Rußlands "Bedrohungen aus dem Süden" (II): Entwicklungen in Afghanistan
In: Aktuelle Analysen / Bundesinstitut für Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien, 1998,37
1568 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: Aktuelle Analysen / Bundesinstitut für Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien, 1998,37
World Affairs Online
Blog: Between The Lines
Critics, including intraparty ones, of Republican
Gov. Jeff Landry's
dispatch
of state National Guard troops to Texas find their political positioning more
tenuous after a recent spate of high-profile arrests of illegal aliens.
Two weeks ago college student Riley Laken in Georgia
was murdered, allegedly by an illegal alien (an incident which Democrat Pres. Joe Biden
has
yet to address even as he
promotes legislation named after a habitual criminal), focusing attention
on criminal activity by illegal aliens. Under Biden, the U.S. southern border
has become particularly porous, with such
crossings up 277 percent under Biden compared to predecessor Republican Donald
Trump. Unfortunately,
this jump during Biden's third year in office has led to a 257 percent increase
in criminal noncitizen arrests compared to Trump's third year in office; a 319
percent increase in assault, battery, and domestic violence; a 470 percent increase
in burglary, robbery, larceny, theft, and fraud; and homicides and manslaughter
going from 2 to 62, a 3,000 percent increase.
In response, Landry sent Louisiana troops to aid Texas
in its Operation Lone Star, designed to interdict illegal aliens from crossing over
state borders that has attracted like support from about a dozen states, for about
a month. The estimated cost of this could reach as much as $3 million.
In at least one instance, had Landry's predecessor
Democrat John Bel Edwards done the same, perhaps tragedy in Louisiana could have
been prevented. Last week, Kenner
police arrested an illegal alien who had been in the country since 2022 on
rape and robbery charges. Police Chief Keith Conley outlined how having to deal
with such suspects strains policing, which could be vastly ameliorated with tighter
border security: "Lack of access to data, false identification and language
barriers put local law enforcement at a huge disadvantage. We cannot verify if
an illegal alien is giving correct information as it pertains to names and date
of births. It is not only a drain on police manpower, but a financial drain on
local law enforcement's budgets and taxpayer's money."
Thus, it makes far more sense to save Louisiana
local law enforcement and taxpayers these burdens up front by deploying troops
to help border states. But state Democrats, and even some Republicans, don't
see it that way. When Landry announced his deployment initiative, GOP Sen. Bill Cassidy critiqued the move,
refusing to see it as cost-effective. Whether that is true will become apparent
when a Landry initiative to calculate costs of illegal immigration into
Louisiana reports back later this year, but anecdotal evidence suggests Cassidy's
view will end up on the wrong side of the data.
Years
ago, Cassidy made overt gestures against illegal immigration, and even now
still backs some measures
that could discourage it. But ever since his 2020 reelection where almost
immediately after that he
bet on public rejection of Trump and smaller government that his actions
consistent to which to this point have backfired, he has been on the defensive
and now particularly in reelection trouble for 2026 when party primaries will
become installed. This latest incident doesn't help his cause.
Nor that of other opponents of Landry's
deployment. While there is a fascinating intramural debate over whether illegal
aliens are any more likely to commit crimes than legal immigrants or citizens –
the matter being caught up in arguments over data
sources, data
quality, and data
reliability – unimpeachably true is that more illegal aliens means more
crime. Costs from it certainly are lower if enforced at the front end – entry
into the country – than at the back end – responding to criminal behavior. Given
the statistics of arrests for criminal behavior, Landry's policy that lends a
hand to enforcement likely is the most cost effective, putting opponents to
that on the back foot.
This Book examines and takes stock of the main policy and legislative developments during the last 20 years of European Union cooperation on Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) policies. The end of 2019 coincided with the anniversary of the Tampere European Council Conclusions of October 1999, which set for the first time in European integration a common policy programme on Justice and Home Affairs (The Tampere Programme). It also corresponded with the 10 year anniversary of the Lisbon Treaty which brought a majority of these policies under the Community method of cooperation and enshrined a legally binding EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The first set of Chapters examine the main institutional and political developments (the 'Lisbonisation') of AFSJ policies. They study the impacts of politicization and 'depoliticiation' dynamics and 'crises' in policy-shaping and policy making in these domains. The following Chapters cover AFSJ-thematic areas, including those related to borders and asylum, regular and irregular migration, judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation. The contributors review the current facets and latest steps in each of these AFSJ domains. They critically assess the main achievements, unfinished components, as well as the new and old challenges, paying particular attention to different types of 'Europeanization' dynamics (narratives, actors and instruments) witnessed during the last 20 years, their novelty or continuation, and their relations to EU rule of law, democratic and fundamental rights principles. ; --Preface: European Afsj. Common Values as the Gateway for Future Development p.ix Malin Brännkärr; -- Introduction: Setting the Scene, Sergio Carrera, Deirdre Curtin and Andrew Geddes; -- Part I: The Lisbonisation of EU Afsj Policies -- 1. Tampere and the Politics of Migration and Asylum in the Eu: Looking Back to Look Forwards, Andrew