Suchergebnisse

The Bahá'ís of Iran concerns the Iranian Bahá'í situation since the Islamic revolution in lran in 1979-1980. This article begins with a brief résumé of events in 1980 and 1981 which led to the Canadian Bahá'í community becoming involved in the private sponsorship of refugees. This article then discusses the Canadian Bahá'í refugee program of the 1980s, including the relationship of the Bahá'í community of Canada with the Canadian government and the growth of the initially national program into one of global proportions. Reasons for the persecution of Bahá'ís in Iran are explained, as is the nature of the persecution. In the 1991 secret Government memorandum the Bahá'í Question is noted, and details are provided regarding last autumn's raids on homes involved with the Bahá'í Institute for Higher Education. The reader is then brought up to date regarding the current private sponsorship of refugees by the Bahá'í Community of Canada. This article concludes with a short comment regarding remedies. ; Les Baha'is d'Iran examine la situation des Baha'is en Iran depuis la révolution islamique de 1979-80 dans ce pays. Cet article commence par donner un bref aperçu des événements survenus en 1980 et 1981, et qui amenèrent la communauté baha''ie canadienne à s'engager dans la voie du parrainage privé de réfugiés. L'article examine ensuite le programme Canadien baha'ie de parrainage de réfugiés des années 80, y compris les relations de la communauté baha'ie canadienne avec le gouvernement canadien et la manière dont un programme, qui avait débuté au niveau national, a fini par prendre des proportions globales. Les raisons derrière la persécution des Baha'is en Iran sont expliquées, ainsi que la nature de ces persécutions. La mention de la Question baha'ie dans le mémorandum secret du gouvernement de 1991 est notée, et des détails sont donnés sur les descentes des lieux qui ont eu lieu à l'automne dernier chez des familles associées à l'Institut baha'ie d'éducation supérieure. Enfin, les informations les plus récentes sur le ...

The terrorist bombings that rocked France during 1985-1986 are not well known. The media and the politicians spoke of them at the time, but preferred not to refer to them later so as not to draw attention to their mistakes at the time. The author provides a detailed description of the events and the legal evidence implicating members of secret organisations on the basis of the court proceedings of the prosecution of Ali Fouad Saleh and his group, and numerous interviews with the officials concerned. In a second part, he evokes the different hypotheses concerning the participation of Hezbollah and the Iranians. Moreover, he presents an analysis that questions such views of terrorism as those based on " terror networks " or " indirect governmental strategies ". Rather he sees the causes in a transnational transfer of violence. This leads to a new transnational theory which should abandon the overtly simple concept of international terrorism. ; Les attentats qui ont frappé la France en 1985/86 sont mal connus. Les médias, les hommes politiques en ont parlé sur le moment et ont ensuite évité de revenir sur les erreurs qu'ils avaient commises. Grâce au procès criminel du groupe Ali Fouad Saleh et grâce à de nombreux entretiens avec des responsables des services, l'auteur revient sur le déroulement exact des attentats et sur les preuves judiciaires impliquant les membres des organisations clandestines. Dans une deuxième partie il évoque les différente hypothèses possibles concernant la participation du Hezbollah et des Iraniens. Au-delà, il propose un schéma d'analyse qui remet en cause les visions du terrorisme en terme de " réseau de la terreur ", " stratégies indirectes d'Etats " et insiste sur la transnationalié des transferts de violence qui ont caractérisé ces attentats. A partir de ce cas d'espèce, c'est une autre théorie du " terrorisme " dit international qui est proposé.

