Suchergebnisse

Познато је, и у научној литератури мање-више елаборирано да је повратак религији на подручју бивше СФРЈ ишао руку под руку са стварањем нових националних држава и успостављањем нових/старих етничких граница и идентитета. Због тога је логично што се ова појава често квалификује као религија нације и национализма. Међутим, из ове квалификације често изостаје увид у чињеницу да је повратак религији значио и повећање интересовања за религијска учења и знања, те масовније учествовање у црквеним обредима. Иако је извесно да од високог процента оних који су се на последњем попису идентификовали као православни Срби сасвим мали део одлази на активне вернике, евидентна обнова унутрашњег, литургијског живота Цркве сугерише одређена питања и опрезност при етикетирању савремених облика религиозности и улоге Цркве у њиховом формирању. Историјске околности које доводе до појаве религије нације у Србији у 19. веку чине оправданом хипотезу да религија нације ни тада, а ни данас није изникла из крила Цркве, већ да се она појављује као државни/секуларни идеолошки пројекат, чије су везе са религијом сасвим нерелигијске природе. Да бих поткрепила ову тврдњу, покушаћу да установим и покажем шта се налазило у основама ове световне религије 19. века, те да одговорим на питање начина обликовања њених садржаја. Ово ћу учинити на основу анализе политичке употребе мртвих тела, тј. доношења посмртних остатака Вука Караџића из Беча у Београд и обнављања гроба Доситеја Обрадовића том приликом. ; It is widely known and has been more or less elaborated in scientific literature that return to religion in the area of former SFRY was conducted hand-in-hand with the development of the new national states and establishment of new/old ethnic borders and identities. This is why it is logical that this phe- nomenon is frequently qualified as the religion of the nation and nationalism. However, this qualification frequently lacks insight into the fact that return to religion also meant increased interest in religious teachings and dogmas, as well as greater attendance at Church rituals. Even though it is certain that, among the large percentage of those who declared themselves as Orthodox Serbs during the last Census, a very small number of them are actually active believers; thus, the evident restoration of the internal, liturgical life of the Church suggests certain issues and advises prudence in labeling modern forms of religiousness and the role of the Church in their development. Historical conditions which led to the phenomenon of religion of the nation in Serbia in 19 century justify the hypothesis that religion of the nation was not, and still is not, something to have sprouted out under the auspices of the Church, but that it has occurred as a state/secular ideological project, whose links to religion are of purely non-religious nature. In order to corroborate this statement, I will try to determine and show what was in the basis of this secular religion of 19 century, and answer the question relating to the manner in which its content was shaped. I will do this based on an analysis of political use of dead bodies, i.e. relocation of mortal remains of Vuk Karadžić from Vienna to Belgrade, and restoration of the grave of Dositej Obradović, which was performed on the same occa- sion.

The author shows the numerical and territorial distribution of the Serb population in Croatia during the 19th century and the structure of their vocations and occupations. Throughout 19th century, the participation of the Orthodox in the Croatian population demonstrated a decline. While in 1840 they represented 31,41% of the population, in 1900 that participation was only 25,52%. The Serbs were mixed with other nationals even in places where they were majority. Only in few districts, their participation in general population exceeded 80%. The majority of Serb population is made of agrarian inhabitants. However, although their participation in cities was not great, their economic strength and political positions were responsible for their relatively great influence. (SOI : CSP: S. 152)

Recent historical developments in the relationship between Croats and Serbs are discussed, refering to an article by V. Vujacic (Theory and Society, No. 6, 1996). The idea of an Illyrian and later a Yugoslav commonwealth of all South Slavs, originating in Croatia in the 19th century, had its legitimating psychological foundation in a "illusion of centrality", developed at the time by a part of the Croatian political and intellectual elite, a view of the preeminent position of Croatia and the Croats among all the Slav ethnic groups in the region and, therefore, of a natural central role of Croatia in the future commonwealth. In a similar way, the armed struggle of the Serbs for independence from the Ottoman empire in the 19th century and for the expansion of the Serbian State in the 19th and 20th century has generated a Serbian belief in the dominant role of Serbia and the Serbs in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes established in 1918, later Kingdom of Yugoslavia. These incompatible illusions are believed to be the roots of a number of political positions and decisions taken by both Croats and Serbs in the 20th century. The views of Max Weber on nationality and nationalism are discussed in relation to the problem of cooperation and conflict between Croats and Serbs in the 20th century. (SOI : PM: S. 17)

In his first review of Korunic's position published in an earlier issue of the Journal, the autor tried to show how Korunic fails to base his assessment of the early Croat nationalism of the 19th century on historical sources and how he changes his appraisal of the ideology of yugoslavism and the ideas of federalism and confederalism in political programs of the Croatian Revival Movement (so-called Illyrian Movement) and the National Party. The author thinks that Korunic's methodology reflects a new not yet well established trend in historiography of basing historical evaluations on slightly modified sources. Thus, instead of discussing the complex problems of Croatian history, Korunic and other representatives of this new trend force the issue of establishing the exact factography and by singling out of certain authors create an unhealthy atmosphere in Croatian historiography. Korunic renounced his previously held assessment of the presence of Yugoslav idea in the Croatian history of the 19th century, which creates an atmosphere where it is not easy to begin a discussion about historiography in former Yugoslavia. (SOI : CSP: S. 514f.)