Geddes; -- 2. The Appeal to Tampere's Politics of Consciousness for The Eu's AFSJ, Dora Kostakopoulou; -- 3. The Afsj Two Decades After Tampere: Institutional Balance, Relation to Citizens and Solidarity, Jörg Monar; -- 4. Twenty Years Later: The Legacy of the Tampere Conclusions, Kimmo Nuotio; -- 5. Tampere Programme 20 Years on: Putting Eu Principles and Individuals First, Sergio Carrera; -- Part II - Borders and Asylum -- 6. The European Border and Coast Guard in the New Regulation: Towards Centralisation in Border Management, Juan Santos Vara; -- 7. Reinstatement of Internal Border Controls in the Schengen Area. Conflict, Symbolism and Institutional Dynamics, Galina Cornelisse; -- 8. Normalising 'the Hotspot Approach?' An Analysis of the Commission's Most Recent Proposals, Giuseppe Campesi; --9. EU Asylum Policies Through the Lenses of the UN Global Compact on Refugees, Sergio Carrera and Roberto Cortinovis; -- 10. Search and Rescue at Sea, Non-Governmental Organisations and the Principles of The EUs External Action, Paolo Cuttitta; -- Part III - Irregular and Regular Immigration; --11. 20 Years After Tampere's Agenda on "Illegal Migration": Policy Continuity in Spite of Uninteded Consequences, Virginie Guiraudon; -- 12. Micro-Harmonisation of The Fundamental Right to an Effective Judicial Remedy in the Proposed Return Directive and Beyond: a Dangerous Path?, Elise Muir and Caterina Molinari; --13. 20 Years of 'Partnership with Countries of Origin and Transit, Michael Collyer; -- 14. Who Is a Smuggler?, Gabriella Sanchez; -- 15. Eu Legal Migration Policies Since Tampere, and Their Relationship with International Standards and the UN Global Compact for Migration, Ryszard Cholewinski ; --Part IV - Eu Criminal Justice Cooperation; -- 16. 20 Years From Tampere. The Constitutionalisation of Europe's Area of Criminal Justice, Valsamis Mitsilegas; -- 17. European Criminal Justice – From Mutual Recognition to Coherence, Dominik Brodowski; -- 18. 'Scenes From a Marriage': Trust, Distrust and (Re)Assurances in the Execution of a European Arrest Warrant, Pedro Caeiro; -- 19. The Dynamic Evolution of Eu Criminal Law and Justice, Maria Bergström; --Part V - Police Cooperation; -- 20. Internal Security in the Eu and Police Cooperation: Operational Police Cooperation, Saskia Hufnagel; --21. From Tampere Over Stockholm to Luxembourg and Brussels: Where Are We Now? The Evolution of Afsj Databases – Meandering Between Security and Data Protection,Teresa Quintel; --22. Targeted Surveillance: Can Privacy and Surveillance Be Reconciled?, Edoardo Celeste and Federico Fabbrini; Contributors List.
BASE
Will the Mexican left finally put a stop to the slaughter of migrants on their behalf? Soon the party leader will be dead. Andrés Manuel López Obrador, fondly known as AMLO by his supporters, is an old man. This summer, he will finish his historic six-year presidency and, at least formally, make his exit from Mexican political life. There is no other president who has done more for the average Mexican in living memory. Founder of the Morena party, which swept to national victory in 2018 despite being only four years old, AMLO has overseen a litany of policies that "put the poor first," the golden rule of the president's campaign. Under his tenure, the Mexican poverty rate has dropped to historic lows, the minimum wage has over doubled, and a number of new labor laws have been passed to empower trade unions. It is, without exaggeration, one of the greatest accomplishments of any Latin American political party in the last half-century.But there is one glaring problem. What the average Mexican citizen has gained also came at the expense of the approximately 400,000 migrants who cross into the country each year. In 2014, Barrack Obama struck a discreet border externalization pact with then-right-wing President Enrique Peña Nieto known as the Southern Border Program. Under the Program, Mexico is paid millions of dollars each year to detain and deport as many migrants as possible before they can reach the US and ask for asylum. The militarization of Mexico's immigration enforcement was swift and brutal. Approximately 20,000 migrant kidnappings occur in Mexico every year, and around 100,000 have simply been "disappeared," meaning that they are likely dead but their remains have not been recovered. Apparently, to AMLO at least, these migrants did not count as part of the poor he promised to put first. When Donald Trump was elected the stakes became even higher. He threatened to impose new tariffs on Mexico if they did not halt all undocumented migration to the US border. The deal was clear: keep migrants out of the US at all costs, and Mexico will be rewarded with a fat check. But dare to let migrants through, and the United States would intentionally tank Mexico's economy, undoing all of Morena's anti-poverty reforms. In response, AMLO doubled down on border militarization, even inventing a new branch of the military, the National Guard, whose driving purpose seems to be beating migrant caravans on television. Many in Morena are quietly dismayed by this—how could a party that describes itself as anti-US intervention conduct, with relish no less, some of the gringos' bloodiest bidding?—but few have dared to speak publicly against their own party leader. But now change is on the horizon. This summer, Claudia Sheinbaum, AMLO's named successor, is poised to become Mexico's first female president. Sheinbaum, in actuality, is not significantly younger than AMLO. But in spirit she represents a new and fresh face for the party. Whereas AMLO's vision for Mexico has always been firmly—one might even say petulantly—nationalistic, Sheinbaum's outlook is more international. A formal doctoral researcher at UC Berkeley, as mayor of Mexico City Sheinbaum technocratically stewarded the metropolis in its reemergence as one of the world's great cities, all the while attending—at least in part—to the growing number of poor, undocumented migrants within its urban boundaries. As mayor, Sheinbaum greenlit the refurbishment of three large migrant shelters, and has affirmed that Mexico City remains at the forefront of guaranteeing migrant rights in the country. It is enough to