Suchergebnisse

This paper investigates the effects of sanctions on the behavior of deputies in the French National Assembly. In 2009, the Assembly introduced small monetary sanctions to prevent absenteeism in weekly standing committee meetings (held on wednesday mornings). Using a rich monthly panel dataset of parliamentary activity for the full 2007-2012 legislature, we study the reactions of deputies to (i) the mere eligibility to new sanctions, (ii) the actual experience of a salary cut, and (iii) the public exposure of sanctioned deputies in the media. First, our diff-in-diff estimates show very large disciplining effects of the policy in terms of committee attendance, and positive or null effects on other dimensions of parliamentary work. Second, exploiting the timing of exposure to actual sanctions (monthly salary cuts versus staggered media exposure), we find that deputies strongly increase their committee attendance both after the private experience of sanctions and after their public exposure. These results suggest that monetary and reputational incentives can effectively discipline politicians without crowding out intrinsic motivation. Abstract This paper investigates the effects of sanctions on the behavior of deputies in the French

This paper investigates the effects of sanctions on the behavior of deputies in the French National Assembly. In 2009, the Assembly introduced small monetary sanctions to prevent absenteeism in weekly standing committee meetings (held on wednesday mornings). Using a rich monthly panel dataset of parliamentary activity for the full 2007-2012 legislature, we study the reactions of deputies to (i) the mere eligibility to new sanctions, (ii) the actual experience of a salary cut, and (iii) the public exposure of sanctioned deputies in the media. First, our diff-in-diff estimates show very large disciplining effects of the policy in terms of committee attendance, and positive or null effects on other dimensions of parliamentary work. Second, exploiting the timing of exposure to actual sanctions (monthly salary cuts versus staggered media exposure), we find that deputies strongly increase their committee attendance both after the private experience of sanctions and after their public exposure. These results suggest that monetary and reputational incentives can effectively discipline politicians without crowding out intrinsic motivation. Abstract This paper investigates the effects of sanctions on the behavior of deputies in the French

This paper investigates the effects of sanctions on the behavior of deputies in the French National Assembly. In 2009, the Assembly introduced small monetary sanctions to prevent absenteeism in weekly standing committee meetings (held on wednesday mornings). Using a rich monthly panel dataset of parliamentary activity for the full 2007-2012 legislature, we study the reactions of deputies to (i) the mere eligibility to new sanctions, (ii) the actual experience of a salary cut, and (iii) the public exposure of sanctioned deputies in the media. First, our diff-in-diff estimates show very large disciplining effects of the policy in terms of committee attendance, and positive or null effects on other dimensions of parliamentary work. Second, exploiting the timing of exposure to actual sanctions (monthly salary cuts versus staggered media exposure), we find that deputies strongly increase their committee attendance both after the private experience of sanctions and after their public exposure. These results suggest that monetary and reputational incentives can effectively discipline politicians without crowding out intrinsic motivation. Abstract This paper investigates the effects of sanctions on the behavior of deputies in the French

Members of groups and organizations often have to decide on rules that regulate their contributions to common tasks. They typically differ in their propensity to contribute and often care about the image they project, in particular want to be perceived by other group members as being high contributors. In such environments we study the interaction between the way members vote on rules and their subsequent contribution decisions. We show that multiple norms can emerge. We draw surprising policy implications, on the effect of group size, of supermajority rules and of the observability of actions.

Members of groups and organizations often have to decide on rules that regulate their contributions to common tasks. They typically differ in their propensity to contribute and often care about the image they project: in particular, they want to be perceived by other group members as being high contributors. In such environments we study, from both a positive and normative perspective, the interaction between the way members vote on rules and their subsequent contribution decisions. We show how endogenous norms can emerge. We study in particular the role played by the visibility of individual actions, votes or contributions. While making votes visible always increases welfare in our setting, making contributions public can be welfare decreasing as it makes some rules more likely to be rejected.

