Trade adjustment assistance
In: Journal of international economics, Band 36, Heft 3-4, S. 239-261
ISSN: 0022-1996
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In: Journal of international economics, Band 36, Heft 3-4, S. 239-261
ISSN: 0022-1996
In: Economic issues, problems and perspectives
In: Trade issues, policies and laws
GLOBAL COMPETITION TRADE ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE -- GLOBAL COMPETITION TRADE ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE -- Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- Chapter 1: TRADE ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE FOR FIRMS: ECONOMIC, PROGRAM, AND POLICY ISSUES -- SUMMARY -- INTRODUCTION -- RECENT DEVELOPMENTS -- THE ECONOMICS OF TRADE ADJUSTMENT -- THE FIRM TRADE ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM -- Eligibility and Certification -- Program Evaluation -- ECONOMIC AND POLICY ISSUES -- End Notes -- Chapter 2: TRADE ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE FOR FARMERS -- SUMMARY -- Rationale for Program
In: World development: the multi-disciplinary international journal devoted to the study and promotion of world development, Band 1, Heft 6, S. 43-47
In: International Chamber of Commerce, Br. [Drucksache] en.
In: Science and public policy: journal of the Science Policy Foundation
ISSN: 1471-5430
In: Economic issues, problems and perspectives
In: Trade issues, policies and laws
In: Political science research and methods: PSRM, Band 9, Heft 4, S. 889-898
ISSN: 2049-8489
AbstractHow responsive is the US' Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) to the labor dislocation that results from trade integration? Recent findings suggest that the world's most ambitious trade adjustment program barely responds to import shocks, and that the shortfall is made up by disability insurance and early retirement. This holds considerable implications: TAA offers a lens onto the central question of whether developed democracies can effectively redistribute the gains from international economic integration. We take a closer look at these results. Using petition-level data over a 20-year period, we find that TAA is between 1.7 and 3.3 times more responsive than current estimates suggest. Yet the news is not all good. As we show, the responsiveness of TAA has decreased considerably since the 1990s, just as developed democracies started facing increasing pushback against liberalization. This shortfall, in turn, has political consequences: areas where TAA has been least responsive were also more likely to shift toward voting for Trump in the 2016 Presidential election. Our findings speak to the considerable challenge governments face in aiding workers "left behind" by liberalization.
In: International journal / CIC, Canadian International Council: ij ; Canada's journal of global policy analysis, Band 72, Heft 1, S. 91-110
Trade adjustment assistance (TAA) is government aid to those affected by trade agreements. We review the history of TAA in Canada and ask whether Canada needs to reintroduce it in response to the recent intensification of trade negotiations. In light of the compensation offered by the federal government in connection with the Canada–European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), we examine how TAA fits in with the evolution of Canadian federalism in the trade policy area. Based in part on interviews with provincial trade negotiators, we conclude, first, that the compensation is an outcome of Canadian federalism. Second, we argue that while there is no reason to reintroduce a federal TAA program for workers, compensation for provinces is necessary to facilitate their cooperation with the implementation of trade treaty provisions. Third, we suggest that a more transparent rationale for such compensation would be superior to the ad hoc compensation observed in CETA.
In: Journal of international economics, Band 60, Heft 1, S. 203-222
ISSN: 0022-1996
In: International journal / Canadian International Council: Canada's journal of global policy analysis, Band 72, Heft 1, S. [91]-110
ISSN: 0020-7020
World Affairs Online
In: Contemporary economic policy: a journal of Western Economic Association International, Band 30, Heft 1, S. 43-59
ISSN: 1465-7287
The U.S. Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program provides workers who have lost their jobs due to increased trade with income support and training, job search, and relocation benefits. This paper uses data collected by the Department of Labor on TAA beneficiaries to provide the most recent econometric evaluation of the effectiveness of the TAA program. Summary statistics suggest that the TAA program successfully targets displaced workers who have a greater difficulty finding new employment. However, using propensity score matching techniques we find that while the required training component of the program improves the employment outcomes of beneficiaries, on average the TAA program has no discernible impact on the employment outcomes of the participants. (JEL F16)
Free trade has long raised the specter of job loss to a wide range of American workers, particularly in periods of recession. Today, with the weakening of free-trade supporters, and the corresponding protectionist pressure mounting, Congress may be taking its eye of the long term benefits of free trade and focusing instead on the short-term, politically attractive benefits of protectionism. This Comment argues, however, that protectionism will in fact add many new faces to America's unemployment lines, and prolong the world recession - for protectionism invites retaliation, and no nation is so insulated from the world economy that it can pursue protectionism without suffering itself from resulting protectionism.
BASE
The United States introduced Federal Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) as part of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act to dampen the adverse impact of increased trade on workers. Applications to receive TAA require approval from the Department of Labor. Guided by the technical criteria used by the U.S. government in the official TAA certification process, we capitalize on a rich multi-dimensional panel dataset to quantify the effects of political inuence on the TAA certification decision. We find that political factors such as party affiliation of the President, voting outcomes at the state level, and whether a petition was certified in an election year inuence the TAA certification outcome. Those effects remain even when including a wide array of controls and a rich set of fixed effects.
BASE
In: Challenge: the magazine of economic affairs, Band 49, Heft 4, S. 42-57
ISSN: 1558-1489