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We use spatial regression discontinuity analysis to test whether the historical partition of Poland among three empires--Russia, Austria‐Hungary, and Prussia--has a persistent effect on political outcomes in contemporary Poland and to examine the channels of this influence. We find that the main difference in voting across Polish territories attributed by many observers to the legacy of empires is driven by omitted variables. However, empires do have a significant causal effect. The lands that belonged to Prussia (compared with those that belonged to Russia) vote more for anticommunist (post‐Solidarity) parties. This difference is largely explained by the persistent effect of infrastructure built by Prussians at the time of industrialization. The former Austrian lands (compared with former Russian lands) votes more for religious conservatives and for liberals. The difference in the vote for religious conservatives is explained by persistent differences in church attendance driven by vastly different policies of the two empires toward the Catholic Church. Higher support for liberals on the Austrian side is partly explained by a persistent belief in democracy, which is a legacy of decentralized democratic governance of the Austrian empire.

We use spatial regression discontinuity analysis to test whether the historical partition of Poland among three empires--Russia, Austria‐Hungary, and Prussia--has a persistent effect on political outcomes in contemporary Poland and to examine the channels of this influence. We find that the main difference in voting across Polish territories attributed by many observers to the legacy of empires is driven by omitted variables. However, empires do have a significant causal effect. The lands that belonged to Prussia (compared with those that belonged to Russia) vote more for anticommunist (post‐Solidarity) parties. This difference is largely explained by the persistent effect of infrastructure built by Prussians at the time of industrialization. The former Austrian lands (compared with former Russian lands) votes more for religious conservatives and for liberals. The difference in the vote for religious conservatives is explained by persistent differences in church attendance driven by vastly different policies of the two empires toward the Catholic Church. Higher support for liberals on the Austrian side is partly explained by a persistent belief in democracy, which is a legacy of decentralized democratic governance of the Austrian empire.

We use spatial regression discontinuity analysis to test whether the historical partition of Poland among three empires--Russia, Austria‐Hungary, and Prussia--has a persistent effect on political outcomes in contemporary Poland and to examine the channels of this influence. We find that the main difference in voting across Polish territories attributed by many observers to the legacy of empires is driven by omitted variables. However, empires do have a significant causal effect. The lands that belonged to Prussia (compared with those that belonged to Russia) vote more for anticommunist (post‐Solidarity) parties. This difference is largely explained by the persistent effect of infrastructure built by Prussians at the time of industrialization. The former Austrian lands (compared with former Russian lands) votes more for religious conservatives and for liberals. The difference in the vote for religious conservatives is explained by persistent differences in church attendance driven by vastly different policies of the two empires toward the Catholic Church. Higher support for liberals on the Austrian side is partly explained by a persistent belief in democracy, which is a legacy of decentralized democratic governance of the Austrian empire.

We use spatial regression discontinuity analysis to test whether the historical partition of Poland among three empires--Russia, Austria‐Hungary, and Prussia--has a persistent effect on political outcomes in contemporary Poland and to examine the channels of this influence. We find that the main difference in voting across Polish territories attributed by many observers to the legacy of empires is driven by omitted variables. However, empires do have a significant causal effect. The lands that belonged to Prussia (compared with those that belonged to Russia) vote more for anticommunist (post‐Solidarity) parties. This difference is largely explained by the persistent effect of infrastructure built by Prussians at the time of industrialization. The former Austrian lands (compared with former Russian lands) votes more for religious conservatives and for liberals. The difference in the vote for religious conservatives is explained by persistent differences in church attendance driven by vastly different policies of the two empires toward the Catholic Church. Higher support for liberals on the Austrian side is partly explained by a persistent belief in democracy, which is a legacy of decentralized democratic governance of the Austrian empire.

We use spatial regression discontinuity analysis to test whether the historical partition of Poland among three empires--Russia, Austria‐Hungary, and Prussia--has a persistent effect on political outcomes in contemporary Poland and to examine the channels of this influence. We find that the main difference in voting across Polish territories attributed by many observers to the legacy of empires is driven by omitted variables. However, empires do have a significant causal effect. The lands that belonged to Prussia (compared with those that belonged to Russia) vote more for anticommunist (post‐Solidarity) parties. This difference is largely explained by the persistent effect of infrastructure built by Prussians at the time of industrialization. The former Austrian lands (compared with former Russian lands) votes more for religious conservatives and for liberals. The difference in the vote for religious conservatives is explained by persistent differences in church attendance driven by vastly different policies of the two empires toward the Catholic Church. Higher support for liberals on the Austrian side is partly explained by a persistent belief in democracy, which is a legacy of decentralized democratic governance of the Austrian empire.

Islamistische Organisationen nutzen das Internet, um ihre Unterstützer und. - Sympathisanten zu mobilisieren. Diese Entwicklung erfordert es, die im Internet. - aktiven Propagandisten zu verfolgen, durch aktive Manipulation Misstrauen zu. - säen und langfristig auch Aussteiger für Gegenentwürfe zu identifizieren. (APUZ)

La quatrième de couverture : Les théories orthodoxes du capitalisme sont en crise: après des siècles de débat, elles sont toujours incapables de nous dire ce qu'est le capital. Libéraux et marxistes tiennent le capital pour une entité "économique" qu'on peut comptabiliser en unités universelles d'"utils" ou de "travail abstrait". Mais ces unités sont fictives: personne n'a jamais été en mesure de les observer ou de les mesurer. Parce que le libéralisme et le marxisme reposent sur ces unités qui n'existent pas, leurs théories flottent dans le vide. Elles ne peuvent pas expliquer le processus qui importe le plus - l'accumulation du capital. Écrit dans une langue claire et aussi accessible aux profanes qu'aux experts, ce livre propose une alternative radicale : une théorie originale du "capital comme pouvoir" et une histoire inédite du "mode capitaliste du pouvoir". Pour les auteurs, le capital n'est pas une simple entité économique, mais bien une quantification symbolique du pouvoir. Le capital, affirment les auteurs, représente le pouvoir organisé dont disposent les groupes du capital dominant pour remodeler - ou créordonner - leur société.