Suchergebnisse

11/15/1882: Justice Felix Frankfurter's birthday.

In March 1962 a secret report landed on the desks of senior officials in the Foreign Office. Written by Foreign Office Historian Rohan Butler it was a forensic and critical account of the loss in 1951 of Britain's single biggest …

Planet A Climate change played a role in the severity of last week's wildfires in Maui, Hawaii, where average temperatures have increased by 2°C since 1950. Other factors such as thinning clouds, La Niña and ...

Soon after Brazil's defeat by Uruguay in the 1950 World Cup, the Brazilian national team wanted to change its kit. A 19 year-old man was responsible for the design that became one of the most iconic in world sport.

Jacob Mchangama (of Justitia, and now a Research Professor at Vanderbilt) has a detailed item about it; an excerpt: In 1950, Eleanor Roosevelt, serving as the first Chairperson of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, was involved in a bitter dispute about the limits of free speech. Stalin's Soviet Union fought tooth and nail to ensure…

Back in 1950, Alan Turing wrote a paper called “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” which enunciated what has come to be called the “Turing test.” Turing was considering the question “can machines think?” He suggested a practical method of answering that question: Imagine a human sending and receiving messages, with one set of responses coming from … Continue reading Do the New AI Tools Actually Reason, or Are They Just Good at Faking It?
The post Do the New AI Tools Actually Reason, or Are They Just Good at Faking It? first appeared on Conversable Economist.

Contributor(s): Professor Hiroko Akiyama, Kath Scanlon, Dr Thijs Van Den Broek, Professor Alan Walker | Welcome to LSE IQ, a podcast from the London School of Economics and Political Science, where we ask leading social scientists - and other experts - to answer an intelligent question about economics, politics or society. We are all getting older. Not just as individuals, but as societies – particularly in the developed world but middle income and developing countries are following on quickly behind us. In 1950 there were 14 million people over the age of 80 globally. In 2080 that number is expected to be 700 million. In Britain, a child born today will live for more than 90 years and more than 30 per cent will reach a hundred. Indeed, Michael Murphy, professor of demography at LSE, has said that perhaps the greatest achievement of humanity over the last century is the doubling of the amount of years a child could expect to live from birth. Given the extended lifespans many of us will live, in this episode of LSE IQ Sue Windebank asks, 'How can we age better?'. This episode features: Professor Hiroko Akiyama, University of Tokyo; Kath Scanlon, LSE London; Dr Thijs Van Den Broek, Erasmus School of Health Policy and Management; and Professor Alan Walker University of Sheffield. For further information about the podcast and all the related links visit lse.ac.uk/iq and please tell us what you think using the hashtag #LSE.

Alan Reynolds


A paper on "Managing Disinflation" was recently presented at Chicago Booth by former Fed Governor Frederic Mishkin, and four distinguished co‐​authors. "There is no post‐​1950 precedent for a sizable central‐​bank induced disinflation," they concluded, "that does not entail substantial economic sacrifice [unemployment] or recession."[1] That was, of course, cheerleading for the familiar "Phillips Curve" theory, which claims low unemployment causes high inflation by raising wages, so high inflation can only be reduced by higher unemployment.







The Phillips Curve is the heart and soul of the Federal Reserve's forecasting model. It is the reason Fed Chair Powell keeps fretting about "tight labor markets" as the reason the FOMC can never stop pushing short‐​term interest rates above long‐​term rates until another "hard landing" pushes the unemployment rate above 4.5 percent.
According to the "Managing Disinflations" and endless lectures by Fed officials, the reduction of inflation since last June could not have happened. After 15 months in which the CPI inflation rate averaged 8.5 percent (and the fed funds rate was tiny), it has now fallen to 3.1 percent for 11 months. Did that happen because the unemployment rate went up? On the contrary, unemployment fell from 4.5 percent to 3.6 percent.
But the Fed and academic economists are not easily dissuaded by troublesome facts. They just keep on searching for new ways of explaining why the theory is still right, but the world has gone wrong.


[1] Stephen G. Cecchetti, Michael E. Feroli, Peter Hooper, Frederic S. Mishkin, and Kermit L. Schoenholtz. "Managing Disinflation" (February 2023) Table 2.1. https://​www​.chicago​b​ooth​.edu/​-​/​m​e​d​i​a​/​r​e​s​e​a​r​c​h​/​i​g​m​/​d​o​c​s​/​u​s​m​p​f​-​2​0​2​3​-​confe…

Norbert Michel and Jai Kedia


A few weeks ago, American Compass released Rebuilding American Capitalism, A Handbook for Conservative Policymakers. This Forbes column (American Compass Points To Myths Not Facts) provided a very brief critique of the handbook's "Financialization" chapter, and Oren Cass, American Compass's Executive Director, released a response titled Yes, Financialization Is Real.
This Cato at Liberty post is the third in a series that expands on the original criticisms outlined in the Forbes column. (The first and second in the series are available here and here.) This post demonstrates that the evidence does not support American Compass's claims regarding profits. This post also documents American Compass's failure to clearly specify terms and dates, as well as its selective use of examples that appear to support its positions.
To recap, the American Compass handbook states the following:
American finance has metastasized, claiming a disproportionate share of the nation's top business talent and the economy's profits, even as actual investment has declined." [Emphasis added.]

The original critique in Forbes pointed out: "It's impossible to know exactly what American Compass means by profits because they don't cite anything, but the National Income and Product Accounts provide financial and nonfinancial company profits dating back to 1998." With nothing else to base an analysis on, the critique then summarized the NIPA data, stating:
While the annual share of total corporate profits in the NIPAs has varied, at the end of 2022 it was 18 percent for financial companies versus 82 percent for nonfinancial companies. In 1998 the share for financial firms was a touch higher (20 percent) compared to nonfinancial firms (80 percent).

The original Forbes critique didn't make clear, however, that these respective shares do not suggest either sector "claimed" a share of total available profits at anyone's expense. They're merely part of the Bureau of Economic Analysis's national accounting exercise that estimates the value of all final goods and services produced in the United States. There is nothing inherently wrong with a higher (or lower) profit share in either sector.
In his response, Cass points out that the NIPA data goes back to 1929. He then shows that the share of total corporate profits for financial firms is twice as high in the 2010s versus in the 1950s (using 10‐​year averages for each decade), and finally complains that the original critique's "focus on the 2022 data as the endpoint is unfortunately misleading."
While Cass still neglects to specify any kind of preferred profit metric, fails to explain why his use of 10‐​year averages for each decade between 1950 and 2019 is appropriate, and fails to stipulate what the optimal share of profits should be, at least he acknowledges the NIPA data goes back to 1929. (For the record, it is just as misleading for American Compass to focus on 1950 to 2019 as evidence of an increase in the financial sector share as it would be for us to focus on the decline since 2009 as evidence of a decrease.)
While it is true, as Cass states, that the financial sector share was 28 percent in 2019, it is also true that the series exhibits a high degree of volatility. The standard deviation of the full series is about seven percentage points, and the financial sector share peaked at an unusually high value in 2002 (37 percent) before crashing to an unusually low value in 2008 (8 percent). This high degree of volatility makes it especially important to focus on the long‐​term trend rather than on any specific period.
As Figure 1 demonstrates,[1] using the NIPA data, the long‐​term trend for the financial sector's share of total corporate profits increases slowly throughout the roughly 100‐​year period. The slope of the trend line in Figure 1 indicates the financial sector's share of corporate profits increased by about 0.2 percent per year between 1929 and 2022.









