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Ethno-political leadership is an important indicator of the social and political representation of minority groups in a multicultural social environment. The most effective form of its implementation provides for the representation of the ethnic community at the level of the highest legislative body of the state. A number of countries in Central and Eastern Europe have developed their own models of such representation over the last past decades. They are implemented through guaranteed reservation of seats for representatives of ethnic communities, lower numerical thresholds for representation in parliament, inclusion of ethno-political leaders in the lists of national parties, single-member districts may provide sufficient minority representation as well. The relevance of the study of the ethno-political leadership in the context of parliamentary representation of ethnic minorities is objectively determined by the multi-ethnicity of Ukrainian society, declaration of Ukraine's integration into the EU structures and implementation of European democratic principles of governance.The subject of the research are public and political leaders, mostly heads of national-cultural societies, foundations, ethnopolitical parties. The author applies the method of electoral statistic analysis for parliamentary elections of 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2007, 2012, 2014 and 2019. Synthetically generalized of minority representation in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of all nine convocations. Emphasis is made on the political participation of representatives of the multi-ethnic regions in Ukraine (Crimea, Eastern Ukraine, Northern Azov, Southern Bessarabia, Bukovina, Transcarpathia).Adequate representationof people's deputies of Russian and Jewish ethnic origin has considered in the article. Among the ethnopolitical leaders of Jewish ethnicity, the figure of Kharkiv resident Olexander Feldman stands out, who since 2002 has invariably been a people's deputy of Ukraine. Vadim Rabinovych, the leader of the All-Ukrainian Jewish Congress is represented in parliament for only the last two terms. The most constant (since 1998 as a people's deputate) is the position of the Crimean Tatar leader, national democrat Mustafa Dzhemilev. A similar ideological orientation is taken by the head of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people Refat Chubarov. The co-founder of the «Our Land» Party Anton Kisse is a stable ethno-political leader of the Bulgarians in Ukraine. The unbalanced position of the ethno-political leadership of the Romanian (Ivan Popescu) and the Hungarian (Ishtvan Haidosh, Vasyl Brenzovich) representatives is also has considered. It is indicated about the first steps at the parliamentary representation of the Azov Greeks in the person of Dmytro Lubinets.The author concludes about the low efficiency of parliamentary representation of ethnic minorities in Ukraine, which is caused by permanent changes in electoral legislation, negative electoral and engineering practice of gerrymandering and neglecting of European good practices of including minority ethnic groups in politics, which are defined in international documents. ; Этнополитическое лидерство является важным индикатором общественно-политической репрезентации миноритарных групп в условиях поликультурной социальной среды. Наиболее эффективная форма его реализации предусматривает представительство этнической общины на уровне высшего законодательного органа государства. Ряд стран Центрально-Восточной Европы в течение последних десятилетий выработали собственные модели подобной репрезентации. Они реализуются через гарантированное резервирование мест для представителей этнических общин, снижение процентного барьера для прохождения в парламент, включение этнополитических лидеров в списки общенациональных партий, создание одномандатных округов для этнических меньшинств, проживающих компактно. Актуальность исследования проблематики этнополитического лидерства в контексте парламентского представительства этнических меньшинств объективно обусловлено полиэтничностью украинского общества, декларированием интеграции Украины в структуры ЕС и внедрением европейских демократических принципов управления.Предметом исследования являются общественные и политические лидеры, как правило руководители национально-культурных обществ, фондов, этнополитических партий. Автор применяет методику анализа электоральной статистики парламентских выборов 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2007, 2012, 2014 и 2019. Синтетически обобщенно репрезентацию миноритарной этничности в Верховной Раде Украины всех девяти созывов. Сделан акцент на политическом участии представителей полиэтнических регионов Украины (Крым, Восточная Украина, Северное Приазовье, Южная Бессарабия, Буковина, Закарпатье).В статье прослежены достаточно значительный уровень репрезентации народных депутатов российского и еврейского происхождения. Среди этнополитических лидеров еврейской этничности выделяется фигура харьковчанина Александра Фельдмана, который с 2002 года неизменно является народным депутатом Украины. Лидер Всеукраинского еврейского конгресса Вадим Рабинович представлен в парламенте лишь последних двух каденций.Наиболее постоянной (с 1998 года в качестве народного детутата) является позиция крымскотатарского лидера, национал-демократа Мустафы Джемилева. Подобную идеологическую позицию занимает глава Меджлиса крымскотатарского народа Рефат Чубаров. Стабильным этнополитическим лидером болгар Украины выступает соучредитель партии «Наш край» Антон Киссе. Рассматривается также несбалансированная позиция этнополитического лидерства представителей румынской (Иван Попеску) и венгерской (Иштван Гайдош, Василий Брензович) общин Украины. Указанно о первых шагах парламентской репрезентации приазовских греков в лице Дмитрия Лубинця.Автор делает вывод о низкой эффективности парламентского представительства этнических меньшинств Украины, которая обусловленаперманентным изменением избирательного законодательства, отрицательной избирательно-инженерийной практикой джерримендеринга и пренебрежением европейскими положительными практиками включения миноритарных этнических групп в политику, которые определены в международных документах. ; Етнополітичне лідерство є важливим індикатором громадсько-політичної репрезентації міноритарних груп у полікультурному соціальному середовищі. Найбільш ефективна форма його реалізації передбачає представництво етнічної громади на рівні вищого законодавчого органу держави. Ряд країн Центрально-Східної Європи впродовж останніх десятиліть виробили власні моделі такої репрезентації. Вони реалізуються через гарантоване резервування місць для представників етнічних громад, зниження відсоткового бар'єру для проходження в парламент, включення етнополітичних лідерів у списки загальнонаціональних партій, створення одномандатних округів для етнічних меншин, які проживають компактно. Актуальність дослідження проблематики етнополітичного лідерства в контексті парламентського представництва етнічних меншин об'єктивно зумовлене поліетнічністю українського суспільства, декларуванням інтеграції України до структур ЄС і впровадженням європейських демократичних принципів урядування.Предметом студії виступають громадські та політичні лідери, як правило очільники національно-культурних товариств, фондів, етнополітичних партій. Автор застосовує методику аналізу електоральної статистики парламентських виборів 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2007, 2012, 2014 та 2019 років. Відтак синтетично узагальнено репрезентацію міноритарної етнічності у Верховній Раді України всіх дев'яти скликань. Зроблено акцент на політичній участі та представництві в українському парламенті політиків із поліетнічних регіонів України (Крим, Східна Україна, Північне Приазов'я, Одещина, Чернівеччина, Закарпаття).У статті прослідковано досить значний рівень репрезентації народних депутатів російського та єврейського походження. Серед етнополітичних лідерів єврейської етнічності виділяється постать харків'янина Олександра Фельдмана, який з 2002 року незмінно є народним депутатом України. Лідер Всеукраїнського єврейського конгресу Вадим Рабинович представлений у парламенті лише останніх двох каденцій.Найбільш сталою (з 1998 року в якості народного детутата) є позиція кримськотатарського лідера Мустафи Джемілєва. Подібну до нього націонал-демократичну позицію займає очільник Меджлісу кримськотатарського народу Рефат Чубаров. Стабільним етнополітичним лідером болгар України виступає співзасновник партії «Наш край» Антон Кіссе. Розглядається також незбалансована позиція етнополітичного лідерства представників румунської (Іван Попеску) та угорської (Іштван Гайдош, Василь Брензович) громад України. Окреслено перші кроки в парламентській репрезентації приазовських греків Дмитра Лубінця.Автор робить висновок про низьку ефективність парламентського представництва етнічних меншин України, яка зумовлена перманентною зміною виборчого законодавства, негативною виборчо-інженерійною практикою джеррімендерингу та нехтуванням європейськими позитивними практиками включення міноритарних етнічних груп у політику, що визначені в міжнародних документах.

Ethno-political leadership is an important indicator of the social and political representation of minority groups in a multicultural social environment. The most effective form of its implementation provides for the representation of the ethnic community at the level of the highest legislative body of the state. A number of countries in Central and Eastern Europe have developed their own models of such representation over the last past decades. They are implemented through guaranteed reservation of seats for representatives of ethnic communities, lower numerical thresholds for representation in parliament, inclusion of ethno-political leaders in the lists of national parties, single-member districts may provide sufficient minority representation as well. The relevance of the study of the ethno-political leadership in the context of parliamentary representation of ethnic minorities is objectively determined by the multi-ethnicity of Ukrainian society, declaration of Ukraine's integration into the EU structures and implementation of European democratic principles of governance.The subject of the research are public and political leaders, mostly heads of national-cultural societies, foundations, ethnopolitical parties. The author applies the method of electoral statistic analysis for parliamentary elections of 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2007, 2012, 2014 and 2019. Synthetically generalized of minority representation in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of all nine convocations. Emphasis is made on the political participation of representatives of the multi-ethnic regions in Ukraine (Crimea, Eastern Ukraine, Northern Azov, Southern Bessarabia, Bukovina, Transcarpathia).Adequate representationof people's deputies of Russian and Jewish ethnic origin has considered in the article. Among the ethnopolitical leaders of Jewish ethnicity, the figure of Kharkiv resident Olexander Feldman stands out, who since 2002 has invariably been a people's deputy of Ukraine. Vadim Rabinovych, the leader of the All-Ukrainian Jewish Congress is represented in parliament for only the last two terms. The most constant (since 1998 as a people's deputate) is the position of the Crimean Tatar leader, national democrat Mustafa Dzhemilev. A similar ideological orientation is taken by the head of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people Refat Chubarov. The co-founder of the «Our Land» Party Anton Kisse is a stable ethno-political leader of the Bulgarians in Ukraine. The unbalanced position of the ethno-political leadership of the Romanian (Ivan Popescu) and the Hungarian (Ishtvan Haidosh, Vasyl Brenzovich) representatives is also has considered. It is indicated about the first steps at the parliamentary representation of the Azov Greeks in the person of Dmytro Lubinets.The author concludes about the low efficiency of parliamentary representation of ethnic minorities in Ukraine, which is caused by permanent changes in electoral legislation, negative electoral and engineering practice of gerrymandering and neglecting of European good practices of including minority ethnic groups in politics, which are defined in international documents. ; Этнополитическое лидерство является важным индикатором общественно-политической репрезентации миноритарных групп в условиях поликультурной социальной среды. Наиболее эффективная форма его реализации предусматривает представительство этнической общины на уровне высшего законодательного органа государства. Ряд стран Центрально-Восточной Европы в течение последних десятилетий выработали собственные модели подобной репрезентации. Они реализуются через гарантированное резервирование мест для представителей этнических общин, снижение процентного барьера для прохождения в парламент, включение этнополитических лидеров в списки общенациональных партий, создание одномандатных округов для этнических меньшинств, проживающих компактно. Актуальность исследования проблематики этнополитического лидерства в контексте парламентского представительства этнических меньшинств объективно обусловлено полиэтничностью украинского общества, декларированием интеграции Украины в структуры ЕС и внедрением европейских демократических принципов управления.Предметом исследования являются общественные и политические лидеры, как правило руководители национально-культурных обществ, фондов, этнополитических партий. Автор применяет методику анализа электоральной статистики парламентских выборов 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2007, 2012, 2014 и 2019. Синтетически обобщенно репрезентацию миноритарной этничности в Верховной Раде Украины всех девяти созывов. Сделан акцент на политическом участии представителей полиэтнических регионов Украины (Крым, Восточная Украина, Северное Приазовье, Южная Бессарабия, Буковина, Закарпатье).В статье прослежены достаточно значительный уровень репрезентации народных депутатов российского и еврейского происхождения. Среди этнополитических лидеров еврейской этничности выделяется фигура харьковчанина Александра Фельдмана, который с 2002 года неизменно является народным депутатом Украины. Лидер Всеукраинского еврейского конгресса Вадим Рабинович представлен в парламенте лишь последних двух каденций.Наиболее постоянной (с 1998 года в качестве народного детутата) является позиция крымскотатарского лидера, национал-демократа Мустафы Джемилева. Подобную идеологическую позицию занимает глава Меджлиса крымскотатарского народа Рефат Чубаров. Стабильным этнополитическим лидером болгар Украины выступает соучредитель партии «Наш край» Антон Киссе. Рассматривается также несбалансированная позиция этнополитического лидерства представителей румынской (Иван Попеску) и венгерской (Иштван Гайдош, Василий Брензович) общин Украины. Указанно о первых шагах парламентской репрезентации приазовских греков в лице Дмитрия Лубинця.Автор делает вывод о низкой эффективности парламентского представительства этнических меньшинств Украины, которая обусловленаперманентным изменением избирательного законодательства, отрицательной избирательно-инженерийной практикой джерримендеринга и пренебрежением европейскими положительными практиками включения миноритарных этнических групп в политику, которые определены в международных документах. ; Етнополітичне лідерство є важливим індикатором громадсько-політичної репрезентації міноритарних груп у полікультурному соціальному середовищі. Найбільш ефективна форма його реалізації передбачає представництво етнічної громади на рівні вищого законодавчого органу держави. Ряд країн Центрально-Східної Європи впродовж останніх десятиліть виробили власні моделі такої репрезентації. Вони реалізуються через гарантоване резервування місць для представників етнічних громад, зниження відсоткового бар'єру для проходження в парламент, включення етнополітичних лідерів у списки загальнонаціональних партій, створення одномандатних округів для етнічних меншин, які проживають компактно. Актуальність дослідження проблематики етнополітичного лідерства в контексті парламентського представництва етнічних меншин об'єктивно зумовлене поліетнічністю українського суспільства, декларуванням інтеграції України до структур ЄС і впровадженням європейських демократичних принципів урядування.Предметом студії виступають громадські та політичні лідери, як правило очільники національно-культурних товариств, фондів, етнополітичних партій. Автор застосовує методику аналізу електоральної статистики парламентських виборів 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2007, 2012, 2014 та 2019 років. Відтак синтетично узагальнено репрезентацію міноритарної етнічності у Верховній Раді України всіх дев'яти скликань. Зроблено акцент на політичній участі та представництві в українському парламенті політиків із поліетнічних регіонів України (Крим, Східна Україна, Північне Приазов'я, Одещина, Чернівеччина, Закарпаття).У статті прослідковано досить значний рівень репрезентації народних депутатів російського та єврейського походження. Серед етнополітичних лідерів єврейської етнічності виділяється постать харків'янина Олександра Фельдмана, який з 2002 року незмінно є народним депутатом України. Лідер Всеукраїнського єврейського конгресу Вадим Рабинович представлений у парламенті лише останніх двох каденцій.Найбільш сталою (з 1998 року в якості народного детутата) є позиція кримськотатарського лідера Мустафи Джемілєва. Подібну до нього націонал-демократичну позицію займає очільник Меджлісу кримськотатарського народу Рефат Чубаров. Стабільним етнополітичним лідером болгар України виступає співзасновник партії «Наш край» Антон Кіссе. Розглядається також незбалансована позиція етнополітичного лідерства представників румунської (Іван Попеску) та угорської (Іштван Гайдош, Василь Брензович) громад України. Окреслено перші кроки в парламентській репрезентації приазовських греків Дмитра Лубінця.Автор робить висновок про низьку ефективність парламентського представництва етнічних меншин України, яка зумовлена перманентною зміною виборчого законодавства, негативною виборчо-інженерійною практикою джеррімендерингу та нехтуванням європейськими позитивними практиками включення міноритарних етнічних груп у політику, що визначені в міжнародних документах.