349Expropriation — Definition — Taking of property — Iran-United States Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights, 1955, Article IV(2) — Whether formal act of nationalization required — Creeping expropriation — Appointment of temporary manager to administer company — Owner deprived of right to manage company — Whether a taking of property — Other acts of interference with property — Date of taking — Nature of property expropriated — Physical assets — Intangible property — Ancillary rights — Right to repayment of loans made to company — Interests in property — Whether including indirect ownership of property through foreign subsidiaryExpropriation — Compensation — Standard of compensation — Iran-United States Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights, 1955, Article IV(2) — Requirement of just compensation based upon full equivalent of property taken — Whether including loss of future profits — Whether distinction between lawful and unlawful expropriationsExpropriation — Compensation — Valuation of expropriated property — Basis of assessment — Fair market price — Price which a willing buyer would pay a willing seller — Reduction in value due to political conditions and government action — Whether conditions to be taken into account — Whether effect on value of anticipation of nationalization relevant — Methods of valuation — Use of discounted cash flow method — Tribunal rejecting elements in Expert's valuation — Tribunal substituting equitable sumNationality — Corporations — Proof of nationality — Requirement that 50% or more of shares be owned by United States nationals — Proof — Relationship between parent and subsidiary companiesInternational tribunals — Iran-United States Claims Tribunal — Jurisdiction — Ownership of claims — Indirect claims — Claims by United States corporation on behalf of foreign subsidiary — Claim by United States corporation regarding shareholder interest in Iranian corporationInternational tribunals — Iran-United States Claims Tribunal — Use of experts — Expert asked to report on valuation — Weight to be given to Expert's Report — Role of the Tribunal — The law and practice of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal

The terrorist bombings that rocked France during 1985-1986 are not well known. The media and the politicians spoke of them at the time, but preferred not to refer to them later so as not to draw attention to their mistakes at the time. The author provides a detailed description of the events and the legal evidence implicating members of secret organisations on the basis of the court proceedings of the prosecution of Ali Fouad Saleh and his group, and numerous interviews with the officials concerned. In a second part, he evokes the different hypotheses concerning the participation of Hezbollah and the Iranians. Moreover, he presents an analysis that questions such views of terrorism as those based on " terror networks " or " indirect governmental strategies ". Rather he sees the causes in a transnational transfer of violence. This leads to a new transnational theory which should abandon the overtly simple concept of international terrorism. ; Les attentats qui ont frappé la France en 1985/86 sont mal connus. Les médias, les hommes politiques en ont parlé sur le moment et ont ensuite évité de revenir sur les erreurs qu'ils avaient commises. Grâce au procès criminel du groupe Ali Fouad Saleh et grâce à de nombreux entretiens avec des responsables des services, l'auteur revient sur le déroulement exact des attentats et sur les preuves judiciaires impliquant les membres des organisations clandestines. Dans une deuxième partie il évoque les différente hypothèses possibles concernant la participation du Hezbollah et des Iraniens. Au-delà, il propose un schéma d'analyse qui remet en cause les visions du terrorisme en terme de " réseau de la terreur ", " stratégies indirectes d'Etats " et insiste sur la transnationalié des transferts de violence qui ont caractérisé ces attentats. A partir de ce cas d'espèce, c'est une autre théorie du " terrorisme " dit international qui est proposé.

The terrorist bombings that rocked France during 1985-1986 are not well known. The media and the politicians spoke of them at the time, but preferred not to refer to them later so as not to draw attention to their mistakes at the time. The author provides a detailed description of the events and the legal evidence implicating members of secret organisations on the basis of the court proceedings of the prosecution of Ali Fouad Saleh and his group, and numerous interviews with the officials concerned. In a second part, he evokes the different hypotheses concerning the participation of Hezbollah and the Iranians. Moreover, he presents an analysis that questions such views of terrorism as those based on " terror networks " or " indirect governmental strategies ". Rather he sees the causes in a transnational transfer of violence. This leads to a new transnational theory which should abandon the overtly simple concept of international terrorism. ; Les attentats qui ont frappé la France en 1985/86 sont mal connus. Les médias, les hommes politiques en ont parlé sur le moment et ont ensuite évité de revenir sur les erreurs qu'ils avaient commises. Grâce au procès criminel du groupe Ali Fouad Saleh et grâce à de nombreux entretiens avec des responsables des services, l'auteur revient sur le déroulement exact des attentats et sur les preuves judiciaires impliquant les membres des organisations clandestines. Dans une deuxième partie il évoque les différente hypothèses possibles concernant la participation du Hezbollah et des Iraniens. Au-delà, il propose un schéma d'analyse qui remet en cause les visions du terrorisme en terme de " réseau de la terreur ", " stratégies indirectes d'Etats " et insiste sur la transnationalié des transferts de violence qui ont caractérisé ces attentats. A partir de ce cas d'espèce, c'est une autre théorie du " terrorisme " dit international qui est proposé.