Figure 1: Financial v. Non‐​Financial Share of Corporate Profits, Annual from 1929 to 2022
But that's all the series reveals. It does not provide evidence that the financial sector "claimed" a "disproportionate share" of the economy's profits, much less that this rate of change harmed the broader economy.
Importantly, it is not the case that corporate profits in the non-financial sector have been falling throughout this period. That is, even though the financial sector's share of NIPA corporate profits has been slightly increasing for 100 years, profits in the non‐​financial sector have been steadily growing, as has the broader economy.
Figure 2 provides a similar analysis. It shows that financial sector profits as a share of GDP have averaged less than two percent from 1929 to 2022. The series exhibits a slightly increasing trend, rising about 1.5 percentage points throughout the period, with a recent downtick since the early 2000s. While it would be misleading to claim that this recent downtick demonstrates a major failure of capitalism, selectively fixating on a narrow period to draw incorrect inferences mirrors American Compass's approach to other claims it has made.









Figure 2: Financial Profits as a Share of Nominal GDP, Annual from 1929 to 2022
For instance, in The Rise of Wall Street and the Fall of American Investment, American Compass claims that corporate profits have stagnated. Sort of. For instance, the report states:
Corporate profits from domestic industries fell for four straight years, from 2014 to 2018, even as the stock market was surging. The level in 2018–19 was 11 percent lower than at the prior business cycle's peak in 2005-06.

The report then presents a graph of pre‐​tax real corporate profits from 1998 to 2019, titled Profits Stagnating. The graph displays a very clear upward trend for the full period, but the report only discusses the decline in the level of profits from 2014 to 2018, and the level of profits in 2018 and 2019 relative to the peak in 2005 and 2006. In other words, American Compass's claim that corporate profits have stagnated ignores the broader trend and relative measures of profits, and carefully selects periods for comparison.
The above examples demonstrate American Compass's propensity to pick and choose metrics and time periods that appear to provide evidence for its claims. But, overall, these statistics do not provide evidence that "In recent decades, American finance has metastasized, claiming a disproportionate share of…the economy's profits." Of course, if American Compass has an optimal share for the financial sector in mind, it should clearly explain what that number is and why it is optimal.
In the next post, we will discuss claims involving "financialization's" alleged effect on investment.


[1] The figure omits data for 1932 and 1933 as these values, during the Great Depression, turned aggregate corporate profits negative. For the sake of completeness, the numbers are presented here. In 1932 and 1933, corporate profits are -$0.2 billion in each year, financial firms' profits are $0.6 billion and $0.8 billion respectively, and non‐​financial firms' profits are -$0.8 billion and -$1 billion respectively.

Norbert Michel and Jai Kedia


A few weeks ago, American Compass released Rebuilding American Capitalism, A Handbook for Conservative Policymakers. This Forbes column (American Compass Points To Myths Not Facts) provided a very brief critique of the handbook's "Financialization" chapter, and Oren Cass, American Compass's Executive Director, released a response titled Yes, Financialization Is Real.
This Cato at Liberty post is the fourth in a series that expands on the original criticisms outlined in the Forbes column. (The first three in the series are available here, here, and here.) This post demonstrates the evidence does not support American Compass's claims regarding investment. It also further documents American Compass's failure to clearly specify terms and dates, as well as its selective use of examples that appear to support its positions.
To recap, the American Compass handbook states the following:
American finance has metastasized, claiming a disproportionate share of the nation's top business talent and the economy's profits, even as actual investment has declined." [Emphasis added.]

As with profits, the "Financialization" chapter does not specify a single preferred measure of investment or any time frame for analysis. It simply complains that "In recent decades…actual investment has declined." [Emphasis added.] The original critique stated, "The claim that investment has declined is also easily verified as false," and then used National Income and Product Account (NIPA) data to show "investment in fixed assets has been steadily increasing since 1970, a trend that holds even if the data is adjusted for inflation."
Cass takes issue with the original critique's use of absolute investment dollars rather than investment as a share of GDP. Cass's response states:
Of course, investment rises in absolute dollars as the American population grows and economy expands. Who would claim otherwise? The question is what has happened relative to GDP.