be cautiously optimistic. But Claudia, too, has at times given the party mixed signals. She famously tweeted her support of Mexico City's rapidly militarizing police forces, despite many reports that the police contribute to the city's organized crime and extort migrants. There are also concerns that AMLO's cult of personality will not simply fade in retirement, but that he will quietly exert his influence from the shadows, strongarming Sheinbaum into further militarizing the country, especially its immigration system. This is a crucial moment for Morena, a party that surged to power largely with the backing of the country's youthful left and working-class coalitions. Now that AMLO is on the way out, will Morena youth hold the party—and especially Sheinbaum—to its internationalist commitments to "put the poor first," regardless of their nationality? Or will Morena betray its commitments and continue to sacrifice hundreds of thousands fleeing state violence and governmental collapse at the behest of the United States? The best thing for Morena—and for AMLO's legacy—is if its youth firmly demand their great leader die in peaceful obscurity. It is their party now, not his. May they use it for what it was intended for: empowering the world's most vulnerable and exploited, Mexican and migrant alike.
SWP
Will the Mexican left finally put a stop to the slaughter of migrants on their behalf? Soon the party leader will be dead. Andrés Manuel López Obrador, fondly known as AMLO by his supporters, is an old man. This summer, he will finish his historic six-year presidency and, at least formally, make his exit from Mexican political life. There is no other president who has done more for the average Mexican in living memory. Founder of the Morena party, which swept to national victory in 2018 despite being only four years old, AMLO has overseen a litany of policies that "put the poor first," the golden rule of the president's campaign. Under his tenure, the Mexican poverty rate has dropped to historic lows, the minimum wage has over doubled, and a number of new labor laws have been passed to empower trade unions. It is, without exaggeration, one of the greatest accomplishments of any Latin American political party in the last half-century.But there is one glaring problem. What the average Mexican citizen has gained also came at the expense of the approximately 400,000 migrants who cross into the country each year. In 2014, Barrack Obama struck a discreet border externalization pact with then-right-wing President Enrique Peña Nieto known as the Southern Border Program. Under the Program, Mexico is paid millions of dollars each year to detain and deport as many migrants as possible before they can reach the US and ask for asylum. The militarization of Mexico's immigration enforcement was swift and brutal. Approximately 20,000 migrant kidnappings occur in Mexico every year, and around 100,000 have simply been "disappeared," meaning that they are likely dead but their remains have not been recovered. Apparently, to AMLO at least, these migrants did not count as part of the poor he promised to put first. When Donald Trump was elected the stakes became even higher. He threatened to impose new tariffs on Mexico if they did not halt all undocumented migration to the US border. The deal was clear: keep migrants out of the US at all costs, and Mexico will be rewarded with a fat check. But dare to let migrants through, and the United States would intentionally tank Mexico's economy, undoing all of Morena's anti-poverty reforms. In response, AMLO doubled down on border militarization, even inventing a new branch of the military, the National Guard, whose driving purpose seems to be beating migrant caravans on television. Many in Morena are quietly dismayed by this—how could a party that describes itself as anti-US intervention conduct, with relish no less, some of the gringos' bloodiest bidding?—but few have dared to speak publicly against their own party leader. But now change is on the horizon. This summer, Claudia Sheinbaum, AMLO's named successor, is poised to become Mexico's first female president. Sheinbaum, in actuality, is not significantly younger than AMLO. But in spirit she represents a new and fresh face for the party. Whereas AMLO's vision for Mexico has always been firmly—one might even say petulantly—nationalistic, Sheinbaum's outlook is more international. A formal doctoral researcher at UC Berkeley, as mayor of Mexico City Sheinbaum technocratically stewarded the metropolis in its reemergence as one of the world's great cities, all the while attending—at least in part—to the growing number of poor, undocumented migrants within its urban boundaries. As mayor, Sheinbaum greenlit the refurbishment of three large migrant shelters, and has affirmed that Mexico City remains at the forefront of guaranteeing migrant rights in the country. It is enough to be cautiously optimistic. But Claudia, too, has at times given the party mixed signals. She famously tweeted her support of Mexico City's rapidly militarizing police forces, despite many reports that the police contribute to the city's organized crime and extort migrants. There are also concerns that AMLO's cult of personality will not simply fade in retirement, but that he will quietly exert his influence from the shadows, strongarming Sheinbaum into further militarizing the country, especially its immigration system. This is a crucial moment for Morena, a party that surged to power largely with the backing of the country's youthful left and working-class coalitions. Now that AMLO is on the way out, will Morena youth hold the party—and especially Sheinbaum—to its internationalist commitments to "put the poor first," regardless of their nationality? Or will Morena betray its commitments and continue to sacrifice hundreds of thousands fleeing state violence and governmental collapse at the behest of the United States? The best thing for Morena—and for AMLO's legacy—is if its youth firmly demand their great leader die in peaceful obscurity. It is their party now, not his. May they use it for what it was intended for: empowering the world's most vulnerable and exploited, Mexican and migrant alike.
