ciencia Forense, Derecho Procesal-Penal y Criminología; con lo cual se logra un aporte transversal, contemporáneo y de impacto sociojurídico, que genera una prospectiva como nueva línea de investigación y futuras investigaciones de alto impacto a nivel teórico e institucional en la USTA. ; In Colombia, Femicide is a closed criminal type, in whose structure of autonomous crime, the legislator determined, according to article 2 of the Rosa Elvira Cely LREC Law, that the taxable person is the woman considered thus from the biological point of view, in reason for your birth sex In Colombian jurisprudence, committing Femicide is causing the death of a woman, necessarily motivated "by her condition of being a woman or by reasons of her gender identity, motive that is part of the type of qualified fraud" (Sentence C-297 of 2016). According to Ramos de Mello (2015), in Femicide "the State is incapable of guaranteeing the lives of women, of respecting their human rights, of acting legally and enforcing respect, of seeking and administering justice, of preventing and eradicating the violence it causes "; While, sociological theories consider Femicide as a crime of the State (Legarde, 2008) or as systematic sexual violence, typical of power relations: social, cultural (machismo, patriarchy), political and economic, dominant (Monárrez, 2009 ). In the Rosa Elvira Cely Law, the legislator did not precisely define that the taxpayer in the crime of Femicide enshrined therein, could be extended to transgender people, a general concept that for the IACHR of the OAS constitutes a basic denomination to designate "those persons whose identity of gender or sexual orientation is different from the expectations based on sexual physical characteristics or on the sex assigned to them at the time of birth "(IACHR-OEA, 2015); social models or stereotypes establish dissimilarities in society, although the anthropological perspective of the role of trans women (transvestites, transsexuals and transgender), is not necessarily linked to medical-surgical procedures for the reassignment of sex, but to the construction of identity gender (Cano-Caballero, 2010). In contemporary society, there are groups of LGBTI people, considered vulnerable due to their sexual diversity, who do not have their legal identity rights regulated in national legislation, despite the fact that the international legal community has recognized them by reason or by their status as gender (IACHR, 2015); a situation that exposes them to prejudice that in turn makes them the object of violence and stigmatization (Ramos-Salcedo & González-Mauricio, 2015). On the other hand, the social order in the States is not structurally organized to prioritize and adapt pertinent processes with gender or sexual identity, for which they should be considered as "construction of the social body as an axis of transversally for culturalization and dissemination of information, so that contemporary society respects and assimilates a more inclusive process that generates greater attention to the different body present in the person" (Cedeño & Cedeño, 2018). In Colombia, the rights of LGBTI people are not only disrespected, but they are also not fully guaranteed, given that judicial and administrative authorities "put the stereotype or prejudice before applying the legislation or by a omisive attitude ignore the precarious and undervalued conditions and social stigmatization "(Colombia Diversa, 2020); perhaps due to the fact that the system is founded on the basis of gender binaries, making trans women invisible and ignoring the reality of people with non-binary gender. Although the Colombian Constitutional Court has established jurisprudence through multiple judgments on the rights of same-sex couples, homophobic discrimination persists in the country for reasons of sexual orientation and gender identity, with the violation of rights being continuously recorded. human and fundamental such as personal integrity, freedom, privacy, freedom of expression, despite the rules and Non-Governmental Organizations that work for their guarantee. After two decades of the 21st century, these rights of transgender people continue to be ignored and as human persons, "marginalized and discriminated against by a society that denies the existence of a gender identity typical of trans people, the right to equality without distinction. of sex or gender, without exclusion" (Cardona-Cuervo, 2016; Godoy, 2019). Not recognizing the trans person in an inclusive way, through public policy or more precise legislation, neglects social valuation, non-normative gender identity and legal identity, being a condition that leads to the incorrect imputation as aggravated homicide, to a criminal type of Femicide whose taxpayer is the transgender woman-adolescent. In this thesis, an analytical and comparative socio-legal research is developed, given its method of intersectional content analysis, based on sources of doctrine, jurisprudence and criminal policy, as well as comparative law with Latin American countries in whose legislation the criminal type is included from feminicide, delimiting its unit of analysis to a transgender adolescent and the epistemological phrase is developed through multidimensional and interdisciplinary treatment, with three analytical categories approached from social anthropology, psychology, law and forensic science; to determine the social construction and legal identity as a transgender woman-adolescent, necessary to propose her exhaustive inclusion as a taxpayer in the LREC. From the procedural-criminal point of view, the forensic medical action protocol is proposed and the incident socio-legal elements are incorporated that, as a judicial mechanism, are required to address for an effective imputation in the criminal investigation process of transgender Femicide. From the academic point of view, the legal problem and its solution are approached from interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary knowledge in the areas of Anthropology, Human Rights, Forensic Science, Procedural-Criminal Law and Criminology; with which a transversal, contemporary contribution with a socio-legal impact is achieved, which generates a prospective as a new line of research and future research of high impact at the theoretical and institutional level in the USTA. ; Magister en Derecho Penal y Procesal Penal

El presente documento representa un esfuerzo por encontrar alternativas para mejorar la gestión de la diversidad biológica del Perú desde de una perspectiva global, procurando integrar conservación y desarrollo, bajo el enfoque del desarrollo sostenible. El trabajo consta de cuatro partes que se desarrollan en 14 capítulos. La Primera parte aborda aspectos relativos a los objetivos, la metodología de investigación y el marco teórico que sirven de base para la comprensión de la gestión de la biodiversidad y para el desarrollo de propuestas. Conocimientos básicos sobre la diversidad biológica Tomando en consideración que en el país el tema de diversidad biológica todavía es muy poco conocido, esta segunda parte tiene como propósito sintetizar los conocimientos básicos sobre la biodiversidad del Perú. Se abordan aspectos relevantes de los componentes básicos: diversidad de especies, diversidad de ecosistemas, diversidad genética, diversidad cultural, agrodiversidad y Áreas Naturales Protegidas. Destaca la condición privilegiada del país de ocupar el 4° lugar entre los 12 países de mayor megadiversidad en el mundo, que le confieren especial posición geopolítica internacional. Otro aspecto que se aborda es sobre la importancia de la biodiversidad del Perú en los aspectos económico, social y ambiental, destaca su importancia en la seguridad alimentaría y el gran peso en la economía del país, que representa más del 50% del PBI. Sin embargo, a pesar de su importancia la biodiversidad viene destruyéndose y deteriorando en forma acelerada, en el capítulo 6 se identifican los principales factores directos e indirectos que amenazan la conservación de la biodiversidad peruana, entre ellos: La contaminación, sobre extracción de recursos, pérdida de habitat, celeridad del cambio climático, la pobreza, fallas de mercado, falta de conciencia ambiental y la deficiente gestión pública; siendo esta última el tema central del presente trabajo, por ser uno de los factores de mayor influencia. Situación general de la gestión En esta tercera parte se busca responder a la pregunta ¿Cómo se está gestionado la biodiversidad del Perú?. Al respecto a fin de tener una visión general de la situación de la gestión, se realizó el análisis seleccionando los siguientes factores operacionales de gestión: Marco legal, planeación, organización, tecnología, infraestructura, cultura y relación con el ambiente externo. Entre los hallazgos más relevantes destacan: el grave atraso tecnológico, escasa comprensión de la importancia de la biodiversidad en el desarrollo del país, falta de un órgano directriz de la gestión integral de la biodiversidad actualmente sectorizada, falta de una visión sistémica del proceso administrativo y planes de largo plazo, dificultad en la formulación e implementación de planes estratégicos, entre otros. El Convenio sobre Diversidad Biológica (CDB) suscrito por Perú el año 1992 en la reunión de Rió de Janeiro, conjuntamente con 156 naciones, constituye el principal instrumento jurídico para la conservación y uso sostenible de la biodiversidad; desde su puesta en vigor a fines de 1993, Perú ha desarrollado importantes esfuerzos para su implementación, sin embargo el avance todavía es lento, y está más focalizado en la conservación de la biodiversidad. La Comisión Nacional de Diversidad Biológica (CONADIB) es el órgano de coordinación intersectorial, pero su accionar sólo se limita al cumplimiento del CDB. Propuestas para una mejor Gestión de la Diversidad Biológica Sobre la base de los resultados obtenidos en los capítulos anteriores, en esta cuarta parte se presentan las propuestas para una mejor gestión de la biodiversidad, en dos categorías: a) Propuestas generales por factores operacionales, en concordancia con la estructura del análisis de la gestión y b) Propuestas específicas, que desarrolla algunos aspectos prioritarios de las propuestas generales, tales como: Necesidad de un enfoque global y sistémico del proceso administrativo de la biodiversidad, en el que se toma como base el Enfoque Operacional, la planeación estratégica como parte del sistema, integración entre conservación y desarrollo, necesidad de órgano que asuma la dirección integral de la biodiversidad del país, y otros. Frente a la dificultad en la formulación de los planes estratégicos para la gestión de la biodiversidad, en el capítulo 11 se hacen propuestas sobre los aspectos más críticos de la planeación estratégica: integración al proceso administrativo total, atención a las premisas de planeación, análisis FODA, y la identificación de frentes estratégicos básicos para la conservación y aprovechamiento sostenible de la biodiversidad: 1) Conservación, 2) Uso sostenible, 3) Aprovecha-miento sostenible y competitivo, 4) Posicionamiento cultural, 5) Desarrollo Humano, y 6) Excelencia administrativa. Considerando la prioridad del país de encontrar alternativas para el desarrollo económico y la lucha contra pobreza, se desarrolla con especial prioridad el frente estratégico: "Aprovechamiento sostenible y competitivo". A fin contribuir en la implementación de planes estratégicos, en el capitulo 12 se formulan algunas propuestas al respecto: criterios básicos para una administración de excelencia, instrumentos de gestión, prioridades de investigación, capacidades humanas requeridas, y alternativas para el financiamiento de la gestión. Otro aspecto que se aborda en este capítulo, es la propuesta de criterios y lineamientos de políticas para la conservación y aprovechamiento sostenible de la biodiversidad. En la certeza de que la conservación y aprovechamiento sostenible de la biodiversidad no solo compete a unas cuantas instituciones públicas, sino que es una tarea que atañe a todos los peruanos, en él capitulo 13 se hace una propuesta de roles para los principales actores sociales tanto del sector público y privado. Finalmente en el capítulo 14 se formulan las respectivas conclusiones y recomendaciones, entre los aspectos más relevantes se tiene: la prioridad de integrar conservación y desarrollo, reconocer el aprovechamiento sostenible de la biodiversidad como uno de los principales motores para el desarrollo del país, impulsar la educación, investigación y tecnología, priorizando la biotecnología, mayor participación del Estado en el desarrollo de factores clave para la competitividad de las empresas, fortalecer CONADIB como órgano directriz de la gestión integral de la biodiversidad nacional, trascendiendo la sola implementación del CDB. ; This document intends to represent an effort in order to find some alternativas for the improvement of the biologic diversity management in Perú according to a global point of view, but also with a sustamable development approach that looks for the integration of the conservaron and the development itself. This paper has 4 parts and 14 chapters. The first part is about topics related to the objectives, methodology and scientific framework, necessary for the understanding and comprehension of the biodiversity management and development of proposals. Basic knowledge for the biologic diversity Considering that the biologic diversity is a not very well known theme in our country, the second part summarizes the basic knowledge about the biodiversity in Perú. Pertinent aspects about the basic components: species diversity, ecosistems diversity, genetic diversity, cultural diversity, agrodiversity, and protected natural áreas. This part also highlights the features of Perú as the 4* country with the greatest megadiversity in the world, which gives us a very interesting geopolítica! situation in the world. Other aspects about this are related to the importance of the biodiveristy in Perú in terms of economic, social and environmental issues, highlighting the importance on food safety and the relationship with the economy of the country (more than 50% of the GDP). However, despite its great importance biodiversity is being destroyed and deteriorated progressively. In chapter 6, the main factors that threat the conservation of the Peruvian biodiversity, direct or