Ethno-political leadership is an important indicator of the social and political representation of minority groups in a multicultural social environment. The most effective form of its implementation provides for the representation of the ethnic community at the level of the highest legislative body of the state. A number of countries in Central and Eastern Europe have developed their own models of such representation over the last past decades. They are implemented through guaranteed reservation of seats for representatives of ethnic communities, lower numerical thresholds for representation in parliament, inclusion of ethno-political leaders in the lists of national parties, single-member districts may provide sufficient minority representation as well. The relevance of the study of the ethno-political leadership in the context of parliamentary representation of ethnic minorities is objectively determined by the multi-ethnicity of Ukrainian society, declaration of Ukraine's integration into the EU structures and implementation of European democratic principles of governance.The subject of the research are public and political leaders, mostly heads of national-cultural societies, foundations, ethnopolitical parties. The author applies the method of electoral statistic analysis for parliamentary elections of 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2007, 2012, 2014 and 2019. Synthetically generalized of minority representation in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of all nine convocations. Emphasis is made on the political participation of representatives of the multi-ethnic regions in Ukraine (Crimea, Eastern Ukraine, Northern Azov, Southern Bessarabia, Bukovina, Transcarpathia).Adequate representationof people's deputies of Russian and Jewish ethnic origin has considered in the article. Among the ethnopolitical leaders of Jewish ethnicity, the figure of Kharkiv resident Olexander Feldman stands out, who since 2002 has invariably been a people's deputy of Ukraine. Vadim Rabinovych, the leader of the All-Ukrainian Jewish Congress is represented in parliament for only the last two terms. The most constant (since 1998 as a people's deputate) is the position of the Crimean Tatar leader, national democrat Mustafa Dzhemilev. A similar ideological orientation is taken by the head of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people Refat Chubarov. The co-founder of the «Our Land» Party Anton Kisse is a stable ethno-political leader of the Bulgarians in Ukraine. The unbalanced position of the ethno-political leadership of the Romanian (Ivan Popescu) and the Hungarian (Ishtvan Haidosh, Vasyl Brenzovich) representatives is also has considered. It is indicated about the first steps at the parliamentary representation of the Azov Greeks in the person of Dmytro Lubinets.The author concludes about the low efficiency of parliamentary representation of ethnic minorities in Ukraine, which is caused by permanent changes in electoral legislation, negative electoral and engineering practice of gerrymandering and neglecting of European good practices of including minority ethnic groups in politics, which are defined in international documents. ; Этнополитическое лидерство является важным индикатором общественно-политической репрезентации миноритарных групп в условиях поликультурной социальной среды. Наиболее эффективная форма его реализации предусматривает представительство этнической общины на уровне высшего законодательного органа государства. Ряд стран Центрально-Восточной Европы в течение последних десятилетий выработали собственные модели подобной репрезентации. Они реализуются через гарантированное резервирование мест для представителей этнических общин, снижение процентного барьера для прохождения в парламент, включение этнополитических лидеров в списки общенациональных партий, создание одномандатных округов для этнических меньшинств, проживающих компактно. Актуальность исследования проблематики этнополитического лидерства в контексте парламентского представительства этнических меньшинств объективно обусловлено полиэтничностью украинского общества, декларированием интеграции Украины в структуры ЕС и внедрением европейских демократических принципов управления.Предметом исследования являются общественные и политические лидеры, как правило руководители национально-культурных обществ, фондов, этнополитических партий. Автор применяет методику анализа электоральной статистики парламентских выборов 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2007, 2012, 2014 и 2019. Синтетически обобщенно репрезентацию миноритарной этничности в Верховной Раде Украины всех девяти созывов. Сделан акцент на политическом участии представителей полиэтнических регионов Украины (Крым, Восточная Украина, Северное Приазовье, Южная Бессарабия, Буковина, Закарпатье).В статье прослежены достаточно значительный уровень репрезентации народных депутатов российского и еврейского происхождения. Среди этнополитических лидеров еврейской этничности выделяется фигура харьковчанина Александра Фельдмана, который с 2002 года неизменно является народным депутатом Украины. Лидер Всеукраинского еврейского конгресса Вадим Рабинович представлен в парламенте лишь последних двух каденций.Наиболее постоянной (с 1998 года в качестве народного детутата) является позиция крымскотатарского лидера, национал-демократа Мустафы Джемилева. Подобную идеологическую позицию занимает глава Меджлиса крымскотатарского народа Рефат Чубаров. Стабильным этнополитическим лидером болгар Украины выступает соучредитель партии «Наш край» Антон Киссе. Рассматривается также несбалансированная позиция этнополитического лидерства представителей румынской (Иван Попеску) и венгерской (Иштван Гайдош, Василий Брензович) общин Украины. Указанно о первых шагах парламентской репрезентации приазовских греков в лице Дмитрия Лубинця.Автор делает вывод о низкой эффективности парламентского представительства этнических меньшинств Украины, которая обусловленаперманентным изменением избирательного законодательства, отрицательной избирательно-инженерийной практикой джерримендеринга и пренебрежением европейскими положительными практиками включения миноритарных этнических групп в политику, которые определены в международных документах. ; Етнополітичне лідерство є важливим індикатором громадсько-політичної репрезентації міноритарних груп у полікультурному соціальному середовищі. Найбільш ефективна форма його реалізації передбачає представництво етнічної громади на рівні вищого законодавчого органу держави. Ряд країн Центрально-Східної Європи впродовж останніх десятиліть виробили власні моделі такої репрезентації. Вони реалізуються через гарантоване резервування місць для представників етнічних громад, зниження відсоткового бар'єру для проходження в парламент, включення етнополітичних лідерів у списки загальнонаціональних партій, створення одномандатних округів для етнічних меншин, які проживають компактно. Актуальність дослідження проблематики етнополітичного лідерства в контексті парламентського представництва етнічних меншин об'єктивно зумовлене поліетнічністю українського суспільства, декларуванням інтеграції України до структур ЄС і впровадженням європейських демократичних принципів урядування.Предметом студії виступають громадські та політичні лідери, як правило очільники національно-культурних товариств, фондів, етнополітичних партій. Автор застосовує методику аналізу електоральної статистики парламентських виборів 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2007, 2012, 2014 та 2019 років. Відтак синтетично узагальнено репрезентацію міноритарної етнічності у Верховній Раді України всіх дев'яти скликань. Зроблено акцент на політичній участі та представництві в українському парламенті політиків із поліетнічних регіонів України (Крим, Східна Україна, Північне Приазов'я, Одещина, Чернівеччина, Закарпаття).У статті прослідковано досить значний рівень репрезентації народних депутатів російського та єврейського походження. Серед етнополітичних лідерів єврейської етнічності виділяється постать харків'янина Олександра Фельдмана, який з 2002 року незмінно є народним депутатом України. Лідер Всеукраїнського єврейського конгресу Вадим Рабинович представлений у парламенті лише останніх двох каденцій.Найбільш сталою (з 1998 року в якості народного детутата) є позиція кримськотатарського лідера Мустафи Джемілєва. Подібну до нього націонал-демократичну позицію займає очільник Меджлісу кримськотатарського народу Рефат Чубаров. Стабільним етнополітичним лідером болгар України виступає співзасновник партії «Наш край» Антон Кіссе. Розглядається також незбалансована позиція етнополітичного лідерства представників румунської (Іван Попеску) та угорської (Іштван Гайдош, Василь Брензович) громад України. Окреслено перші кроки в парламентській репрезентації приазовських греків Дмитра Лубінця.Автор робить висновок про низьку ефективність парламентського представництва етнічних меншин України, яка зумовлена перманентною зміною виборчого законодавства, негативною виборчо-інженерійною практикою джеррімендерингу та нехтуванням європейськими позитивними практиками включення міноритарних етнічних груп у політику, що визначені в міжнародних документах.