SWP
Article in U.S. News and World Report based on excerpts from Hays' book A Southern Moderate Speaks ; Inside Story of Little Rock .'Mayor Mann privately expressed concern to me over the danger that the disorder might be too great to be controlled by his small police force, and he asked for my assistance" force in an effort to prevent violence. He knew it would be difficult and recognized the gravity of the situation, but he felt sure of his men and he would certainly not show any weakness himself. I knew that he was planning to resign and that he would be happier if he were able to make an honorable exit before the crisis arose, but he did not propose to fade into retirement with even the faintest stain on his record. There were equivalent promises from his assistant chief, Eugene Smith, another competent peace officer who has since succeeded Mr. Potts. On Friday, Federal Judge Davies ordered the Governor to end his opposition to judicial authority and directed him to stop interfering with integration at Little Rock Central High School. The following is a summary of the court decision: The Court: It is very clear to this court from the evidence and the testimony adduced upon the hearing today that the plan of integration adopted by the Little Rock school board and approved by this court and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has been thwarted by the Governor of Arkansas by the use of National Guard troops. It is equally demonstrable from the testimony here today that there would have been no violence in carrying out the plan of integration, and that there has been no violence. The petition of the United States of America as amicus curiae [friend of the court] for a preliminary injunction against Governor Faubus, General Clinger and Colonel Johnson and all others named in the petition is granted and such injunction shall issue without delay enjoining those respondents from obstructing or preventing by use of the National Guard or otherwise the attendance of Negro students at Little Rock High School under the plan of integration approved by this court and from otherwise obstructing or interfering with orders of this court in connection with the plan of integration. Governor Faubus's attorneys walked out of the courtroom in the middle of the hearing rather than stay to cross-examine witnesses and hear the verdict, thus challenging the court's authority. Three hours after the decision, Governor Faubus went on television to announce his withdrawal of the Guard, in compliance with the order, but he had earlier indicated he would appeal the decision of Judge Davies on the ground that the district court did not have jurisdiction against him. He said that the right of Negro children to attend white schools had been upheld by the Supreme Court but that he hoped "by their own volition the Negroes would refrain from seizing upon that right until such time as there is assurance that it can be accomplished in a peaceful manner." He closed with an appeal for "reason and clear thinking and good order." Eisenhower's Reaction In Washington, President Eisenhower called the withdrawal of the Guard "a necessary step in the right direction." He went on to say that he was confident that the citizens of Little Rock would demonstrate that in their city proper orders of a United States court would be executed promptly and without disorder. My wife and I boarded the train for Little Rock early Saturday morning in a driving rain which continued all day. It fitted my mood. Late in the afternoon I was met at a station two hours out of Little Rock by my friend, Clyde Lowry, who drove me the remaining distance in his car so he could counsel with me on the gravity of the situation. My wife continued on the train. Clyde was interested in the political phases of the conflict. He felt that my efforts toward mediation had been applauded but that, since they had apparently failed, I should not jeopardize my political future. It was not the counsel of timidity or defeatism but the product of his deep concern for my political influence and position. Neither of us could see any avenues of further service opening for me. As I look back on it now, and I am sure he would share this feeling, I wonder why we thought that there was nothing left to do. Back in the familiar surroundings of the Sam Peck Hotel, I could only hope that, as the collision between State and federal authorities approached, violence would be avoided and no undue strain placed upon existing relationships. I saw this conflict in the framework of a seething South and a disquieted nation. There were vast repercussions abroad, and I was eager for our national prestige not to be damaged. World peril was too great to permit indifference to the foreign-policy aspects of the struggle. I had endeavored in my talks with the Governor to suggest a condition that would not make federal military policing inevitable. An unexpected call from Mayor Mann came early Sunday morning. The mayor was once again responsible for preserving order in the city, and members of the Little Rock police force took over the guard duty as the National Guardsmen left the school. In a public statement, Mr. Mann had urged Little Rock residents to accept integration peacefully and warned that local law-enforcement officers would be on hand to deal with persons who did not co-operate. Privately, he now expressed concern to me over the danger that the disorder might be too great to be controlled by his small police force, and he asked for my assistance. First Mention of U. S. Troops When I had decided to return to Little Rock I told the press that I now considered my responsibilities heavier than ever, since they were related to the preservation of the peace, and I now assured the mayor of my support. The White House informed me that they wanted to keep the Federal Government from coming into the picture and