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p. 7-10 ; Bibliography under articles. Index ; Texts also in English. Summaries in English. ; See also "Listy do władz centralnych w Polsce 1945–1989 (przewodnik)" = Letters to the Central Authorities in Poland, 1945–1989 (Guidebook): ; https://rcin.org.pl./publication/91801 ; s. 7-10 ; Bibliografia pod artykułami. Indeks ; Teksty również w języku angielskim. Streszczenie angielskie. ; Zob. również: Listy do władz centralnych w Polsce 1945–1989 (przewodnik): ; https://rcin.org.pl./publication/91801

p. 137-174 ; Bibliography under articles. Index ; Texts also in English. Summaries in English. ; See also "Listy do władz centralnych w Polsce 1945–1989 (przewodnik)" = Letters to the Central Authorities in Poland, 1945–1989 (Guidebook): ; https://rcin.org.pl./publication/91801 ; s. 137-174 ; Bibliografia pod artykułami. Indeks ; Teksty również w języku angielskim. Streszczenie angielskie. ; Zob. również: Listy do władz centralnych w Polsce 1945–1989 (przewodnik): ; https://rcin.org.pl./publication/91801

p. 239-268, ill. ; Bibliography under articles. Index ; Texts also in English. Summaries in English. ; See also "Listy do władz centralnych w Polsce 1945–1989 (przewodnik)" = Letters to the Central Authorities in Poland, 1945–1989 (Guidebook): ; https://rcin.org.pl./publication/91801 ; s. 239-268, il. ; Bibliografia pod artykułami. Indeks ; Teksty również w języku angielskim. Streszczenie angielskie. ; Zob. również: Listy do władz centralnych w Polsce 1945–1989 (przewodnik): ; https://rcin.org.pl./publication/91801

The period 1945-70 saw a change in the approach to environmental contamination on the part of Polish authorities and the society. Before 1956, the imposed model of economic modernisation, which imitated and reproduced the Soviet patterns, glaringly contradicted the requirements of ecology. In the aftermath of the political turn of 1956, protection of waters and air against pollution finally became a matter of debate involving the authorities and the society. Basic legal solutions in this respect, meant to protect the environment against degradation, were adopted in the 1960s. The legislators generally followed the arguments and reasons behind the period's industrial policy, with the resulting limited efficiency of the legal acts adopted. In any case, between 1956 and 1970 awareness emerged in the society with respect to threats to the environment. This is attested by the letters sent to the authorities whose authors, individuals and groups, criticised the developments of industrial modernisation – owing, primarily, to its detrimental impact on their health. ; p. 5-34 ; 23 cm ; The period 1945-70 saw a change in the approach to environmental contamination on the part of Polish authorities and the society. Before 1956, the imposed model of economic modernisation, which imitated and reproduced the Soviet patterns, glaringly contradicted the requirements of ecology. In the aftermath of the political turn of 1956, protection of waters and air against pollution finally became a matter of debate involving the authorities and the society. Basic legal solutions in this respect, meant to protect the environment against degradation, were adopted in the 1960s. The legislators generally followed the arguments and reasons behind the period's industrial policy, with the resulting limited efficiency of the legal acts adopted. In any case, between 1956 and 1970 awareness emerged in the society with respect to threats to the environment. This is attested by the letters sent to the authorities whose authors, individuals and groups, criticised the developments of industrial modernisation – owing, primarily, to its detrimental impact on their health. ; s. 5-34 ; 23 cm