Yet, American Compass uses the term actual investment in the introduction to the "Financialization" chapter and purposely uses aggregate data in levels when doing so suits its purpose. But importantly, American Compass fails to settle on any definition of investment.
Here's a list of direct quotes describing investment from the "Financialization" chapter:
Unfortunately, in the United States, productive business investment has been in long‐​term decline and the financial industry now specializes in trading assets around in circles. [Emphasis added, no dates given.]
Economy‐​wide, business investment has fallen significantly as a share of GDP. [Emphasis added, no dates given.]
They instead become savers themselves by acquiring financial assets, effectively deferring the earthy and material work of productive capital investment to others. [Emphasis added, no dates given.]
Statistically, this transition began in the 1980s, as the share of corporate investment in tangible assets declined and the acquisition of financial assets climbed. [Emphasis added.]
Despite this ambiguity, Cass's response insists that readers should know exactly what investment data American Compass's handbook is referring to because "the Rebuilding American Capitalism handbook is a synthesis of our analysis and recommendations and provides copious references to further reading alongside each proposal." So, here's a list of direct quotes from two other American Compass reports, none of which provide a clear answer:
Actual‐​investment, by which I mean the allocation of capital toward the development of new productive capacity—the building of structures, the installment of machines, the creation of intellectual property—has been weakening in America for decades now. [Found in "The Rise of Wall Street and the Fall of American Investment" – emphasis added.]
As non‐​investors have overrun the banks and markets and taken control of corporations, actual‐​investment has slowed. The nation's capital base is smaller by literally trillions of dollars as a result, representing untold enterprises never built, innovations never pursued, and workers never given opportunity. [Found in "The Rise of Wall Street and the Fall of American Investment" – emphasis added.]
Net non‐​residential fixed investment as a share of GDP has fallen by almost half, from 4.1% in the 1970s and 80s to 2.5% in the 2010s. [Found in "The Rise of Wall Street and the Fall of American Investment" – emphasis added.]
The classic categories of investment, structures and equipment, account for 87% of the nation's capital base and the rate of investment there has been declining in both gross and net terms. [Found in "The Rise of Wall Street and the Fall of American Investment" – emphasis added.]
Net investment as a share of value‐​add averaged 4.3% during 1998–2000 and then 0.5% during 2002-04. During 2000–17, the average was 2.2%, leading to a $1.0 trillion shortfall over the period, relative to the 1970–99 rate. [Found in "The Rise of Wall Street and the Fall of American Investment" – emphasis added.]
As we have seen, the cumulative gross investment shortfall during 2009–17 as compared to 1970–99 amounted to $3.4 trillion. [Found in "The Rise of Wall Street and the Fall of American Investment" – emphasis added.]
Nationwide, net investment as a share of GDP has fallen sharply, and the shortfall since the Great Recession totals roughly $3 trillion (equivalent to the excess outflow from public companies). [Found in "Confronting Coin‐​Flip Capitalism" – emphasis added.]
This creates a vicious cycle in which business leaders pursuing promising opportunities become harder to find, further encouraging the financial sector to develop strategies for deriving profits disconnected from actual investment. [Found in "Confronting Coin‐​Flip Capitalism" – emphasis added.]
From 2009 to 2017, the nation needed $22.9 trillion in gross investment to match the average growth rate of the capital stock during 1970–99 (3.8% of GDP annually). Instead, investment totaled only $19.6 trillion. [Found in "Confronting Coin‐​Flip Capitalism" – emphasis added.]
Even the market fundamentalists—indeed, especially the market fundamentalists—recognize that higher investment levels would be beneficial. [Found in "Confronting Coin‐​Flip Capitalism" – emphasis added.]
Setting aside American Compass's failure to explain whether any of these versions of investment is its single preferred measure of investment to study "financialization," it is true that there are many ways to describe investment. Indeed, there are even many different time periods, inflation adjustments, aggregation issues, and sub‐​components of investment that influence how an aggregate investment series behaves.
Moreover, if investment (however defined) declines, or declines slower than some metric, that fact alone would not be evidence that investment is less than optimal. While many American Compass reports imply investment is suboptimal, American Compass has not provided evidence that investment is less than what it should be.
Take, for instance, American Compass's claim that "Net non‐​residential fixed investment as a share of GDP has fallen by almost half, from 4.1 percent in the 1970s and 80s to 2.5 percent in the 2010s." If American Compass believes that that 4.1 percent was the optimal share in 1970, and a 1.6 percentage point lower share in the 2010s "threatens our future prosperity" and requires America to rebuild capitalism, then the least it can do is state a clear hypothesis and make an empirical case. Such critics cannot simply argue that a lower number is less than optimal. (For what it's worth, American Compass's "The Corporate Erosion of Capitalism" also fails to provide such evidence – it is merely an accounting exercise without any economic analysis of the optimal levels of real investment individual firms need to sustain their own operations.)
It turns out, though, that the long‐​term trend in most of these investment measures is not decreasing. The only way to show that "investment" has declined is to selectively define the measure and period for analysis. Otherwise, it is impossible to say that investment has declined.
Regardless, there is no inherent economic reason that investment, whether in absolute amounts or relative to GDP, whether net or gross, or real or nominal, must constantly increase. A developed economy with evolving working patterns, for instance, would not need to constantly invest more in new corporate structures.
Similarly, the rate of growth of investment does not have to constantly match or exceed GDP (or profit) growth in any historical period. The mere fact that some metric of investment grows slower than some other economic measure – even for an extended period – does not indicate that the economy will be harmed much less that "financialization" caused the "slow" growth.
Our analysis now turns to the actual time series of real investment and real GDP, respectively (see Figure 1 and Figure 2). Contrary to what Cass claims in his response, the right question is not always "what has happened [to investment] relative to GDP." (Even if it was the correct question, simply dividing investment by GDP would not adequately account for confounding factors such as population growth, the cost of investment, productivity, feedback loops, etc.) Bluntly, it is not at all clear that using a relative measure is the "right" way to look at investment.









Figure 1: Real Gross Private Investment in the U.S., Annual from 1929 to 2022









Figure 2: Real Gross Domestic Product in the U.S., Annual from 1929 to 2022
For starters, nobody invests in amounts relative to GDP, and even American Compass often refers to levels of investment. Regardless, there are some basic mathematical issues that suggest, at the very least, researchers must be very careful drawing inferences from relative investment measures.
As Figure 1 and Figure 2 show, real (gross private domestic) investment and real GDP both display a sharp upward trend. However, the two series exhibit an enormous difference in size and volatility – the standard deviation of investment growth is five times greater than for GDP growth. A 20 percent year‐​to‐​year decline in investment is normal, but it would be highly unusual for GDP. Moreover, any decline in the ratio can easily mask the causal relationship between investment and economic growth.
Put differently, GDP is stable but one of its components – investment – fluctuates rapidly. This stability arises as investment accounts for only 13 percent of GDP on average and fluctuations in investment can be offset by counter‐​cyclical fluctuations in other components of GDP, such as consumption or fiscal spending. Consequently, measuring investment relative to GDP can give the appearance that something dreadful has happened even though such deviations may be the result of a perfectly normal economy, even one with optimal decision making.
Investment's high volatility is a commonly known macroeconomic fact. Benchmark macro models dating back to the start of macroeconomic modeling itself have highlighted investment's significant volatility in comparison to the rest of the economy. Successes of models since then are measured (at least in part) by whether their simulated time series can match the observed volatility of macro indicators such as investment.
Leaving the appropriateness of using levels aside, we now examine nominal investment relative to nominal GDP (i.e., the investment‐​to‐​GDP ratio), as well as several of its component measures. (See Figure 3.) These nominal metrics are available from 1929, but in fairness to American Compass, we only present the data from 1950 onwards. The series exhibits high volatility between 1929 and 1950 and starting the graph in 1929 biases the data toward a steeper increasing trend for investment and its component measures. (Incidentally, replicating Figure 3 with real investment and GDP figures also shows the ratio exhibiting an increasing trend.[1])
As Figure 3 shows, the investment‐​to‐​GDP ratio exhibits variation around a very mildly increasing trend for all of modern U.S. economic history. As for component measures, non‐​residential investment has grown significantly as a share of the economy, offsetting the decline in the share of residential investment. Finally, net private domestic investment has declined over time. From this set of investment measures, focusing only on net private domestic investment to argue "actual investment" has declined equates to selectively using a sub‐​component of investment while ignoring others.









Figure 3: Investment Metrics as Share of NGDP in the U.S., Annual from 1950 to 2022
Of course, there are still many other ways to describe investment. Assume, for example, that net nonresidential (or business) investment is the "right" measure to analyze, as Cass's response suggests. Figure 4 presents real net business investment and its subcomponents from 1967 to 2021.[2] It shows that net business investment exhibits a sharp increasing trend. (Figure 3 showed that nonresidential investment as a share of GDP exhibits an increasing trend.) While the trends are not as steep for the subcomponents, Figure 4 shows that net investment in business equipment and intellectual property also display increasing trends. However, net business investment in structures exhibits a decreasing trend. (Interestingly, in The Rise of Wall Street and the Fall of American Investment, American Compass groups structures and equipment together to demonstrate that investment in "Structures & Equipment" is declining.)