The terrorist bombings that rocked France during 1985-1986 are not well known. The media and the politicians spoke of them at the time, but preferred not to refer to them later so as not to draw attention to their mistakes at the time. The author provides a detailed description of the events and the legal evidence implicating members of secret organisations on the basis of the court proceedings of the prosecution of Ali Fouad Saleh and his group, and numerous interviews with the officials concerned. In a second part, he evokes the different hypotheses concerning the participation of Hezbollah and the Iranians. Moreover, he presents an analysis that questions such views of terrorism as those based on " terror networks " or " indirect governmental strategies ". Rather he sees the causes in a transnational transfer of violence. This leads to a new transnational theory which should abandon the overtly simple concept of international terrorism. ; Les attentats qui ont frappé la France en 1985/86 sont mal connus. Les médias, les hommes politiques en ont parlé sur le moment et ont ensuite évité de revenir sur les erreurs qu'ils avaient commises. Grâce au procès criminel du groupe Ali Fouad Saleh et grâce à de nombreux entretiens avec des responsables des services, l'auteur revient sur le déroulement exact des attentats et sur les preuves judiciaires impliquant les membres des organisations clandestines. Dans une deuxième partie il évoque les différente hypothèses possibles concernant la participation du Hezbollah et des Iraniens. Au-delà, il propose un schéma d'analyse qui remet en cause les visions du terrorisme en terme de " réseau de la terreur ", " stratégies indirectes d'Etats " et insiste sur la transnationalié des transferts de violence qui ont caractérisé ces attentats. A partir de ce cas d'espèce, c'est une autre théorie du " terrorisme " dit international qui est proposé.

State responsibility — Claims — Nationality of — Claim on behalf of United States shareholders of Canadian company — Whether company a United States national within meaning of Iran- United States Claims Settlement Declaration, 1981 — Articles 11(1) and VII(2) — Ownership interests of United States shareholders — Whether collectively sufficient to control company — Majority of shareholders reporting United States addresses — Majority of shares owned by United States citizens — Whether a reasonable inference — The law and practice of the Iran- United States Claims TribunalThe individual in international law — Nationality — Nationality of corporations — Claim on behalf of United States shareholders of Canadian company — Whether company a United States national within meaning of Iran- United States Claims Settlement Declaration, 1981 — Articles 11(1) and VII(2) — Ownership interests of United States shareholders — Whether collectively sufficient to control company — Majority of shareholders reporting United States addresses — Majority of shares owned by United States citizens Whether a reasonable inference — The law and practice of the Iran United States Claims TribunalDisputes — Arbitration — Evidence — Nationality of claim of Canadian company — Majority of shareholders reporting United States addresses — Majority of shares owned by United States citizens — Whether a reasonable inference — Iran- United States Claims Settlement Declaration, 1981 — Articles II (1) and VII (2) — The law and practice of the Iran- United States Claims Tribunal725Disputes — Arbitration — Procedure — Competence — Purchase agreement between Iranian corporation and Swiss subsidiary of Canadian company — Jurisdiction over claim on behalf of United States shareholders — Iran-United States Claims Settlement Declaration, 1981 — Articles II (1) and VII (2) — Nationality of claim — Ownership interests of United States shareholders — Whether collectively sufficient to control Canadian company — Evidence — Majority of shareholders reporting United States addresses — Majority of shares owned by United States citizens — Whether a reasonable inference — The law and practice of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal

Reza Baraheni was born in Tabriz, Iran, in 1935. After studying there and in Turkey, he obtained a Ph.D. in English literature from the University of Istanbul, and in 1963 was appointed Professor of English at Teheran University. He has also taught at the University of Texas in Austin, the University of Utah in Salt Lake City, and Indiana University in Bloomington, read his poetry at various American universities and published in leading American quarterlies. He is the author of three novels and two dozen short stories, most of which have not been published in Iran as they were suppressed by the censor. The text that follows will appear in a revised form as an introduction to his Prison Poems, which are being published in book form by the Indiana University Press in Bloomington. The poems and the introductory article were written on the basis of his experience of three months 'imprisonment in Teheran.' The Doves' he actually wrote while in prison, scratching the words into the wall as he had no paper or writing utensils. 'I was in prison, and that in solitary confinement, for 102 days at the end of 1973,' writes the author. 'I was released as a result of international pressure exerted on the Iranian government on my behalf in the United States. My release came on 22 December 1973. The prison was called the "Joint Committee for the Campaign against Terrorism in Iran". But I met no terrorists in this prison. I discovered that the name was just a disguise to conceal the fact that most of the prisoners were students, professors and government employees. The reason for my arrest and subsequent physical and psychological torture was the publication of my book, Masculine History, which had become an underground success immediately after its appearance in 1972, and of an article called "The Culture of the Oppressor and the Culture of the Oppressed", in which I had demanded cultural autonomy for Iran's ethnic minorities. After my release 1 left Iran for the United States.'