hoped that local forces could do the job. The school board met in emergency sessions over the week end but no final decisions were made until Sunday concerning entry of the Negro students on Monday, September 23. It was suggested that the city might need federal financial help, at least, in order to pay for temporary police that might be necessary. Police Chief Potts said again he would do his duty, that he would "de-fend" all students, white or black, but he balked at pledging an "escort." At this time Sherman Adams indicated that, if requested by appropriate authority, the Administration might make troops available at the State border in the event that the situation got out of hand. Meanwhile, Governor Faubus flew to Georgia to attend the Southern Governors' Conference and left Lieutenant Governor Nathan Gordon as the State's acting chief executive. When asked in Atlanta if he thought the Little Rock U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, March 23, 1959 129
BASE
Blog: Responsible Statecraft
UPDATE 7/31 6:50 AM: The U.S. conducted an airstrike south of Baghdad late Tuesday. U.S. officials told ABC news that it was a defensive strike to thwart an attempted militant attack on a U.S. base in Babil Province."U.S. forces in Iraq conducted a defensive airstrike in the Musayib in Babil Province, targeting combatants attempting to launch one-way attack uncrewed aerial systems (OWAUAS)," an official told reporters."Based on recent attacks in Iraq and Syria, U.S. Central Command assessed that the OWAUAS posed a threat to U.S. and Coalition Forces," the official said.After six months of calm, Iran-aligned militias are again targeting U.S. troops in Iraq and Syria. Following the Gaza war's eruption, these militias sharply increased their attacks, resulting in the deaths of three U.S. soldiers on January 28 by a Kataib Hezbollah drone at Tower 22 in Jordan, near the Syrian border. In response, the Biden administration launched strikes against the militias, killing a senior Kataib Hezbollah commander on February 7, but avoiding commanders of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard, or IRGC. This led to a temporary lull in violence, but attacks have recently resumed.Last Thursday and Friday, rockets were launched by Iran-aligned militias at bases hosting U.S. troops in Iraq and Syria, including Ain al-Assad base in Iraq and a coalition base in Syria. On July 16th, two drones also attacked al-Assad base, marking the first reported attack since February. No injuries were reported, and the attacks received little media attention.As the U.S. and Iraq negotiate a drawdown of U.S. troops, which would leave only technical advisors, the militias may be trying to speed up implementation of this decision or show strength. These Iran-aligned militias are also part of the so-called Axis of Resistance which includes Lebanese Hezbollah. Any eruption in the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah is likely to spur an uptick in activity by the Iraqi militias, particularly against U.S. troops and Israeli targets like the port of Eilat.The bottom line is that it should not be assumed that these attacks will remain non-lethal. These militias operate outside Iraqi government control and see targeting U.S. troops as part of their raison d'etre. As long as U.S. troops are present, attacks are likely to continue and shows of force to "restore deterrence" will delay — not end — attacks going forward.
Archaeological limbos are unofficial archaeological sites in Mexico that are administered by individuals, communities, organizations, or municipalities and not by the Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia (National Institute of Anthropology and History). These limbos exist in the shadow of the monumental areas consecrated by a Mexican nationalist imagination that monopolizes scarce public resources and available staff. This essay seeks to transport the readers to some of these unofficial projects located in diverse geographical and cultural contexts: To La Proveedora, on the northern border, a private site for petroglyphs in the Sonoran Desert; to the center, where a mestizo ejido guards the cave paintings of El Boye, Hidalgo; to the southeast, to Xoclan, administered as a municipal park; and to Yaxuna, an ancient city preserved by a Mayan community. ; Los limbos arqueológicos son sitios extraoficiales en México no son administrados por el Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia sino que por terceras personas (particulares, comunidades, entidades o municipios), a la sombra de las zonas monumentales consagradas en el imaginario nacionalista que acaparan los escasos recursos y personal disponibles. Este documento busca trasladar a quienes lo lean a algunos de estos proyectos en contextos geográficos y culturales divergentes, a La Proveedora en la frontera norte, un sitio privado de petrograbados en el desierto sonorense; al centro, donde un ejido mestizo custodia las pinturas rupestres de El Boyé, Hidalgo; al sureste, a Xoclán, administrado como un parque municipal y a Yaxuná, una antigua urbe preservada por una comunidad maya. ; Os limbos arqueológicos são sítios não oficiais: significa que não são administrados pelo Instituto Nacional de Antropologia e História, mas por terceiros (indivíduos, comunidades, entidades ou municípios), à sombra das áreas monumentais consagradas no imaginário nacionalista que monopolizam os escassos recursos e pessoal disponível. Este documento pretende situar o leitor em alguns desses projetos em contextos geográficos e culturais divergentes: na La Proveedora na fronteira norte, um sítio privado com petróglifo no deserto de Sonora; no centro, onde as pinturas rupestres de El Boyé, Hidalgo, são guardadas por um terreno mestiço; e no sudeste, Xoclán, administrado como parque municipal, e Yaxuná, uma antiga cidade preservada por uma comunidade maia.