Figure 4: Real Net Nonresidential Investment and its Components in the U.S., Annual from 1967 to 2022
Obviously, it would make little sense to argue that "actual investment" is declining by focusing only on the decline in the net structure subcomponent, or any other component of investment for a shorter period. Put bluntly, American Compass is incorrect to use declines in any of these subcomponents to argue that there is some kind of broad decline in investment.
Still, the trends in these subcomponents on Figure 4 are even more problematic for American Compass. Not only do the trends contradict that investment is in a general decline, but American Compass's story requires an explanation for: (1) why the highly developed U.S. economy needs constantly increasing growth in structures; and, (2) how "financialization" is responsible for a decline in structure investment and a simultaneous increase in equipment and IP investment.
It is also worth noting that while there's nothing inherently wrong with using net investment figures, as American Compass sometimes does, neither the Bureau of Economic Analysis's depreciation estimates nor accounting depreciation perfectly coincide with economic depreciation. In other words, even when someone fully depreciates a piece of equipment for tax or accounting purposes, it does not mean that the equipment is no longer useful and must be immediately replaced.
More generally, from a macroeconomic perspective, there is no reason to distinguish between different sub‐​components of investment. The primary macro indicator of economic health is real GDP growth away from trend (or similar metrics such as output gap and unemployment). Investment is a means of facilitating capital accumulation and it is not immediately clear why one component of it is necessarily better than any other. This is why seminal empirical economic papers always focus on investment as an aggregate. Even highly cited papers that explicitly model net investment don't bother to include it in their results, instead focusing again on aggregate investment.
Overall, aggregate investment in the United States is not in decline. Yet, American Compass relies on a wide array of investment descriptions, in various time periods, to argue that American investment is in a general decline and below optimal levels. American Compass's error is only compounded by its imprecise definition of financialization. This combination of errors leaves American Compass with little more than a set of stories that appear to provide evidence financial markets threaten American capitalism.
In the next post, we will conclude this series by discussing American Compass's flawed characterization of Americans' income.


[1] It may seem unintuitive that shares would be different between nominal and real variables (prices on the numerator and denominator should cancel out), but the relative price of investment has changed significantly in comparison to overall GDP. Specifically, the deflator for investment has been significantly higher than for GDP, equalizing only since the 2010s.


[2] The BEA provides values for sub‐​components of investment that only go back to 1967.

In a recent Foreign Affairs article, Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-Wis.) — recent chair of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party — and former deputy national security advisor Matt Pottinger argue that the United States "shouldn't manage the competition with China; it should win it." To do so, the authors say Washington should suspend dialogue with Beijing, declare a "new cold war," and establish "primacy in Asia."Not only does the article fail to adequately describe what "winning" a cold war would look like, it actually advocates for an aggressive approach that could result in a hot war. Beijing will have little incentive to back down if it suspects that Washington is bent on achieving "victory" regardless of China's actions. A more assertive U.S. posture would likely be met with more, rather than less, hostility from Beijing.While the United States must deter offensive actions, it should also provide reassurances that any moderation in China's behavior will be met with reciprocal restraint. A strategy that prolongs peace — by managing competition — is more likely to preserve Washington's advantageous position and sustain stability in Asia.Gallagher and Pottinger argue that the United States should only engage in diplomacy with China from "a position of American strength." However, the authors fail to mention the fact that the scales are already tipped in favor the United States, which possesses the world's largest economy, a robust network of allies and partners, a nuclear arsenal nearly 10 times larger than China's, four times as many fifth-generation aircraft, control over the global reserve currency, a growing population, and relatively favorable soft power around the globe. To be sure, China's strength has grown rapidly in recent years, but Beijing is unlikely to ever match the combined strength of the United States and its allies and partners.Since coming to office in 2021, the Biden administration has leveraged the United States' relative position to manage relations with Beijing. Early on, Washington invested in domestic resolve before pursuing diplomacy with China. In February 2021, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the administration would "engage China from a position of strength." After a period of "strategic patience" — during which Washington repaired alliances and supported the U.S. economy — the administration then began to establish guardrails with Beijing. Recently, the two sides reopened military dialogues, and China has refrained from unsafe encounters with U.S. military assets.While the U.S.'s relative advantage has provided a solid basis from which to engage Beijing, any attempt to establish "primacy" would be unrealistic at best and self-defeating at worst. A rapid increase in U.S. military spending, as advocated by Gallagher and Pottinger, would likely prompt an acceleration in Beijing's military modernization, risking a destabilizing arms race.In addition, many countries in Asia, even those favorable to the United States, would not welcome U.S. attempts to establish regional hegemony. Rather than seek conventional military dominance, Washington should instead focus on providing allies and partners with defensive arms, especially cost-effective area-denial weapons.Gallagher and Pottinger argue that detente is a "discredited" policy. However, negotiations with the Soviet Union are one factor that prevented the Cold War from turning hot. Henry Kissinger described the rationale for detente as follows: "Our view was that a long period of peace would benefit us more than the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union had a very rigid system, a very stagnant economy."Although former President Reagan campaigned against detente, he ultimately engaged in negotiations with the Kremlin to reduce the chances of nuclear conflict. Cold War historian Simon Miles writes that, during his first year in office, Reagan announced that the United States would "return to the arms control bargaining table in Geneva." Likewise, Melvyn Leffler suggests that reassurances by Reagan gave Mikhail Gorbachev the confidence to continue with his plan to cut defense spending and pursue internal reforms. "By seeking to engage the Kremlin," Leffler argues, the Reagan administration "helped to win it."Like the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, coexistence between the United States and China is the only option. The hypothesis that one side can force its will on the other is an illusion. A war between two nuclear-armed superpowers would be a calamity for both countries and the world.If coexistence is the only option for U.S.-China relations, then Washington should seek terms of coexistence that favor U.S. interests and promote global stability. Sar far, the Biden administration has been too vague about its goals. This stems in part from Washington's insistence that it wants to shape "the strategic environment in which it [China] operates" rather than "change the PRC." However, if the United States wants to see more constructive behavior by Beijing, it must also clarify what actions China can take to improve the relationship.China, for its part, has been very good at defining what it wants from the United States, issuing so-called "lists" of actions that Washington "must stop." While this messaging can be ineffective when the demands are maximalist or delivered as accusations rather than good faith attempts to negotiate, the reality is that each side needs an opening bid.In 1950, then-Secretary of State Dean Acheson delivered a speech at UC Berkeley, laying out the conditions on which U.S.-Soviet coexistence could take place. He argued that Moscow should abide by the agreements made in Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam to establish a post-World War II modus vivendi. Today, Washington and Beijing should take advantage of the short-term stability in bilateral tensions to consider how to lay the groundwork for a long-term period of coexistence.