Problem setting. The legal framework for regulating the ethnic and national sphere determines the influence of state authorities on the current ethnic and national model of interaction between the titular Ukrainian ethnic group and national minorities. An objective factor in the ethnic and national modeling of Ukraine's development is the Ukrainian political nation, whose potential readiness for state-national self-determination is determined by the level of national and regional identity, whose research is extremely in demand in modern science, which begins with the state and determines how it affects poly-ethnic society.Recent research and publications analysis. In the context of the topic under study, the fundamental works of domestic and foreign scholars were used to substantiate the idea of the ethnic core of the nation (A.D. Smith), which constitutes the "foundation" of any ethnic and national model of the state; such ethno-national models are defined: "parallel segmentation" (J. Rothschild), "clan democracy" (O. Kucherenko, O. Lisnichuk), "crossed grid", which is transformed into "mosaic concept" (S.P. Huntington), "universal democracy" (A. Lijphart), the "cosmopolitan" model of democracy (D. Held), "racial democracy"(P. Mancini), as well as the works of P. Van den Berg, O. Kartunov, O. Kryukov, O. Kucherenko, O. Mayborody, Y. Rimarenko, L. Shklyar and others. In the scientific works of A. Andreev, A. Royce, Y. Bromley, M. Weber, G. Nodi, K. Popper, A. Smith, E. Jan, and others. main stages of ethnic and national development of states are analyzed.Paper objective.The author of the article considers the European experience on protecting national minorities' rights and possibility of its application in the Ukrainian legislation and sees it as a basis for the ethnic and national modeling of Ukraine development.Paper main body.Author emphasizes that the European Legislation does not ensure the right to self-determination to ethnic and national minorities. Therefore, effective Constitutional and legal security for the national minorities is provided only in case of their getting the citizenship of the country they live in. Besides, their rights do not exceed the range of rights enjoying by all the citizens of the country they reside and the peculiarities of certain ethnic groups (their needs to preserve national identity, traditions, language, cultural heritage etc.) are not reflected in the legislation of the country of their residence.As a subject of the International Law and the equal participant of international communication, Ukraine ratified the majority of conventions and agreements in the field of human rights protection.The crucial issue of Ukrainian society in the legislative adjustment of ethnic and national sphere is its endeavor to respond to the European legal standards. To use the terms "ethnic groups" would be more adequate for both the genuine Ukrainians and the untitled ethnic groups. Application of the terms "native people" or "autochthonal people" could be disputable as for Tatars or Caraims, who are in fact the "pieces" of some other large communities lived in the past. The same situation is in the issue of language functioning. The EU countries' language policy is carried out in the conditions, which differ from the Ukrainian ones: non-dominant languages in the EU community enjoy protection rights. On the contrary, in Ukraine the language of the titled nation needs every possible support. In this respect, nowadays every attempt to approach the issue of peculiarity of language policy in Ukraine can be criticized by the EU community, which may cause Ukrainian language discrimination.Therefore, just imitating both EU experience and EU legislation in the national issue is not acceptable for development of ethnic and national policy in Ukraine, where there are certain peculiarities.Objective reality of polyethnizm existence in Ukraine as well as some specific national conditions require critical and constructive application of various approaches to interethnic relationships regulation in which EU countries have already been a success. And in Particular, we mean consultative and authority bodies, where national minorities are represented, especially in education, cultural and religious organizations; legislative and executive bodies (formed in the result of free and equal elections); self-government of national minorities as for their authenticity in conditions when territorial autonomy is not provided; bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements regarding national minorities; ensuring the right of national minorities representatives to be educated on different educational levels in their native language; to create state research centers to improve legislation and spreading information as for their non-discrimination; creation of permanent boards to be in touch with the appropriate border-line areas. Application of all-round approaches mentioned above in conjunction with the peculiarities of ethnic and national modeling of state development must favor harmonization of relationships between the Ukrainian title ethnos and national minorities.Conclusions of the research.The research on regulatory and juridical principles of the valid ethnic and national state building model (title ethnos and national minorities) gives grounds to conclude that all the citizens of Ukraine are equally protected by the state. As for the assuring the human rights of national minorities representatives, the state bases on the fact that this law is an integral part of the generally acknowledged Law on human rights.For the Constitution of Ukraine stipulations' realization and establishing the procedures of implementation of the abovementioned regulatory Acts, the author proposes to adopt the set of laws, which would regulate not only the status of national minorities, but also the status of the Ukrainian nation as a title nation. In particular, we mean preambles to the Articles 10, 11, 12 of the Constitution of Ukraine, which are fragmentarily accomplished now in the legislative Acts. In order to achieve it, we need to systematize and make codification of the Ukrainian legislation. ; Рассматривается европейский опыт защиты прав национальных меньшинств и его воплощение в украинском законодательстве как основание для этнонационального моделирования развития Украины. Подчеркивается, что европейское право отказывает этническим, национальным меньшинствам в праве на самоопределение; эффективное правовое обеспечение прав национальных меньшинств возможно лишь при условии, что их статус предоставляется только гражданам государства, в котором они проживают; специфические права национальных меньшинств (то есть права, отличные от прав большинства других граждан) ‑ это их права в тех сферах, где они проявляют себя как особая этническая группа (сохранение идентичности, традиций, языка, культурного наследия). ; Розглядається європейський досвід захисту прав національних меншин та його втілення в українському законодавстві як підставу для етнонаціонального моделювання розвитку України. Підкреслюється, що європейське право відмовляє етнічним, національним меншинам у праві на самовизначення; ефективне правове забезпечення прав національних меншин можливе лише за умови, коли їх статус надається лише громадянам держави, в якій вони проживають; специфічні права національних меншин (тобто права, відмінні від прав більшості інших громадян) – це їх права у тих сферах, де вони проявляють себе як особлива етнічна група (збереження ідентичності, традицій, мови, культурної спадщини).

This book is derived from the abridged version of papers presented in 3rd Silkroad Congress / 14th ADAM International Social Sciences Conference organized jointly by Ankara Center for Thought and Research (ADAM), Istanbul Sabahattin Zaim University (IZU), National University of Uzbekistan (NUUz) and Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA). ; Turkey has increasingly paying much attention to its relationship with the all over the world, especially in Middle East, Africa and Asia. Turkey was the first country to recognize Uzbekistan's independence on 16 December 1991. Since that date, relations between Uzbekistan and Turkey have been developing dynamically in the commercial-economic and financial spheres. Many co-operation agreements have been signed between the two states. The positive aspect of Turkey's renewed interest to foster relations with all over the world recently is, partly demonstrated by the strong interest and action taken by the countries that wanted to improve relations Turkey as a strategic partner. There are not only commercial and economic relations between Uzbekistan and Turkey, but also cultural relations. In recent years, great importance has been attached to the development of tourism sector and bilateral cultural relations. Uzbekistan's historical tourism potential and rich cultural heritage attract the attention of Turkish citizens. For this reason, the development of cooperation in the tourism sector plays an important role in the approach of the peoples of the two countries. It is necessary to show all efforts to develop mutually beneficial relations in economic, cultural and humanitarian fields. For the bilateral relations to be developed more actively, both countries have the necessary resources and great potential. As known, the Turkish – Uzbek relations is very old and multi-dimensional which includes economic and trade, social and cultural, diplomatic, development and humanitarian etc. In this part, a brief review of the diplomatic and economic relations is given. This part is expected to give a highlight with respect to the historical and relations and, hence, would help the urgency to revive relations in the future and the importance of the conference towards that goal. The cultural and artistic relations between Turkey and Uzbekistan are very old. The common characteristics of the two countries are their history, culture and art that based on the same ancestry. Within the framework of the agreements between the two countries, not only commercial and economic relations but also cultural and artistic relations are developing are developing between Turkey and Uzbekistan. The purpose of this book and organized congress has an aim to contribute to the developing relations. --From editors ; OPPORTUNITIES OF IMPLEMENTING THE WORLD INNOVATION POLICY EXPERIENCE IN PROVIDING SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC GROWTH IN UZBEKISTAN -- TURKEY AND TURKIC REPUBLICS: AN ANALYSIS FROM ECONOMIC GROWTH PERSPECTIVE -- THE MAIN FORMS OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBALIZATION -- ÖZBEK ÖĞRENCILER ÖZELINDE TÜRKIYE'DEKI ULUSLARARASI ÖĞRENCILER YA DA ÇOK YÖNLÜ ELÇILER -- DEVELOPMENT EVENTFUL TOURISM ON THE SILK ROAD -- NORMATIVE-LEGAL BASES OF ECOLOGICAL-ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN UZBEKISTAN -- SLAM BİLİM TARİHİ: EMPİRİK BİR ÇALIŞMA -- THE DYNAMIC DEVELOPMENT BETWEEN TURKEY AND UZBEKISTAN: COOPERATION BASED ON TRUST AND FRIENDSHIP -- INTELLECTUAL POTENTIAL OF CREATIVE SOCIETY -- DEVELOPING SOCIOECONOMICAL AND CULTURAL RELATIONS BETWEEN UZBEKISTAN AND TURKEY -- THE USING OF TURKEY'S SCHEMES PRIORITY FOR DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRY OF UZBEKISTAN -- TRENDS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TOURISM INDUSTRY IN THE REPUBLIC OF UZBEKISTAN -- MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL UZBEKISTAN – TURKEY RELATIONSHIP AND COOPERATION IN THE SPHERE OF TOURISM -- ÜLKELER ARASI İŞBİRLİKLERİNİN GELİŞTİRİLMESİNDE İSLÂMÎ FINANSIN ÖNEMİ -- DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL TOURISM IN UZBEKISTAN -- INNOVATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMY IN UZBEKISTAN -- UZBEKISTAN: REFORMS IN EDUCATION AS A FACTOR OF MODERNIZATION OF THE COUNTRY -- ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION - THE WAY TO INNOVATIVE DEVELOPMENT -- INVESTMENTS IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR AND WAYS OF IMPROVING THEIR EFFICIENCY -- FAMILY BUSINESS AND ITS DEVELOPMENT -- TURKISH EXPERIENCE IN INCREASING COMPETITIVENESS IN EXPORT AND THE EFFECTIVE WAYS OF USING THEM -- WAYS TO ENSURE INNOVATIVE DEVELOPMENT IN UZBEKISTAN -- MODERN BANKING SYSTEM: A GUARANTEE OF DEVELOPMENT OF COUNTRY'S EXPORT POTENTIAL -- FOOD SECURITY IN UZBEKISTAN -- THE USE OF MODERN METHODS TO INCREASE THE COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM IN AGRICULTURE -- IMPROVING THE METHODOLOGY OF FINANCIAL RESULTS IN TOURISM COMPANIES -- TARGETED PROGRAMS OF BALANCED DEVELOPMENT OF TERRITORIES AS A FACTOR OF INNOVATIVE DEVELOPMENT -- MODELS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT AND THE DECENTRALIZATION EXPERIENCE: AN INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH -- INCREASING COMPETITIVENESS BASED ON INNOVATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (IN CHINESE CASE) -- VALUE OF CREATIVE TOURISM IN DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRIORITY DIRECTIONS OF THE TOURISTIC INDUSTRY IN UZBEKISTAN -- URBANIZATION AND ITS CURRENT STATE -- TECHNOLOGICAL MODERNIZATION AS A FACTOR OF DEVELOPMENT -- THE ECONOMY OF UZBEKISTAN -- LABOR THEORY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH IN MODERN ECONOMY -- INDICATORS OF POLITICAL SYSTEM STABILITY ASSESSMENT -- THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF HANDICRAFT ENTREPRENEURSHIP DEVELOPMENT IN UZBEKISTAN -- GOVERNMENT CHARGES FOR PUBLIC DEBT MANAGEMENT -- INFRASTRUCTURE AS A DRIVER OF DEVELOPMENT -- INVESTMENT IN REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES -- THE ROLE AND VALUE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES IN DEVELOPMENT OF TOURIST INDUSTRY IN UZBEKISTAN -- PRIORITY DIRECTIONS OF SUPPORTING EMPLOYMENT POPULATION IN LABOR -- INCREASE OF COMPETITIVENESS AND EXPORT-ORIENTED REGION: EXPERIENCE OF TURKEY -- INCREASING COMPETITIVENESS OF COUNTRY BY SUPPORTING EFFECTIVE EMPLOYMENT -- SOME FEATURES OF THE FORMATION OF VALUE-ORIENTATED EDUCATION IN UNIVERSITIES -- THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TEACHERS' TEACHER LEADERSHIP ROLES AND ORGANIZATIONAL COMMITMENT LEVELS -- STUDYING THE EXPERIENCE OF IMPROVING THE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM OF THE STATE BUDGET REVENUES OF TURKEY -- INNOVATIONS – AS AN IMPORTANT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FACTOR -- PRINCIPLES OF THE TERRITORIAL STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT OF UZBEKISTAN -- CIVIL - LAW PROBLEMS OF PRELIMINARY CONTRACT ACCORDING TO THE LEGISLATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UZBEKISTAN -- INCREASING THE COUNTRY'S COMPETITIVENESS: CURRENT STATE AND PROSPECTS -- THE ROLE OF PUBLIC SECTOR IN INNOVATION DEVELOPMENT -- THE IMPORTANCE OF USING BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGIES IN DIGITAL ECONOMY -- THE ESSENCE OF INVESTMENT POTENTIAL AND INVESTMENT FIELDS REGULARITIES IN ECONOMY -- ON THE QUESTION OF THE REVIVAL OF THE GREAT SILK ROAD, AND THE TOPONYM "GREAT SILK ROAD" ON THE TERRITORY OF TASHKENT -- SOME COMMENTS ON THE "COTTON CASE" REPRESSION CONDUCTED IN UZBEKISTAN -- PROBLEMS OF STUDYING INTELLIGENCE IN THE WORLD PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE -- FROM THE HISTORY OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CENTRAL ASIAN KHANATES AND THE OTTOMAN TURKS (XIX. CENTURY) -- COOPERATION AGREEMENT ON CULTURAL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE REPUBLIK OF UZBEKISTAN AND THE REPUBLIK OF TURKEY -- ORTA ASYA HANLIKLERI VE OSMANLI DEVLETI ARASINDEKI ILISKILERDE TICARET YOLLARININ ÖNEMİ -- OSMANLI'DA VAKIF KERVANSARAYLAR -- THE HISTORY OF THE ASIAN COUNTRIES IN THE TURKESTAN COLLECTION -- PAN-TURKIC IDEA OF JADID MOVEMENT AND ITS REFLECTION IN ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS -- CLASSIFICATION OF WORLD MANUSCRIPTS SOURCE STUDY OF MAVARDI PRODUCT "AHKОM" GENERAL CHARACTERISTIC OF THESIS -- S'HOQXON TO'RA JUNAYDULLO XO'JA O'G'LI IBRAT –FOUNDER OF PRINTING HOUSE OF NAMANGAN -- HOCA MUHAMMED PARSA'NIN "FESLÜ'L-HİTAB" ESERİNDE HANEFİLİK VE MATURİDİLİK -- THE LOGIC OF ABU NASR AL-FARABI IN THE REFLECTION OF THE HISTORY OF ISLAM -- MAHBÛBU'L KULÛB'UN HİTABET/RETORİK DEĞERİ ÜZERİNE -- RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE AS A FACTOR IN SUSTAINABILITY OF SOCIETY -- MAVERAÜNNEHİR ÂLİMLERİNDEN EBU ZEYD ED-DEBÛSÎ VE İBNÜ'L-MÜNZİR EN-NİSABÛRÎ'NİN HİLAF İLMİNE KATKILARI -- GELENEKTEN GELECEĞE MÜSLÜMAN ZİHİN DÜNYASININ YENİDEN İNŞASI VE EĞİTİM -- UZBEKISTAN IS THE LAND OF INTER-RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE -- TÜRKIYE ÖZBEKISTAN ARASINDAKI SOSYO-KÜLTÜREL İLİŞKİLERİN GELİŞTİRİLMESİNDE SEMERKAND HAVZASININ ÖNEMİ -- THE ROLE OF HOLY BUKHARA ON THE GREAT SILK ROAD -- ÖZBEKİSTAN'IN DİNİ VE KÜLTÜREL HAYATINDA NAKŞBENDÎLİK VE HÜSEYNİYYE KOLU -- THE INTENTION – A CHOICE OR THE DOCTRINE OF ELECTION IN MAVARDI PRODUCT « ALAHKOM-AS-SULTONIYA VA-L-VALOYOT AD-DINIYA » ; 1