BASE
In: Aktuelle Analysen / Bundesinstitut für Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien, 1997,32
World Affairs Online
In: Südosteuropa-Mitteilungen, Band 43, Heft 4/5, S. 14-29
ISSN: 0340-174X
World Affairs Online
Статья посвящена анализу употребления наркотических средств среди мобилизованных в условиях проведения операции объединенных сил (ООС) в Украине. Авторами рассмотрено нормативно-правовое регулирование вопросов, касающихся организации профилактики и выявления пьянства, наркомании и токсикомании. Обсуждаются нерешенные вопросы своевременного выявления больных алкоголизмом, токсикомании, наркозависимых и установка наркологических противопоказаний к службе в Вооруженных силах Украины. На основе изучения нормативно-правовой базы Украины по организации выявления больных алкоголизмом, токсикомании, наркозависимых и проведения профилактических наркологических осмотров авторами установлено, что вопросы проведения мер профилактики и выявления пьянства, наркомании и токсикомании в Вооруженных силах Украины сегодня не урегулированы. На основе полученных данных авторами разработаны предложения, предусматривающие законодательные и организационные меры по разработке и утверждению межведомственного приказа о порядке проведения наркологических и психиатрических осмотров в Вооруженных силах Украины; а также по разработке и утверждению межведомственного приказа о координации действий специалистов Министерства здравоохранения Украины и Министерства обороны Украины при оказании психиатрической и медико-психологической помощи участникам ООС. Вместе с тем предлагается усилить контроль за работой военных комиссариатов по изучению призывных контингентов, сбору необходимой информации об алкогольной и наркотической зависимости граждан, призываемых в Вооруженные силы Украины. ; Стаття присвячена аналізу вживання наркотичних засобів серед мобілізованих в умовах проведення операції об'єднаних сил (ООС) в Україні. Авторами розглянуто нормативно-правове врегулювання питань з організації профілактики та виявлення пияцтва, наркозалежності та токсикоманії. Обговорюються невирішені питання своєчасного виявлення хворих на алкоголізм, токсикоманії, наркозалежних та встановлення наркологічних протипоказань до служби в Збройних силах України. На основі вивчення нормативно-правової бази України щодо організації виявлення хворих на алкоголізм, токсикоманії, наркозалежних та проведення профілактичних наркологічних оглядів авторами встановлено, що питання організації заходів профілактики та виявлення пияцтва, наркозалежності та токсикоманії в Збройних силах України остаточно неврегульоване. На підставі отриманих даних авторами розроблені пропозиції, що передбачають законодавчі та організаційні заходи з розробки та затвердження міжвідомчого наказу про порядок проведення наркологічних та психіатричних оглядів в Збройних силах України; а також з розробки та затвердження міжвідомчого наказу щодо координації дій фахівців Міністерства охорони здоров'я України та Міністерства оборони України при наданні психіатричної та медико-психологічної допомоги учасникам ООС. Разом із тим пропонується посилити контроль за роботою військових комісаріатів з вивчення призовних контингентів, збору необхідної інформації про алкогольну та наркотичну залежності громадян, які призиваються у Збройні сили України. ; Background. To date, the problem of the drug addiction spread among young people aged 15 to 35 years has been acutely registered in Ukraine. Involving young people in the Armed Forces of Ukraine simultaneously forms the task of timely diagnosis of drug and alcohol abuse among servicemen, military and reservists. However, the procedure of identifying patients with alcoholism, substance and drug abuse, carrying out preventive narcological surveys and implementation of measures for the prevention and detection of alcoholism, drug addiction and substance abuse in the Armed Forces of Ukraine has not been completely regulated. The purpose of the study is to analyze the legal framework for the development of scientifically sound preventive measures and the detection of alcohol, drug and substance abuse in the Armed Forces of Ukraine as an important element of the system of medical support of combat readiness of troops. Materials and methods. The analysis was carried out of publications on the topical issues of organizing the prevention and detection of alcohol, drug and substance abuse. The recommendations were worked out in regulations on the timely detection of patients with alcoholism, substance abuse, drug addicts and the identification of narcological contraindications for certain types of activities. The normative documents concerning anti-alcohol and drug-related measures and obligatory preventive drug tests in the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other force ministries and departments are considered. Results. Prevention of alcohol, drug and substance abuse among military personnel includes organizational, social, educational, psychological and pedagogical, medical measures. It consists in timely detection and evaluation of allegations of alcohol abuse by servicemen, the creation of social and organizational barriers to the development of this negative phenomenon, a qualified explanation of the physiological, psychological and social consequences of alcoholism, drug addiction and substance abuse. Often, the following types of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances are used: products of processing hemp in the form of chopped parts of this plant (hashish, anasha, marijuana) or bunched; hemp pitches (pills of black or brownish brown color); opium poppy products in the form of opium-raw; heroin (diacetyl morphine — a crystalline substance of white color); synthetic drugs (methadone, amphetamine, opioid alkaloids); pharmaceuticals, precursors (acetic anhydride, ephedrine, ergometrine, lysergic acid, etc.). A preventive narcological survey was introduced in Ukraine in order to timely detection patients with alcoholism, substance abuse, drug addicts and the identification of narcological contraindications for certain types of activities. Normative documents provide for primary, periodic and ordered drug tests. The initial survey is conducted by persons who are recruited for a certain position. A periodic survey is carried out at specified intervals (different for different professions) throughout the period of work in the office. The issue of ordered test is solved individually. A significant proportion of Ukrainian citizens are undergoing this procedure at a drug treatment institution at their place of residence, except for employees: of the Ministry of Internal Affairs; Security Service of Ukraine; Foreign Intelligence Services of Ukraine; State Border Guard Service of Ukraine. Persons who work in the above-mentioned structures undergo narcological examinations in departmental medical institutions. It should be noted that the organization of mandatory prophylactic drug test of persons who enter the service to the Ministry of Defense and undergo military service in departmental health care institutions is not regulated. If it is not possible to carry out ordered examinations of persons of private and commanding staff, officers of internal affairs, servicemen, workers of the National Guard of Ukraine in departmental medical institutions, this issue is solved by conducting these surveys in public