The Korean War ended more than 70 years ago, and a tense peace has reigned ever since on the Korean peninsula. The two Koreas have exchanged artillery fire, battled in the economic and diplomatic arenas, and even covertly dispatched spies to each other's territory. But the threats of a resumption of conflict, disproportionately coming from North Korea in recent years, have been rhetorical. The firepower of the South Korean military, backed by a U.S. defense pact, has deterred Pyongyang; the sheer number of soldiers in the North Korean army, backed by a small but operational nuclear arsenal, has deterred Seoul.But borders don't seem quite as inviolable as they once did. Russia has invaded Ukraine, Israel has sent forces into Gaza, and even Venezuela recently seemed to contemplate an incursion into Guyana. The United States, meanwhile, has recently attacked various targets abroad, from the Houthis in the Red Sea to Iranian commanders in Syria.Against this geopolitical backdrop, are the latest threats emanating from Pyongyang still rhetorical?North Korean leader Kim Jong Un sounds more and more embattled and belligerent. In power since the death of his father at the end of 2011, he has been constrained by a hemorrhaging economy and uncompromising adversaries abroad. The growth rate of the North Korean economy wasn't too bad at the beginning of his tenure. Since 2017, however, the arrow has simply gone downward, with a devastating 4.1 percent contraction in 2018, followed by a further 4.5 percent decline during the pandemic year of 2020. International sanctions have made North Korea dangerously dependent on China for trade, which explains in part Kim Jong Un's current interest in covering his bets by improving relations with Russia.Meanwhile, the two leaders that promised some form of engagement with Pyongyang—South Korea's Moon Jae-in and Donald Trump—are no longer in office. South Korea's current government is very cool toward engagement. Joe Biden, focused on a raft of other foreign policy challenges from Ukraine to Gaza, has not expressed much interest in expending political capital on a risky venture like negotiating with Pyongyang.Washington's failure to remain engaged with North Korea is the primary reason that longtime North Korea watchers Robert Carlin and Siegfried Hecker believe that Kim Jong Un has abandoned the default approach of more-or-less peaceful coexistence in favor of launching an attack against South Korea. In some ways, Kim is following the logic of Hamas, an illiberal force also in charge of a largely failed entity. Kim, too, perceives his adversaries as complacent, uninterested in any real negotiations, and vulnerable to a surprise attack. Presiding over an "open air prison" in Gaza, Hamas decided it had nothing left to lose. The North Korean leadership, in charge of an impoverished country with a horrific human rights record, may well have decided that it also has run out of options."The literature on surprise attacks should make us wary of the comfortable assumptions that resonate in Washington's echo chamber but might not have purchase in Pyongyang," Carlin and Hecker write in 38North. "This might seem like madness, but history suggests those who have convinced themselves that they have no good options left will take the view that even the most dangerous game is worth the candle."Carlin and Hecker don't have what the Israeli intelligence community possessed a year before the October 7 attacks, namely a detailed description of preparations to launch a surprise attack. They are relying on official North Korean statements eschewing reunification of the peninsula and a constitutional change that now identifies South Korea as an adversary rather than as tanil minjok ("one people, one blood"). This week, reports based on satellite images showed the destruction of Pyongyang's iconic Monument to the Three Charters for National Reunification, also called the Arch of Reunification, which Kim earlier referred to as "an eyesore," and called for its demolition.North Korea has also recently conducted a rash of missile tests, including one with a hypersonic warhead, as well as military drills near the maritime border that seem designed to provoke a response from the South. As sober analysts, Carlin and Hecker are not given to overstatement, so their warnings must be taken seriously.At the same time, the usual North Korean approach has been to make wild threats to get the attention of an otherwise indifferent U.S. government in order to pave the way for a fresh round of negotiations. Missile launches, nuclear tests, and promises to turn South Korea into a "sea of fire" have all, in the past, signaled not an interest in war but, perversely, a determination to restart peace talks with newly attentive adversaries. Also, Kim might be eyeing elections in South Korea where the pro-engagement opposition party is hoping to increase its parliamentary majority in the April elections and in the United States where Donald Trump is now running even or better against Joe Biden in the polls. Trump has long boasted of the 27 "love letters" he exchanged with the North Korean leader. Perhaps, Kim strategizes, the love could continue if Trump is reelected.Beware wishful thinking. Most analysts misinterpreted Vladimir Putin's warlike rhetoric and military preparations at the end of 2021 as merely a bid for Western attention and a better bargaining position at the negotiations table. Conventional notions about the deterrence of superior force—Israel, NATO, South Korea—may not apply in a world of increasingly volatile leaders and increasingly violated borders.Kim's closer relationship with Putin may well prove pivotal in North Korean calculations. Beijing has traditionally attempted to rein in Pyongyang because an overly provocative neighbor is not good for the Chinese economy in addition to boosting U.S. military presence in the region. Moscow, on the other hand, might be sending different messages, given Putin's more confrontational approach to the West. Just as the war in Gaza has proven a boon to the Kremlin, in that it has distracted attention and military hardware away from the European theater of operations, a conflict on the Korean peninsula would be an even greater draw on U.S. and European resources.In the late 1940s, Stalin was skeptical about the advantages of North Korea attacking South Korea. Kim Jong Un's grandfather, Kim Il Sung, eventually convinced Stalin otherwise and won Soviet support for the attack on the south that took place on June 25, 1950. Vladimir Putin, meanwhile, has indicated that he will visit North Korea "at an early date," his first trip there since 2000. Pundits and policymakers take note: Putin's visit might tip the balance one way or the other in North Korea's deliberations over war and peace.In the meantime, it's not too late for the United States and South Korea to offer Kim Jong Un an offramp from the conflict he has yet to initiate.

