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Abstract
Suicide is a major global public health problem, but rarely is the subject viewed as a human right. With the sole exception of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), no international authority has taken a strong position on whether a human right to suicide exists. Even that court's jurisprudence goes no further than intimating that such a right falls within the scope of the human right to private life. This essay tackles the question of whether there is a human right to suicide under existing international law and, if so, what are its sources and limits. It concludes with an analysis of what obligations, both negative and positive, a right to suicide would impose on the state.

Intro -- Contents -- Foreword -- Preface -- About the Authors -- Part 1: Background -- Chapter 1: (Southern) African priorities in international economic law -- 1 Commercial interests -- 1.1 Sector-driven priorities -- 1.2 Priorities driven by low levels of economic development -- 1.2.1 Addressing internal factors -- 1.2.1.1 Trade facilitation -- 1.2.1.2 Intra-Africa trade -- 1.2.2 Addressing external factors -- 1.2.3 Infant industry protection and export growth -- 1.2.3.1 Rationale -- 1.2.3.2 Specific measures -- 2 Socio-economic interests -- 2.1 Export restrictions -- 2.1.1 Food security -- 2.1.2 Medical and pharmaceutical products -- 2.2 Import restrictions/liberalisation -- 2.3 Intellectual Property restrictions -- 3 Domestic policy considerations -- 4 Enforceability and political feasibility -- 4.1 Development status designation -- 4.2 Dispute settlement system -- 4.3 Power asymmetries -- 5 Organisation of the book -- Chapter 2: South African trade policy and regulation in the 1990s: The late years of the Uruguay Round and the early days of the WTO -- 1 Uruguay Round and the establishment of the WTO -- 2 New era of world trade -- 3 Acquiring knowledge and capacity building -- 4 Trade remedies -- 5 Greater export-orientation -- 6 Regional groupings and bilateral trade agreements -- 7 Conclusion -- Chapter 3: South Africa's international economic relations -- 1 Introduction -- 2 An overview of South Africa's approach to foreign policy and economic diplomacy in the post-apartheid era -- 2.1 President Mandela's term (1994-1999) -- 2.2 President Mbeki's terms (1999-2008) -- 2.3 President Zuma's terms (2009-2018) -- 2.4 The current administration: President Ramaphosa (since February 2018) -- 3 Approach to, and policies on, economic diplomacy in the post-apartheid era -- 3.1 South Africa's approach to economic diplomacy: Perceptions of incoherency.

"Two of the great achievements of international law have been to define the human rights integral to a life of dignity, freedom, and equality, and to develop rules and institutions that protect the global environment. Because these two areas of the law developed separately and at different times, the relationship between them was at first unclear"--

I study the pollution control problem faced by an imperfectly informed supranational governmental authority (SNGA) that wishes to design an international environmental agreement (lEA) for developing countries (DC). The SNGA cannot contract directly with polluting firms in the various DCs; it must deal with such firms through their national governments. Further, owing to national sovereignty, the SNGA is unable to either monitor the actions of DC governments and firms or enforce the terms of the lEA in the event of a contractual breach. In this setting, I study the properties of equitable lEAs in which similar DCs are held to similar environmental standards. In particular, I focus on two cases. In the first case, governments and firms within individual DCs do not collude among themselves, and, in the second case, they do. I show that when the private information of firms and governments across the two DCs is perfectly correlated, whether or not there is collusion, the SNGA can always implement the full information lEA in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. My analysis tells us that (i) the significance of the monitoring and enforcement problem in such international settings has been exaggerated, and (ii) the technological similarities between DCs have a far greater bearing on the design problem than do the potentially deleterious effects of sovereignty. Indeed, there are a number of situations in which Pareto-efficient lEAs can be designed by the SNGA.