This paper investigates the effects of sanctions on the behavior of deputies in the French National Assembly. In 2009, the Assembly introduced small monetary sanctions to prevent absenteeism in weekly standing committee meetings (held on wednesday mornings). Using a rich monthly panel dataset of parliamentary activity for the full 2007-2012 legislature, we study the reactions of deputies to (i) the mere eligibility to new sanctions, (ii) the actual experience of a salary cut, and (iii) the public exposure of sanctioned deputies in the media. First, our diff-in-diff estimates show very large disciplining effects of the policy in terms of committee attendance, and positive or null effects on other dimensions of parliamentary work. Second, exploiting the timing of exposure to actual sanctions (monthly salary cuts versus staggered media exposure), we find that deputies strongly increase their committee attendance both after the private experience of sanctions and after their public exposure. These results suggest that monetary and reputational incentives can effectively discipline politicians without crowding out intrinsic motivation. Abstract This paper investigates the effects of sanctions on the behavior of deputies in the French

One of the central and constantly recurring features of youth participation studies is the depiction of young people and adolescents as the future of democratic politics. According to previous research, however, young people exhibit generally lower levels of political participation than adults and show decreasing trends in their politica activities over time. In this study, we argue that, in order to arrive at meaningful conclusions about young and adult people's political participation over time, 'construct-equivalent' rather than identical instruments of political participation across different age groups and time points should be used. Applying the so called 'identity-equivalence procedure' for political participation across three different age groups and the time period 2002-2014 using data from the European Social Survey (ESS), our results indicate that (1) the concrete manifestations of the concept of political participation differ across young and adult people and over time and (2) levels of political participation are quite similar for young and adult people and increasing from 2002-2014. Therefore, the commonly employed strategy of applying identical instruments of political participation across age groups and time points appears at least questionable.

Der betriebliche Arbeits- und Gesundheitsschutz ist ein wichtiger Bestandteil gewerkschaftlichen Handelns und spielt bei den Aushandlungsprozessen um Arbeitsbedingungen durchaus eine Rolle. Nachhaltige Beschäftigungssicherung ist zudem ein Interesse, das rechtlich (bspw. im Kontext der Gefährdungsbeurteilungen) und politisch von Arbeitnehmer- wie von Arbeitgeberseite adressiert wird. Der vorliegende Beitrag stellt anhand einer Fallstudie zum Verein Arbeit und Gesundheit e.V. dar, inwiefern die Neuen Sozialen Bewegungen den Arbeits- und Gesundheitsschutz auf die Agenda von Gewerkschaften, aber auch von Interessenvertretungen und anderen betrieblichen Akteur_innen in arbeitsregulativen Prozessen setzten. Zentrales Anliegen ist es herauszuarbeiten, wie sich Protestkommunikation zu einer auf Dauer angelegten Kommunikation über den betrieblichen Arbeits- und Gesundheitsschutz formieren und so die Position in den Auseinandersetzungen um Arbeitsbedingungen stärken konnte. Dafür war der Aufbau (in-)formeller Netzwerkstrukturen, eine juristische Absicherung des Akteursstatus, das Aneignen von Fachwissen und das Schaffen von Plausibilitätszonen, die für Gewerkschaften relevant wurden, eine zentrale Voraussetzung.

Während des Zweiten Weltkrieges flüchteten etwa 150.000 Europäer vor Krieg und Besatzung nach Großbritannien. Unter ihnen waren Angehörige der vormaligen europäischen Regierungen, Verwaltungen, politischen Eliten, Militärs und Königshäuser. Aus ihren Reihen bildeten sich Nationalkomitees und Exilregierungen, die die nationale Souveränität ihrer Länder trotz deutscher Besatzung aufrechterhalten und als Alliierte für einen gemeinsamen Sieg über Hitler eintreten wollten. Im Zentrum Londons lebten und arbeiteten sie in enger Nachbarschaft. Rechtlich betrachtet erreichten die Mitglieder der Exilregierungen London meist als individuelle Flüchtlinge; sie verließen die Stadt überwiegend als Angehörige anerkannter Regierungen. Eine genauere Untersuchung des »London Moment«, dieser formativen Phase europäischer Politik, bricht den vermeintlichen Gegensatz zwischen Macht und Ohnmacht auf und trägt so zur Reflexion über Flucht und Flüchtende bei. Der Aufsatz erläutert die Entwicklung des rechtlichen Status der Exilanten und folgt vier Fallbeispielen von der Ankunft zur Etablierung in London.