Abstract: The studies about Abnormal Return had been studied by many researchers in their study. Researchers want to know the factors that driven the existence of Abnormal Return in an investment decision. One of the factor is the investors' overreaction towards the financial report of the company. Therefore, this study was condusted to examine the impact of the accounting information to the Abnormal Return of the company that go public during the period from 2013-2017. This study was aim to describe the effect of the selected accounting information to the Abnormal Return of the company that go public during the period from 2013-2017. The sample that were taken in this study consist of 97 samples which after deleting several outliers, the final sample that were observed consist of 64 samples. The accounting information that were used as the independent variables to determine the Abnormal Return were Price to Earning Ratio, Return on Equity, Firm Size, Book to Market Ratio, and Debt to Equity Ratio. The analysis method that were used was multiple regression analysis and using Microsoft Excel and SPSS as the tool of analysis. The result of the study showed that from the five independent variables, three of them have a significant effect, meanwhile the other two don't have significant effect. Return on Equity, Firm Size, and Book to Market Ratio have a positive effect to the Abnormal Return and significant at the 5% level of significance. Price to Earning Ratio has a positive effect to the Abnormal Return but insignificant and lastly Debt to Equity Ratio has has a negative effect to the Abnormal Return but insignificant.Keywords : Abnormal Return, Accounting Information, Price to Earning Ratio, Return on Equity, Firm Size, Book to Market Ratio, and Debt to Equity Ratio.REFERENCESAbid, Muhammad Talkhisul; Muharam, Harjum. (2013). "Analisis Faktor-Faktor yang Mempengaruhi Abnormal Return Saham Pada Kinerja Jangka Panjang Penawaran Umum Perdana (IPO)". Diponegoro Journal of Management, Vol.2, No. 3.Altin, Hakan. (2015). "Efficient Market Hypothesis, Abnormal Return, And Election Periods". European Scientific Journal, Vol. 11, No. 34.Ball, Ray; Brown, Philip. (1968). "An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income Numbers". Journal of Accounting Research, Page 159-178.Beaver, William H., et al. (1979). "The Association Between Unsystematic Security Returns and the Magnitude of Earning Forecast Errors". Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 7 No. 2.Behbahani, Khalil Bevali; Rezvani, Karim. (2016). "Investigating the Effect Among Size, Growth Opportunity and Cumulative Abnormal Returns of the Companies". International Journal of Advanced Biotechnology and Research, Vol. 7.Botika, Marianna. (2012). "The Use of DuPont Aanalysis in Abnormal Returns Evaluation : Empirical Study of Romanian Market". Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences, 2012, Page 1179-1183. Bou, Juan Carlos; Satorra, Albert. (2003). "The Persistence of Abnormal Return at Industry and Firm Levels : Evidence From Spain". Department of Business Administration and Marketing, Universitat Jaume I, Castello´ , Spain. Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain. Brav, Alon; Geczy, Christopher; Gompers, Paul A. (2000). "Is the Abnormal Return Following Equity Issuances Anomalous?". Journal of Financial Economics 56, Page 209-249. Brokke, Anette Dalen; Osteby, Madeleine. (2016). "Abnormal Stock Market Returns around VIX Volatility Peaks". Department of Economics and Finance, School of Business and Law, Univesity of Agder.Cohen, Gil. (2010). "P/E Versus PEG : Which Better Pedicts Abnormal Returns?". The Max Stern Academic College of Emek Yezreel, Emek Yezreel 19300, Israel.Connelly, Brian L., et al. (2011). "Signaling Theory : A Review and Assessment". Journal of Management, Vol. 37, No. 1.Dang, Ngoc Hung, et al. (2017). "The Relationship Between Accounting Information in the Financial Statements and the Stock Returns of Listed Firms in Vietnam Stock Exchange". International Journal of Economics and Finance, Vol. 9, No. 10.Diaraya, et al. (2017). "The Effect of Accounting Information on Abnormal Return of Stock : Assesment by Capital Asset Pricing Model". Journal of Research in Business and Management, Vol. 5, No. 3, Page 25-32.Dupernex, Samuel. (2007). "Why Might Share Price Follow A Random Walk?". Student Economic Review, Vol. 21.Filsaraei, Mahdi; Azarberahman, Alireza; Azarberahman Jalal. (2013). "An Empirical Analysis for Abnormal Returns from Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) : evidence of Iranian oil and chemical industries". International Journal of Accounting and Financial Reporting, 2013, Vol. 3, No. 1.Kai, Qian; Xiaoguang, Lee. (2014). "An Empirical Study on Abnormal Returns of Listed Companies of Chinese Pharmaceutical Industry". Journal of Chemical and Pharmaceutical Research, 2014, 6(6):846-850.Kun, Qian; Xiaojiang, Yuan. (2017). "Financial Leverage and Firm Performance During and After the Financial Crisis". Simon Fraser University, 2017.Lyon, John D.; Barber, Brad M.; Tsai, Chih-Ling. (1999). "Improved Methods for Tests of Long-Run Abnormal Stock Returns". The Journal of Finance, Vol. LIV, No. 1.Martani, Dwi, et al. (2009). "The Effect of Financial Ratios, Firm Size, and Cash Flow From Operating Activities in the Interim Report to the Stock Return". Chinese Business Review, Vol. 8, No. 6.Melgarejo, Mauricio A., et al. (2013). "The Stock Market's Reaction to Accounting Information : The Case of the Latin American Integrated Market Abstract". Scholarship and Professional Work – Business, 276.Muradoglu, Gulnur; Sivaprasad, Sheeja. (2007). "An Empirical Analysis of Capital Structure and Abnormal Returns". Cash Business School, 106 Bunhill Row, London, EC1Y 8TZ, United Kingdom.Mustilli, Mario, et al. (2017). "Abnormal Returns and Fundamental Analysis in Institutional Investors' Decision Making : An Agency Theory Approach". International Business Research, Vol. 11, No. 2.Penman, Stephen H., et al. (2006). "The Book-to Price Effect in Stock Returns : Accounting for Leverage". Columbia University, Department of Accounting, 3022 Broadway, New York.Permana, Sidiq Jati. (2017). "Analisis Faktor-Faktor Yang Mempengaruhi Abnormal Return Saham Pada Perusahaan Perbankan dan Asuransi Yang Terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia". Journal of Business and Management, Vol. 11, No. 1, Page 12-27.Reinganum, Marc R. (1981). "Abnormal Returns in Small Firm Portfolios". Financial Analysis Journal, Page 52-56. Seketer, Ahmet. (2017). "An Analysis of Theories on Stock Returns". International Journal of Social Sciences & Educational Studies, Vol. 3, No. 3.Shah, Priyanka, et al. (2014). "M&A Announcements and Their Effect on Return to Shareholders : An Event Study". Accounting and Finance Research, Vol. 3, No. 2.Viskanta, Tadas. "Abnormal Returns: Winning Strategies from the Frontlines of the Investment Blogosphere". McGraw-Hill Education, May 11th 2012.Whisky, Ayakeme Ebiwarefa, et al. (2014). "Do Investors Make Abnormal Returns Cocsistently? An Econometric Investigation in the Nigerian Capital Market". International Journal of Financial Research, Vol. 5 No. 2.Xia, Zhangliang. (2015). "An Explanation of Factors Related to the Acquiring Firm's Abnormal Returns From M&A Activities". Saint Mary's University, Halifax, Nova Scotia.Ziobrowski, Alan J.; Boyd, James W.; Cheng, Ping; Ziobrowski, Brigitte J. (2011). "Abnormal Returns From the Common Stock Investments of Members of the U.S. House of Representative". Business and Politics, Vol. 13, Article 4.