Daniel Raisbeck


Less than a year ago, I wrote of the almost certain regret that awaited the prosperous, urban, multiple‐​degree‐​holding types who voted for Gustavo Petro, Colombia's Chavista president. They thought they had supported a Nordic‐​style social democrat—failing to notice that they had helped to elect a tropical socialist who, given his past as a guerrilla group member and Hugo Chávez supporter, was also a potential autocrat. Caveat emptor (or rather suffragator) indeed. But I never thought that voter's remorse would set in so quickly. Or so extremely.
According to poll data from June 1, 2023, only 26 percent of Colombian citizens approved of Petro's performance as president. And this was before the scandal that shook the country's political scene last Sunday evening, when Semana magazine released a series of WhatsApp audio files sent by Armando Benedetti, Petro's former ambassador in Caracas, to Laura Sarabia, the president's former chief of staff.
Among the least bombastic revelations is Benedetti's claim that Alfonso Prada, Petro's former interior minister, "stole the whole ministry with his wife." This implies massive levels of corruption around Petro, who came to power with an anti‐​corruption agenda (quite cynically given his disreputable political alliances). Prada proceeded to sue Benedetti for libel.
Petro's dwindling number of supporters may dismiss this as a politician's petty slander against a rival in the cabinet. Far more concerning for them—and for Petro—is Benedetti's matter‐​of‐​fact assertion to Sarabia that he himself obtained COP $15 billion (around USD $3.58 million at today's exchange rate) for Petro's 2022 presidential campaign, during which he served as the former candidate's right‐​hand‐​man and main political handler. Petro's campaign did not officially report any donation nearly as large. Its declared funds consisted mostly a series of bank loans, which were meant to be paid with the "reimbursement" sum that the Colombian state guarantees to candidates for each vote received in an election.
In many countries, an insider's admission of how millions of undeclared dollars flowed into the president's campaign coffers would bring down the government. Alas, Colombia is not one of them. This is not due to a lack of unashamedly corrupt presidents; as I wrote recently in The Wall Street Journal, the opposite has been the case. Rather, since the 1950's, the Colombian elite's idiosyncratic approach to presidential corruption has followed the maxim, attributed to journalist Hernando Santos (1922–1999), that the trouble with overthrowing a president is that he may fall upon those doing the toppling.
Already in Petro's case, the three‐​member House of Representatives commission created to investigate Benedetti's statements includes two members of the president's own party. The enquiry will be a charade, which is a pity since the source of the undeclared campaign money is as important as the sum itself. In an interview, Benedetti told Semana that the money "did not come from entrepreneurs," meaning the legal business community. Suspicion has fallen on the Marxist guerrilla groups and other drug trafficking organizations, but also on the Venezuelan regime of Nicolás Maduro. Anonymous, the hacker group, claims that Maduro financed "part of the campaign of the current president of Colombia," but has not published evidence hitherto.
What is certain is that, in regional terms, the Maduro regime has been the principal beneficiary of Petro's election. To begin with, Colombia recognized Maduro's presidency after a three‐​and‐​a‐​half‐​year hiatus, and Petro himself has met Maduro four times since his inauguration. His government, which opposes any future hydrocarbon exploration in Colombia despite dwindling reserves, has promoted the idea of importing Venezuelan natural gas.
While Petro wages a political war against Colombia's key petroleum industry—crude oil has been the country's main legal export for decades—he lobbied President Joe Biden to end American sanctions against the Maduro regime. This would imply renewed Venezuelan oil exports to the U.S. market (even if socialism devastated Venezuela's oil industry well beyond immediate or even medium term repair). Petro's "shoot yourself in the foot / prosper‐​thy‐​neighbor" policy is devoid of any rationality. Unless, of course, Colombia's increasingly authoritarian president is somehow subject to the Venezuelan tyrant.
Petro's eco‐​fanatical crusade against the hydrocarbon industry is but one example of how his government is bent on destroying the few areas of the Colombian economy that are functional. Other examples include his plans to put the state in charge of centralized funding for the healthcare and pension systems, both of which are efficient—although certainly not perfect—thanks to private sector involvement and some degree of consumer choice. Where things are already problematic, Petro's policies would make them worse. For instance, he wants to make a rigid, overregulated labor market even less flexible and more hostile to businesses.
Then there is the matter of rising insecurity, an old problem that, until recently, appeared mostly solved, only to resurface dangerously in the last year. Under Petro, illegal armed groups have expanded their power as they launch constant, deadly attacks against the armed forces and police. It all brings to mind the dark era of the late 1990's, when Colombia was on the verge of becoming a failed state as it came under siege from the FARC guerrillas, which are still up in arms despite the much‐​touted "peace" agreement of 2016.
Usually, a crisis in government breeds economic instability. Under Colombia's current government, however, the opposite has been the case. Since the Benedetti scandal broke, the peso rallied to reach its highest value against the dollar since mid‐​2022, when Petro was about to win the presidential election. In October, two months after he took office, the peso reached an all‐​time low against the dollar. Amid the current political turmoil, forward‐​looking markets are anticipating the failure of Petro's legislative initiatives in health care, pensions, and labor law. Which is to say, there is speculation that Colombia's institutional framework has already survived Petro's statist onslaught. The weaker his position, the thinking goes, the less likely it is that non‐​leftist parties will lend him their support, which he needs to obtain congressional majorities.
I fear, however, that markets may be getting ahead of themselves. The Colombian congress is minimally ideological and highly transactional. There is still a good chance that, issue by issue, Petro's government can negotiate just enough votes to have his "reforms" approved, in which case only the courts will stand in the way of his agenda.
Not that Petro is respectful of any check or balance. This week, he propounded the theory that, since he was elected, his government represents "the will of the people," meaning that any opposition to his political project—including from the news media—is part of an illegitimate, "soft coup." The onslaught, in other words, is far from over.
In my view, the worst part about Petro's election victory is that, at this time last year, Colombia was in need of radical reforms. Above all, a chronically sluggish economy required budget discipline, public spending cuts, drastic debt reduction, a strong currency (ideally through dollarization), far lower taxes, labor market deregulation, subsoil privatization, school choice, and an end to non‐​tariff barriers. By electing Petro, however, voters decided to do precisely the opposite on all fronts. As warned, most already regret it.

Norbert Michel


A few weeks ago, American Compass released Rebuilding American Capitalism, A Handbook for Conservative Policymakers. After I provided a very brief critique of the handbook's "Financialization" chapter in a Forbes column (American Compass Points To Myths Not Facts), Oren Cass, American Compass's Executive Director, released a response titled Yes, Financialization Is Real. (Cass's response lists many reports and statistics, but it does not answer my critique of the "Financialization" chapter. I encourage everyone to read Cass's response, or one of his Twitter threads, to better understand how Cass and his organization produce research.)
To provide a more thorough critique of the "Financialization" chapter, my colleague Jai Kedia and I will release a series of Cato at Liberty posts over the next few days. The present post is the first in the series, and it expands on the most basic of my criticisms: American Compass's failure to define financialization, the most important term in the chapter.
Although the American Compass handbook does not provide a coherent definition of financialization, it still claims "financialization is a blight on capitalism" and that financialization diverts "resources away from capital intensive projects and toward financial assets." (See page 59 of the "Financialization" chapter.) In the foreword, Cass warns that "Financialization shifted the economy's center of gravity from Main Street to Wall Street, fueling an explosion in corporate profits alongside stagnating wages and declining investment."
None of these scary‐​sounding phrases define the term financialization or explain precisely what is (supposedly) diverting resources away from other projects, much less why such diversions are suboptimal. A robust research report would not make such mistakes. It would immediately define the term as clearly as possible to avoid any confusion, a bare minimum requirement to provide well‐​supported policy prescriptions to policymakers.
It is true, of course, that effective political campaigns often employ such rhetorical tactics. But American Compass isn't a political campaign. It claims to be a think tank engaged in serious analysis of economic problems. It is American Compass's responsibility to clearly define terms and problems so that policymakers (and others) can understand and evaluate American Compass's recommendations. On this score, American Compass fails miserably.
From the very beginning of the chapter, the financialization concept is so broad that it could be construed as almost anything. For instance, after the chapter introduction acknowledges that "Robust financial markets are vital to a productive economy," it states:
In recent decades, American finance has metastasized, claiming a disproportionate share of the nation's top business talent and the economy's profits, even as actual investment has declined. Businesses, rather than invest their own profits in growth and innovation, increasingly disgorge capital back into the market, where it flows into speculative frenzies that drive the prices of existing assets higher rather than creating new ones. The private equity and hedge fund industries have captured hundreds of billions of dollars in fees while underperforming simple market indices. Strategies that load debt onto companies place workers and their communities at risk while transferring the profits far away. This "financialization" of the American economy weakens the nation and threatens our future prosperity.

