Suchergebnisse

The existing conflicts between approval of Rome Statute by Islamic Consultative Assembly along with joining the International Criminal Court and national interests and some of Islamic laws and regulations, has always been a controversial issue among scholars of law community of Iran because of the establishment of International Criminal Court and signed the Rome Statute by Islamic Republic of Iran. Many believe that accession to the International Criminal Court and its approval by parliament is inconsistent with national interests and sovereignty and also would bring negative consequences to the country. Contrary to this view, it is believed that provisions of the Rome Statute are not inconsistent with Islamic and domestic regulations and this accession can bring positive outcomes and international interests to Iran. In this way, national power and sovereignty of country would be reinforced at international level. The present study has investigated positive consequences and advantages of Iran's accession to the Rome Statute.

On 2 April 2014, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas signed the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), the only globally agreed framework for combating corruption One month later, the UNCAC entered into force in Palestine. Palestine is now obliged to incorporate the convention into domestic legislation. It must also make the necessary changes to its institutions and practices. This requires effecting corruption-preventive measures at both the domestic and international level. At the domestic level this involves criminalizing certain conducts. At the international level it means strengthening international law enforcement, judicial cooperation, technical assistance, and the provision of effective legal mechanisms for stolen asset recovery and exchange of information. Although the UNCAC outlines international standards, it does not stipulate how to put them in place. Each state must determine its own priorities and the appropriate sequencing of reform steps. This requires a broad political dialogue with domestic and international stakeholders and the crafting of technical assistance programmes. ; Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)

Although they are arguably the worst violators of human rights, dictators sometimes commit to international human rights treaties like the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT) to appease their domestic opposition. Importantly, however, executives facing effective judiciaries must anticipate ex post costs that can arise when international treaties are likely to be enforced domestically. This suggests that one domestic institution—a political opposition party—may provide a dictator with incentives to commit to international human rights treaties and violate human rights, while another—an effective domestic judiciary—may constrain the dictator's ability to violate human rights and incentivize him to avoid international commitment. How do dictators make choices about commitment to human rights law and respect for human rights when they face conflicting domestic incentives? Furthermore, how do these divergent incentives affect compliance when dictators do commit to international treaties? In this article, I argue that the domestic incentives dictators face to support the CAT and engage in torture are moderated in countries with effective domestic judiciaries.

Security sector reform (SSR) emerged as a strategy in postconflict states during the late 1990s, driven by development donors, international organizations and other international affairs consultants which have been accepted by policymakers, development practitioners and security experts. Primarily, SSR aims to strengthen, professionalize, discipline and democratize security forces: the national army and state police. However, SSR has faced many challenges. SSR in transitional administrations such as Kosovo and East Timor in 1999 and Afghanistan in 2002 has been dominated by the international community leading such processes. As a result, the international community and international donors have heavily focused on professionalizing the security forces under externally driven programs. This practice has failed to adopt a holistic vision of SSR. Less investment in the judicial sector has made the whole process counterproductive. This article argues that SSR has three pitfalls. SSR focuses on physical security; is externally driven and compartmentalized. The rule of law and justice, otherwise justice sector reform (JSR) needs to be injected into SSR to benefit a more sustainable peacebuilding program.

Argues that Russia has regained strength in the world arena even though it was not a "beneficiary of the burgeoning new world order." The need to resist situations in which international law is subordinated to expedience is discussed & suggestions are offered for ways to make Russia's foreign policy more efficient in light of today's international situation. First, Russia must strive to promote a positive agenda that exhibits a constructive approach to a wide range of themes. Second, Russia must minimize the number of situations in which it stands alone in international politics. There will always be some circumstances in which standing alone is essential in order to adhere to principles; however, these circumstances must not become the norm. Third, Russia's international policy must be clear & predictable & include "an efficient mechanism for preemptive support of foreign policy decisions." Lastly, a strong & efficient diplomacy requires the development of both a conceptual approach to participation in international forums & a "non-standard, non-stereotyped," systematic approach to key foreign policy problems. J. Lindroth

That democracies, though just as belligerent as non‐democracies, are unlikely to fight one another is practically law in the study of international relations. Yet prevailing liberal explanations for this democratic peace, which focus primarily on democratic political institutions and culture, remain incomplete. Most importantly, these explanations emphasize a rights‐based ethic, which has significantly limited our comprehension of the link between domestic politics and international relations to empirical generalizations. International relationships, however, are intrinsically interdependent and therefore thoroughly knowable only in the context in which they occur and are experienced. In this article I interpret the "democratic peace" as a single thread, albeit a highly visible and important one, in the dense fabric of international relations. More specifically, I enlarge the context in which domestic politics is connected to international relations to include the politics of care—itself a practice that is usually understood to be private, i.e., particular, often emotional, and contextually moral. The result is a more refined understanding of the conditions for peace among all nations—democratic or not.

That democracies, though just as belligerent as non-democracies, are unlikely to fight one another is practically law in the study of international relations. Yet prevailing liberal explanations for this democratic peace, which focus primarily on democratic political institutions & culture, remain incomplete. Most importantly, these explanations emphasize a rights-based ethic, which has significantly limited our comprehension of the link between domestic politics & international relations to empirical generalizations. International relationships, however, are intrinsically interdependent & therefore thoroughly knowable only in the context in which they occur & are experienced. In this article I interpret the "democratic peace" as a single thread, albeit a highly visible & important one, in the dense fabric of international relations. More specifically, I enlarge the context in which domestic politics is connected to international relations to include the politics of care -- itself a practice that is usually understood to be private, ie, particular, often emotional, & contextually moral. The result is a more refined understanding of the conditions for peace among all nations -- democratic or not. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractThis article examines the interrelationship between and the relative importance of individual leadership and structural power in promoting (or impeding) regime implementation. The theoretical debates on structural power and individual leadership are related to a particular case of regime implementation: the efforts of the Preparatory Commission on the International Seabed Authority and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea to make the international seabed regime operational. The article concludes that hegemonic stability theory highlights a variable—structural power—which in this case is the key determinant of the ability to exert influence. On the other hand, hegemonic stability theory fails to establish causal links and it ignores other important variables, such as the constraints imposed by changes in the domestic environments of leading states as well as in the international environment. In the pulling and hauling of international negotiations aimed at regime implementation, individuals can and do play significant roles as structural, intellectual and, most particularly, entrepreneurial leaders.