Britain's counter-terrorism policies do not work. They do not work for the British people, who wish to live free of terrorism. They do not work for the various communities in the UK whose experience of counter-terrorism has been one of stigmatisation and criminalisation. And they do not work for the people of the Middle East, South Asia and Africa, whose human rights have been systematically violated in the War on Terror. Just over two decades ago, the Irish and UK governments signed the Good Friday Agreement, the culmination of a negotiated peace process involving Republican and Loyalist armed groups in Northern Ireland. Principles of human rights, community consent and peace were key to achieving a dramatic reduction in lives lost to political violence. Indeed, by that measure, the Good Friday Agreement was the most successful instrument of counter-terrorism policy-making in recent history. But the lessons of this success were not registered. The year after the Agreement was signed, Tony Blair's government introduced the first of the fifteen new Terrorism Acts that have been passed since then in what has become a near-annual parliamentary ritual. Each Act ratcheted up the powers available to the police and intelligence agencies, creating a shadow criminal justice system in which legal principles applicable in other spheres were dispensed with. Alongside this legislative agenda, norms shifted in other ways: the use of surveillance and propaganda was expanded and deepened; military force and extra-judicial killing as counter-terrorist methods became routine; and complicity with torturers was normalised. Intelligence agencies, police forces and the military doubled or tripled their counter-terrorism budgets and held onto this funding even as other sectors were ravaged by austerity measures. The logic of counter-terrorism was spread into every sphere of public life in Britain as workers across government services were expected to become the eyes and ears of national security surveillance. The definition of the threat was itself transformed: no longer simply a matter of individual acts of violence but a much broader danger, understood in terms of clashes of culture, ideology and values, and informed by the Islamophobic principle that Muslim political organisation and dissent should be cast as forms of extremism. Concerns for human rights, for avoiding the stigmatising and criminalising of communities, or for basing policy on clear statements of goals and evidence of effectiveness were ignored. The number of civilian lives lost in ostenisbly fighting "jihadist" terrorism were many times greater than those that have ever been lost or could have been lost due to "jihadist" terrorism itself. Even on the narrowest measure of success – the reduction of terrorism – the record of UK counter- terrorism over the last twenty years is a poor one. The relentless expansion and proliferation of this War on Terror apparatus was underpinned by a consensus across the political class from the late 1990s. Central to that consensus were the claims that the UK faced an exceptional threat from "jihadist" terrorism, that this threat was the expression of an ideological rejection of British values among a generation of young Muslims and that, in response, the normal principles of domestic and international law should be suspended. Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn's Chatham House speech on the War on Terror in the 2017 general election campaign was the first sign of a crack in that consensus. In the days after the killing of twenty-two concert-goers at the Manchester Arena, Corbyn argued that "the war on terror is simply not working" and opinion polls suggested a majority agreed.1 This report offers an account of the failures of current counter-terrorism policies, an analysis of the reasons why they do not work and an outline of a progressive alternative that we hope will be the basis for a future Labour government's approach. We recognise the difficulty and complexity of the issue of terrorism and the various barriers that stand in the way of a different approach. But we believe the time is right to critically assess the legacy of the last twenty years and change course. At the heart of our argument is a question of democracy. Counter-terrorism policy-making has failed because its development is unmoored from any substantial process of democratic accountability. Instead, the aims and means of current counter-terrorism policy have been set by a security establishment according to its own interests and values. This security establishment has not sought to provide a consistent and precise definition of terrorism or to seek to counter terrorism in an evidence-based way, based on academic studies of how terrorism comes into existence. It has not sought to ground security policy in the actual problems of political violence that communities in the UK face. And it has repeatedly placed loyalty to elite interests above the need to uphold human rights, especially with respect to Muslim populations, both within the UK and abroad. The Labour Party has a particular responsibility to address the harms resulting from counter- terrorism as it was the Labour government led by Tony Blair that incorporated the War on Terror into British policy-making and his successor Gordon Brown who continued and extended the paradigm. Labour's 2017 manifesto already contained policies that align with our argument and can be built upon, such as the call to review Prevent, to address civil liberties concerns with the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act and to hold public inquiries on past injustices. However, counter-terrorism policy has been one of the least discussed topics within the Labour Party, despite its deep impact on the lives of the over two million Muslims in the UK. We hope this report will help to initiate a more vigorous discussion. Clearly, any left-wing Labour government will be attacked by its opponents as weak on national security. The temptation will be to not rock the boat and allow counter-terrorism policy to remain unchanged, the better to secure political victories in the core economic policy areas Labour Party supporters are more focused on. We believe this would be a mistake. It would mean a Labour government failing to uphold principles of human rights and racial and religious equality. But as a political strategy, it would also likely be counter-productive. Conceding ground on security policy will not minimise the attacks from right-wing media organisations or Conservative politicians; and a Labour government would be left defending itself reactively and inconsistently within a policy framework not of its own choosing. In this way, a failure to develop a progressive approach to security could end up undermining the credibility of a Labour government's broader policy agenda. A better strategy, we believe, is to adopt from the outset a coherent, explicitly stated, progressive policy that can be defended consistently and confidently.

Problem setting. The legal framework for regulating the ethnic and national sphere determines the influence of state authorities on the current ethnic and national model of interaction between the titular Ukrainian ethnic group and national minorities. An objective factor in the ethnic and national modeling of Ukraine's development is the Ukrainian political nation, whose potential readiness for state-national self-determination is determined by the level of national and regional identity, whose research is extremely in demand in modern science, which begins with the state and determines how it affects poly-ethnic society.Recent research and publications analysis. In the context of the topic under study, the fundamental works of domestic and foreign scholars were used to substantiate the idea of the ethnic core of the nation (A.D. Smith), which constitutes the "foundation" of any ethnic and national model of the state; such ethno-national models are defined: "parallel segmentation" (J. Rothschild), "clan democracy" (O. Kucherenko, O. Lisnichuk), "crossed grid", which is transformed into "mosaic concept" (S.P. Huntington), "universal democracy" (A. Lijphart), the "cosmopolitan" model of democracy (D. Held), "racial democracy"(P. Mancini), as well as the works of P. Van den Berg, O. Kartunov, O. Kryukov, O. Kucherenko, O. Mayborody, Y. Rimarenko, L. Shklyar and others. In the scientific works of A. Andreev, A. Royce, Y. Bromley, M. Weber, G. Nodi, K. Popper, A. Smith, E. Jan, and others. main stages of ethnic and national development of states are analyzed.Paper objective.The author of the article considers the European experience on protecting national minorities' rights and possibility of its application in the Ukrainian legislation and sees it as a basis for the ethnic and national modeling of Ukraine development.Paper main body.Author emphasizes that the European Legislation does not ensure the right to self-determination to ethnic and national minorities. Therefore, effective Constitutional and legal security for the national minorities is provided only in case of their getting the citizenship of the country they live in. Besides, their rights do not exceed the range of rights enjoying by all the citizens of the country they reside and the peculiarities of certain ethnic groups (their needs to preserve national identity, traditions, language, cultural heritage etc.) are not reflected in the legislation of the country of their residence.As a subject of the International Law and the equal participant of international communication, Ukraine ratified the majority of conventions and agreements in the field of human rights protection.The crucial issue of Ukrainian society in the legislative adjustment of ethnic and national sphere is its endeavor to respond to the European legal standards. To use the terms "ethnic groups" would be more adequate for both the genuine Ukrainians and the untitled ethnic groups. Application of the terms "native people" or "autochthonal people" could be disputable as for Tatars or Caraims, who are in fact the "pieces" of some other large communities lived in the past. The same situation is in the issue of language functioning. The EU countries' language policy is carried out in the conditions, which differ from the Ukrainian ones: non-dominant languages in the EU community enjoy protection rights. On the contrary, in Ukraine the language of the titled nation needs every possible support. In this respect, nowadays every attempt to approach the issue of peculiarity of language policy in Ukraine can be criticized by the EU community, which may cause Ukrainian language discrimination.Therefore, just imitating both EU experience and EU legislation in the national issue is not acceptable for development of ethnic and national policy in Ukraine, where there are certain peculiarities.Objective reality of polyethnizm existence in Ukraine as well as some specific national conditions require critical and constructive application of various approaches to interethnic relationships regulation in which EU countries have already been a success. And in Particular, we mean consultative and authority bodies, where national minorities are represented, especially in education, cultural and religious organizations; legislative and executive bodies (formed in the result of free and equal elections); self-government of national minorities as for their authenticity in conditions when territorial autonomy is not provided; bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements regarding national minorities; ensuring the right of national minorities representatives to be educated on different educational levels in their native language; to create state research centers to improve legislation and spreading information as for their non-discrimination; creation of permanent boards to be in touch with the appropriate border-line areas. Application of all-round approaches mentioned above in conjunction with the peculiarities of ethnic and national modeling of state development must favor harmonization of relationships between the Ukrainian title ethnos and national minorities.Conclusions of the research.The research on regulatory and juridical principles of the valid ethnic and national state building model (title ethnos and national minorities) gives grounds to conclude that all the citizens of Ukraine are equally protected by the state. As for the assuring the human rights of national minorities representatives, the state bases on the fact that this law is an integral part of the generally acknowledged Law on human rights.For the Constitution of Ukraine stipulations' realization and establishing the procedures of implementation of the abovementioned regulatory Acts, the author proposes to adopt the set of laws, which would regulate not only the status of national minorities, but also the status of the Ukrainian nation as a title nation. In particular, we mean preambles to the Articles 10, 11, 12 of the Constitution of Ukraine, which are fragmentarily accomplished now in the legislative Acts. In order to achieve it, we need to systematize and make codification of the Ukrainian legislation. ; Рассматривается европейский опыт защиты прав национальных меньшинств и его воплощение в украинском законодательстве как основание для этнонационального моделирования развития Украины. Подчеркивается, что европейское право отказывает этническим, национальным меньшинствам в праве на самоопределение; эффективное правовое обеспечение прав национальных меньшинств возможно лишь при условии, что их статус предоставляется только гражданам государства, в котором они проживают; специфические права национальных меньшинств (то есть права, отличные от прав большинства других граждан) ‑ это их права в тех сферах, где они проявляют себя как особая этническая группа (сохранение идентичности, традиций, языка, культурного наследия). ; Розглядається європейський досвід захисту прав національних меншин та його втілення в українському законодавстві як підставу для етнонаціонального моделювання розвитку України. Підкреслюється, що європейське право відмовляє етнічним, національним меншинам у праві на самовизначення; ефективне правове забезпечення прав національних меншин можливе лише за умови, коли їх статус надається лише громадянам держави, в якій вони проживають; специфічні права національних меншин (тобто права, відмінні від прав більшості інших громадян) – це їх права у тих сферах, де вони проявляють себе як особлива етнічна група (збереження ідентичності, традицій, мови, культурної спадщини).

Under embargo until: 18.06.2021 ; This study examines comprehensive school reforms in Norway and the German federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) in the period from around 1954 to 1979 from a comparative-historical perspective. In both cases, great educational expansions took place during this period. However, in Norway, the expansion was connected to a prolongation of comprehensive schooling from seven to nine years and to the abolition of grading in lower secondary schooling, while in Germany multi-tiered parallel schooling from grade five persisted despite attempts at reform. The study examines potential reasons for this difference in historical outcomes. In doing so, it sheds light not only on the dynamics of school politics, but also contributes to the general understanding of the different cleavage structures and balances of power of the two societies. The results and arguments of the study can be summarized in three steps. Firstly, it places the post-war reforms of primary and lower secondary schooling in the context of the long-term institutional development of the two countries' school systems. It explores the history of comprehensive and other structural reforms, as well as the history of school political debates about state-church conflicts, centralization, language or women's access to education. It is shown that the Norwegian trend towards comprehensivization dates back well into the 19th century, as does the German trend towards hierarchical differentiation of school types. This indicates that feedback effects of previous reforms play a role in both cases. At the same time, there are also great similarities between the two cases. In both Norway and Prussia/Rhineland-Westphalia, recurring debates led to reform phases of educational expansion, during which liberal and later social democratic reformers propagated comprehensive schooling, while many conservatives – especially in Germany, and less militantly also in Norway – opposed it. The post-war reform phase shaped the school system significantly in both cases and left important legacies, so it can be considered a particularly relevant critical juncture. Furthermore, in the second half of the 1970s there was a political trend reversal in both cases, forcing social democratic governments to relinquish their most far-reaching reform ideas. Despite a certain amount of path dependence, the development was open to the extent that more similar school political compromises could have come about if actors had made different choices. Secondly, the thesis offers a detailed, comparative analysis of the material power resources and of the ideology and degree of ideological unity of the protagonists, consenters and antagonists of comprehensive school reforms. It is shown that the distribution of material power resources is relevant, for example in the sense that reform protagonists in Norway were somewhat stronger with regard to their membership numbers, election results and organizational unity. However, it also becomes clear that material power resources and interests are not the whole story. Ideology must be considered as an important additional factor. The analysis shows that actors were divided ideologically along a left/right-axis in both cases, indicating that conflicts over comprehensive schooling are an expression of the class cleavage. There are similarities between the ideologies of the major collective actors; for example, the main argument of reform protagonists was in both cases their quest for social equality and justice, while reform antagonists valued academic standards, selection based on competitive achievement and parental rights. At the same time, the arguments, which became hegemonic in the two cases, differ greatly. In Norway, the idea that parallel schooling, tracking and ability grouping contribute to an unacceptable reproduction of inequality became hegemonic. Teaching all students in the same classes, independent of their background and abilities, was also justified with the need to create a spirit of cooperation and to foster joy in learning. Even some representatives of the Norwegian Conservative Party consented to this kind of thinking and the party remained split over school politics, at least until the 1970s. In Germany, on the other hand, the hegemonic ideological argument was that learning is facilitated by supposedly homogenous ability groups and that students should therefore be divided into school types which are in accordance with their biological endowments. In particular, the legitimacy of the Gymnasium as the school type of high-achievers and future elites remained high. Several leading social democrats in NRW were influenced by this thinking and did not support comprehensive school reforms wholeheartedly, so the German Social Democratic Party was split on the issue. Finally, the thesis emphasizes the importance of the unequal cleavage structures of Norway and NRW/Germany for the different cross-class coalitions, which came about in school politics. It spells out how the rural-urban cleavage, the center-periphery cleavage, the statechurch cleavage, the communist-socialist cleavage and the gender cleavage came to expression in school political debates in the two cases and how these affected the outcomes of attempts at comprehensive school reform. In the Norwegian case, the rural-urban and centerperiphery cleavages manifested themselves in emotional debates about centralization, Christian education and language. The state-church cleavage also played a role in debates about Christian private schooling and about the Christian preamble of the school law. The gender cleavage came to expression for example in debates about coeducation and equal curricula for boys and girls. Overall, the Labor Party mostly succeeded in handling these cleavages in a way which at least did not sabotage and sometimes even strengthened its comprehensive school reforms. In particular, it formed an alliance with the rural population, with the primary school teachers and with the women's movement. However, potential alliances between the political center and the Conservative Party were weakened by disagreements over these issues. In the case of NRW, on the other hand, the state-church cleavage was a major obstacle for the social democrats and their liberal allies. The Catholic rural population was integrated in a broad cross-class coalition under the umbrella of the Christian Democratic Union, for example over issues such as denominational schooling, Catholic private schooling and the centralization of "dwarf schools" so a potential reform alliance with the social democrats was out of the question. The state-church cleavage also split the teachers' organizations and the women's movement. Primary and lower secondary school teachers were split into social democratic and Christian currents, which made it easier for Gymnasium teachers to dominate politically. Catholic women's and teachers' organizations played an important role in Catholic private schooling for girls and stood in opposition to liberal and leftwing parts of the women's movement with regard to topics such as coeducation, equal curricula for the sexes and comprehensive schooling. The gender cleavage therefore did not weaken the internal unity of the Christian democrats and their allies. Finally, the communist-socialist cleavage played an important role in NRW. Antagonists employed anti-communist arguments against comprehensive schooling regularly. The prevalence of anti-communism deepened the internal splits of the social democrats and the teachers' organizations and thus weakened them considerably.

