Suchergebnisse

Abstract: 1989 – The Year That Transformed EuropeThomas Lundén (Centrum för Östersjö- och Östeuropaforskning (CBEES), Södertörns högskola) reviews 1989 – Året som endret Europa (1989 – The Year That Transformed Europe) written by Per Anders Madsen.

Abstract: Security Policy and Memory Politics: Establishing the Soviet Liberation Monument in Kirkenes, 1945–1952A few kilometers from the border with Russia, in the town of Kirkenes in the easternmost corner of Northern Norway, there stands a bronze statue of a Soviet soldier looking out over the borderland. The Soviet Liberation Monument, as the statue is called, was unveiled in 1952 by the Norwegian authorities, in gratitude for the Soviet liberation of the East Finnmark area in 1944. The statue has served as a meeting place for regular commemorative ceremonies involving the Norwegian and Soviet authorities, throughout the Cold War and up until the present. This article explores the interplay between security policy and memory politics at the onset of the Cold War by examining the seven-year long process of establishing this monument. As the Iron Curtain descended over Europe, the monument and the memories attached to it became important tools with which Norway developed a critical dialogue with its great-power neighbor. The article shows how the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs learned how to use the collective memories of the Soviet liberation to ensure Norway's security-policy goal of low tension in its relations with the USSR.

Formålet med denne boken er å analysere nyere norsk politisk historie fra et valg-. og velgerperspektiv. Bokens to første deler tar for seg sentrale utviklingstrekk hos velgere og politiske institusjoner i Norge siden 1945, mens bokens tredje del beskriver noen utvalgte hendelser som har formet den politiske utviklingen. Del 1 kaster lys over norsk politisk historie fra et velgerperspektiv. Kapitlene tar for seg sentrale utviklingstrekk hos norske velgere langs seks dimensjoner: velgeres dagsorden, politiske holdninger, sosiale bakgrunn, tilknytning til partiene, valgdeltakelse og tillit til det politiske systemet. Del 2 tar for seg de politiske institusjonene som velgerne bemyndiger: Stortinget, regjeringen og partiene; samt institusjonene som utgjør rammen som de demokratiske valgene skjer innenfor: valgordningen og mediene. De to første delene av boken er forfattet av noen av de fremste norske forskerne på hvert av disse områdene. I del 3 fortelles ulike deler av norsk etterkrigshistorie av politikere som selv var en del av historien. Kapitlene er skrevet av Kjell Magne Bondevik, Kristin Clemet, Anne Enger, Carl I. Hagen, Kristin Halvorsen, Rasmus Hansson og Tove Strand. Hvert av bidragene kaster nytt lys over og gir et personlig perspektiv på norsk politisk historie

Abstract: The Collapse of the Planned Economy – and Other Widespread Misconceptions of the Transitions in Russia and Eastern EuropeAccording to the prevailing view, the Soviet planned economy collapsed around 1990; it was a failure, because a planned economy cannot work. Comparing this common view, as it appears in numerous quotations from special and general sources, with basic empirical evidence reveals deep discrepancies. This also applies to other common conceptions regarding the transition in Russia and Eastern Europe e.g. environmental problems, agricultural crisis, poverty and inequality. The command economies in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union did not collapse; they were dismantled, and until then they functioned and delivered growth rates comparable to those of western countries. The transition after 1989 was driven by marketliberalistic enthusiasm as a short cut to imitation of western prosperity and entailed a refusal of economic planning in the East and in the West. A more realistic evaluation of the planned economy is important for how we politically and economically address our two great challenges, the global environment, and the global distribution.

Abstract: On the Historiography of Zubov et al.'s History of Russia in the 20th CenturyAround 2009, a certain Kremlin-sanctioned Vergangenheitsbewältigung of Russia's Soviet past developed. A case in point is the collective two-volume work edited by Andrei B. Zubov, Istoriya Rossii. XX vek, published in 2009. Societal agency is said to be stressed over structural forces, but it is mainly the agency of Lenin, Stalin and later Soviet leaders that is analyzed. The narrative of the times before Stalin's ascent to power emphasizes repression, terror and planned famine as precursors of the totalitarian excesses under Stalin (1923–1953). The originality of Zubov's historiography is evident in his approach to the Great Fatherland War of 1941–1945, which Zubov refers to as The Soviet–Nazi War. Further, the narrative of the Cold War era culminates in an 'imperial overstretch' theory about the Soviet collapse. However, Zubov has been vehemently criticized for lack of critical rigor; his work represents an awkward mix of liberal enlightenment and obscurantism in its veneration of the fascistoid thinker Ilyin. Today Russia officially operates with one historical truth about the years 1941–45 and is hereby distancing itself from scholars like Zubov.

Abstract: Trauma and Collective Memories in Georgia's Foreign PolicyGeorgia's foreign policy since the mid-1990s would appear to be a regional anomaly. While Georgia's neighbors have either accommodated to Russia's geopolitical interests or sought to navigate between Russia and the West, Georgian governments have pursued a comparatively stable pro-Western foreign policy orientation. Thus, structural arguments like geographic proximity, or Russia's assertive foreign policy, cannot account for the variation in foreign-policy orientation among post-Soviet states. Moreover, although alternative explanations, like Georgia's European identity and commitment to democracy, or explanations related to qualities of the Mikheil Saakashvili government, are not without merits, they cannot fully account for the continuity in Georgia's pro-Western foreign policy over time. This article argues that the collective memory of the traumatic years 1989–1994 is a key factor for understanding Georgia's foreign policy continuity. The collective memory and trauma related to loss of territory, together with a weak state and Russia's negative involvement, have shaped the strategic thinking of Georgia's foreign policy elites. This trauma explains Georgia's shift to a pro-Western foreign policy in the mid-1990s and the continuity of this policy up until today. This argument is supported by the author's interviews with key Georgian decision-makers responsible for foreign policy decisions.