A new system of Polish-Lithuanian relations was shaped manly by the passivity of Poles inhabiting the eastern Lithuania in the plebiscite organised by the Lithuanian government on 9 February 1991, and a decision of the authorities of Vilnius and Šalčininkai (Polish: Sołeczniki) regions to hold a referendum, initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev, on the future of the Soviet Union to turn it into a new, loose confederation of states, which was not recognized by the Lithuanian authorities. Such an attitude of Lithuanian Poles was determined by several factors. Firstly, the Soviet social and economic structure; secondly, for a large part of people the old governments of the Vilnius and Šalčininkai districts and the memory of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic guaranteed stability and predictability. The soviet structures were more trusted than a newly introduced, not strong yet Lithuanian social and political order. The sense of threat was intensified by an unquestionable domination of Lithuanians on all levels of the new hierarchy. Social and political reforms were perceived by the Polish minority in Lithuania through the prism of a rule of the majority. For the rest of the Lithuanian society (except of the Russian minority) such an attitude was completely incomprehensible. In such complex geopolitical circumstances Poles from the regions of Vilnius and Šalčininkai decided to convene a congress of deputies of the Vilnius and Šalčininkai regions to Mostiškės. According to a project adopted at the Congress, the Vilnius district was to become "an autonomous administrative-territorial unit within the Lithuanian Republic", with a broad political autonomy. In the opinion of Lithuanians, however, the region of Vilnius should not be "an autonomous administrative-territorial unit of the Lithuanian State", but form a part of Lithuanian federation. This meant that the Poles wanted to enlarge the status of the Vilnius region and to strengthen its autonomy within Lithuania. The implementation of such a project would mean a decentralisation of the state. In a complex geopolitical situation of that time all attempts at the decentralisation of the country was regarded by the Lithuanian political elite as the threat of the security of the young Lithuanian state, its sovereignty and territorial integrity. ; p.163-195 ; Summary in Polish, English and Russian ; Continues: Studia z Dziejów ZSRR i Europy Środkowej ; A new system of Polish-Lithuanian relations was shaped manly by the passivity of Poles inhabiting the eastern Lithuania in the plebiscite organised by the Lithuanian government on 9 February 1991, and a decision of the authorities of Vilnius and Šalčininkai (Polish: Sołeczniki) regions to hold a referendum, initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev, on the future of the Soviet Union to turn it into a new, loose confederation of states, which was not recognized by the Lithuanian authorities. Such an attitude of Lithuanian Poles was determined by several factors. Firstly, the Soviet social and economic structure; secondly, for a large part of people the old governments of the Vilnius and Šalčininkai districts and the memory of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic guaranteed stability and predictability. The soviet structures were more trusted than a newly introduced, not strong yet Lithuanian social and political order. The sense of threat was intensified by an unquestionable domination of Lithuanians on all levels of the new hierarchy. Social and political reforms were perceived by the Polish minority in Lithuania through the prism of a rule of the majority. For the rest of the Lithuanian society (except of the Russian minority) such an attitude was completely incomprehensible. In such complex geopolitical circumstances Poles from the regions of Vilnius and Šalčininkai decided to convene a congress of deputies of the Vilnius and Šalčininkai regions to Mostiškės. According to a project adopted at the Congress, the Vilnius district was to become "an autonomous administrative-territorial unit within the Lithuanian Republic", with a broad political autonomy. In the opinion of Lithuanians, however, the region of Vilnius should not be "an autonomous administrative-territorial unit of the Lithuanian State", but form a part of Lithuanian federation. This meant that the Poles wanted to enlarge the status of the Vilnius region and to strengthen its autonomy within Lithuania. The implementation of such a project would mean a decentralisation of the state. In a complex geopolitical situation of that time all attempts at the decentralisation of the country was regarded by the Lithuanian political elite as the threat of the security of the young Lithuanian state, its sovereignty and territorial integrity. ; s. 163-195 ; Streszcz. pol., ang., ros. ; Czasop. kontynuuje numerację wydaw. pt.: Studia z Dziejów ZSRR i Europy Środkowej

The article analyzes the archetype of Serbian political leadership and compares it with the present-day model, on the basis of traditions and expectations of the Serbian society of their leader. ; p. 145-168 ; Sum. pol, rus. ; Artykuł prezentuje analizę charakteru modelu władzy politycznej w Serbii na przestrzeni długiego okresu czasu. Autor prześledził analogie pomiędzy modelami władzy przywódców serbskich w różnych okresach i kontekstach historycznych: księcia Miłosza Obrenowicia (1780‒1860), premiera Nikoli Pašicia (1845‒1926) i prezydenta Slobodana Miloševicia (1941‒2006). Przez cały ten długi czas model sprawowania przywództwa pozostał niemal niezmieniony w odpowiedzi na określone oczekiwania, odzwierciedlające wartości uznawane przez serbskie społeczeństwo za fundamentalne, w szczególności zaś: stabilność relacji społecznych, egalitaryzm, kolektywizm i konserwatyzm. Ponieważ wartości te niemal nie ulegały zmianie w analizowanym okresie, aktualny pozostał archetyp serbskiego przewódcy jako rzecznika egalitaryzmu, wojownika i trybuna ludowego, jaki zrodził się w reakcji na dominację osmańską. ; s. 145-168 ; Streszcz. pol, ros.

The article presents an analysis of the character of model Serbian political leadership with respect to its endurance over an extended period. The author traces the analogies between the leadership models of Serbian leaders active in diff erent periods and historical contexts: Prince Miloš Obrenović (1780–1860), Prime Minister Nikola Pašić (1845–1926) and President Slobodan Milošević (1941–2006). Over this extended period, the type of leadership remained relatively constant in response to a certain set of expectations that reflected the values regarded as fundamental by Serbian society, and in particular: stability of social relations, egalitarianism, collectivism, and conservatism. As this set of values changed little over the examined period, the archetype of Serbian leader as an advocate of egalitarianism, a warrior and a tribune of the people, that had emerged in response to Ottoman domination, remained relevant. ; Summary in English. ; p. 143-165 ; Text eng. ; The article presents an analysis of the character of model Serbian political leadership with respect to its endurance over an extended period. The author traces the analogies between the leadership models of Serbian leaders active in diff erent periods and historical contexts: Prince Miloš Obrenović (1780–1860), Prime Minister Nikola Pašić (1845–1926) and President Slobodan Milošević (1941–2006). Over this extended period, the type of leadership remained relatively constant in response to a certain set of expectations that reflected the values regarded as fundamental by Serbian society, and in particular: stability of social relations, egalitarianism, collectivism, and conservatism. As this set of values changed little over the examined period, the archetype of Serbian leader as an advocate of egalitarianism, a warrior and a tribune of the people, that had emerged in response to Ottoman domination, remained relevant. ; s. 143-165 ; Tekst ang. ; Streszcz. ang.