Abstract Impossible Landings: Precarity, Populism and Walling in a 'European' Refugee CrisisbyAlessandro TiberioDoctor of Philosophy in Geography University of California, BerkeleyProfessor Michael Watts, Co-ChairProfessor Jon Kosek, Co-ChairThe rise of populist movements that gathered momentum in 2016 across Europe and the European settler-colonial world has seriously challenged the US-led neoliberal order as much as the discourse around 'globalization' that such order promoted and defended. Such crisis has been most striking in countries like the UK and the US, with the votes for Brexit and Trump, given that for the last 30 years successive government administrations of both center-right and center-left political alignments there have been championing neoliberal reforms domestically and internationally, but the rise of populist movements has been years in the making in the folds of ordinary life across the 'European' world, and can arguably be best understood through an ethnographic research of the everyday space-making and border-renegotiating social processes that made a rightward shift possible in individual and collective consciences and that also allowed it to gather momentum at a wider scale.I have focused my research on the borderlands of what I call 'Mediterranean Central Europe' in and around the now mostly white-Italian border-town of Trieste, formerly the main port of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire and today sitting at the Italian border to Slovenia. Dominant discourses on a local level have traditionally idealized the city and its inhabitants as quintessentially 'European' even more than 'Italian', and in its borderlands at the edge of the Balkans the renegotiation of borders with non-European 'Eastern' and Muslim othered subjects and spaces has historically been particularly explicit. At the same time, Trieste has also represented a model of border un-making or un-walling thanks to the local anti-psychiatric movement led by Doctor Basaglia, that in the 1970s successfully advocated for the closure of asylums and for the transformation of wider society by multiplying spaces of encounter between formerly interned patients and the general population at large. The current model of asylum seekers' reception in the city promoted by ICS (the Italian Consortium of Solidarity) inherited and followed the same decentralizing logic, and since the 1990s has been promoting the transformation of the 'European' space of the city though everyday practices of border renegotiation. Over the course of a multi-year ethnographic fieldwork since 2013, I have looked at the longer history of experiments with walling and un-walling in the city, and finally focused on the 2015/16 moment, when I have explored the remaking of 'European' borders in Trieste's borderlands during the boom of the 'Balkan migration route(s)'. At that time, I have investigated different forms of border renegotiation practices from a neo-liberal standpoint, by far-right groups and by radical-left activists, and attempted to understand their different politics on an individual, collective and regional level.In the midst of a strong reactionary wave on a wider scale, 2016 also saw the election of a far-right city administration in Trieste at the conjuncture of lingering economic stagnation and of a boom in the arrivals of asylum-seeking migrants traveling across the Balkans and hailing especially from Pakistan and Afghanistan. In an attempt to understand the reactionary closure of European borders in the conjuncture of 2015/16, in the context of both the post-2008 'economic crisis' and of what has been commonly referred to as the 'European refugee crisis' of 2015, in my work I show the ways in which the two processes have articulated with one another though the lived and perceived experience of what Italians call 'precarietà' or precarity, referring to the widespread sense of insecurity resulting from the introduction of sweeping neoliberal reforms in Italy and Europe at large, and in particular from the 'flexibilization' of the job market and life conditions in general. I further show how in Trieste and elsewhere the articulation of these two processes has engendered a third crisis, namely an 'identity crisis', a crisis of 'Europe' and of what may be called 'European', and has led to the new desires for border closure or walling and to the rise of far-right populist movements possibly heralding a post-neoliberal moment. In particular, I argue that current reactionary tendencies in Trieste and in many parts of the 'European' world in the current conjuncture are the result of the widespread perception of a deep crisis in the gendered and racialized commonsensical idea of 'Europe', and particularly of 'European' privilege and exceptionalism, and have emerged in the attempt to defend it. Further, I argue that the perception of such crisis and the related desires for border closure among many white-Europeans stem from the widespread idealization of 'precarity' or insecurity as a European problem, in their eyes justifying wall-building of a 'natural' reaction. Finally, in my study I also question the naturalized necessity of such a reactionary logic in the contemporary conjuncture and present the possibility for radical alternatives.In this sense, I argue that the different politics of far right and radical left 'anti-globalization' movements, both opposing the 'free movement' of capital, are produced through alternative forms of space-making and border-renegotiation in everyday life on a 'local' level, understanding their sense of belonging as tied to a bounded homeland or to a shared space of encounter respectively. In order to understand these different politics, I looked at the production of 'local' communities in collective gardening projects where highly precarized Italians renegotiated their relationship with both land and homeland in everyday life. I have then also carried out participant observation in mixed collective gardens shared by Italians and Afghan or Pakistani asylum seekers, and in other mixed spaces that offered interesting opportunities to understand ordinary border renegotiation practices in relationship to one's sense of precarity or insecurity. Finally, in order to understand border renegotiation both on a communal and on an individual level, during long interview sessions with both Italians and Central Asian migrants I have used individual 'mad map' drawing exercises to encourage the representation of one's condition of precarity and ways to renegotiate any perceived need for security, as a form of mental mapping method adopted and adapted from the American anti-psychiatric movement Icarus, of which I have been part of for years in California. In this context, my work finally also argues that in places like Trieste it is alternative readings of 'precarity', questioning exclusivists senses of belonging and based on appreciating relational forms of insecurity between differently-precarious 'European' and 'non-European' subjects, that may make a different politics of border renegotiation possible. In particular, the production of common spaces enabling the acceptance of mutual vulnerability between such differently-precarious subjects may allow not only for the renegotiation but also for the actual questioning and un-walling of the borders of 'Europe' themselves.

When we started our preparation for this project only a year ago, our prime concerns were the deepening of the social and economic asymmetries between the North and the South under the impact of the financial crisis, with Germany and Italy providing an example of existential importance for the EU as a whole. Both of us had resided in the two countries for prolonged periods in the past, and we had never witnessed such a surge in antagonistic feelings on both sides of the Alps as occurred during the Euro crisis. This can even be measured: while it had been common in Germany, at the beginning of the crisis, to talk about the PIIGS states (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain), with Italy figuring among them as an important member, the percentage of Italians having a positive image of Germany crashed only from 75 to 65 per cent during the immediate crisis period, and now the majority of the Italians thinks that Germany has too much influence in Europe and that it uses this influence at the expense of Southern Member States. While our application for funding was still pending, we witnessed two crucial events that increased the pertinence of our project way beyond our expectations. First, on the 24 September 2017, for the first time in post-war German history, a far right party entered the German Bundestag with a landslide victory, receiving 14 per cent of the popular vote and 100 parliamentary seats. Second, only five months later in Italy, the far-right Lega party and the Movimento Cinque Stelle emerged as the big winners from the Italian federal elections of the 4th of March 2018. Forming a previously unthinkable coalition between right-wing and left-wing populism, they entered into government. We are not so naïve as to believe that the variety of Europe's crises could be understood and adequately analysed as though these were isolated events. The course of Italy's economic and social policy has so obviously been affected by the migration burdens that Italy has had to shoulder and the lack of European solidarity; the bitter disappointment could be turned into populist critique of the constraints that European rule imposes upon national policies and the public announcement of disobedience by members of the Italian government. In a similar vein, the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany had been founded as an anti-Euro rescue party, which catalysed quickly through the immigration crisis of 2015 into a xenophobic far-right populist party, sharing many positions with the Italian Lega. While the parties and alliances in both countries had capitalised very much upon the antagonisms between Italy and Germany and their positions during the Euro crisis by building on nationalist sentiments, today we have reached a true anti-climax when one observes that the intensification of tensions are accompanied by the founding of new alliances and a contagion towards formerly non-populist and non-far right parties in both countries: "Europe does not want migrants, it wants our money" (Luigi Di Maio); "Migration is the Mother of all problems" (Horst Seehofer). Both the AfD in Germany and the Lega in Italy share two major targets against which they direct their rage: European integration, especially in the economic realm, and immigration. We refrain, however, from attempting to disentangle all these interdependencies, but hope that our study of the two exemplary cases of Italy and Germany will provide us with some answers to the question of what led us down this road. We believe that the approach which we have pursued in our design of this project provides illuminating insights of lasting importance. ; Acknowledgements 6 ;Introductory Explanations 6; Contributors 20; A) The Political Economy of Germany and Italy;The German Political Economy under the Euro – and a Comparison to the "Southern Model" - Philip Manow 27; The Political Economy of Public Sector Wage-setting in Germany and Italy - Donato Di Carlo 48;Geo-Politics of Exporting Too Much: Contrasting Trajectories of Germany and Japan - Margarita Estévez-Abe 63; Ideational Differences between Italian and German Governments during the Crisis -Frederico Bruno 74; A Cultural Political Economy Approach to the European Crisis - Josef Hien 80; B) Sectors of the Political Economy of Italy and Germany;Worlds Apart: The Divergence of Southern-European Housing-Construction Economies and Northern European Export Economies - Sebastian Kohl & Alexander Spielau 99;Banking Crisis Interventions in Germany and Italy: the Unpleasant Case of the New European Bank Resolution Framework -Frederik Traut 108;Comparing the German and Italian Approaches to Banking Union - Lucia Quaglia 120; Maternal employment, attitudes toward gender equality and work-family policies. German-Italian Discrepancies? - Agnes Blome 129;C) German and Italian Perceptions, Differences and Misgivings;Italy and Germany during the Crisis: Support for the EU and Reciprocal Views - Alessandro Pellegata 140;The Political Space in Italy and Germany during the Crisis: Italian and German Populism Compared - Hanspeter Kriesi148;The political economy of recovery in Southern Europe - Manos Matsaganis 157;Accommodating EU's influence vs protecting national sovereignty. - Ilaria Madama and Matteo Jessoula 162; European Integration and Political Ownership: Fiction and Reality behind Structural Reforms and Risk-Sharing - Filippo Taddei 170;D) The Legacy of the Welfare State in Europe;An Alternative to the Constitution of the EU's Single Market? - Florian Rödl 176; Industrial Relations and Labour Law in the EU Economic Governance Mechanisms:The Cases of Italy and Germany - Francesco Costamagna 182; What to expect from Germany for the European Pillar of Social Rights and beyond? - Marcel Hadeed 188; The EU Political Culture of Total Optimism is not Dead: Reflections on the European Pillar of Social Rights - Vladimir Bogoeski 196;A 'more political' leadership for the President of the Commission? A mixed-methods language-based analysis -Pamela Pansardi 201;E) The Demise of Law; The EU as "Honest Broker"? German and Italian Perspectives on an Adminstrative Body -Anna Katharina Mangold 215; Integration-through-crisis as a distinct integrative mode: Placing expediency ahead of democracy? - Nicole Scicluna 220; Should the Specifics of National Political Cultures be Characterised as "Democratic Acquis" and Can they be Defended by Law? Beyond the Nostalgia-Controversy between JÜrgen Habermas and Wolfgang Streeck -Christian Joerges 229; The End of the Universality of Norms as a Model for Europe: The Error of "Seeing like a State" (J.S. Scott) in the Postmodern Condition - Karl-Heinz Ladeur 237; F) Justice Deficits and Solidarity; Is the EU Unjust? - Glyn Morgan 244; A European Minister of Economy and Finance:Assessing the Commission's proposal and Comparing the Positions of Germany and Italy - Tiziano Zgaga 253; Re-solidarizing Europe and Defusing the Crisis - Maurizio Ferrera and Carlo Burelli 263; Summarising Comments; Concluding Remarks: Economic Cultures and the Politics of Interdependence - Visnja Vukov 269; Two Annexes; Order in the Eurozone: Maurizio Ferrera and Claus Offe in Conversation - Maurizio Ferrera and Claus Offe 278; Germany is Quietly Rebalancing its Economy – But This will not Fix the Eurozone's Flaws - Donato Di Carlo 282;