indirect, are presented: pollution, resources overexploitation, loss of habitáis, weather changes, poomess, market failures, lack of environmental conscrousness, and deficient public administration. The last one is the central topic of the paper since it is the factor with the biggest influence. General situation of the management In the third part we intend to answer the question, How is the biodiversity being managed in Perú? In order to have a general overview, an analysis was made by selecting some operational factors: legal framework, planning, organization, technology, infrastructure, culture and relations with the extemal environment. The most important findings were: technological backwardness, poor comprehension of the biodiversity in the development of the country, lack of an institution in charge of the integral management of the biodiversity which at the time is dispersed in sectors, lack of a systemic visión of the administrative processes and long-term plans, difficulty on formulation and implementation of strategic plans, among others. The Biological Diversity Agreement (BDA), signed by Perú in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro along with other 156 nations, is the main legal instrument for the conservation and permanent use of the biodiversity. Since it was set into effect in 1993, Perú has developed important efforts for its implementation, however the results are scarce and the process especially focuses only on the conservation of biodiversity. The National Comité for Biologic Diversity (CONABID) is the coordinating institution but its actions are defined only by the BDA. Proposals for the best management of the Biologic Diversity According to the outcomes presented in the previous chapters, the fourth part presents the proposals in order to improve the management of the biodiversity into two categoríes: a) General proposals for operational factors (analysis of the management); and b) Specific proposals, which develop the most important ítems of the general proposals, such as: need of a global and systemic approach of the administrative process of biodiversity (operational approach), strategic planning as part of the system, conservation and development integration, need of a coordinating institution for the biodiversity in the country, etc. Because of the difficulty on the formulation of strategic plans for the management of the biodiversity, chapter 11 presents proposals about the most crítica! aspects on strategic planning: integration to the general administrative process, planning features, FODA analysis, identification of the strategic sides for the conservation and use of the biodiversity: 1) Conservation; 2) Sustainable use; 3) Competitive and sustainable exploitation; 4) Cultural positioning; 5) Human development; and 6) Excellence in management. According to the necessity of the country on finding altematives for the economic development and the fight against the poorness, the item 3 is developed in a detailed way. In order to make some contribution for the implementation of the strategic plans, chapter 12 presents some proposals: basic entena for a better management, management instruments, research príoríties, required human skills. and altematives for the management financing. Another aspect that is presented in this chapter is the proposal of entena and political guidelines for the conservation and permanent use of the biodiversity. Understanding that this idea is not only a task for some public institutions but for al) the Peruvian people, chapter 13 presents many proposals for the activities that should be made for the public and prívate sector. Finally, Chapter 14 presents the conclusions and recommendations: The importance of the integration of conservation and development, recognition of the sustainable use of biodiversity as one of the main engines for the development of the country, promoting the education, investigation and technology being biotechnology priorized, more participation of the government in the development of key factors for the competitiveness of enterprises, strenghtening of the CONABID as the ruling institution for the integral management of national biodiversity. ; Tesis

Issue 52.1 of the Review for Religious, January/February 1993. ; rel i gious Christian Heritages and C0mempora~ Living JANUARY-FEBRUARY1993 ,,VOLUME52 ¯ NUMBERi Review for Religious (ISSN 0034-639X) is published bi-monthly at Saint Louis University by the Jesuits of the Missouri Province. Editorial Office: 3601 Lindell Boulevard ¯ St. Louis, Missouri 63108-3393. Telephone: 314-535-3048 ¯ FAX: 314-535-0601 Manuscripts, books for review, and correspondence with the editor: Review for Religious ¯ 3601 Lindell Boulevard ¯ St. Louis, Missouri 63108-3393. Correspondence about the Canonical Counsel department: Elizabeth McDonough OP ¯ 5001 Eastern Avenue ° P.O. Box 29260 Washington, D.C. 20017. POSTMASTER Send address changes to Review for Religious ¯ P.O. Box 6070 ¯ Duluth, MN 55806. Second-class postage paid at St. Louis, Missouri, and additional mailing offices. SUBSCRIPTION RATES Single copy $5 includes surface mailing costs. One-year subscription $15 plus mailing costs. Two-year subscription $28 plus mailing costs. See inside back cover for more subscription information and mailing costs. ©1993 Review for Religious for religious Editor Associate Editors Canonical Counsel Editor Assistant Editors Advisory Board David L. Fleming sJ Philip C. Fischer SJ Michael G. Harter SJ Elizabeth McDonough OP Jean Read Mary Ann Foppe Joann Wolski Conn PhD Mary Margaret Johanning SSND Iris Anti Ledden SSND Edmundo Rodriguez SJ S~fin Sammon FMS Wendy Wright PhD Suzanne Zuercher OSB Christian Heritages and Contemporary Living JM',/UARY-FEBRUARY 1993 ¯ VOLUME 52 " NUMBER 1 contents 6 feature The Religious Life Futures Project: Executive Summary David J. Nygren CM and Miriam D. Ukeritis CSJ provide a summary of "The Future of Religious Orders in the United States" (FORUS), a comprehensive study of the opinions, beliefs, attitudes, and practices of men and women religious. 56 69 growing spiritually A Developmental View of Salesian Spirituality Joann Wolski Conn examines a process of self-knowledge through the lens of the lives of St. Francis de Sales and St. Jane de Chantal. The Cloistered Heart Nancy Shuman provides snapshots of her journey into a heart cloister for finding a union with God. discerning vocation 86 The Transfer and the RCIA: Process and Ritual 102 Kathleen Hughes RSCJ and Barbara Quinn RSCJ draw outlines of development from the RCIA process for the transfer of a religious from one community to another. Vocations among Teaching Brothers Eleace King IHM provides the encouraging results of the CARA study of vocations in teaching brothers communities. 2 Review for Religious 111 119 131 living religious life Internationality: Intentional or Accidental Catherine M. Harmer MMS focuses on the structural aspects necessary for a religious group to be intentionally international. Mission before Mission: God's Mission within Us A. Paul Dominic SJ develops the insight that the mission of individual Christians is one and the same as God's mission in themselves. Talents for Living in Community Melannie Svoboda SND proposes eight "lesser" gifts of personality and attitude which enable people to live more graciously with others. departments 4 Prisms 140 Canonical Counsel: New Communities 147 Book Reviews January-February 1993 3 prisms Anew year ushers in new life. Newspapers in every city vie for the picture of the first baby born in the early moments of a new year. Perhaps all of us need to image ourselves in that picture of a newborn and ask our-selves what kind of fresh life we seek in this year 1993. As we enter into this new gift of time, God's grace con-tinues to be a light to our mind and a strength to our will. In 1993, what light do we seek for our faith, and what strength do we need to live in closer union with our Lord? Review for Religious hopes to focus some light where it will be helpful by highlighting an article in each issue of this new volume. Our present issue is privileged to publish "The Religious Life Futures Project: Executive Summary." David J. Nygren CM and Miriam D. Ukeritis csJ have worked some three years on a major study of religious life and its future in the United States. By means of this arti-cle, they present in a concise and understandable form the conceptual background, methodological considera-tions, research findings, and major implications of their three-year study. Because this article attempts to provide easy entrance to the complete study shortly to be pub-lished in book form, it also gives our readers a ready ref-erence for use with future articles that will either critique assumptions and method or suggest further developments implied in this study. The importance of the study lies especially in the breadth and thoroughness of its col|ection of data, rep-resented in it~ six independent elements: a national survey, leadership studies, a study of caring people and one of visioning groups, individual interviews, and a final theo-logical/ historical monograph. There is no doubt about its timeliness gince the church is now looking forward to the Review for Religious ninth assembly (in 1994) of a worldwide synod of bishops. The theme of the synod is "The consecrated life and its role in the church and in the world." Since bishops, priests, lay people, and religious need to be involved in the preparation and the followup of this and every church synod, Review for Religious hopes to be a channel of grace by bringing to its readers clear informative articles as well as inspiring motivational ones for the ever richer living out of the spiritual heritages found in particular religious families such as the Benedictine or the Franciscan. It is especially crucial that members of the institutes of con-secrated life become active participants in the presynodal reflec-tion. As for the hierarchy, the apostolic pronuncio reminded the assembled bishops of the United States in November 1992 that every bishop has a special responsibility regarding consecrated religious life. Ultimately all active Catholics need to become involved because the church is as healthy as religious life is healthy. For if the Spirit's charismatic structuring of the church, represented in the ever fecund religious-life form, appears to be weakening or becoming attenuated, then the body of the church in all its members suffers. Such an interrelatedness is reflected in the Pauline principle about the Body of Christ, and church history provides the data of its reality. While special articles will highlight this synod preparation, Review for Religious through its usual wide variety of spiritual topics will continue to bring fresh understandings and applica-tions of spiritual legacies to our Christian life. We hope that our readers will find both light and strength for their spiritual growth in 1993 through the contributions of our many authors. I would like to draw your attention to a new name added to the listing of our Advisory Board members. Joann Wolski Conn, with her doctorate in theology, teaches in the Neumann College Graduate Program in Pastoral CounselinF and Spiritual Direction, a program which assists spiritual.directors to use four great tra-ditions (Franciscan, Ignatian, Carmelite, and Salesian) in their ministry. Her books, Women's Spirituality (1986) and Spirituality and Personal Maturity (1989), have been well received. In this very issue our readers will profit from her "Developmental View of Salesian Spirituality." We look forward t6 her contribution to our board discussions and decisions for the good health and progress of this journal. David LI Fleming SJ 37anuary-February 1993 5 DAVID J. NYGREN and MIRIAM D. UKERITIS The Religious Life Futures Project: Executive Summary feature In this Executive Summary we attempt to provide in as concise and understandable a form as possible the conceptual back-ground, methodological considerations, research findings, and major implications of the Religious Life Futures Project. VVe also recognize the range of interests and various needs of the many persons like yourself who bare expressed great interest in reading the results. With that in mind, the following description of the con-tents of the various sections may assist you in selecting the point at which you would prefer to begin your reading. Section I presents the purpose of this research project. Section H provides the theoretical perspective. This includes some background information on the concept of trans-formation as used in studying groups and organizations. It also David J. Nygren CM, an organizational psychologist, and Miriam D. Ukeritis csJ, a clinical psychologist, began work on this three-year study at Boston University in 1989 and completed it at De Paul University in Chicago in 1992. Nygren is now director of the Center for Applied Social Research and assistant professor of organizational psychology at De Paul University. Ukeritis is director of the Institute for Leadership of Religious Organizations at De Paul and a research associate in its Center for Applied Social Research. They may be addressed at De Paul University; Center for Applied Social Research; 2219 North Kenmore Avenue; Chicago, Illinois 60614. NOTE. This study in modified form was originally pub-lished in Origins 22, no. 15 (24 September 1992). 6 Review for Religious provides some information on the levels of change (social institution, congregational, and individual) considered in this project. Section III provides a description of each of the six research units and of the methodology for each of them and then offers summary find-ings. Results are presented in terms of the analysis described above. Section IV, "Conclusions: Shaping the Future, "presents the summary conclusions of the entire project. If you are interested in "bot-tom lines, "you may want to start your reading with this section. Some may wonder why we did not present this chapter first. When, in shar-ing our results with some groups, we began by presenting a summary of our findings, we were repeatedly asked, "Where/bow did you reach these conclusions?" Hence, in this executive summary, we begin at the begin-ning and work through to the conclusions. Subsequent publications of the results of this study will refer to these findings as The Future of Religious Orders in the United States (FO~U3). Table of Contents I. Introduction and Purpose .8. II. Theoretical Perspective . 