and municipal health care institutions on a self-sustaining basis, at the expense of the customer. Today, the Armed Forces of Ukraine do not have military medical institutions that have the right to carry out preventive narcological examinations in full, namely, there are no laboratories that have the right to conduct a medical laboratory examination in accordance with the procedure established of the Ministry of Health of Ukraine. Therefore, in order to ensure compliance with the requirements of the current legislation on the procedure for conducting a narcological review, the medical service of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, if necessary, conducts extraordinary narcological examinations of servicemen during military service, in particular under ATO conditions, organizes these surveys on a self-supporting basis in state and municipal health care included in the list of institutions, where it is possible to undergo a drug screening, approved by the order of the Ministry of Health of Ukraine. Conclusions. In order to increase the effectiveness of the system for the detection and prevention of drug addiction, substance abuse and alcoholism, the system of organizational measures for the development and approval of an interagency order on the procedure for conducting narcological and psychiatric examinations in the Armed Forces of Ukraine should be harmonized. The urgent issues are the elaboration and approval of an interagency order on coordinating actions of specialists of the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine with provision of psychiatric and medical psychological assistance to ATO participants. The control over the work of military registration offices should be strengthened in order to study contingents, collecting the necessary information on the alcohol and drug addictions of citizens who are called to the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
BASE
Ph.D.(Melit.) ; The prevailing view in academic literature highlights the independence of European agencies as the rationale for their creation. Contrary to this perception, this work demonstrates that the Commission exercises considerable control through its opinions on an agency´s Single Programming Document. Being part of the budgetary procedure, European agencies are obliged to draw up a `Single Programming Document` comprising an annual and multiannual work programme together with corresponding planning of human and financial resources. Based upon performance-budgeting principles, the Framework Financial Regulation (FFR) hereby sets out detailed rules on the programming procedure and defines the Commission´s role in this respect. Apart from proposing the number of contributions from the EU budget, the Commission has the competence to give its opinion on an agency´s draft single programming document. To examine the Commission´s exercise of control, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) and the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) were part of the case study. For both agencies, the draft single programming documents for the years 2019-2021 were analysed and compared with their final programming version. It was noticed that the Commission´s comments frequently appear as instructions rather than recommendations and that the majority of their requests were observed by the agency. To establish the Commission´s role in a broader context, its opinions are analysed in terms of their content and quality of comments. Hereby, it is noticed that the Commission´s role depends on external factors and is thus a flexible one. Acting mainly as a legal supervisor, the Commission also addresses efficiency-related aspects and ensuresthat policy directions are properly considered in the programme. Several instances are noted where the Commission pursues its own interests that are outside the scope of the programme procedure. Even though, it exercises considerable powers over an agency´s programming content, the relationship between the Commission and European agencies is not yet comparable with ministry-agency constellations found at the nation-state level. Nevertheless, it is regarded that the Commission transgresses its competences as its opinions go beyond the limited scope of the Framework Financial Regulation. Possible legislative improvements are discussed in the last chapter of this work. It concludes that the Treaties lack an appropriate basis for the adoption of secondary legislation that regulates the programming procedure comprehensively. Therefore, Treaty amendments are required in addition to secondary EU legislation that sanctions today´s programming practice. Suggestions for legislative proposals are made to this end. ; N/A
BASE
The article is devoted to the issues of interaction between the forces of the state security sector during the protection of the places of compact stay of diplomatic personnel, as well as during its evacuation. A classical definition of interaction is given, how it is achieved and what is determined during its planning, in what forms the work on its organization is carried out. A particular definition of the interaction of interagency forces in the protection of diplomatic facilities is given. Interaction methods are recommended. In relation to the planned interaction table, it is recommended that the totality (sequence) of stages of action of the state security sector forces, which are involved in the protection of places of compact stay of diplomatic personnel. Separately, the levels at which the interaction is carried out are considered, and the corresponding departmental structures that are involved. For a case of resolving a crisis situation at the local level that has developed in connection with threats to the functioning of diplomatic facilities, a list of direct subjects of interaction between representatives of law enforcement agencies is proposed. Two examples of documenting the interaction order are proposed as examples, namely, planned interaction tables indicating the preferred option. Separately, the issues of coordination and clarification of interaction during the transition from the protection of places of compact stay of diplomatic personnel and their evacuation, as well as during the evacuation itself, are considered. A variant of threats to the evacuation convoy (including those of a terrorist nature) is given, its marching order on the march, a place in this marching order is recommended for carrying out the procedure for clarifying the interaction of the marching guard in case of threats to diplomatic personnel. Attention is drawn to the importance of the last stage of the evacuation of diplomatic personnel – the passage of customs and border control procedures.In the conclusion of the article, attention is focused on the need to expand the empirical base of materials related to questions of clarifying interaction, especially in unusual crisis situations, and the role of command and staff and tactical exercises, as well as field research, in this. ; Розглянуто основи взаємодії представників силових відомств у разі загрози функціонуванню дипломатичних представництв та консульських установ іноземних держав. Викладено питання взаємодії під час здійснення охорони місць компактного перебування дипломатичного персоналу, а також під час його евакуації. Запропоновано варіанти оформлення планових таблиць взаємодії.