Based on this introduction, whatever financialization is, it consists of at least six different concepts. And just in case these concepts aren't broad enough, the chapter also warns that the "ideas and ideologies" inside of corporations, as opposed to merely financial incentives, "play a primary role in setting business investment decisions." It then states, "In this sense, 'financialization' is also a useful shorthand for the predominance of financial considerations in business management." (It would be difficult to argue this last version of financialization is some kind of new phenomenon, but I digress.) On Page 62, the "Financialization" chapter includes the following items under the financialization umbrella: "corporate profit strategies and compensation schemes, rival foreign subsidies and industrial policies, [and] cumbersome environmental and permitting regulations."
Even more confusingly, the chapter also claims the aforementioned resource diversion is both "one definition" and "the most pernicious effect" of financialization.
Further, citing a publication released by Senator Marco Rubio (R‑FL), the "Financialization" chapter argues that "For most of modern American history," corporations primarily raised capital from the "rest of the economy and spent it on non‐​financial assets." Supposedly, though, "Financialization (whether as cause or effect) disorders this cycle." The parentheses are included in the original text.
So, while it seems this idea – corporations should invest less in financial assets and more in non‐​financial assets – might be the core of American Compass's argument, it is impossible to tell whether financialization is causing the disorder or whether some disorder is causing financialization. Identifying what is cause and what is effect is a primary responsibility of the authors of such a report.
Yes, American Compass could be arguing that it is both cause and effect, but the question of precisely what financialization is remains a mystery. This critique – that American Compass fails to provide a coherent definition of financialization – is more than a technical matter. This failure is a major research flaw because it is impossible to analyze a problem without identifying the variables that would be affected by it, let alone the cause of the supposed problem.
American Compass uses the term so broadly that it can point to virtually any economic phenomenon or statistic, even a socially beneficial one, as "evidence" of how harmful "financialization" has been. (In this interview, Cass defines the term even more broadly than the "Financialization" chapter.) It allows critics of financial markets to engage in circular arguments, such as: financialization makes corporate profits explode, so public corporations are buying back shares, so investment is declining, which itself is also financialization.
Under such broad terms, anyone could easily associate "financialization" with any number of facts. For instance, financialization may have caused the female labor force participation rate to be almost 30 percentage points higher in 2022 than it was in 1950. Perhaps it caused the percentage of American households with a computer to increase from 8 percent in 1984 to 92 percent in 2018, or real median household income to rise from $50,000 in 1967 to $67,521 in 2020. Maybe it even caused workers with an associate degree to earn $157 more in median weekly earnings in 2020 than those with just a high school diploma.
The problem, of course, is that these kinds of statements amount to little more than opinions because the term "financialization" is used so broadly. And when critics provide evidence against these alleged effects (or causes?) of financialization, American Compass can easily push back by focusing on a different alleged effect or using a different piece of evidence. When critics point out that, for example, investment has not declined, American Compass can easily point to a different investment metric, thus changing the debate.
Obviously, this elusiveness is a great political strategy.
It becomes very easy, for example, to pit "Main Street" against "Wall Street" with what appears to be empirical evidence. It becomes easy to vilify the "speculators" who profit by "trading piles of assets in circles" instead of financing the "real" economic activity that provides jobs to typical Americans. American Compass can simply point out that someone earned high profits or that someone's income declined. But neither these slogans, nor these simplistic data points, amount to evidence.
This kind of populist attack on finance is hardly new, and it's one that lawmakers such as Senator Elizabeth Warren (D‑MA) use to vilify "Wall Street" for "looting" businesses. It is eerily reminiscent of the way government officials blamed Wall Street for the Great Depression, ultimately winning support for the Glass‐​Stegall Act. It also has some of the populist themes (the common man versus the banks) William Jennings Bryan used in his "Cross of Gold" speech at the 1896 Democratic National Convention, though Bryan failed, three times, to win the U.S. presidency. In fact, many aspects of American Compass's concept of financialization are virtually indistinguishable from Karl Marx's concept of fictitious capital versus real capital in Volume 3 of Capital.
With this Cato at Liberty series, we will not try to cover all the different versions and descriptions of financialization that American Compass uses. Instead, we will focus on the specific claims discussed in the original critique along with a few that didn't make the cut in that Forbes piece. In the next post, we will discuss claims involving the nation's top business talent leaving for the financial industry.

Alex Nowrasteh


The recent Supreme Court case about affirmative action in university admissions (SFFA v. Harvard) paralleled a broader social debate over meritocracy. Those opposed to affirmative action broadly say they are supportive of meritocracy. They believe individual achievement should be more prominent in university admissions, at least when the government is involved in university funding. The debate over affirmative action and meritocracy intersects with the immigration debate in two ways. First, immigration restrictions are the most destructive form of affirmative action. Second, immigrants and their descendants have been essential in reducing the scope of affirmative action in the United States over the last 30 years.
Meritocrats believe that individuals should rise or fall on their achievements. Those supportive of affirmative action are more skeptical of meritocracy, at least how it exists under the current system. They argue that meritocracy is bad, a myth, unfair, or that current means of identifying merit are insufficient because systemic rules or practices hold back some people in specific racial, ethnic, or other categories.
I'm a supporter of meritocracy, but a compelling point raised by skeptics is that the design of meritocratic systems can select wildly different types of merit. In other words, there's a principal-agent problem whereby the most meritocratic people design methods of gauging merit that favor themselves and people like them.
This problem could be to the detriment of specific organizations relying on merit and, eventually, to the rest of society.
Hard work, fluid intelligence, crystallized intelligence, personality, luck, physical attractiveness, and other characteristics contribute to merit in different endeavors and extents. A one-size-fits-all approach across all organizations doesn't make sense and is slightly less bad in organizations in the same industry. That doesn't mean some of the factors listed above aren't good predictors of merit in most endeavors, some certainly are, but their relative weights are important.
For instance, the combination of characteristics that make a successful film actor differs from those required to be a successful astrophysicist, CEO, or farmer. But that's just the supply side of merit; there's also a demand side. What consumers demand of people in different endeavors changes over time. Consumers want the best over time, but what they think is best changes.
That's why I favor the "competitive meritocracy;" that is, the meritocracy of the market over alternatives like massive government examination systems that exist in other countries. Under competitive meritocracy, firms and individuals seeking to increase profits, economic efficiency, and consumer surplus under competitive market conditions are incentivized to develop means to identify meritorious individuals that deliver. Otherwise, firm profits shrink, they go bankrupt, and consumers are left unsatisfied.
One of the beneficial results of a competitive market system is the identification and use of merit. Of course, government rules and regulations reduce the effectiveness of new merit identification techniques, but the market is better at identifying and producing meritocratic identification methods than other alternatives because it best aligns incentives to do so on the supply and demand sides.
U.S. immigration restrictions are the most anti-meritocratic policies today, and they are intended as affirmative action for native-born Americans. Ignore the myriad ways that immigration laws disadvantage certain immigrants relative to others, such as with the per-country quotas that make immigrants from populous countries wait longer for green cards. Just peruse nativist websites, and you'll see many arguments about immigrants taking jobs from more Americans who are more deserving because of where they were born. When people think of anti-meritocratic policies, they rightly jump to quotas, race-based affirmative action, or class-based affirmative action.
It's true; those are all anti-meritocratic and likely wouldn't exist in a free market outside of a handful of organizations in the non-profit sector. But U.S. immigration restrictions are worse. The U.S. population is about 4.2 percent of the global population. Immigration laws prevent the other 95.8 percent of the world from trying their hand in the U.S. market meritocracy. The cost of immigration restrictions is in the trillions of dollars, which makes the real costs of affirmative action seem small by comparison. Those who truly favor meritocracy and oppose affirmative action on principle should reject the anti-meritocratic affirmative action of American immigration laws.
Nativists agree with my analysis. They argue that the U.S. government exists to protect Americans from market competition, so it should do so with immigration restrictions. Nationalist affirmative action is still affirmative action. And lest you accuse me of hypocrisy, of working behind the protection of immigration restrictions while others labor exposed to the brutality of globalist labor competition, the sector of the economy where I labor is more exposed to legal immigrant competition than yours is.
One of the main arguments for immigration restrictions is to protect Americans. That makes sense when protecting Americans from criminals, terrorists, national security threats, or those with severe contagious diseases, because they could physically harm Americans or their property. It makes sense in the same way that the NYPD exists to protect the life, liberty, and private property of New Yorkers and shouldn't be enforcing laws in North Dakota.
But protecting jobs and wages or shielding people from the market doesn't make sense. On a purely principled opposition to preferences, meritocrats should oppose almost all immigration restrictions regardless of the wage effects. Immigration restrictions don't even work well to protect American workers. Ironically, immigration restrictions do more to protect the wages of immigrant workers in the United States than native-born workers. Affirmative action likely helps the beneficiaries more than immigration restrictions help American workers.
The idea of shielding Americans from market competition to protect them under the theory that that would make them better is silly. Industries protected behind tariffs and trade barriers tend to stagnate because they have no incentive to innovate or improve. Why would they when the government removes competition by legal fiat? Americans similarly shielded from immigration have less of a reason to get more skills, improve their human capital, or be more productive. As I wrote in my review of Reihan Salam's Melting Pot or Civil War?, labor protectionism incentivizes stagnation among American workers.
Salam fails to draw additional connections between wages and education. He worries about low levels of educational attainment among the descendants of immigrants but also favors restricting low-skilled immigration to raise the wages of high school dropouts. He does not explain how raising the wages for dropouts relative to other educational cohorts will incentivize workers to spend more time in school (hint: it won't). Salam is worried that automation will destroy lots of jobs, so he wants to stop low-skilled immigration by raising wages for low-skilled Americans and immigrants already here, which will just make it more likely that their jobs will be automated.