9 A. The Concept of Transformation . 9 B. Levels of Change . 12 III. Research Units . 16 A. National Survey . 17 B. Leadership . 30 C. Visioning Groups . 35 D. Caring People . 38 E. Individual Interviews. . 40 E Theological/Historical Monograph .42 Conclusions: Shaping the Future .42 Acknowledgments . 51 References . 51 Bibliographical Notes . 52 January-February 1993 7 Nygren and Ukeritis ¯ Religious Life Futures Project I. Introduction and Purpose The 30 years since the Second Vatican Council have been turbu-lent ones for Roman Catholic religious orders in the United States. The average age of the members of many congregations has increased to 67 years, while the number of religious has decreased approximately 45% for brothers and sisters and 27% for religious priests. Sevei'al "traditional" works, have been called into question while other works and other definitions of mission have arisen. The understanding of ways of living the vows ha~ changed substantially within many congregations. The distinction between religious life and the "laity" has also decreased considerably, with many "lay people" now developing some type of formal associa-tion with religious congregations and many religious identifying more clearly with lay people. How can such phenomena, which apply in many congrega-tions and across the traditional distinctioris of religious life (con-templative, monastic, mendicant, and apostolic), be best understood? How do individual religious and congregations expe-rience and understand the changes that have taken place in reli-gious life? What do these changes portend for the future of religious life? And, most important, what changes must yet occur if religious life is to remain a vital gift to the church into the next millennium? These were the questions with which we began the Religious Life Futures Project in 1989. Our own congregations, the Vincentian Fathers and Brothers and the Sisters of St. Joseph of Carondelet, are but two of the hundreds of congregations that were seeking to transform their lives, ministries, and institutions. With the support of our respective congregations and with a gen-erous grant from Lilly Endowment, we designed a comprehensive study of religious orders in the United States. Basic Purpose of the Research Our purpose was to examine the changes that are occurring in the experience and the understanding of religious life. To accom-plish this end we embarked upon a project that would have as its outcomes: 1. identification of the norm~ative beliefs about religious life and how they will likely shape the future of religious life in this country. 2. building a national data base of all male and female religious 8 Review for Religious that includes current demographic data, membership informa-tion, existing and emerging structures, current member atti-tudes on multiple dimensions, and projections for the future. enabling the leadership of religious orders to identify the current paradigms of effective management of transformation, consol-idation, merging, or extinction. labeling the changes that must yet occur if religious life is to remain a vital social and theological gift to the church into the next millennium. In this summary we hope to indicate how the lives of 121,000 religious are reflected in the opinions of the more than 10,000 religious priests, sisters, and brothers who took time to share their ideas and beliefs with us through personal interviews, ques-tionnaires, workshops, and written communications. We worked from several assumptions: that only religious can describe their experience of faith as religious; that the sociological data we gath-ered would serve them in their own self-direction; that without significant change religious life in the United States will continue to decline an, d, more important, that those who most need the help of religious will not be cared for; and that the generosity and self-sacrifice still present in the lives of religious must be articulated for others if they are to consider following Jesus in this manner. The study sought the broadest possible input from leader-ship, membership, and those with unique perspectives to offer. These latter were persons identified by their peers as possessing vision about the future of religious life and/or possessing notable caring attributes. This summary combines all the results and shows what, after all these scientific undertakings, we believe will make a difference to individual religious, to the various congre-gations, and to their ministry. II. Theoretical Perspective A. Transformation "Transformation" is perhaps most familiar to Christians in Paul's call to "be transformed into Christ," but the dramatic change undergone by religious orders and organizations has expanded the meaning to include organizational considerations. In the organizational realm it refers to qualitative, discontinuous shifts in members' shared understandings of the organization, accompanied by changes in the organization's mission, strategy, January-February 1993 9 Nygren and Ukeritis ¯ Religious Life Futures Project and formal and informal structures. In contrast to simple and gradual changes, organizations undergoing tranoCormation come to understand themselves and their: .missioh very differently from their original understanding. Studies of transformation focus on one or another level at which .the change occurs: either the industry or the social insti-tution considered as a whole, or a particular organization, or a part of one (individual persons). In contrast, we investigated issues related to change in religious life on all three levels: Religious life as a whole (the social institution). This inves-tigation revealed that, while congregations may differ in their expression of religious life by virtue of gender or tradition (apostolic, monastic, mendicant, or contem-plative), all groups share broad-based beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors. ¯ The particular congregation (organization), namely, the 816 groups that participated in the survey. This survey investigated the shifting ways in which the groups expe-riencing transformation interpret a shared past, select value priorities, allocate resources, and assess mission opportunities. It also investigated the shifting metaphors and rituals which members use to express their beliefs and which draw them together with a shared sense of belonging. ¯ The individual (126,000 sisters, brothers, and priests). The study investigated the implications of transforma-tion for the individual members of religious congrega-tions. These three approaches enable a more complete understand-ing of how intercongregational, congregational, and individual experiences can affect each other and of how the various types of change can occur. A Model for the Process of Transformational Change Transformation usually begins with a crisis, an awareness that the understandings currently shared by the organization's mem-bers are no longer adequate. Several types of crisis may occur: performance may be poor, leadership transitions occur, some pow-erful subgroups' interests may no longer be served, management practices may no longer be successful, or, most typically, a major environmental shift may.confront the already existing interpretive schemes. The easiest response for the organization to take is to defend itself against the challenge and perhaps not to respond at 10 Review for Religious all. For transformation to begin, the experience of crisis must "unfreeze" the members' present understandings of the organi-zation by presenting a strong enough challenge to their validity. After unfreezing takes place or in conjunction with it, various individuals and groups begin developing alternative understand-ings. These lead to new types of action and most likely to changes in the structures of the organization. Moreover, the new types of actions that take place are likely to occur out-side the organization's traditional boundaries (for example, AT&T's work moved beyond telephones to include computers and other forms of communication as well); bound-aries are likely to break down. There is likely to be considerable conflict among the original and the developing interpretive schemes and the. subgroups espousing them. Groups that hold one particular new perspective, for example, are likely to find themselves in conflict with indi-viduals or groups that espouse the original perspective or a different new one. The conflict may take various forms: one perspective may clearly dominate various other perspectives and may stand aloof from them, or leaders may acknowledge the potential value of, and .thus encourage, interac-tion between several different perspectives. Leaders can have a strong impact on the outcome of the con-flict between perspectives. If they support only one perspective, they are likely to decrease the creativity of the transformational process and the active involvement of members whose perspectives are not taken into account. If they "separate out" the different perspectives, they are likely to perpetuate splits between the groups. If they enable conflicting perspectives to interact with each other, they will increase the chances of paradoxical trans-formations, of new and creative shared understandings that emerge from the interaction of the competing perspectives. The process of transformation is not affect-free. Rather, it is often paralyzing and disorienting and is experienced as a sequence In contrast to simple and gradual changes, organizations undergoing transformation come to understand themselves and their mission very differently from their original understanding. ~anuary-February 1993 11 Nygren and Ukeritis ¯ Religious Life Futures Project of deaths and rebirths. Initially, various members' primary feelings are likely to include shock, defensiveness, loss, and anger. Throughout the development of new interpretive schemes, mem-bers will experience both ambiguity and confusion, not only when it is unclear that any satisfactory new understanding is develop-ing, but also when there are multiple potential perspectives. The conflict among subgroups will create additional tension. If and when a new synthesis is reached that people experience as acceptable, there is likely to be a sense of rightness and satisfac-tion, at least among members whose perspectives have been incor-porated. Summary Application of the Conceptual Model In this study we assume that religious life, congregations, and religious priests, brothers, and sisters are in the midst of a trans-formational process and that the new understandings of religious life held by significant numbers of members have not yet been fully developed. We also assume that the environmental change that most stimulated the transformation process was the new understandings of the church proclaimed during Vatican II and incorporated shortly afterward in documents directing religious congregations to begin the analysis and revision of their basic principles and practices. Presently, diverse, sometimes contradictory understandings of religious life have been developed among groups of religious. In addition, environmental forces that strongly support the devel-opment of particular understandings are present (for example, among the hierarchy and in various segments of the laity). How can the process to this point be best understood? What will hap-pen next in the transformational process? To what extent can leaders influence the transformation process? B. Levels of Change Change at the Level of the Social Institution The changes that have taken place generally in religious life have, of course, occurred in many different congregations. Schneiders's (1986) work describes a shared shift across many congregations--in the understanding of many of the components of religious life such as the vows and community. In addition, books suggesting that religious are meant to be "prophetic" or 12 Review for Religious "countercultural:' (for example, Woodward, 1987; Foley, 1988) are written to religi6us as a group, not to particular congrega-tions. Thus, the first level this study will consider is religious life as a shared entity across congregations. Shifts in understanding are frequently intertwined with shifts in structures, both formal and informal, and these structural shifts include not only new types of relationships and divisions among subgroups, but also the breakdown of formerly established orga-nizational boundaries. At the level of the universal church, Molinari and Gumpel (1987, p. 19) ask, "Is the consecrated way of life a structure in the church or a structure of the church?" The latter phrase implies only one structure of divine origin, namely the hierarchical one, while the former implies multiple divinely willed structures in the church. At the core of the dis-tinction is the degree to which the hierarchic structure governs the pneumatic components, the charismatic dimensions, of the church. Depending on the response to the question of one structure ¯ or many, structural diversity and change will occur in very dif-ferent ways. Many religious believe that their traditions repre-sent the pneumatic or charismatic dimension of the church that was evident in their founders and foundresses, and that these tra-ditions are better structured and controlled without the influence of the hierarchic structure. Areas for Investigation. In addition to the changes occurring within religious life in relation to the church, intercongregational structures have also been developing. We examined in a limited way intercongregatiofial changes such as mergers that are associ-ated with shifts in understanding or direction. What in particu-lar has happened to the boundaries separating religious from the diocesan clergy and from the laity? Change at the Level of lndividual Congregations Mthough some changes in understanding have been occur-ring across congregations in religious life as a "social institution," others have been occurring differently within different congre-gations. Moreover, many of the changes that have occurred across the board have been experienced by members of individual con-gregations as occurring within their own congregation more than in religious life as a whole. Thus, this study was concerned not only with changes in religious life generally, but also with changes occurring within specific congregations. .