BASE
Досліджено зміни кількісного і якісного стану землекористування оборони в період з 1990 р. по 2017 р. В результаті чого стало відомо, що з 1990 р. зменшилася загальна площа земель оборони на 59,7%, а з 2010 р. по 2017 р. на 0,4%.Землі Міністерства оборони в складі категорії земель оборони складають – 339,8 тис. га або 84,9% від загальної площі (табл. 2.2), Міністерство внутрішніх справ – 11,8 тис. га або 2,9%, Національна гвардія – 10,0 тис. га або 2,5%, Державний комітет у справах охорони державного кордону – 6,8 тис. га або 1,7%, Товариство сприяння обороні України – 3,1 тис. га або 0,8%, інші військові формування – 10,7 тис. га або 2,7%.В землекористуванні оборони пройшли відчутні зміни після окупації АР Крим Росією. Зокрема, площа земель оборони зменшилася до 362,2 тис. га або на 9,5% (табл. 2.3 ). В складі землекористування оборони питома вага забудованих земель коливається від 0,6 до 26,2 відсотки. Питома вага забудованих земель у тих регіонах де розміщені військові частини.Встановлено, що суттєві зміни, які пройшли у землекористуванні оборони, не вплинули на підвищення екологічної, економічної та соціальної його безпеки, а відповідно і безпеки життєдіяльності населення України.Ключові слова. Землекористування оборони, землі оборони, земельні відносини, функціональне використання земель. ; The changes in the quantitative and qualitative state of use of defense lands in the period from 1990 to 2017 were researched. As a result, it became known that since 1990 the total area of defense lands has decreased by 59.7%, and from 2010 to 2017 by 0.4%. The lands of the Ministry of Defense in the category of defense lands constitute 339.8 thousand hectares or 84.9% of the total area, the Ministry of Internal Affairs - 11.8 thousand hectares or 2.9%, the National Guard - 10,0 thousand hectares or 2.5%, the State Committee for the Protection of the State Border of 6.8 thousand hectares or 1.7%, the Society for the Defense of Ukraine - 3.1 thousand hectares or 0.8%, other military formations - 10.7 thousand hectares or 2.7%.Significant changes in the land use of defense took place after the occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea by Russia. In particular, the area of defense lands decreased to 362.2 thousand hectares or 9.5%. In the structure of the land use of defense the component of built-on sites varies from 0.6% to 26.2%.Established, that significant changes that took place in the land use of defense did not increase of ecological, economic and social security, and, consequently, the safety of the life of the population of Ukraine.Keywords. Land use of defense, land of defense, land and property relations.
BASE
In Schengen terminology, the establishment of common external borders and the increase o f controls on them are part of the so - called "compensatory measures".They respond to an idea of "compensating" for the absence of internal borders, and consequent free internal movement, with other measures such as a common immigration policy, judicial and police cooperation, etc. It is the origin of the Freedom, Security and Justice Area introduced in the Treaty of Amsterdam. In sum, it is about guaranteeing freedom in a context of security and justice.The present paper tries to analyze the evolution o f the regulation of one of the "compensatory mechanisms" of free circulation, FRONTEX, and the causes of successive revisions of its mandate, included the new European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG). Regulation 1624/2016 about EBCG, is provoking an intense debate between the specialists of European Union Law; for some of them the EBCG is a real step towards a common policy on common control of external borders, and for others it is nothing more than "Frontex + ". For this reason, we will try to provide the cr itical news of the latest regulation for lighting and facilitate the taking of positions. ; En terminología Schengen, el establecimiento de unas fronteras exteriores comunes y el incremento de controles en estas se encuentran dent ro de las llamadas "medidas compensatorias".Estas responden a la idea de "compensar" la ausencia de fronteras interiores con otro tipo de medidas como la cooperación judicial y policial. Ese es el origen del Espacio de Libertad, Seguridad y Justicia intro ducido en el Tratado de Ámsterdam. En definitiva, se trata de garantizar la libertad en un contexto de seguridad y justicia común.El presente trabajo tratará de analizar la evolución de la regulación de uno de los "mecanismos compensatorios" de la libre c irculación, FRONTEX, y las causas de las sucesivas revisiones de su mandato, culminadas en la nueva Guardia Europea de Fronteras y Costas (GEFC). El Reglamento regulador de la GEFC, está provocando un intenso debate entre los especialistas en Derecho de la Unión Europea; para parte de la doctrina supone un verdadero paso hacia una política común en materia de control común de las fronteras exteriores y para otros no es más que "FRONTEX+ ". Por ello, trataremos de dar noticia de los aspectos más relevantes de la nueva regulación para dar cierta luz y facilitar la toma de posicione
BASE