Women's rights have been a historically controversial issue. This is no exception in Iran, where the struggle between modernization and keeping with traditional Islamic values has been a topic of constant disagreement between political leaders. Women in Iran have experienced many changes in their personal rights and freedoms throughout the decades. This research focuses on religion and culture, the policies of the main leaders of Iran in the past decades, and the role of non-governmental organizations as factors that expand or limit the rights and freedoms of women. It attempts to identify which factor is mostly responsible for the position that women have been historically placed in. The intent of this thesis is to research the rights and conditions of women in Iran.In general the question could be proposed as "are the lives of women in Iran better off today than in the past?" In the western world there are many stereotypes that are oftentimes attached to women, such as the notions that they are not allowed to pursue an education or career and that they do not have any legal rights. Evidence shows that these notions are not accurate in contemporary Iran, and that women have made significant strides in gaining their rights and freedoms. Through the analysis of several case studies, literature reviews, and statistical evidence, this thesis seeks to identify the factors that most affect women's rights and freedoms. By analyzing the factors that have historically placed women at a disadvantage in Iranian society, and better understanding their lives, this thesis aims to fight the stereotypes placed upon them as well as raise awareness for the continuing plight of women in Iran today. ; 2012-12-01 ; B.A. ; Sciences, Dept. of Political Science ; Bachelors ; This record was generated from author submitted information.

The fate of the 2,500 troop multi-national coalition force in Iraq remains uncertain as ongoing negotiations within the context of the Iraq-US Higher Coordinating Committee decide on its future.While there is general agreement that the counter-ISIS coalition in its present structure should end, both sides agree that there is a need for ongoing military assistance but in a bi-lateral framework.One of the key players in this discussion is Iraq's National Security Advisor, Qasim al Araji, a longstanding official in the Iraqi security establishment. He was trained by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps and fought against the regime of Saddam Hussein before returning to Iraq in 2003. After the 2003 invasion, he was one of the first high-level detainees held by the Americans and released three months later, only to be detained again in 2007 and held until 2009 at Camp Bucca. Sometime after that he joined the Iranian-supported Badr Corps, was elected to Parliament in 2014 and was appointed as Iraq's Minister of Interior in 2017, and National Security Advisor in 2020. Despite a checkered relationship with the U.S. prior to 2017, his terms as Minister of Interior and National Security Advisor have won praise from foreign military and diplomatic officials who note his professionalism and willingness to work together, with the Americans in particular, on security "portfolios" of mutual concerns. In a long interview on 1 March on the sidelines of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum, he discussed the major threats facing his country with Responsible Statecraft. Asked about his thoughts on "America's obsession with Iran", he replied with humor: "My answer? Iran is obsessed with the American influence in Iraq as well. The view of the Iraqi government is that we don't support either Iranian or American influence on Iraqi decision making." RS: What do you see as the major security challenges facing Iraq today? Al Araji: Since the defeat of Daesh, narcotics are now the biggest challenge for us. The interference of other countries is another threat to our stability. Iraq believes it should not interfere in the affairs of other countries and would expect the same from other countries. RS: Are you satisfied with the support of regional neighbors on issues such as ISIS and drug trafficking? Al Araji: Narcotics and drugs are a global challenge, so it needs regional and international cooperation, not only with our neighbors but with all the world. There is already some degree of cooperation, but I think we can do more as narcotics are a common threat to the stability and prosperity of all countries. RS: How dire is the threat posed by Daesh and how prepared are the Iraqi forces to handle it alone? Al Araji: Our battle with Daesh is primarily an intelligence battle. The information we have is that Daesh does not have many fighters in Iraq, but we should cooperate with other partners in sharing intelligence, and to fight and defeat the remaining Daesh fighters. We believe the main threat is the 10,000 Daesh foreign fighters from different countries in addition to those from Iraq and Syria. The remaining Daesh fighters in Iraq do not pose a significant threat to Iraq but they are still a threat. Iraq is capable