~anuary-Febrtmry 1993 13 Nygren and Ukeritis ¯ Religious Life Futures Project For example, Bartunek (1984) described how the under-standing of the educational mission in one women's congregation shifted from the mid 1960s to the late 1970s. At the beginning of the change process, education was viewed as synonymous with activities that took place in schools the congregation adminis-tered. By the late 1970s, however, the educational mission was seen primarily as "seeking justice with the heart of an educator," which might or might not take place in formal educational set-tings, let alone schools the congregation administered. Beres and Musser (1987) have described how during that same period another congregation broadened its mission from particular areas of service to a general philosophy of service, with priorities shift-ing from the works of the congregation to the works of the con-gregation's individual members. Within religious congregations Nygren (1988) found that both male and female religious are adapting their structures and categories of membership to their emerging self-understanding. In a survey of 740 leaders of religious congregations, he found that 70% of the female leaders indicate that they are adapting their membership to include the full or partial membership of lay people. Among female congregations 18% of the total sur-veyed expect to amalgamate with another congregation, province, or monastery to adapt to internal changes. Correspondingly, 25 % of the male leaders anticipate altering membership categories, and 12% of them expect to amalgamate with another entity to adapt to change. These anticipated or accomplished changes affect both the existing members and the organization's self-definition. In one congregation studied by Bartunek (1984), members' shifts in understanding were intertwined with the development of several cross-province groups and commissions. They were also intertwined with the breakdown of formerly established exter-nal boundaries. Many congregational members started working with groups that had been clearly outside the original boundaries of the congregation. These structural changes eventually resulted in a merger of the U.S. provinces of the congregation. Areas for Investigation. How broadly applicable are the types of changes described above? What types of structural changes are occurring? What effects.do these changes have on the develop-ment of new understandings? Next, what are the processes through which new under-standings have be~n occurring? The model articulated above sug- 14 Review for Religious gests that change typically includes an initial experience of crisis, accompanied by strong feelings such as sadness, anger, and defen-siveness and followed by the development of differing under-standings on the part of various organizational subgroups. Feeli.ngs and reactions also accompany this stage: ambiguity and confu-sion about the possible understandings as well as conflict between groups. The introduction of the new Council of Major Superiors of Women Religious, for instance, introduces legitimacy to a divergent opinion among religious leadership. When a new syn-thesis is reached, a sense of rightness occurs. If it fails to occur, more destructive dynamics may characterize the group's func-tioning. In addition, from which elements of the environment do members of a particular congregation receive messages or con-straints regarding appropriate (or publicly appropriate) self-under-standing? In particular, how do the hierarchical church and the laity have an impact? How do intercongregational groups and networks affect the development of understandings within the congregations that belong to these groups? Next, how has leadership been affecting the experienced changes in religious life? The role of leadership has been ana-lyzed !n detail for an understanding of how leaders contribute to the development or decline of organizations. Change at the Level of Individual Members of Congregations It is clear ~hat changes have not left individual members untouched. For example, Ebaugh (1977) showed that the changes had strong effects on why members of women's religious con-gregations left the congregation. Others have indicated that one of the typical effects of a transformational process is an increase in the stress level of individual members. This is due to the ambi-guity that accompanies the change and to conflict between sub-groups. There should be more to the experience of individual reli-gious, however, than difficult feelings. Bartunek and Ringuest (1987) found that members of a particular congregation whose work took them across the congregation's original boundaries during the early 1970s, and who remained in their congregation, eventually came to perceive themselves as more influential in the congregation than did members who continued to carry out tra-ditional works. January-February 1993 15 Nygren and Ukeritis ¯ Religious Life Futures Project Thus, we are concerned not only with the change taking place on the congregational and intercongregational level, but also with the way various members of religious orders and particular sub-groups are experiencing the change. In addition, the differences between the experience of men and women religious may be rel-evant. We address two questions regarding this experience. Areas for Investigation. What has the experience of change been like for individual members of congregations? The model we have presented proposes that individual members of congrega-tions should experience a wide range of feelings during the change process. The departure of such a large percentage of religious has also had an impact on those who remain. Those who con-tinue to live the vocation to religious life surely have a unique perspective on their role and are rooted in a spirituality that sus-tains them. With this frame of transformation, then, we designed a .comprehensive assessment that could give us some measure of how change is occurring and affecting religious life at the level of the social institution, congregations, and individuals. III. Research Units The design of the Religious Life Futures Project contained six independent studies. They are described below. Figure 1 depicts the six research units, and a brief description of each unit follows. Figure 1 Religious Life Futures Project Research Units Hist/Theol Monograph Leadership S~udies Interview Survey Caring People Study Visioning Groups 16 Review for Religious The National Survey was a comprehensive questionnaire asking 9,999 religious sisters, brothers, and priests to express their beliefs and opinions about spirituality, motivation, services they provide, issues they consider to be negative or positive influences on the future of religious life, and various other matters of religious life in general and their orders in particular. The Leadership Studies were based on the recognition that leadership is a key factor in sustaining the life of any group. Investigations of leaders' views, of members' perceptions of their leaders, and of the competencies required ~or"~utstanding leadership were pursued in this research unit. The Caring People and Visioning Groups units of our project were constructed on the reason-able assumption that these subgroups could offer distinct perspectives. The caring people were identified by virtue of their exemplary car-ing for others, and participants, in the visioning-groups unit con-sisted of people nominated in virtue of their hopeful, positive, and compelling vision concerning the future of religious life. Individual Interviews, using a standard protocol, were pursued with persons identified as particularly knowledgeable about reli-gious life. These interviews probed for the interviewees' under-standings of the nature and purpose of religious life, of the challenges facing women and men religious at this time, and of the qualities required for leadership in the future. The Theological/Historical Monograph was commissioned to be written by Elizabeth Johnson CSJ, PhD, with a historical postscript by John W. Padberg SJ, PhD. Their material wi!l add perspective to the wealth of information collected, analyzed, and evaluated. The Religious Life Futures Project contained six independent studies. A. The National Survey Purpose and Method The purpose of the National Survey was to obtain informa-tion about members' attitudes and practices regarding religious life. Questions ranged from general demographics to patterns and attitudes about living arrangements and job satisfaction. The sur-vey also sought information regarding attitudes toward vows, var-ious aspects of religious life, spiritual growth, and future plans. .~anuary-Felrruary 1993 17 Nyffren and Ukeritis ¯ Religious Life Futures Project Early in 1990 each major superior in the United States was contacted by letter with a request for a list of the names and addresses of their members. From the more than 121,000 names received, a stratified random-sample design selected the partici-pants for the survey. This random sample was stratified to ensure statistically valid comparisons according to tradition (apostolic, contemplative, mendicant, monastic) and vocation (sisters, broth-ers, religious priests). The 335-item questionnaire was mailed in October 1990 to the 9,999 religious priests, brothers, and sisters selected in this manner. With postcard and phone follow-ups, an overall response of 77.4% (7,736 responses) was obtained. The data base used for reporting results consists of 6,359 usable surveys. In the data anal-ysis, the responses were weighted to reflect population proportions of sisters, brothers, and religious priests and of apostolic, mendi-cant, monastic, and contemplative groups. All data were analyzed according to age groups that would reflect developmental stages (ages 19-45, 46-60, 61-73, 74-96). Data Analysis and Results The questions throughout the survey represented a broad range of topic categories. Initial principal-components factor anal-yses were conducted on a select number of the items in the sur-vey. Separate factor analyses were conducted for vocation (sister, brother, priest), tradition (apostolic, mendicant, contemplative, and monastic), and age group (19-45, 46-60, 61-73, and 74-96). The results of these analyses, presented in terms of level of analysis and grouped in meaningful clusters, appear in Table 1. As indicated, four major clusters of factors emerged on the level of the Social Institution: structures, innovations, restraints, and cred-ibility. The clusters of factors are listed on the chart and will be defined and discussed below; summary findings, too, will be pre-sented on the following pages. Social Institution: Structures The National Survey factors related to Structures include role clarity, permanent commitment, external authority, systemic change, and hierarchical alliance. Because of the significance of role-clarity findings in this study, we present an extended discus-sion of this issue and then a summary of the other factors. 18 Review for Religious Categorization of Factors Derived from the Religious Life Futures Project Table 1 Social Institution Congregation Individual STRUCTURES Role Clarity Permanent Commitment External Authority Systemic Change Hierarchical Alliance INNOVATIONS Diversity Expanding Lay Roles Greater Inclusion RESTRAINTS Cultural Threats CREDIBILITY Commitment to the Poor Anomie LEADERSHIP ' Spiritual Intensity Charisma/Individual Consideration Intellectual Stimulation/ Inspirational Laissez-Faire Active Management by Exception Contingent Reward DYNAMICS Community Living Involvement Influence Ongoing Development GUIDANCE Procedural Clarity Effects of Renewal Support of Sponsored Institutions SPIRITUALITY Oneness with God Intensified Spirituality Structured Prayer BELONGING Congregational Commitment Affiliation Intention to Remain ACTION Faithfulness to Vows Works of Mercy Role Clarity. Role clarity for religious is defined as "the indi-vidual's perceived level of understanding regarding his or her pur-pose and function within the current structure of the church." On this measure 55% of the sisters reported high role clarity, along with 65% of the brothers and 68% of the priests. More than 30% of the women reported low role clarity, indicating a lack of understanding or clarity regarding their role in the church today. The discussion of leadership issues related to the National Survey may be found in the section which fbcuses exclusively on this topic. ffanuary-Felr~utry 1993 19 Nygren and Ukeritis ¯ Religious Life Futures Projea Considering the data by tradition, we find 77% of the con-templatives and 64% of the monastics reporting high role clarity while only 59% of the apostolic and mendicant religious indi-cated they have a clear understanding of their role. Role clarity may be proportionately greater in the future, for, while only 52% of the youngest members reported high role clarity, 71% of the oldest did so. This finding parallels research that finds in many professions greater role clarity among those who have been in the profession for a longer time. Interestingly, the more highly educated members of religious congregations experience lower role clarity as religious. In terms of the fields of study, religious in the more applied disciplines such as business, education, and health care were less clear about their role as religious in the church than religious whose training is in the more theoretical disciplines such as theology, the human-ities, and the social sciences. The role demands of health-care providers or educators may present pressures that replace or com-pete with, rather than complement, the current role of religious in the church. Other research has demonstrated that ambiguity regarding role can, in general, lead to anxiety, reduced ability to meet role requirements, decreased ministerial satisfaction, lower trust and self-confidence, increased sense of futility, and greater propen-sity to leave a religious order. The lack of role clarity that a high percentage of religious experience may contribute to still more decline in the numbers of religious. There may also be some con-nection between the equal number of women and men entering religious life now (in contrast to women's former, three-times-greater number) and the greater number of women now experi-encing low role clarity. Taken together, this data signals the essential need