Suchergebnisse

On July 16, 1980, France passed a law forbidding the communication of economic, commercial, industrial, financial, or technical documents or information to foreign natural or legal persons. In doing so, France joined a growing number of nations in efforts to put an end to what they perceive as the "abusive" extraterritorial application of United States law.

AbstractDuring the later years of the War of Resistance to Japan (1937–1945), United States (US) propaganda activities intensified in both Japanese military-occupied and 'free' regions of China. One of the most important organizations behind these activities was the Office of War Information (OWI). This paper examines the OWI, and particularly its Overseas Office, as key institutional actors within a broader US total war effort which touched the lives of civilian populations in East Asia as well as combatants, arguing that:•US propaganda institutions and propagandists played demonstrable roles in representing and shaping the experience of war in China;•these institutions, which included Asians and individuals of Asian descent, simultaneously acted to advance US goals in the wartime 'Far East';•while cooperation between US and Chinese governments was sporadic in the area of psychological warfare, conflicts over control often undermined or limited operations;•despite these shortcomings, US propaganda institutions (which included both the OWI and offices within the Department of State) had developed comparatively wide-ranging capabilities by the end of the war, and continued operations into the Civil War of 1945–1949.By 1945 propaganda had become an activity which regularly targeted allied populations as well as enemies. This process was facilitated by the early twentieth-century communications revolution, but was planned and controlled by the new engineers of the post-war order.

At the recent Washington Conference it was agreed to call another meeting to discuss desirable changes in the rules of maritime warfare. At the meeting this spring of The American Society of International Law opinions did not coincide as to what form the future development of international law of war should take. There seemed a disposition on the part of many to attempt to resume the position previous to 1914 and say, "Let us forget the war damage to international law and continue its development on the old lines."

This study takes a fresh conceptual look at modern military victory so as to shed new light on the meaning of victory in the post-Cold War global security context and to probe the pitfalls and opportunities surrounding the pursuit of war-winning and peace-winning strategies. This analysis identifies competing notions of victory, defines the notion of strategic victory, common fallacies by victors, and discusses some ideas about how to improve management of complexities surrounding modern victory.