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THIS ARTICLE EXAMINES THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE UNITED STATES NEED A SEPARATE AIR FORCE INDEPENDENT OF THE ARMY, NAVY, AND MARINE CORPS. IT IDENTIFIES THE INTELLECTUAL AND BUREAUCRATIC JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE CREATION OF A SEPARATE AIR FORCE AND EXAMINES RECENT TRENDS WHICH SEEMINGLY INVALIDATE THOSE JUSTIFICATIONS. THE LOSS OF THE NUCLEAR MONOPOLY OF THE AIR FORCE, AND ITS INDECISIVE SHOWINGS IN KOREA AND VIETNAM HAVE LEFT THE AIR FORCE WITH ONLY ITS TACTICAL SUPPORT CAPABILITY (A CAPABILITY EASILY DUPLICATED BY OTHER BRANCHES OF THE ARMED SERVICES) AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR ITS EXISTENCE.

GROUND LAUNCH CRUISE MISSILES (GLCM) ARE THE MOST OBSCURE OF THE TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF THE FORMER SOVIET AIR FORCE. DEPLOYED IN SMALL NUMBERS, THEY WERE OVERSHADOWED BY THE ARMY'S TACTICAL BALLISTIC MISSILES. YET THEY PRESENT AN INTRIGUING MYSTERY, AS THEY REPRESENTED THE MOST NUMEROUS NUCLEAR WEAPON DEPLOYED ON CUBA DURING THE 1962 MISSILE CRISIS. THEIR PRESENCE ON CUBA WAS NOT RECOGNIZED BY U.S. INTELLIGENCE AT THE TIME, NOR IN MOST ACCOUNTS OF THE CRISIS SINCE. THIS ARTICLE PROVIDES THE FIRST DETAILED ACCOUNT IN ENGLISH OF THEIR DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT.

'FLYING OFFICERS' OF THE US AIR FORCE HAVE BEEN, TRADITIONALLY, THOSE WITH THE HIGHEST PRESTIGE. RECENT INDICATIONS AMONG AIR FORCE JUNIOR OFFICERS SUGGEST THAT A NEW GROUP, BASED ON MANAGEMENT, IS EMERGING. THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY IS TO DOCUMENT THE TREND OF DECLINING PRESTIGE OF FLYING OFFICERS, AND OFFICERS' GROWING ACCEPTANCE OF CIVILIAN IDENTITIES, VALUES AND NORMS.

THE ROOTS OF THE MODERN THEORY OF DETERRENCE ARE TO BE FOUND IN THE EVOLUTION OF STRATEGIC AIR POWER BEFORE WORLD WAR II. AIR POWER THEORY AND FORCE STRUCTURE BEFORE 1939 SHOW STRONG LINES OF CONTINUITY WITH THE POST-WAR WORLD. INDEED, MANY UNDERLYING ASSUMPTION AND MODES OF THOUGHT IN DETERRENCE THEORY CAN BE TRACED BACK TO THE INTER-WAR ERA. MANY CENTRAL ARGUMENTS IN CONTEMPORARY DETERRENCE THEORY HAVE THEIR SOURCE IN SIMILAR 1930'S ARGUMENTS ABOUT FIRST-STRIKE CAPABILITY. BUT A FULL-FLEDGED DETERRENCE THEORY DID NOT EXIST BEFORE WORLD WAR II, BECAUSE THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE THEORY HAS BEEN A SLOW, INCREMENTAL PROCESS, BOUND UP CLOSELY WITH TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, POLITICAL RECEPTIVITY, AND COMBAT EXPERIENCE.

SECRETARY OF THE U.S. AIR FORCE, DONALD RICE, OFFERS A COMPREHENSIVE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE B-2 BOMBER, ARGUING THAT IT IS AN ESSENTIAL COMPONENT OF THE U.S. STRATEGIC TRIAD. WITHOUT THE B-2 THE U.S. BOMBER FORCE WILL DWINDLE. HE ARGUES THAT THE USSR WILL LACK THE CAPABILITY FOR A SURPRISE SLBM ATTACK. HE ALSO SUGGESTS THAT ESTIMATES OF THE COST OF THE B-2 ARE INFLATED.