for role clarity if religious orders in the United States are to be revitalized. Permanent Commitment. In responding to questions related to the normativeness of a lifelong commitment for religious life, all groups (considered by vocation, by tradition, and by age) reg-istered barely moderate agreement. On a scale wher~ 1 repre-sents "strongly disagree," 3 represents "neither agree nor disagree," and 5 represents "strongly agree," the group means ran between 3.1 and 3.5 on the matter of their agreeme.nt that permanent commitment is the norm. External Authority. All respondents tended to disagree that 20 Review for Religious reliance on external authority would influence the future of reli-gious life favorably. There was a general rejection of seeking input regarding thought, opinion, or behavior from outside sources such as church or group authority, indicated by the fact that, on the five-point scale described above, means for all groups were between 2.5 and 3.1. Systemic Change. Sisters, brothers, and religious priests experienced little connection between their work for sys-temic change (defined as "efforts to influence the social and political struc-tures which tend to discriminate against disadvantaged persons") and their per-sonal and spiritual fulfilhnent. All means were greater than 3.0 and less than 3.4. This did not change when considered by age groups or tradition. Hierarchical Alliance. The cluster of items that reflect a positive relationship between the hierarchy and religious or a positive attitude regarding the church's hierarchy and magiste-rial authority was not typically rated highly by religious. The more highly educated members of religious congregations experience lower role clarity as religious. Social Institution: Innovations The National Survey included items measuring participants' responses to trends in religious life that introduce greater diver-sity into community living. Items inquired about the conscious inclusion of persons who have declared their homosexual orien-tation, about the comfort level of minority-group members as perceived by members-at-large, and about the impact of includ-ing lay associate members. Admitting Homosexual Persons. Survey participants were asked to respond to this statement: "Declaring a homosexual orientation would not exclude an individual from being admitted to my con-gregation." Sixty-four percent (64%) of all respondents indicated either agreement with the statement or uncertainty. Thirty-six percent (36%) disagreed. Considering the data by vocation, only 16% of sisters agreed with the statement, and nearly 50% expressed uncertainty. This was significantly different from the responses of religious priests and brothers. Agreement of religious priests registered at 43 %, January-February 1993 21 Nygren and Ukeritis ¯ Religious Life Futures Project with 22% uncertain. Thirty-five percent (35%) of the brothers agreed, with 25% uncertain. Among the four traditions, 53% of contemplatives indicated disagreement, im:plying the least expectation that persons declar-ing a homosexual orientation would be admitted to their con-gregations. "Agree," "uncertain," and "disagree" percentages were rather evenly split among the other traditions. Among monastics the greatest percentage (39%) agreed. Thirty-eight percent (38%) of the members of apostolic groups (again the greatest percentage) indicated uncertainty regarding admission of candidates with a known homosexual orientation. Considering the data by age, 45% of the members under 45 expressed their belief that a person with a homosexual orientation would be admitted to their congregation. Forty-three percent (43 %) of the oldest age group felt that homosexual persons would not be admitted, and 46% of the same age group expressed their uncertainty. Members of Minority Groups. When asked to respond to this statement, "Members of minority groups may feel uneasy in my congregation," the sentiment among religious in general is fairly well split: 36% agree; 22% are uncertain, and 42% disagree. This response pattern reflected the response pattern of the sisters, the brothers, and the religious priests considered separately and also of the apostolic, the mendicant, and the monastic religious con-sidered separately. But 52 % of contemplatives disagreed with the statement, while 27% agreed. Analysis by age reveals the greatest differences. Fifty-two per-cent (52 %) of the youngest group and 44% of the next age group (46-60 years) indicated their belief that members of minority groups would feel uneasy. In contrast, half of the 61-to-73 age group and 53% of the oldest group did not believe minority-group members would feel uneasy in their orders. At present, less than 10% of the members of religious orders in the United States are members of minority groups even though, in the near future, 50% of the U.S. Catholic population will be Hispanic. The real-ity of multiculturalism must be addressed by religious orders. Lay Associates. In response to this statement, "Inclusion of lay associates as members of my congregation may undermine what it means to be a member of my congregation," only 16% of the respondents agreed; 65% clearly disagreed. Lay associates, includ-ing members of the opposite sex and married couples, appear to 22 Review for Religious have widespread acceptance among religious. In general, religious reported little concern about having lay associates as members of their congregation and about the effect their presence may have on the meaning of membership in it. Other Factors. When asked to rate the impact that expanded lay roles in church ministry, feminist thought, the ordination of women, and the inclusion of married persons would have on reli-gious communities, respondents of all groups consistently indi-cated their belief that these situations and possibilities would have little effect if any. Social Institution: Restraints Respondents were invited to rate (on a five-point Likert scale where 1 represents "not at all" and 5 represents "extremely") aspects of contemporary American culture such as capitalism, technology, and affluence in terms of their potential threat to the future of religious life. Data analysis by age and tradition shows that religious view them as minimal threats. Considering the data by vocation, sisters indicated a greater (but not high) concern regarding the impact of cultural realities than did brothers and religious priests. Social Institution: Credibility The "credibility" cluster consisted in working with the poor and anomie. Commitment to the Poor. To measure a member's stated com-mitment to work personally with the poor, survey participants were asked to respond to this statement: "Although there is in.creasing talk about working with the poor, I feel little commit-ment to that." Mean scores for all vocations, traditions, and age groups did not exceed 3.5. (Sisters, members of apostolic groups, and religious in the 19-45 age group yielded the highest means in their groupings.) Thus, members of congregations express little commitment to participate in an activity which has increasingly become a value espoused by many congregations and, quite explic-itly, by the church. These findings suggest that the greatest commitment to work with the poor would be found in a young sister in an apostolic congregation. This group currently shows the least tendency to increase in size. Anomie, defined as a state in which normative standards of January-Felrruary 1993 23 Nygren and Ukeritis ¯ Reli~ous Life Futures Project conduct and belief are weak or lacking, is characterized by dis-orientation, anxiety, and isolation. Loss of conviction about the vows, lack of clarity about the role of religious, reactance to authority, lack of a corporate mission and ministry, and disillu-sionment with leadership pose significant threats to the future of religious life. The mean scores for all groups were greater than 3.5. These concerns increased with age. Congregational Level." Leadership The National Survey used specifically designed items related to qualities of spiritual leadership along with Bass's leadership scale to assess members' perceptions of their leaders. So that all leadership studies may be reported together, these findings are incorporated into Section III B, Leadership. Congregational Level." Dynamics The National Survey .also measured several factors affecting community living, including involvement, influence, and satis-faction with opportunities for ongoing development. Involvement and Influence. Involvement is defined as "the expe-rience of having, and the desire to be engaged in, activities related to the life of one's congregation"; influence, as "the experience of having and the desire to have some impact regarding the deci-sions and future of one's congregation." On a scale where 1 rep-resents "strongly disagree" and 5 represents "strongly agree," agreement regarding involvement in congregational activities was high (ranging from 3.9 to 4.0.), with nearly the same means across the three vocations (sister, brother, religious priest). Levels of perceived influence wei-e significantly lower, with means ranging from 3.2 to 3.0. Vv-hen the factors of involvement and influence were considered by tradition, the range was the same. Considering the data by age, interesting patterns surfaced. The youngest group had the lowest mean for influence and the highest mean for involvement. The 74-96 age group, in contrast to the 19-45 group, had the highest mean for influence and the lowest for involvement. A consistent pattern did emerge: The members' perceived or desired level of influence in their congregation is consistently lower than their experience or desire of involvement in it. This raises serious questions that touch on group-commitment and ownership issues. 24 Review for Religious Ongoing Development. Respondents' satisfaction with oppor-tunities for ongoing development through education and forma-tion, rated on a scale of 1 ("very dissatisfied") to 5 ("very satisfied"), averaged about 4.0. In general, the high levels of sat-isfaction and the high expectations that possibly accompany that satisfaction may encounter significant frustrations or difficult choices when, as is likely in most congregations, they encounter decliriing revenue and personnel. Congregational Level: Guidance The National Survey also investigated the degree to which a congregation's policies and structures promote the effective func-tioning of the group. Procedural clarity, effects of the renewal process, and members' willingness to support sponsored institu-tions are the focal points for addressing this question. Procedural Clarity. Analyzed by vocation, tradition, and age, religious indicated a moderate level of satisfaction with the clar-ity of their congregation's policies, and procedures. The group means ranged from 3.5 to 3.9. With the scale ranging from 1 ("strongly disagree") to 5 ("strongly agree"), it is fair to say that members do not experience an.overwhelming sense of clarity con-cerning their congregation's policies and procedures. Effects of Renewal, Thirty years ago the Second Vatican Council directed religious orders to examine their structures and update themselves. A return to the spirit of the founder was identified as a critical part of this renewal process. Members' assessments of their congregation's efforts and success in remaining faithful to the founding charism or in maintaining the prophetic character of religious life reflect once again only a moderate level of agree-ment. Across age groups the highest rating (the mean was 3.8) reflected the assessment of the 61-to-73-year-olds. Significantly, this was the group that provided most of the leadership during the past 30 years. The youngest group expressed the lowest satisfac-tion. There were no differences between the various traditions in their ratings of the effectiveness of renewal efforts. Support of Sponsored Institutions. In an effort to assess the com-mitment of members to their congregation's institutional com-mitments, respondents were asked to indicate their willingness to work in an institution sponsored by their congregation and their willingness to live in such an institution. Overall, 93% of the religious responding to the survey January-February 1993 25 Nygren and Ukeritis ¯ Religious Life Futures Project answered yes regarding their willingness to work there. This rep-resents 94% of the religious priests and brothers and 92% of the sisters who responded. A smaller but still sizable percentage (88%) indicated their willingness to live at an institution sponsored by the congregation; this figure represents 84% of the sisters, 91% of the brothers, and 92% of the priests. ~'hese results present the opportunity to leaders, congrega-tional planners, and institutional decision makers to consider the availability and willingness of members of religious organizations and to direct their efforts toward a corporate mission. The empha-si~ on individual ministries that has evolved in recent years may now be shifting or open to reconsideration by members. Individual Level: Spirituality Spirituality was considered in terms of the experience of a sense of oneness or harmony with God, the degree of increased spiritual intensity, and the value of structured prayer to personal and spiritual fulfillment. Oneness with God. M1 religious report a moderately high level of agreement on a five-point Likert-type scale (1 represents "not at all" and 5 represents "frequently if not always") to questions assessing a sense of oneness with God. Sisters and contempla-tives score highest. Not surprisingly, this sense appears to deepen with age insofar as mean scores for age groups increased as age increased. Intensified Spirituality. The survey also measured changes in spirituality in terms of the degree to which respondents reported finding greater value in religious life and having deeper belief in Jesus Christ and deeper appreciation of the value of prayer since the time of their first profession of vows. While sisters, contemplatives, and members of the 74-96 age group reported the greatest levels of intensified spirituality, the other groups reflected high levels. StTv~ctnred Prayer. The degree to which structured prayer ex~)e-riences such as common prayer, an annual retreat, confession, and devotion to Mary were reported to be a source of spiritual and personal fulfillment was also measured on a five-point