of confronting Daesh by itself, but it needs to cooperate with others to dry up the financial support and other resources to Daesh. Last year we signed around 23 memorandums of understanding with our neighbors and other countries to deal with Daesh. I also think al Hol camp is a significant threat. We need to find a way to resolve the situation in al Hol, otherwise it will keep providing extremists for Daesh. We urge countries to repatriate their citizens as there are almost 60 countries with citizens in al Hol. There are about 4,000 Iraqi families in this camp, and Iraq has repatriated about 1,924 families, but there are many more that must be repatriated.RS: There has been concern over spillover effects from the Gaza war in the region and an escalation. What are your thoughts on how this is impacting Iraq?Al Araji: The spillover from Gaza will impact Iraq and the whole region at the same time. The war crimes happening in Gaza will impact the stability of the whole region. Humanity is rejecting what is happening in Gaza right now. The policy of starvation, the policy of killing, and the policy of displacing people is affecting the whole world, and I am wondering why the international community is unable to stop this war. Nobody can stop the sympathy toward what is happening right now to the Palestinian people in Gaza. I think you know about the American Air Force airman who burned himself to death because of Gaza. RS: There has been significant questions about the role of militias in the national security structures. Why can't the militias be demobilized and incorporated into the MOD and MOI? Al Araji: These factions are not working against the government but supporting the current government. Some of them played a role in defeating Daesh in Iraq. Yes, there isn't a legal framework for their existence in Iraq, our security institutions are very obvious, and the current government is doing its best to control the weapons that are outside of the government's control. These factions first formed during the occupation of the US troops in Iraq. Any country that feels it is occupied by another country would give rise to such resistance factions. After the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq in 2011, the country was stable with few major security problems. But when Daesh invaded and occupied over one third of our territory, these factions formed again to defeat Daesh. What is happening now in Gaza is an excuse for these factions to restart their activities, and that is embarrassing the government because the government is trying to do its best to prevent an escalation.We are in communication with them. I am personally talking to these factions and if some of them are willing to join the Iraq Security Forces, we can work on that together. The stability of Iraq depends on all weapons being under control of the State and government.RS: The US has been critical about the lack of action on attacks against their forces. Why is it so hard to capture and prosecute those responsible for the attacks?Al Araji: There are very clear orders and instructions from the government to capture and prosecute anyone who is playing a role in attacking the Americans. Those who attacked the American embassy were captured and arrested. And some of those who also attacked American advisors in the Iraqi bases are being arrested as well.RS: Do you believe it is time for the US-led coalition forces to leave Iraq or is there a compelling reason for them to remain? Al Araji: The Iraqi forces are capable of confronting Daesh and other security challenges, and this is understood by the global coalition. The relationships between Iraq and the global coalition are positive and we are looking forward to keeping these relationships friendly. We are friends and partners. They are here because we asked them to be here, and after 10 years, Iraq has the right to reassess the terms of this presence. There is an Iraqi-US Higher Coordinating Committee, and it will assess the presence of the Americans and the Coalition in IraqWe are waiting for the result of these committees and depending on the reports we will take action. Iraq wants to establish separate bilateral relations with the members of the global coalition. It already has a bilateral agreement with the Americans, and we are looking forward to strengthening bilateral relations with other countries. We really want to have bilateral cooperation with the US and all the other members of the coalition. RS: The Americans seem obsessed with the influence of Iran in Iraq. Is that a justified concern? Al Araji: (laughing) My answer? Iran is obsessed with the American influence in Iraq as well. The view of the Iraqi government is that we don't support either Iranian or American influence on Iraqi decision making. We have good relations with Iran and the US, but the conflict between both is negatively affecting Iraq. Hopefully Iraq will not be a proxy battlefield for them. I think restoring relations between the US and Iran will also help the relation between Iraq and the US and will affect Iraq positively overall.

