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The author looks into the methodological features of public choice theory. On the example of James Buchanan's contribution, he demonstrates the differences between that kind of approach (often dubbed political economy) versus welfare economics and mainstream economics. Unlike welfare economics, which tries to work out the optimal state of allocation and distribution of economic resources by using certain logical rules based on Pareto's principles, or mainstream economics, which tries to identify the improvements in observable economic categories (such as national income or investment consumption), political economy encompasses the process of collective decision-making i.e. politics. In this, the efficacy criterion is t extent of consent (consensus) in collective decisionmaking. On the example of Buchanan's and Tullock's joint contribution in the book "The Calculus of Consent", the author concludes that this paved the way for introducing a legitimate categorial mechanism for investigating the costs of political decision-making into political science. (SOI : PM: S. 88)

The author discusses the basic structure of Mancur Olson's political economy. He highlights three concepts on which it is based - public goods, interest groups, and selective incentives. The last concept represents Olson's innovation in contemporary political science. The author's central methodical assumption is based on the insight that Olson's key theory is linked with the so-called public goods paradox. Unlike private goods, public goods are non-competitive and non-exclusive, which means that it is not possible to bar those who do not share the costs of their production from using them. On the basis of this, Olson has developed the original theory of interest groups. By looking into the costs of organizing along interest lines as a collective activity whose result is a public good, he distinguishes between large, heterogeneous, and small, homogeneous groups. Besides, he has shown that, regarding public goods, individuals tend to behave as free riders, defaulters who try to avoid the costs of securing these goods. The author shows that Olson has, notwithstanding certain flimsiness of his reductionist methodology, significantly revamped political science. (SOI : PM: S. 202)

The Ministry of Science of the Republic of Croatia decided on a new "Rule book of definition of scientific areas". By the "Book", politology is a scientific field in the area of social sciences. The field is divided in three branches: 1. politology, 2. theory and history of politics, 3. political philosophy. The author of this article shows by documents how the "political science" is quite differently structured by IPSA and APSA, and describes 120 years of dominantly American development of "political science" and of professions of political scientists which brought out a recent new world standard with around 100 subdisciplines and areas of expertise which are structured in 8 fundamental disciplines: 1. political institutions, 2. political behaviour, 3. comparative politics, 4. internationa relations, 5. political theory, 6. public policy and public administration/management, 7. political economy, 8. political methodology. The author points out that a voluntaristic intervention in the definition of scientific areas could mean an attack on development of science, research organisation, renewal of teaching staff on University, and on academic education of political scientists, as well as on internationally comparable competence of Croatian experts, and Croatian democratic political thought and political culture in general. (SOI : PM: S. 240)