scale. Considered by vocation (si~ters, brothers, priests), all resporidents registered agreement beyond a level of 4. I. Consistent with their tradition, contemplatives had the highest mean of the tradition groupings in reporting structured prayer to be a very valuable 26 Review for Religious contributor. The experience of structured prayer as spiritually and personally fulfilling increased with age. Individual Level'. Belonging The National Survey measured individuals' commitment to their congregation as well as affiliation and the intention to remain. Commitment to Congregation. All traditions, vocations, and age groups reported moderately high to very high levels of congre-gational commitment. Not surpris-ingly, levels of agreement steadily increased with the respondents' ages. Affiliation. As was the case for commitment to the congregation, all groups (vocation, tradition, and age) were strong in their agreement with items indicative of high affiliation. Sisters, contemplatives, and members of the oldest age group had the high-est means in their respective cate-gories. Intention to Remain. Members of all groups (considered by age, voca-tion, and tradition) expressed--at or beyond the 4.2 level on the five-point "strongly disagree/strongly agree" scale--agreement with items related to their intention to remain in their congregation. This high degree of durability may be viewed both as cause for celebration and as cause for concern. Religious women report chastity as most meaningful and least difficult, while men report chastity as most difficult and least meaningful. Individual Levek Actions The National Survey also measured respondents' manifesta-tion of belief through their fidelity to vows and works of mercy. Faithfulness to Vows. Self-ratings regarding faithfulness to their vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, when analyzed by voca-tion, tradition, and age, ranged between 3.7 and 4.1. Because the purpose of this study was not to delve into the details of behav-iors of religious women and men as they relate to observance of their vows, the research asked only for individual self-reports of fidelity to each vow. Of greater concern in this investigation were those individual that were related to persons who do or do not perceive themselves as faithful. January-February 1993 27 Nyg~ren and Ukeritis ¯ Religious Life Futures Project Regarding practice of the vows, the researchers learned that religious women report chastity as most meaningful and least dif-ficult, while men report chastity as most difficult and least mean-ingful. In a ranking of difficulty, obedience emerges as more difficult for women than for men. Works of Mercy. The belief that direct action to help the sick or poor made a somewhat valuable contribution to their spiritual and personal fulfillment was registered most strongly by religious priests and sisters. Considering the data by tradition, members of the mendicant and apostolic groups reported that their practice of the works of mercy was somewhat valuable to their personal and spiritual fulfillment. Monastic religious experienced such works as less valuable, and contemplatives, perhaps as a function of their lifestyle, experienced them as least helpful. Factor Conclusions: Social Institution The social institution of religious life in the United States continues to reflect the dynamics of an organization in signifi-cant transition. The lack of role clarity for a large percentage of religious and the ambivalence regarding permanent commitment to the classic vows leave the social institution vulnerable to innu-merable other social and cultural forces. The results would indi-cate that the population of religious in general is moving toward a much more permeable system of membership, commitment, autonomy, and inclusion. While on the one hand this reinforces innovation that includes diversity and broadened assumptions about religious life, the research also indicates that religious do not see how clearly they are influenced by cultural assimilation. Likewise, the credibility of many religious may be lessened in the eyes of those they serve and in the society in which they func-tion because of the discrepancies between their espoused values and their practice. By their own admission, religious see indif-ference and a lack of passion to be a major threat to themselves as persons and to religious life overall in relation to other social sys-tems in society. Factor Conclusions: Congregation Leadership is a critical force for the clarification of the role identity of religious in the United States. Within congregations, 2 8 Review for Religious particularly among women, there exists a fair degree of satisfac-tion with leadership. The hidden side of the satisfaction is that it may signal complaisance among members who at the same time find it difficult to influence the direction of the congregation. For many, the congregation lacks a coherent approach to col-lective action, particularly regarding sponsored institu-tions. In addition, the efforts at renewal have not met indi-vidual hopes. Community life continues to engage mem-bers, and they feel deeply committed to congregational life, willing to be more involved than they currently are, but also feel less influen-tial with leadership in the matter of setting the direction of the congregation. The high need for affiliation noted in the survey results may, in fact, stifle the creativity necessary to move groups into the future. Leadership is a critical force for the clarification of the role identity of religious in the United States. Factor Conclusions: Individual A facet of the research that addresses optimistically the lack of role clarity for many religious is the data that suggests how important spirituality and a vital relationship with God really are for many of them. Structured prayer, however varied the forms, continues to be a value. Individuals feel genuinely called by God to religious life and see an intensified spirituality as desirable. They are personally committed strongly to the community, they derive satisfaction from belonging, and most intend to remain in religious life. It is fair to say that the data indicates a stronger ecclesiology than Christology. Individuals emphasize participation in the life of the church and community as foundational to their spirituality. Their relationship to the person of Christ is less clearly drawn, perhaps because of the design of the study itself or maybe because of shifting language schemes to describe one's spirituality. What is clear from the research is that their spirituality will define their uniqueness in the church and their belonging will satisfy their affiliative needs. January-February 1993 29 Nygren and Ukeritis ¯ Religious Life Futures Project The data suggests also that, if religious experience difficulty, it has to do with the impact of the vows on their life and with their fidelity to the vows. The personal sacrifice that has been the foundation of the vowed life has found support in the effect it has had on the mission of the congregation and the church. Profound shifts have occurred in the interpretation of the vows and the willingness to live them. More fluid interpretations of poverty, obedience, and chastity are widely observed. In addition, some religious describe new vows--of ecology, for instance--as descriptive of the future. Personal understandings of religious life and the commitment required to live the life are very broad. This results in part from lack of role clarity and from the vast cultural shifts in American society that have had a significant influence on religious life. Most religious would see some return to normative behavior as neces-sary, but they are reluctant to do so if that means returning to the sect-like distinction of religious life of the past. B. Leadership The recognition and identification of leadership as a critical factor in the transformation of religious orders prompted the investigation of leadership from many perspectives. These included: 1. a series of regional gatherings attended by 192 leaders of religious congregations; 2. members'oat-large perceptions of their leaders through the National Survey; 3. a separate "Leadership-Competency Assessment of Leaders of Religious Orders" with personality psycholo-gist David McClelland PhD. One of the first issues to surface during the course of the Religious Life Futures Project was the urgency of selecting and training leaders who not only can manage the complexity of reli-gious life that is predicted to intensify during the next 10 years, but also can focus the attention of their communities on a vision that will unite individual efforts inspired by the mission of their founder or foundress. The most striking weakness among cur-rent leaders is their inability to formulate a strategy to achieve a purpose or mission. Also of concern was the increasingly widespread use of con- 30 Review for Religious sensual processes and team leadership. The findings indicate that, while potentially effective, such approaches can often lead to mediocre management, representing the least common denomi-nator within an organization. Uninformed implementation of consensual methods often paralyzes the visionary leader. Leadership Workshops At the Leadership Workshops the participants were asked to write, in the form of a letter to their members, their vision for the future of their congregation, of the people whom their congre-gation serves, and of religious life in general. A content analysis of these "letters" yielded four categories of leadership: Value-based leaders expressed a sense of direction for their con-gregations or themselves in terms of the conceptual and cultural aspects of religious life. They were able to give expression to their values, but were unable to ide.ntify strategies to actualize them. For example, the author of one letter expressed concern about the environment, but only vaguely proposed that the congregation become involved in recycling. A letter simply urging the eradi-cation of "oppressive structures" without any suggested imple-mentation illustrates another value stated without a strategy. Visionary leaders, on the other hand, expressed a sense of direc-tion in terms of the structural and organizational aspects of reli-gious. life. The articulation of a strategy to accomplish their vision marks the difference between visionary and value-based leaders. One of the letters, besides proposing a new form of community in which nonvowed members would participate in governance, named specific guidelines and thus coupled a vision with a strat-egy. Conflicted leaders were unable to address change and often expressed frustration, anger, sadness, and even despair. These feelings were frequently directed toward members of the con-gregations. One such leader wrote, "It seems to me that some of our religious are unconcerned. They seem to have lost the orig-inal enthusiasm for their religious calling. Life has become drudgery for them, and membership in our congregation is a bur-den. Nothing we do or try to do seems to change this picture, and it is of great concern to me." Incognizant leaders, those who are unconscious or unaware of major issues facing their orders, failed to address any of the con- January-Felrruary 1993 31 Nygren and Ukeritis ¯ Religious Life Futures Project cerns facing their congregations or the church. For example, one leader wrote, "There is no secular history/profane history; there is only sacred history. God is present in everything and in all. God journeys with us, with all people. God is the force, the life, the purpose behind everything and everyone." The researchers note that, while God is ultimately the means and the end of reli-gious life and leadership itself, incognizant leaders do not realize their role in enabling the action of God. From these workshops, the researchers concluded that there is often a gulf between the responsibilities of the office and the abilities some leaders bring to it. In many cases, leaders lack the necessary competencies or training to function effectively. Members' Perceptions of Leadership from the National Survey The National Survey measured members' perceptions of their leaders, using a measure of leaders' spiritual intensity and Bass's transformational and transactional leadership scales. The spiri-tual intensity of their leaders is rated highly by both men and wbmen. Both female and male religious expressed a slighdy higher degree of satisfaction with individual leaders than with leader-ship teams. Women were generally more satisfied with their lead-ership than men were. The survey measured the degree to which members viewed their leaders as transformational and transactional. Transforma-tional leaders provide vision and a sense of mission while instill-ing pride and gaining respect and trust. Transactional leaders focus on administrative and operational details. Typically, trans-actional leaders orient subordinates toward achieving goals by monitoring their performance, rewarding their accomplishments, and taking corrective action when necessary. Sometimes they abdicate responsibilities and avoid decision making. Both women and men tend to consider their leaders to be transformational people who embody charisma and individual consideration as well as intellectual stimulation and inspiration. On a scale where 1 represents "almost never" and 5 represents "frequently if not always," sisters' mean ratings of their leaders on charisma and intellectual stimulation were 3.67 and 3.57, respec-tively. Conversely, male religious consistently rate their leaders higher on transactional qualities, contingent reward (brothers' mean was 1.78; priests' mean was 1.70) and active management by exception (brothers' mean was 2.38; priests' mean was.2.26), than 32 Review.for Religious do female religious (contingent-reward mean was 1.62; manage-ment- by-exception mean was 2.06). The findings showed that, while spiritual intensity was the most frequently observed behavior of all outstanding leaders, charisma or individual consideration of members was the most significant predictor of satisfaction with an individual leader or a leadership team. Leadership Competency Study This research unit assessed systematically the competencies required for outstanding leadership. The model of competency assessment developed by McClelland and associates at McBer & Co. was employed. It began