En: Doxa Comunicación : revista interdisciplinar de estudios de comunicación y ciencias sociales. ISSN 1696-019X n. III, 2005, pp 33-44 ; Las sociedades modernas se caracterizan por su complejidad. Desde el punto de vista de la teoría de sistemas eso significa que siempre hay una pluralidad de perspectivas desde las que pueden ser observadas y también significa que el observador es, a la vez, objeto de la observación de otro. En estas condiciones no es posible encontrar una unidad de pertenencia, una identidad aislable que pueda ser concebida como un "nosotros". Se produce un intercambio entre lo familiar y lo extraño. Si antaño, lo extraño era lo no familiar ahora la diferencia se hace progresivamente más relativa. En el orden constitucional de la convivencia democrática siempre queda un "nosotros" paradójico que se reproduce y se transforma de modo incesante. Por eso lo político no puede ser monopolizado por las realidades institucionales, por la organización de la sociedad y por un estado ritual. "Lo político es más bien el lugar en el que una sociedad actúa sobre sí misma y renueva las formas de su espacio público común". Por eso, la identidad de lo común no es de carácter cronológico. La "sociedad", en el sentido que esta expresión adquiere en Tönnies, no ha surgido de la pérdida de una previa "comunidad", lo cual no significa que el pueblo no exista en absoluto, sino que es una magnitud inestable, una realidad abierta y mutable. ; The modern societies are characterized by their complexity. From a systems theory point of view, it means that modern societies can always be observed from many perspectives and also means that the observer is watched as well. Under these conditions, it is impossible to find a linking belonging; an isolated identity able to be understood as 'ourselves'. An exchange between the familiar and the strange comes out. If long time ago, the strange was not the familiar, right now the difference is getting more relative. A paradoxical 'ourselves', that it gradually reproduces and changes itself, remains at the constitutional order into the democratic coexistence. That is the reason why the institutional realities, the societies organization and the ritual State cannot monopolize the politics. "Politics is rather than a place where the society acts over itself and renovate the public sphere methods". For that, the identity of the common interest does not have a chronological nature. The 'society', such Tönnies explains, has not loomed up out of the losing of a previous 'community' –it does not mean that the people do not exist not at all– but the society is an unsteady scale, an opening and mutating reality.

En: Doxa Comunicación : revista interdisciplinar de estudios de comunicación y ciencias sociales. ISSN 1696-019X n. III, 2005, pp 33-44 ; Las sociedades modernas se caracterizan por su complejidad. Desde el punto de vista de la teoría de sistemas eso significa que siempre hay una pluralidad de perspectivas desde las que pueden ser observadas y también significa que el observador es, a la vez, objeto de la observación de otro. En estas condiciones no es posible encontrar una unidad de pertenencia, una identidad aislable que pueda ser concebida como un "nosotros". Se produce un intercambio entre lo familiar y lo extraño. Si antaño, lo extraño era lo no familiar ahora la diferencia se hace progresivamente más relativa. En el orden constitucional de la convivencia democrática siempre queda un "nosotros" paradójico que se reproduce y se transforma de modo incesante. Por eso lo político no puede ser monopolizado por las realidades institucionales, por la organización de la sociedad y por un estado ritual. "Lo político es más bien el lugar en el que una sociedad actúa sobre sí misma y renueva las formas de su espacio público común". Por eso, la identidad de lo común no es de carácter cronológico. La "sociedad", en el sentido que esta expresión adquiere en Tönnies, no ha surgido de la pérdida de una previa "comunidad", lo cual no significa que el pueblo no exista en absoluto, sino que es una magnitud inestable, una realidad abierta y mutable. ; The modern societies are characterized by their complexity. From a systems theory point of view, it means that modern societies can always be observed from many perspectives and also means that the observer is watched as well. Under these conditions, it is impossible to find a linking belonging; an isolated identity able to be understood as 'ourselves'. An exchange between the familiar and the strange comes out. If long time ago, the strange was not the familiar, right now the difference is getting more relative. A paradoxical 'ourselves', that it gradually reproduces and changes itself, remains at the constitutional order into the democratic coexistence. That is the reason why the institutional realities, the societies organization and the ritual State cannot monopolize the politics. "Politics is rather than a place where the society acts over itself and renovate the public sphere methods". For that, the identity of the common interest does not have a chronological nature. The 'society', such Tönnies explains, has not loomed up out of the losing of a previous 'community' –it does not mean that the people do not exist not at all– but the society is an unsteady scale, an opening and mutating reality.