Maybe you favor meritocracy in university admissions and affirmative action through immigration restrictions. You wouldn't be the first person to have inconsistent policy opinions, but you support less meritocracy than you probably believe. Most people recognize that Texas' "Top 10 Percent Law" is thinly disguised affirmative action because it guarantees admission to the University of Texas to all students in the top 10 percent of their high school graduating class. Since students are geographically clustered in Texas by race, this law advantages some students based on race who otherwise wouldn't be admitted.
Harvard tried something similar when it adopted an admissions policy that accepted top-ranking students nationwide under geographic quotas rather than relying on admissions exam scores. The intent was to reduce Harvard's Jewish population. The Harvard freshman class was 21 percent Jewish in 1922, up from about 7 percent in 1900. Harvard's President Abbott Lawrence Lowell wanted to bring their percentage down to 15 percent and faced fierce opposition from Jewish students, the Boston press, and the meritocrats of his day. The geographic distribution system discriminated against Jewish students and reduced their numbers to 15 percent of the student body by 1931. Harvard later eased the geographic system and then ended it altogether. One should view the admissions policy as anti-Semitic, and the effect was identical to a policy that favored the admission of other groups like white Protestants. Regardless, the geographic admissions system was anti-meritocratic.
Despite restrictions on immigration, immigrants and their descendants are already indirectly improving meritocracy in the United States. Edward Blum, the attorney behind numerous challenges to affirmative action, including SFFA v. Harvard, lost a challenge to affirmative action in 2015 when he had a white female plaintiff. There are many reasons why that challenge failed, but afterward, Blum said, "I needed Asian plaintiffs." Law and the Constitution always matter to the Court, but politics and optics also matter for major controversial questions. When the issues are controversial and Congress or the President don't want to resolve conflicts or are otherwise at loggerheads, the Court steps in as a sort of super-legislature to decide the issue. Sometimes they rule to maintain their own institutional power in an environment where the power of Congress is declining, and that of the Presidency is increasing. Viewing the Court as a sometimes-super-legislature makes it clear that political narratives, public opinion, and other normal tools of political persuasion are important to ruling in a certain way. Without Asian American plaintiffs, it's hard to see how SCOTUS would have struck down affirmative action this time. It may have happened eventually because the arguments are good, but sympathetic plaintiffs and damning facts are just as important.
Beyond the plaintiffs in SFFA v. Harvard, immigrants, their descendants, and the diversity they bring to the United States have greatly helped reduce affirmative action through politics. As I wrote in 2022:
Voters in California—the most diverse state and the one with the highest immigrant share of the population—first voted to ban affirmative action when presented with Proposition 209 in 1996. Since then, progressives in the state have attempted to revive the issue. But in 2011, Governor Jerry Brown vetoed a bill that would have weakened the affirmative-action ban. Another proposal to re-institute affirmative action failed in 2014 after several Asian-American state senators defected from the effort in response to opposition from their constituents. "As lifelong advocates for the Asian-American and other communities," Democratic state senators Ted Lieu, Carol Liu, and Leland Yee wrote, "we would never support a policy that we believed would negatively impact our children." In 2020, voters affirmed the state's ban on affirmative action by a wider margin than the original vote to ban it 24 years earlier.

Asian Americans are the most likely to be foreign-born of any racial group. In 2019, two-thirds of Asian Americans in California were immigrants. As is clear to all after SFFA v. Harvard, Asians are the biggest losers in any race-based affirmative action system. Without them, it would be tougher to make the case that affirmative action is unjust. That's an unfortunate commentary on the state of political debate in the United States because the arguments against affirmative action are convincing regardless of who wins or loses, but those are the facts.
Furthermore, states with a higher foreign-born share of the population are likelier to have banned affirmative action than states with a lower foreign-born share. Interestingly, the share of the non-citizen population is best correlated with a state banning affirmative action. According to a piece I coauthored a few years ago, a 1 percent increase in the share of non-citizens is associated with a 27–34 percent increase in the probability of the state banning affirmative action. The share of the white population is not statistically significant in any regression we ran, and the measure of population-wide diversity is only significant at the 10 percent level in the 3‑and‐​5‐​year lags.
Affirmative action is more politically stable when they are two groups, one of which is large and the other that is small. Malaysia has a Chinese minority punished by affirmative action and a Malaysian majority aided. Apartheid South Africa punished blacks and favored whites, which was then reversed after the end of apartheid. The United States, with blacks favored and whites punished before large waves of immigrants in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, are such cases.
Of the above examples, only the United States has a substantial immigrant-induced demographic change that upended that relatively stable institutional dynamic by adding mainly Asian and Hispanic immigrants. Suddenly, Asians became the biggest losers of affirmative action, whites the second biggest, and Hispanics moderate beneficiaries. The goals of affirmative action became murkier – why would the U.S. government help Hispanic immigrants and their descendants with a program designed to help the descendants of black slaves?
Even more so, competition between disadvantaged groups seeking affirmative action lessened the benefits. Worse for the supporters of affirmative action, the biggest victims became a large and growing immigrant group and their children, a group whose ancestors were also targeted by racist laws like the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, various Alien Land Laws that barred Asians from owning land, and Japanese Internment.
There are three significant motivations for supporting redistribution, of which affirmative action is a type. They are self-interest, compassion, and malicious envy. Self-interest and compassion are obvious. Malicious envy is hatred toward a group that has done better. Immigration weakens all three supports for affirmative action. Immigration weakens self-interest by spreading the benefits among more groups, it weakens compassion because new beneficiaries have dubious claims to racial preferences under the justifications for the schemes, and malicious envy is weakened because the biggest victims are no longer whites.
Immigrants weakened affirmative action in the United States by being the specific plaintiffs in SFFA v. Harvard and changing the politics of the issue. But a far more substantial and destructive apparatus of affirmative action operates today through our immigration laws that bar about 96 percent of the world's population from participating in the American market meritocracy. Opponents of affirmative action should rest on their laurels by embracing just a touch more meritocracy just among Americans; they should embrace a true global meritocracy.