with the convening of a panel of experts to assist in identifying a criterion group of 24 present or former leaders of religious congregations regarded by their peers as "outstanding." Using the "Behavioral Event Interview" (BEI) method also devel-oped by McClelland, the research team interviewed this group of 12 women and 12 men. Similar interviews were conducted with a control group of 15 "typical" leaders (11 women and 4 men) matched with the criterion group for age, gender, tradition, size of congregation, and length of tenure. These interviews were then transcribed and coded by two separate raters for leadership competencies. Analysis of the data revealed that outstanding and typical lead-ers share certain "threshold competencies," including an ability to articulate the mission of their congregations, an inclination to act efficiently, basic conceptual and analytical skills, self-confi-dence, and avoidance of impulsive or emotional expression. These can be regarded as foundational competencies for leaders of reli-gious orders. Outstanding leaders, however, were found to differ from typ-ical leaders in several significant ways. For instance, outstanding leaders expressed, nearly three times as often as did typical lead-ers, a desire to perform tasks well or better than they had been performed in the past. They stated more than twice as often as typical leaders that they wanted to find new ways to achieve goals and to make things better for the people their order serves. Approximately 65% of the outstanding leaders mentioned taking initiative to deal with anticipated problems at least five times. Only 22 % of typical leaders referred that often to taking such actions. January-February 1993 33 Nygren and Ukeritis ¯ Religious Life Futures Project Outstanding male leaders are more likely to start projects dealing with problems anticipated in the coming years than are typical male leaders and female leaders in general. The study also found that outstanding leaders were signifi-cantly more likely than typical leaders to mention using their power to influence group decisions or behavior; to build consen-sus and team spirit by soliciting the views of others; to attempt to see issues from different perspectives; and to draw on divine assis-tance in their leadership roles. Conversely, typical leaders were more inclined than outstand-ing leaders to mention that they had threatened sanctions to control the behavior of subordinates; had acted out of formal authority, not by building consensus; and had involved themselves with the per-sonal problems of individual mem-bers as opposed to the problems of the entire congregation. Typical leaders seldom refer to God in their leadership activity. The study' also found differ-ences between outstanding men and outstanding women leaders. Outstanding men appeared more likely than outstanding wo~nen to have begun new projects; to have acted assertively; to have offered more opinion, s, particularly negative ones, to subordi-nates; to have developed the leadership capacity of others; and to have experienced the benefit of God's support. The outstanding women, on the other hand, appeared more likely to have focused on consensus building; to have pointed to the spiritual significance of events; and to have positive expecta-tions of others and of religious life in general. The leadership-competency assessment revealed that out-standing male leaders are more likely to start projects dealing with problems anticipated in the coming years than are typical male leaders and female leaders in general. Neither ?utstanding nor typical female leaders appear to initiate such projects. While all male leaders report more behavior that threatens members with termination of an assignment or with dismissal from a con-gregation than do female leaders, this is strikingly true of typical male leaders. Outstanding female leaders behave in this manner more frequently than their typical counterparts. This suggests the desirability of a moderate use of sanctions. 34 Review for Religious C. Visioning Groups Recognizing that various groups of members could offer distinct perspectives, the study was to include the views of persons who could provide specifically clear opinions regarding the future of religious orders. Individuals identified as future oriented yet rooted in their order's charism were invited to participate in one of four Visioning Groups. This research unit was conducted through a series of weekend gatherings. The aim was to learn about the personality characteristics and beliefs of the individu-als and to develop strategies and agendas that could implement the visionaries' images of the future of religious life. Their prospec-tive views would also be compared with those of both leaders and members-at-large of religious orders. Selection of Participants Subjects for the Visioning Groups were recruited through a nomination process that began with a letter sent to the major superiors of 550 randomly selected congregations. The superi-ors were asked to consult with their councils, similar groups of advisors, or members-at-large to nominate one member of their order to participate in a group experience. Criteria for selection asked that the nominee be a person of vision who is recognized for his or her ability to live the charism of the congregation in today's society and that the nominee be able to articulate a sense of hope and a belief in the future of religious life. A total of 92 religious-- 48 women and 44 men (12 brothers and 32 priests)--participated in the Visioning Groups' gatherings. "The Dilemma": Affiliation vs. Transformation One of the most significant findings of the Visioning Group workshops emerged from an exercise conducted during the course of each gathering. Participants were organized randomly into groups of three or four people and given the task of identifying those elements critical to the future of religious life. After a period of private reflection, participants were asked to gather in their assigned groups and share the results of their reflections. Each of these groups then joined another, resulting in groups of 6 to 8. They continued the conversation and were then asked to con-struct an image or metaphor that captured visually and graphically the components they considered essential to a future vision of religious life. The results of their work included such images as a January-February 1993 35 Nygren and Ukeritis ¯ Religious Life Futures Project kaleidoscope, a prism, a jazz band, a symphony orchestra, and the spiral of unitive consciousness. After all groups in a session had ~'eported and presented their images of the future of religious life, each person was asked to consider all the models and to stand near the one he or she found most compelling in terms of a future vision. Participants were asked to base their choice on their willingness to make a personal commitment and to devote their energy to realizing that future vision. This request invariably created a dilemma for the partici-pants. Preferring a model designed by another group produced in most individuals a sense of guilt, of betrayal and abandonment of the group with which they had worked to produce an image. This process replicated the dilemma which many members of congregations experience in wanting to be involved in actualizing a compelling vision of the future, but desiring also to maintain existing relational bonds. While this sense of loyalty or affilia-tion that inhibits change is not unique to religious groups, it does represent a critical factor in groups moving toward changing the future. Affiliation is generally stronger than vision. This tension is particularly important to consider in light of the National Survey's finding that members of religious orders experience a particularly high need for affiliation. This dynamic is an important challenge for religious leaders. Visioning Groups Conclusions: Social Institution Revitalized religious life, rooted in Jesus Christ and the gospel's values, will manifest that spirit in the world by challeng-ing systems that oppress others, by living in visible simplicity, and by renewing congregations' fidelity to their founding pur-pose. The visioning groups view authority as power that is shared among communities of equals. This perception, however, may level the traditional notions of the vow of obedience and bring more democratic ideals into the classical traditions of religious life. Viewing the global community as the locus of redemption, sisters, brothers, and religious priests will face alterations in prayer, expanding their language for a greater inclusivity. They will choose to share in the world's suffering and will shift away from the rigidity of regional and juridical thinking. Members of reli- 36 Review for Religious gious orders will express their relationship with Jesus in the con-text of belonging, in shared symbolic life, and possibly in a shift in primary language. The dominant language of religious life has shifted from theological constructs to social and psychological paradigms. Many religious no longer use sacramental or tran-scendental frames of reference to describe their experience of God. Multiculturalism as normative is desirable, but confronting the personal and systemic racism that marks our society and reli-gious orders could be the single greatest challenge in the area of membership. Conclusions: Congregation Religious congregations ought to provide opportunities for structural expressions of emerging forms of religious life. To do so, they will have to discern the contemporary expression of their founder's charism, redefine or reestablish boundaries for mem-bership and behavior, and confront the discrepancies between espoused and lived values. The images (discussed above) of a future vision of religious life that were constructed by small teams were efforts to isolate and highlight a particular manifestation of a charism, not as an end in itself but to show a possible direction for the congregation to move in. At present, such efforts to regain the founding spirit are often viewed by the majority of members as marginal. When those who may have the vision are pressured to conform to the group, revitalization may be undermined. Conclusions: Individual Individuals within religious orders will shift from an internal to a global focus. They will need to acquire new interpersonal skills and an ability to cope with moving from stability and secu-rity to change and risk that lead to a more clearly focused mission. Challenging a culture that has supported privatism and indi-vidualism, members of religious congregations will need to reex-amine nonnegotiables. Relinquishing many previously held tenets, they will respond to the call of serving absolute human need in the spirit of their founder. New members must demonstrate the maturity to live a life of sacrifice, must possess or acquire the skills for leadership posi- .~anuary-Fetrruary 1993 37 Nygren and Ukeritis ¯ Reh~ious Life Futures Project tions in global and church communities, and must be able to sus-tain intimate relationships in the context of a celibate commit-ment. Current members, too, who continue to belong to religious congregations will need these skills and qualities and must prepare to live in communities that require them. D. Caring People The Caring People unit studied the characteristics of persons identified by members of their congregations as "uniquely car-ing" or "unusually helpful, thoughtful, understanding, or caring persons." All selected subjects received mailed packets that included a cover letter, a six-picture story exercise (projective technique), the National Survey questionnaire, and a variety of open-ended and short-answer measures. Because traditional question-and-answer research does not easily permit the study of unconscious motives, open-ended (projective) techniques were used to study the motive structures of these persons. This approach was espe-cially important because much research about traits and behavior typically depends on self-reports which introduce the possibility of bias in the direction of socially acceptable responses. In other words, what might have been measured in other studies was the need for consistency of self-image, not necessarily the subject's willingness to go to the assistance of a needy person. By coding responses to some open-ended questions, we were able to con-struct a profile of caring people. Findings The Caring People study found that, in contrast to typical religious, religious who are perceived as unusually helpful, under-standing, and caring feel closer to and more trusting of God, who is seen as the source of healing and care. On projective measures, caring religious score higher in trust and lower in mistrust than typical sisters, brothers, and priests and tend to portray authority as benevolent. Caring religious con-nect divine assistance, in contrast to individual effort, with heal-ing experiences. They are less self-controlling and more spontaneously inclined to generosity. Caring people state that they often find the experience of contemplative prayer very valuable. They also demonstrate a 3 8 Review for Religious greater interpersonal involvement in caring experiences. Caring religious describe these relationships as growing and mutual and as containing a wider meaning or significance beyond the imme-diate relationship. Finally, these religious experience more joy in caring and more zest for living. This contrasts with typical religious, who describe caring for others in tension-reduction terms. That is, typical religious report their caring as a response to a need in themselves such as caring out of duty or as a repayment, or car-ing in response to special needs such as the illness, rejection, or trauma of other people. Presence of God This research suggests that, for caring religious, helping is not simply a transaction between two people. There is a third force in the relationship that .might most generally be called a "benevolent authority" or, more simply, God. The caring reli-gious stays in close touch with God and wants to share this behev-olent authority with others. When encountering a person in need, the goal of the caring religious is not primarily to relieve his or her suffering, but to create a three-way relationship in which Jesus and the gospel's values are deeply involved. Helpers of this type do not see themselves as agents in