After more than three decades of conflict and several bloody wars, the Republic of Azerbaijan recaptured the Armenian-inhabited enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh on September 28. Azerbaijan's lightning victory followed a nine-month blockade of the Lachin Corridor, the only link between the Karabakh region to mainland Armenia, effectively depriving the roughly 120,000 Karabakh Armenians who lived there of food and other necessities.Following Azerbaijan's victory, there was a mass exodus of Armenians from Karabakh and the creation of a severe humanitarian crisis that reminded some of the Armenians' flight from the Ottoman Empire during 1915-16 when as many as a million people died or were killed — considered a genocide by Armenians and part of World War I's tragic collateral damage by the Turks.Many factors contributed to Azerbaijan's final victory in its long-simmering conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. Some factors are rooted in the South Caucasus' complex history as part of the Iranian state until 1813, followed by the Russian and Soviet empires, the USSR's nationalities policies and its practice of using various ethnic groups as levers of influence, and finally the messy breakup of the USSR beginning in 1988. Other factors relate to the disparity in Armenia's and Azerbaijan's size, population, and resources. Unlike Armenia, which has few natural resources, Azerbaijan is an energy-rich country and thus capable of spending large sums on arms.Additional factors include Armenia's persistent internal political differences on the country's foreign policy orientation, as well as rivalries and disagreements between Armenian and Karabakh political elites.Since gaining independence after the Soviet collapse, Armenia has mostly depended on Russian support. But largely due to the 20-month-old war in Ukraine, Moscow's priorities have changed. Both Turkey and Azerbaijan became more important for Moscow, and its failure to adequately support Armenia, particularly by deploying its peacekeeping force to dismantle the blockade, sealed last month's outcome.Unfortunately for Armenia, Azerbaijan also became more important for the West in light of the Ukraine war. This meant that neither Europe nor the United States was willing to take major risks to restrain Baku.Lastly, international and regional geopolitical rivalries and Armenia's vulnerable geopolitical position contributed to its ultimate defeat. Among these factors were the larger Russia-West rivalry for control of Eurasia and Washington's 30-year-old efforts to contain and isolate Iran by denying Tehran any role in the emerging post-Cold War economic and security structures of the Southern Caucasus, most importantly in the construction of pipelines to transport oil and gas from Azerbaijan, the Caspian Sea, and Central Asia to Western markets.To accomplish this aim, the U.S. and Europe effectively assigned a leading role to Turkey in the Caucasus and Central Asia both as a model to be emulated by the Central Asian states and as the West's major regional partner. Perhaps, at the time, Armenia should have seen the writing on the wall and aligned itself more closely with the West while seeking some form of accommodation with Turkey. But given Armenians' history with the Ottomans and Turkey, this was not easy to do, and Yerevan chose to align itself more closely to Russia instead.Armenia did, in fact, retain ties with the West and even joined NATO's Partnership for Peace program. Yet, despite religious and cultural bonds with the West and a politically active Diaspora community, particularly in France and the U.S., Yerevan's closer ties to Moscow resulted in a lingering Western distrust. And, as time went on, the lure of Azerbaijan's energy resources became too strong for the West to resist.Surrounded by Turkey and Azerbaijan, Armenia saw Iran with which it built a constructive relationship after independence, as a potential counterweight to Azerbaijan. But Iran, fearful of antagonizing its own Azeri population concentrated in the northwestern part of the country and concerned about antagonizing a fellow Muslim and mostly Shi'a country, was limited in its response. At the same time, Moscow worked to enhance Armenia's dependence on Russia, making it more difficult for Yerevan to develop closer economic and energy ties with Tehran. In short, U.S. containment of Iran and Russia's desire to control Armenia deprived Yerevan of alternative sources of support.The regional involvement of Israel, the Middle East's most important military power and a sworn enemy of the Islamic Republic, has further complicated matters. As a minority state in the Muslim world that was itself born in part as a result of the Nazi genocide against the Jews in Europe, Israel should theoretically have