Suchergebnisse

La Commission Constitutionnelle a ete creee par le decret presidentiel No. 100/039 du 21 mars 1991. En son article 2, la Commission a pour mandat: "(1) d'analyser toute la problematique de la democratisation et de produire un rapport a transmettre au President de la Republique; (2) d'organiser le debat national sur la democratisation des institutions et de la vie politique; (3) d'elaborer enfin le projet de la Constitution de la Republique du Burundi et d'en assurer l'explication avant son adoption". La presente note resume les principales regles contenues dans les dispositions du projet de la Commission. (DÜI-Hff)

La Commission Constitutionnelle a ete creee par le decret presidentiel No. 100/039 du 21 mars 1991. En son article 2, la Commission a pour mandat: "(1) d'analyser toute la problematique de la democratisation et de produire un rapport a transmettre au President de la Republique; (2) d'organiser le debat national sur la democratisation des institutions et de la vie politique; (3) d'elaborer enfin le projet de la Constitution de la Republique du Burundi et d'en assurer l'explication avant son adoption". En execution du deuxieme volet de son mandat, la Commission a organise et anime le debat national sur son rapport du 30 septembre au 23 novembre et du 13 au 21 decembre 1991. (DÜI-Hff)

The article analyses the notes, which were prepared by provisional investigation commissions formed by the Seimas, in which it was suggested that the Seimas should either agree or disagree on the abolition of the immunity of a Member of the Seimas. In the opinion of the author, an analysis of these notes permits to assert that these notes often have essential drawbacks: the notes contain insufficient arguments following which the commission substantiates its proposal that the Seimas should not give its consent to hold a Member of the Seimas criminally liable, to arrest him or restrict he freedom otherwise; at times such notes do not contain any such arguments at all; sometimes the commissions exceed the powers granted to them and undertake functions which are not characteristic of such commissions. The Constitution establishes the immunity of a Member of the Seimas not for the purpose that a Member of the Seimas who committed a crime could avoid criminal liability, but that he would not be held criminally liable in the absence of legal grounds, that he would not be persecuted for political or other similar reasons, and that no influence (which is prohibited by the Constitution) would be exerted on him due to his activity in the capacity of a Member of the Seimas.

The article analyses the notes, which were prepared by provisional investigation commissions formed by the Seimas, in which it was suggested that the Seimas should either agree or disagree on the abolition of the immunity of a Member of the Seimas. In the opinion of the author, an analysis of these notes permits to assert that these notes often have essential drawbacks: the notes contain insufficient arguments following which the commission substantiates its proposal that the Seimas should not give its consent to hold a Member of the Seimas criminally liable, to arrest him or restrict he freedom otherwise; at times such notes do not contain any such arguments at all; sometimes the commissions exceed the powers granted to them and undertake functions which are not characteristic of such commissions. The Constitution establishes the immunity of a Member of the Seimas not for the purpose that a Member of the Seimas who committed a crime could avoid criminal liability, but that he would not be held criminally liable in the absence of legal grounds, that he would not be persecuted for political or other similar reasons, and that no influence (which is prohibited by the Constitution) would be exerted on him due to his activity in the capacity of a Member of the Seimas.