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I'm
a political scientist—with an emphasis on the science.  I've viewed my role in the public sphere as inserting
into debates what political scientists have learned about political processes
and institutions—and to try to keep both sides faithful to the empirics. At
heart, I've always been a skeptic and my training as a political scientist
makes me even more so. I'm not one to join partisan frays. It's not my style. I just go where data lead.



The election of Donald Trump, someone who had zero political
experience, certainly sent my skepticism into high gear given the data. Limited
political experience does not often equate with political success. One major
exception is Dwight David Eisenhower, but he is the exception who proves the
rule. Eisenhower was an exceptional student of leadership and, as Supreme
Allied Commander in Europe, developed a well-honed ability to convince,
negotiate and compromise with many talented, egoistic generals as they fought
the Third Reich to rid the world of Nazism.


During the fall campaign, a video of historian David
McCullough made the rounds on social media. I've long admired McCullough's accessible
and well-written history, especially his biography of Truman.





In the video, McCullough draws our attention to Eisenhower's
four qualities of leadership, noting that Trump exhibited none of those
qualities. He had neither character, ability, experience, nor responsibility. In
short, McCullough did not believe Trump was suited for the presidency. He
was especially not suited to articulating a clear moral purpose and acting as
the conciliator in chief in times of national sorrow and crisis.



Trump's repeated failure as a leader over the past eight
months should not surprise. He was as prepared for the presidency as I am to do any kind of home or car repair.



Yet the president can be a poor leader and the nation can survive:
We managed the ineptitude of Hoover and Carter. What is most troubling is that
Trump himself, through apparently carefully contrived acts, may be encouraging
values antithetical to the Republic itself.



That causes me great alarm and concern, as it should every
American regardless of party.



There are certain moral certainties, bright lines in the
sand, that are not debated in civilized society. Racism, white supremacy, and support
for Nazism are among them. No race, no people, no ethnicity is superior to any
other. Advocating violence against someone else because they are different than
you is wrong. Killing innocent people is wrong. Full stop.



An easy test of leadership, methinks, is denouncing
yesterday's terrible events in Charlottesville with clarity and precision. "Nazism,
racism, and violence are acts of terrorism, and have no place in our Republic
and receive my strongest condemnation" would've been a good start. Perhaps you might have taken a cue from Vice President Pence, who had no problem naming who was the blame for yesterday's events: "We have no tolerance for hate and violence from white supremacists,
neo-Nazis or the KKK," said Pence, calling them "dangerous fringe groups" today in Colombia.



Instead, the President issued a statement that was ambiguous
at best, but spoke volumes: Calling out racism, Nazism, and white supremacy wasn't
on the table. Best case? He's a coward and inept. I'm less inclined to believe this is the case: He's spoken out clearly concerning acts of terrorism undertaken by Muslims in the past. And Trump certainly has no trouble telling us what he thinks most of the time. That leaves the worst case: He's sympathetic
to their cause.


Many Americans voted for Trump because they were angry at
what they believe our country had become. Others voted for Trump simply because
he was the Republican nominee. Still others voted for him because they couldn't
stomach Hillary Clinton. It is not for me to judge a person who voted for
Trump. That's their business, and frankly, that's water under the bridge



We've seen Trump can't stomach doing what's right when the
path is clear, and may be conspiring with forces seeking to undermine the very
foundation of our Republic. It doesn't matter how you voted, but how you answer
the question: "What now?"



If you are troubled with what you've seen, at least we have
a constitutional system with multiple points of access. Write to the president;
tell him how you feel (although I'm skeptical that would matter). Write to your congressional delegation: Remember,
ambition counters ambition in our system of separated (but shared) powers. Write
to your state parties and tell them to make changes to the primary system that
will make it more likely better candidates survive the nomination process
(ironically, that may mean a little less democracy in the primaries and more
control to party elites who were overwhelmingly opposed to Trump). But do
something. Be heard, while you still can.



We have a democracy. That is, as Ben Franklin said, as long
as we can keep it. We've kept it for more than 200 years.



Whether we keep it for another 200 depends on the choices
you make now.



Just in case you need a refresher course on leadership, here's
how great leaders should behave:



1.      
Responsibility. Eisenhower, on the eve of D-Day,
prepared this statement should the landings fail:









"Our landings in the Cherbourg-Havre area have failed
to gain a satisfactory foothold and I

 have  withdrawn
the troops. My decision to attack at this time and place was based on  the  best information available. The troops, the
air and the Navy did all that bravery and devotion to duty could do. If any blame or fault attaches
to the attempt it is mine alone."



2.      
Character. George W. Bush after 9-11.





3.      
Ability and Experience. LBJ and the Voting
Rights Act.





4.      
Fortitude. Ronald Reagan in Berlin at the
Brandenburg Gates.





5.      
All of the Above. Churchill. 1940, as France
fell and Britain stood alone.





Ask our members of Congress to display the leadership our President will not.

The present report provides an overview of the main debates and developments in relation to migration and asylum in Luxembourg in 2016. The issue of migration remained on the forefront of public and political debate, a debate axed on both planned legislative changes as well as the concrete migratory situation in Luxembourg. Four topics dominated public and policy discussions over the course of the year: the reform on Luxembourgish nationality, economic migration, the organisation of reception, as well as support and integration measures, linked to the continued inflow of applicants for international protection (AIPs) in 2016 and steps taken to adapt formal and informal education to the increasing heterogeneity of Luxembourg's population. The debate on international protection that arose in 2015 was carried onward in 2016, the focus shifting towards reception, support and integration measures. As the inflow of AIPs remained relatively high in 2016 with 2.043 applications, Luxembourg's Reception and Integration Agency (OLAI) warned throughout the year that the country's structures would soon reach the limits of their capacity. Linked to the high recognition rate, the legal challenges that local residents put to the plans for the construction of new reception facilities and the difficulty of beneficiaries of international protection (BIPs) in finding appropriate accommodation, the perceived dearth of housing was discussed broadly by the public, the media, as well as civil society and political actors. The continued inflow of AIPs also put a strain on the concerned administrations, both in terms of financial and human resources, leading to discussions regarding the duration of procedures and the variations of this duration. Moreover, the question of integration or support measures for beneficiaries and applicants stepped to the forefront: the changed profile of people arriving in Luxembourg posed new challenges to language learning and education for the newly arrived, and overall, emphasised the need to adapt existing and create new integration and support measures for beneficiaries and applicants. At the same time, the role of non-governmental organisations in supporting the government in the reception of applicants and in establishing new projects facilitating their integration also grew over the course of 2016, not least due to over 80 projects being granted funding by the Oeuvre Nationale de Secours Grande Duchesse Charlotte (henceforth Oeuvre). The Luxembourgish Centre for Integration and Social Cohesion (LISKO), part of the Red Cross and supported by convention to the Ministry for Family and Integration opened its doors in April 2016. The newly created centre will take care of the integration of BIPs into Luxembourg's society, putting its emphasis on facilitating access to housing. The planned extension of the maximum period of detention for families with children and unaccompanied minors (UAMs) from 72 hours to 7 days precipitated strong reactions from civil society and the public. Luxembourg furthermore followed through on its resettlement and relocation commitments made in 2015, with 167 persons being relocated from Greece and Italy to Luxembourg and with 52 being resettled in the context of the EU-Turkey agreement over the course of 2016. The adaptation of Luxembourg's legislation in the domain of legal migration also took shape over in 2016 and was broadly debated during the law-making process, while warranting less public attention. With the introduction of one bill, the legislator started the process of transposing Directive 2014/36/EU on seasonal workers and Directive 2014/66/EU on intra-corporate transfers into national law. The same bill furthermore introduced an authorisation of stay for investors, the aspect most commented on by civil society; a mechanism for continuation of activity; detailed the conditions under which a TCN (third country national) corporate officer (mandataire social) can apply for an authorisation of stay, extended the period of validity of the "European Blue Card" residence permit from two to four years, modified dispositions regarding the change of status of students and facilitated family reunification. These developments are to be framed within a wider context of economic diversification, encouragement of entrepreneurship and the repositioning of the financial centre. The reform of the Luxembourgish nationality, another major subject of discussion, was recognised as the best way to counteract Luxembourg's increasing democratic deficit after the electorate's refusal to extend legislative voting rights to foreign residents, decided in the referendum of 2015. This reform further proceeded over the course of 2016, reintroduced the perennial language debate in Luxembourg, a larger debate on the role and status of the Luxembourgish language as well as its relation to integration of migrants into Luxembourgish society. In order to increase foreign residents' participation in the upcoming municipal elections of October 2017, the government launched an awareness campaign encouraging foreign residents to register on the electoral roll, and provided support for organisations wishing to organise complementary actions. The Ministry of National Education and Youth made efforts to find responses to the growing heterogeneity of Luxembourg's population, aiming to diversify and broaden the post-primary school offer, to develop plurilingual education in nurseries and to develop non-formal education by reforming in-kind benefits, this with the aim of promoting integration and equal opportunity. The transposition of Directive 2013/55/EU on the recognition of professional qualifications was also completed in 2016. The law further amended several national provisions, recast the legislation in the field of recognition of diplomas, combined all applicable provisions in a single legislative text and simplified the procedure for recognition. The debate regarding the return of irregular migrants circled around a number of issues in 2016: the exclusion of Kosovar nationals from the AVRRL programme, the Schengen evaluation and the aforementioned resulting changes to provisions on detention, the debate on the enforcement of the EU-Afghanistan 'Joint way forward on migration issues' agreement, as well as the continuation of the elaboration of readmission agreements. Luxembourg's government took further steps in the fight against trafficking in human beings (THB) over the course of 2016. The Council of Government adopted the National Action Plan on trafficking in human beings, which focuses on the detection and protection of victims, the prosecution and punishment of perpetrators and a policy to combat trafficking. Luxembourg's strategy on prostitution was presented, consisting of a National Action Plan on prostitution and a bill strengthening the fight against the exploitation of prostitution, procuring and THB. Additionally, the Consultative Commission on Human Rights (Commission Consultative des Droits de l'Homme – C2DH) published its first report on THB, which reviewed the years 2014-2016. In reference to migration and development, Luxembourg continued putting emphasis on vocational training and integration programmes in its indicative cooperation programmes with partner countries. Additionally, the Council of Government approved the bill on the agreement between the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and the Republic of Cape Verde on the concerted management of migratory flows and solidarity-based development, facilitating the movement of persons and to encourage temporary circular professional migration between Luxembourg and Cape Verde.