felt a natural affinity for Armenia. But a desire to expand its diplomatic relations with Muslim states (long before the 2020 Abraham Accords), the lure of energy resources and markets, and its hostility toward Iran have pulled Israel ever closer to Azerbaijan.Over time, Israel became a key supplier of weapons for Baku, providing it with as much as 69 percent of its total arms imports, including some of its most advanced weapons systems, between 2016 and 2020, a trend that intensified significantly as Azerbaijan prepared its offensive to take Karabakh. Moreover, Baku's principal patron and mentor, Turkey, which has its own regional ambitions, supplied additional weaponry and assistance, even to the extent of reportedly providing Syrian mercenaries for Baku to fight in Karabakh during the 2020 Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict.Since Ottoman times, Turkey has coveted what is now the Republic of Azerbaijan, as well as the Iranian province of Azerbaijan. Pan-Turkist and neo-Ottoman forces, with which President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is identified, have long wanted to create a land bridge between, first, Turkey and Azerbaijan, and subsequently through northern Iran to Central Asia. In this way, Turkey hopes to realize a direct land route to link all Turkic peoples.Azerbaijan's conquest of Karabakh marks the first step towards this goal. Now, Turkey is insisting on the creation of a land corridor between Azerbaijan and Nakhicevan, an Azerbaijani exclave bounded by Armenia, Iran and Turkey. This would amount to the incorporation of what the Armenians call Syunik and the Azerbaijanis call Zangezur into Azerbaijan, thus bypassing Iran. In a demonstration of Turkey's aims, Erdoğan himself visited Nakhichevan for a meeting with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev on September 25, two weeks before Baku's Karabakh offensive, and talked about the opening of the so-called Zangezur Corridor.Iran is understandably concerned by all of these developments. While relations between Baku and Tehran have oscillated between warm and cold since Azerbaijan's independence, they have grown more tense in recent years, particularly as Israel became increasingly critical to Baku's military buildup, possibly in exchange for oil and reportedly also for access to Iran for Israeli intelligence operations. Iran has long been concerned that Azerbaijan may serve as a launch pad for an Israeli, U.S., or joint attack on its territory.As for Turkey's ambitions, it should be noted that the Nakhicavan exclave lies only 90 miles from Tabriz, the capital of Iranian Azerbaijan, which Baku claims is occupied territory it refers to as Southern Azerbaijan. Erdogan appears to share that sentiment; in 2020, his recitation of a poem that claimed that Iran had usurped the region provoked protests in Tehran.Iran has said clearly that it opposes any other territorial changes in the region, especially the creation of a corridor that would eliminate its common border with Armenia. In early October, Iran's president, Ayatollah Ebrahim Raisi, expressed this view to Armenian and Azerbaijani officials who met with him. Earlier, members of parliament had warned that Iran would not tolerate any changes to its border with Armenia, while an article that appeared in Tehran's influential "Iran Diplomacy" even suggested that Iran unilaterally create a 20-mile buffer zone within Karabakh, Nakhichevan, and Syunik in order to prevent any incursions into Iranian territory. A year ago, Iran held large-scale military exercises along its Azerbaijani border, signaling its determination to resist further territorial changes to its detriment.Against this background, the steady rapprochement between Turkey and Israel since last year's exchange of ambassadors — Erdogan was reportedly preparing to host Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu later this month or in November before the latest Gaza war broke out last weekend – has done little to calm Tehran's concerns. Earlier this year, 30-plus members of Israel's Knesset also called for international support for "the national aspirations of the peoples of South Azerbaijan."Thus, the latest Caucasus conflict is not finished, and larger clashes may lie ahead, especially if Azerbaijan pursues its irredentist claims against Iran with the backing of Turkey and Israel. In the last few days, there have been reports that Baku and Tehran are now trying to normalize bilateral relations and even discuss opening a new transit route through Iran to Nakhicevan, which could alleviate some of Tehran's key concerns. However, the deep-rooted sources of tension between Iran and Azerbaijan are unlikely to be quickly resolved, and thus the risk of possible conflict remains high, especially if Iran's rivals pressure Baku.