the process; at most they are partners with or assistants to the real source of helping. They do not feel ultimately responsible. For this reason and also because the helping is in itself joyous, caring religious do not as readily "burn out." This description also explains why caring religious who are so motivated are perceived to be helpful rather than manipulative. Because they so obviously believe that of themselves they can do nothing and because they want to establish a mutually rewarding i'elationship, caring religious are not perceived as egoistically threatening the self-esteem, interpersonal power, or indepen-dence of others. To the extent that responding to absolute human need is embraced anew as the ultimate mission of religious congrega-tions, the formation and development of this motive for religious life is clearly essential. Caring People Conclusions: Social Institution This part of the research effort assumes that a fundamental ffanuary-Felrruary 1993 39 Nygren and Ukeritis ¯ Religious Life Futures Project component of the role identity of religious is their call to care for others. It also assumes the motive of desire for oneness with God. Perhaps the future of religious life will be defined increas-ingly by these attributes or actions on behalf of others that medi-ate the presence of God. Caring religious live an operative Christology that is simultaneously immanent and transcendent. Conclusions: Congregation The Caring People study suggests that the heart of congre-gational life is the life of Jesus Christ in the gospel. The imme-diacy of the presence of the caring person to another is possible because of this effort to mediate God, whom they see as a benev-olent authority and the source of their action. Conclusions: Individual The focus of individual formation must be increasingly spir-itual. This research would indicate that those who learn to be authentically caring are inclined spontaneously to generosity, are trusting, and are aware that God acts in and through them. This level of freedom requires viewing God as a benevolent authority in whose name one acts as mediator. E. Individual Interviews Using a standard protocol developed for use in the Individual Interviews phase of the study, the researchers 15robed persons identified as particularly cognizant and understanding of religious life's nature and purpose and of the challenges now facing women and men religious and identified, too, as having the qualities required for leadership in the future. The purpose of this por-tion of the study was to verify the beliefs of members-at-large about the nature and purpose of religious life and its mission, about emerging forms and structures, and about future directions and to compare these beliefs with those surfacing in other forums. Conclusions: Social Institution Interviewees noted that the mission of Jesus will be the cen-tral focus and that the spirituality of congregations will be rooted 40 Review for Religious in their charism. Driven by pressing social and ecclesial needs, charity and justice will be the focus of mission and ministry, and most apostolic community life will be in proximity to the poor. Although a clear church identity will be maintained, the struc-tures of religious life will be based on mission rather than canons, and the unique charism of religious life will remain largely distinct from hierarchical functions. An inclusive atmosphere will be marked by multiculturalism, a clear inclusion of women and the feminine, and a genuine respect for diversity. Perhaps the most striking discrepancy in the portrait of the future of the social institution of religious life that emerges from the Visioning Groups, the National Survey, and the Individual Interviews involves commitment to the poor. The random sam-ple of members reveals at most a moderate commitment to par-ticipate in an activity which has become increasing!y a mission espoused by many religiou~ orders and quite explicitly by the church. Conclusions: Congregation Some of several changes in congregational living could strengthen the religious orders of the future. Specifically, inter-viewees indicate that religious community life will be marked increasingly by the intentionality of sha~ed values, purpose, and resources. Some congregations whose charisms are similar will merge, the number of apostolic groups will decrease, and many groups will become smaller. Because their members report greater clarity of focus and mission, membership in monastic orders may increase. The ranks of religious orders will be marked by older mem-bers, with few younger members and many second-career entrants. New congregations, though few, will contribute to the revital-ization of religious life. Religious congregations must examine the impact of what has often been an uncritical introduction of associational and affilia-tional forms of membership. This will entail a focus on the mean-ing of membership and in many cases the reestablishment of boundaries. Congregations that are vital to the church will have an explicit focus, and their effectiveness will be enhanced by the members' commitment to the collective mission. January-February 1993 41 Nygren and Ukeritis ¯ Religious Life Futures Project Conclusions: Individual In the view of those who participated in the interviews, com-mitment to works of mercy is critical. Most individuals who belong to religious orders were motivated at the outset by their impulse to generosity and are sustained by their special relation-ship with God. By serving those with absolute human need, sis-ters, brothers, and religious priests will dedicate themselves to a high-cost, high-commitment life in communities that can be wit-nesses to Jesus Christ and the gospel. E Historical/Theological Monograph Because it is important also to understand the findings of the study from both historical and theological perspectives, the researchers commissioned a theological/historical monograph. Elizabeth Johnson CSJ, PhD, of Fordham University, will write a theological monograph focusing on religious life since the Second Vatican Council. John W. Padberg SJ, PhD, of Saint Louis University, will provide a historical postscript to her work. This work, projected for completion in 1993, will add perspective to the wealth of information collected, analyzed, and evaluated in this research effort. IV. Conclusions:Shaping the Future of Religious Life If religious life is to continue to be a vital force in the church and the world, the FORUS study concludes that dramatic changes must occur in most religious congregations in the United States. Fidelity to the spirit of the founder and responsiveness to critical and unmet human needs are basic to the ongoing mission of reli-gious communities. Yet, while individual examples abound, only in limited ways have religious acted collectively to address absolute human needs, new forms of poverty, and demands that seemingly outstrip the capacity of any group to respond. Vatican II called religious to a return to the "spirit of the founder." While most congregations have engaged in much study and have made great efforts to move in this direction, the absence of corporate commitment to meeting currently unmet needs in the light of gospel imperatives stands in contrast to the collective vision and action inspired by God that marked the birth of most apostolic, monastic, and contemplative congregations. Religious 42 Revieva for Religious life as a social institution in United States society is at a crossroads. To achieve a desired future, religious as a group as well as indi-viduals must confront the forces that currently restrain them and reinforce the dynamics that will allow them to be in fact respon-sive to absolute human need in accord with their particular charism. A future marked by significant revitalization will emerge for congregations that--in union with God, in fidelity to their founding purpose, and in response to absolute human need--confront the current gap between the gospel and the culture. The research concludes with an equation of sorts, depicted in Figure 2 below, that can be applied to all con-gregational traditions in vary-ing degrees. The interaction of eight critical factors in the context of personal and collec-tive conversion will move con-gregations from their current states to their desired futures. The research also concludes that for other groups the The absence of corporate commitment to meeting currently unmet needs in the light of gospel imperatives stands in contrast to the collective vision and action inspired by God that marked the birth of most apostolic, monastic, and contemplative congregations. restraints on advancement are severe and may lead to decline. What follows is a brief summary of the conclusions drawn from the various facets of the study. 1. Individualism and Vocation Since Vatican II, shifting paradigms of vocation and con-comitant cultural trends have deemphasized the distinctiveness of the religious life. The research suggests that the personal call to holiness given to all Christians in Lumen Gentium did in fact impact religious life and the understanding of the religious life. Religious feel somewhat ambivalent about their current state while at the same time celebrating the advances of the laity in the church since Vatican II. The age of experimentation in the church paral-leled vast cultural shifts in kanerican society towards individualism, cultural assimilation, and the democratization of all authority. ~anuary-February 1993 43 Nygren and Ukeritis ¯ Religious Life Futures Project Figure 2 Shaping the Future of Religious Life in the US Restraining Forces ~ lndividualisrn]~ ~Average Loadershipl_~ Aut"orit V'i

This book has the potential to contribute to a reversing of this trend, whereby activities in not only the health sector but also in other sectors relevant to nutrition will gain increased support and prominence in national development planning. South Asia has by far the largest number of malnourished women and children, and no other region of the world has higher rates of malnutrition. Malnutrition in childhood is the biggest contributor to child mortality; a third of child deaths have malnutrition as an underlying cause. For the surviving children, malnutrition has lifelong implications because it severely reduces a child's ability to learn and to grow to his or her full potential. Malnutrition thus leads to less productive adults and weaker national economic performance. Therefore, the impact of malnutrition on a society's productivity and well being and a nation's long-term development is hard to underestimate. For the South Asia region of the World Bank, malnutrition is a key development priority, and in the coming years, the Bank intends to enhance dramatically its response to this challenge. As a first step, a series of country assessments such as this one are being carried out. These assessments will be used to reinforce the dialogue with governments and other development partners to scale up an evidence-based response against malnutrition. To succeed, we will need to address the problem comprehensively, which will require engaging several sectors. This assessment of malnutrition in Afghanistan lays out the scale, scope, and causes of the problem. The assessment also indicates key elements of a potential response.

The aim of this report is to provide a broad overview of the current state of gender equality in Tajikistan. While the Europe and Central Asia (ECA) region traditionally surpassed many other regions in terms of gender equality, this advantage has been eroding in recent decades. Particularly in Tajikistan, concerns have been raised that men and women have unequally born the consequences of economic, political, and social transitions after independence in 1991. The report examines several dimensions of gender equality both quantitatively and qualitatively. Tajikistan has set up a legal framework that enshrines principles of equality and non-discrimination, but better implementation results require continued efforts. Prevailing social norms and patriarchal systems of decision-making limit women s ability to make effective choices be it at home or at work. The paper is structured along the following lines. The first section introduces the idea of agency that will remain an important issue throughout the report. This is followed by an analysis of disparities in human capital endowment, including health and education. Gender gaps in the Tajik labor market and entrepreneurial activities of men and women are discussed in the fourth and fifth section. The final section concludes with some policy recommendations that might be beneficial for discussions among policy-makers, civil society actors, and development partners.

With this first Zambia economic brief, the World Bank is launching a series of short economic updates that will be produced twice a year. Each brief will include two sections: the Bank's assessment of recent economic developments and outlook in the short to medium term; and its analysis on a specific development topic or theme. The authors expect these briefs to support evidence-based policy debate in the country, strengthen public demand for good policies and outcomes, and inform government policies and programs. In this brief, first section reports on Zambia's continued robust growth, fiscal outcomes, and capital inflows at the end of 2012 against the backdrop of performance of other Sub- Saharan and global economies. It stresses the need for the government to spend borrowed and own resources more prudently. While acknowledging continuing strong prospects for growth, the analysis highlights considerable downside risks emanating from global uncertainties. Second section covers basic human opportunities for children in Zambia. The opportunities approach is premised on the notion that predetermined circumstances such as gender, ethnicity, place of birth, and family origins should not determine people's economic, social, and political success. A person should not have fewer opportunities in life just because she is a girl or born in a rural area. This is the core principle behind the concept of equality of opportunity and it is also the framework adopted in this report for Zambia. The analysis shows the extent to which basic opportunities for education, health, and infrastructure services in Zambia are influenced by circumstances in which children find themselves.