A lo largo de la presente tesis doctoral, se desarrolla un análisis evolutivo de la cultura política en España. Dicho análisis abarca desde las primeras elecciones de nuestra actual democracia hasta el año 2011. Con ello se pretende alcanzar un objetivo general de conocimiento de la evolución de la cultura política de la ciudadanía española, a través de un análisis longitudinal descriptivo, comparativo y causal de los diferentes elementos que la configuran. La consecución de este objetivo general se concreta a través de cinco objetivos específicos, a saber: Objetivo Específico 1: Analizar las influencias de los factores de cohorte, edad y período en el proceso de construcción de la cultura política de los españoles. Objetivo Específico 2: Establecer una diferenciación entre los factores actitudinales y comportamentales de la cultura política española para acometer un análisis de las interacciones entre variables de ambos subgrupos. Objetivo Específico 3: Conocer la evolución de los factores actitudinales y comportamentales de la cultura política de la ciudadanía española. Objetivo Específico 4: Determinar la influencia de las variables sociodemográficas en aquellas otras relacionadas con aspectos comportamentales. Objetivo Específico 5: Observar la influencia de los factores actitudinales de la cultura política (interés, conocimiento, orientación ideológica y fidelidad de voto) en los factores comportamentales de la misma (formas de participación política convencional y no convencional). Las conclusiones obtenidas al respecto del objeto de conocimiento que se perseguía alcanzar, giran en torno a las hipótesis planteadas en el inicio de esta tesis doctoral, a saber: 1. De los efectos cohorte, ciclo vital y período en la construcción de la cultura política de los españoles a lo largo del proceso democrático, aquel que afecta en mayor medida en dicha evolución es el efecto período, que será el que mayor peso ejerza como variable independiente en la construcción de la cultura política de los españoles a lo largo del actual periodo democrático español. 2. Existe una reducción de las diferencias en la cultura política de la población española a lo largo del proceso democrático en razón de las variables socio-demográficas de la población española. 3. El interés se constituye como la variable de cultura política de tipo actitudinal con mayor influencia, como variable independiente, respecto a aquellas otras variables de tipo comportamental referidas a las formas de participación política analizadas (participación electoral, afiliación a sindicatos, afiliación a partidos políticos, asistencia a manifestaciones y firma de peticiones). Con respecto a la primera de las hipótesis, a tenor de los datos obtenidos del análisis longitudinal de cuatro cohortes generacionales, se confirma la hipótesis alternativa que sostiene el mayor peso del efecto período sobre la evolución de la cultura política española. Por su parte, los datos descriptivos obtenidos del análisis de las tablas de contingencia, indican una reducción progresiva de las influencias de muchas de las variables socio-demográficas sobre las características de la cultura política de la población española. Por último, el análisis multivariante representado en los modelos loglineales obtenidos para cada momento del presente estudio (1980, 1989, 2000 y 2011), devuelve el protagonismo de la variable orientación ideológica en la configuración de la cultura política española. En consecuencia, podemos concluir que la cultura política española es una realidad dinámica que varía a lo largo del proceso democrático español. En ese proceso de cambio hay que destacar la influencia del efecto periodo y variables como la orientación ideológica. Por su parte, la influencia de variables socio-demográficas en la caracterización dicha cultura política, ha venido descendiendo a lo largo del estudio. ABSTRACT Throughout this thesis, an evolutionary analysis of the political culture in Spain is carried out. This analysis spans from the first elections of our current democracy until 2011. The aim is to achieve an overall objective of understanding the evolution of the political culture of the Spanish public, through a descriptive, comparative and longitudinal causal analysis of the different elements that make it up. The achievement of this overall objective is specified through five specific objectives, namely: Specific Objective 1: To analyze the influence of the group factors, such as age and period in the process of building the political culture of the Spaniards. Specific Objective 2: Establish the difference between the attitudinal and behavioral factors of the Spanish political culture in order to undertake an analysis of interactions of the variables between both subgroups. Specific Objective 3: Understand the evolution of the attitudinal and behavioral factors of the political culture of the Spanish citizens. Specific Objective 4: Determine the influence of the social demographic variables on those others related to behavioral aspects. Specific Objective 5: Observe the influence of the attitudinal factors of political culture (interests, knowledge, ideological orientation and fidelity of vote) on the same behavioral factors (forms of conventional and unconventional political participation). The conclusions that were sought and reached regarding the object of knowledge, revolves around the hypothesis proposed at the beginning of this thesis, namely: 1. Of the cohort effects, life cycle and the building period of the political culture of the Spaniards throughout the democratic process, the period effect is the one that most affects the development, being this period which will have a stronger weight as an independent variable in the construction of the political culture of the Spaniards during the current Spanish democratic period. 2. There is a reduction of the differences in the political culture of the Spanish population over the democratic process because of the socio-demographic variables of the Spanish population 3. The interest is constituted as a variable of the attitudinal political culture with a greater influence, as an independent variable, as opposed to behavioral related to the analyzed forms of political participation (voter participation, union membership, political party memberships, protest assistance and petition signing). With regard to the first hypothesis, according to the data from the longitudinal analysis of four generational cohorts, we confirm that the alternative hypothesis that sustains the greatest influence on the period effect with regards to the evolution period of the Spanish political culture. For its part, the descriptive data obtained from the analysis of contingency tables indicate a progressive reduction of the influences of many of the socio-demographic variables over the characteristics of the political culture of the Spanish population. Finally, the multivariate analysis represented in loglinear models obtained in each moment of this study (1980, 1989, 2000 and 2011), returns the prominence of the ideological orientation variable in the configuration of the Spanish political culture. Consequently, we can conclude that the Spanish political culture is a dynamic reality that varies throughout the Spanish democratic process. In this process of change we must mention the influence of the period effect and variables such as ideological orientation. For its part, the influence of socio-demographic variables in characterizing this political culture has been declining throughout the study.

Luxembourg has been a country of immigration for more than 50 years. Located in the heart of Europe, it holds a strong attraction for EU citizens and nationals from countries all around the world, who play a central role in the national economy, making an important contribution to the population growth and the labour market. Over the course of 2015, Luxembourg's population has continued its steady growth of approximately 13.000 people per year, increasing by 2,36%, from 562.958 on 1st January 2015 to 576.249 on 1st January 2016. Foreign citizens have continued to play an essential role in Luxembourg's population growth, both in terms of net migration and births. The total net migration amounted to +11.159 individuals in 2015, which signifies a surplus of arrivals over departures. Foreign EU citizens accounted for 76,1%; third-country nationals represented 32,9%, while Luxembourgish nationals' contribution was negative, at -9%. The number of births in 2015 was the highest on record, equal to that in 2013, with 6.115 births in total. Foreigners contributed a birth surplus of 2.150 to Luxembourg's natural increase, while a birth deficit of -18 was recorded for Luxembourgish nationals. 2015 also marked a record year regarding naturalisations, with Belgians remaining the citizens that obtain citizenship most frequently, followed by the French and the Portuguese. On 1st January 2016, 46,7% of Luxembourg's residents were foreigners. Representing 34,6% of the total foreign population, Portuguese remained the most represented nationality, followed by France (15,5%) and Italy (7,5%), while the most numerous third-country nationals were Montenegrins. Due to the war in Syria and the influx of applicants for international protection that followed, the Syrian population living in Luxembourg showed the highest proportional increase during 2015, growing by 461,5% from January 2015 to January 2016. A look at Luxembourg's labour market also reveals the central role that foreigners play in the national economy. In the first quarter of 2016, residents of Luxembourg represented 55% of the country's salaried workforce. Of these, 27,5% were Luxembourgish nationals, while EU nationals represented 24,2% and third-country nationals 3,3%. Cross-border workers from France, Belgium and Germany represented 45% of all salaried workers in Luxembourg. They mainly work in the manufacturing industries, construction and commerce. A majority of recruitments in the HORECA sector are of foreign residents. Third-country nationals who do not benefit from free movement must be issued with a residence permit in order to enter Luxembourg. An increase in first issues of residence permits was recorded for most categories compared to the preceding year, which had experienced a decrease in almost all categories. In 2015, residence permits were most frequently issued in the "family member", "salaried worker" and "European Blue Card" categories. 2015 was marked by a significant increase in the number of applications for international protection, which has more than doubled when compared to 2014 (2.447 applications in 2015). While there was a strong increase at the end of 2015, the trend slowed down in 2016. Nonetheless, the number of applications for international protection remains higher than levels in 2013/2014. Most applications were from Syrians and Iraqis (27,3% and 22% respectively), who accounted for only 9% and 1% respectively in 2014. Moreover, both the rate of status recognition (refugee and subsidiary protection status) and of return decision increased. In 2015, Luxembourg pledged to relocate 557 individuals to Luxembourg in the framework of the EU Council decision to relocate 160.000 international protection applicants from Greece and Italy. Within this framework, 114 refugees have been relocated from Greece and 20 from Italy up until mid-August 2016. Furthermore, 46 refugees were resettled from Turkey in 2015, followed by 52 further refugees as a result of Luxembourg's pledge to resettle 194 refugees from Turkey in the context of the EU-Turkey agreement of March 2016. Additionally, 44 Syrians were welcomed in 2015 following a request for assistance by German authorities. Faced with the increased inflow of applicants for international protection, an emergency reception plan was developed in 2015. The plan included the establishment of first-instance reception centres and the strengthening of the capacity in human resources of both the Luxembourg Reception and Integration Agency (OLAI) and the Directorate of Immigration, which is under the authority of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The OLAI also strengthened the collaboration with stakeholders at inter-ministerial and local levels. A strong focus has also been put on integration, where major developments include the setting up of integration projects by the municipalities in the context of the 'Communal Integration Plan' project and the creation of Luxembourg's Centre for Integration and Cohesion (LISKO), a service supporting the beneficiaries of international protection in their process of integration in Luxembourgish society. Over the course of 2015 and 2016, Luxembourg continued to transpose and implement several EU directives. The law of 18th December 2015 on the reception of applicants for international protection and temporary protection transposes Directive 2013/33/EU (re-cast reception conditions) into national law. The law of 18th December 2015 on international protection and temporary protection transposed Directive 2013/32/EU (re-cast procedure), establishing the procedures for granting and withdrawing international and subsidiary protection and the standardisation of the content of this protection. The bill implementing Directive 2013/55/EU on the recognition of professional qualifications was introduced into parliament in 2015 and the bill implementing Directive 2014/36/EU on seasonal workers and Directive 2014/66/EU on intra-corporate transferees and investors' residence permits was introduced in 2016. Regarding the transposition of the Blue Card Directive, a Government Decree was issued on 22nd May 2015 establishing the professions to which the lower salary threshold for hiring highly qualified workers applies. On the national level, a number of legislative changes address some of the challenges set by Luxembourg's heterogeneity. The bill no. 6410 on youth, introduced into parliament on 6th February 2015, gives cross-border workers access to the care service voucher system which was previously only available to Luxembourgish residents. Bill no. 6893 on the recognition of qualifications was introduced in parliament in October 2015. At the referendum of 7th June 2015, the proposal to extend the right to vote of non-Luxembourgish residents was rejected by a large majority, who argued in favour of the acquisition of nationality as the more appropriate way to acquire the right to vote. Consequently, the government took steps towards reforming the law on nationality in order to soften the requirements for acquisition of nationality, and in this way enable the broadening of participation in elections. Bill no. 6977 on nationality was introduced in parliament on 24th March 2016. It includes the reduction of the required duration of residency from seven to five years and the reintroduction of procedure of option in cases of close links with Luxembourg. The level of fluency in Luxembourgish required has become a central focus of the debate on the bill on nationality, some fearing that linguistic requirements would become an obstacle to foreigners' acquisition of nationality, others underlining the command of the language as a central factor in integration and thus also in the acquisition of nationality.