Alternative Regulation: The Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers
In: Capital Markets Law Journal, Band 6, Heft 3, S. 326-363
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In: Capital Markets Law Journal, Band 6, Heft 3, S. 326-363
SSRN
In: American Review of Political Economy: ARPE, Band 18, Heft 2
ISSN: 1551-1383
Drawing upon the 2007-2008 global crisis and the current Covid pandemic, this article aims to show that since the 1980s, the organization of the economy in a liberal way transformed public financial regulation into market-relying self-regulation that led to persistent crises. The article maintains that the financialized accumulation regime generates endogenous inconsistencies and proves to be unable to ensure systemic stability and long-term viability of society. An alternative financial regulation resting on preventive collective action seems to be a relevant way to provide society with a sustainable and progressive financial system.
The ill-management of the Covid crisis is related to the socio-economic framework that rules societies and economies around the world since the 1980s. The evolution of capitalism rests on speculation-led accumulation process that deepens inequalities and puts collective projects and goals on the back burner. This evolution, also known as financialization, is based first and foremost on the primacy of short-term profitability. Relying on individual (micro) rationality, it is unable to conduct market activities from a macroeconomic perspective to ensure the development of society. Although individual market strategies can be regarded as rational actions, the systemic financial stability cannot be achieved by market mechanisms. In a capitalist economy, financial stability is to the viability of society what public health is to the lives of citizens. Both require the oversight of a visible public hand. Drawing upon institutional economics this article then shows that systemic dysfunction of capitalist finance does reflect the dysfunctional organization of society in which collective action has been abandoned in favor of the doctrine of efficient, self-regulating markets. Recurrent crises, caused by the imbalances generated by laissez-faire economics, are the main threats to the sustainability of an open, innovative and progressive society. From this perspective, the regulation of financial systems is of paramount importance and calls for alternative models of collective action that should determine the conditions of exercise of private financial institutions according to the goals of a sustainable economy respectful of both people and the environment beyond the conservative individualistic doctrines.
In: Socio-economic planning sciences: the international journal of public sector decision-making, Band 41, Heft 4, S. 305-319
ISSN: 0038-0121
In: Review of policy research, Band 16, Heft 1, S. 65-85
ISSN: 1541-1338
ABSTRACTTwo national estuary programs in Florida, the Sarasota Bay Estuary Program (SBNEP) and the Tampa Bay National Estuary Program (TBNEP) are used to study the intricacies of implementation networks. Both programs are forms of alternative regulation and share similar attributes: an absence of a regulatory authority, exchange relationships based on equitable partnerships and an expected net aggregate benefit. Yet they arrive at two very different solutions. The results raise questions regarding the nature, scope and functioning of implementation networks. They also indicate that building networks is shaped by members' expectations and perceptions, and the degree of congruency they share with each other and the role of champions.
In: EIPASCOPE: bulletin, Heft 1, S. 2-11
World Affairs Online
In: EIPASCOPE: bulletin, Band 1, S. 2-11
In: Policy studies review: PSR, Band 16, Heft 1, S. 65-85
ISSN: 0278-4416
Examines and compares steps taken in the Sarasota Bay and the Tampa Bay estuary programs to build networks in order to implement a comprehensive conservation management plan in a multijurisdictional setting. Included in a collection of articles under the overall title "Symposium: The impact of collaborative efforts". The SBNEP and TBNEP.
Having achieved grid parity, photovoltaic (PV) self-consumption will play a key role in the transition to a low-carbon energy system. Spain, whilst among the EU countries with highest solar irradiation, has recently passed one of the most restrictive self-consumption regulations. We study the implications of this regulation in comparison with alternatives (net metering, net billing) on the profitability (internal rate of return) of potential residential, commercial and industrial investors, as well as the impact of PV self-consumption on government revenues and the electricity system. We find that this regulation hinders the diffusion of PV self-consumption applications by making them economically infeasible. It also creates inefficient disincentives for demand-side adjustment and by fostering disconnection from the grid. Under the current conditions, the direct economic impact of PV self-consumption on both aggregate government and electricity system revenues is positive for investments in the residential segment, negligible for those of the commercial segment and negative for those of the industrial segment. In order to raise compliance with the relevant European Commission guidelines and to promote the diffusion of PV systems at minimum cost to the electricity system, a dynamic net billing scheme is recommended. ; (VLID)6126096 ; Version of record
BASE
In: Managing Regulation, S. 96-119
National audience ; The post-crisis financial reforms address the need for systemic regulation, focused not only on individual banks but also on the whole financial system. The regulator principal objective is to set banks' capital requirements equal to international minimum standards in order to mimimise systemic risk. Indeed, Basel agreement is designed to guide a judgement about minimum universal levels of capital and remains mainly microprudential in its focus rather than being macroprudential. An alternative model to Basel framework is derived where systemic risk is taken into account in each bank's dynamic. This might be a new departure for prudential policy. It allows for the regulator to compute capital and risk requirements for controlling systemic risk. Moreover, bank regulation is considered in a two-scale level, either at the bank level or at the system-wide level. We test the adequacy of the model on a data set containing 19 banks of 5 major countries from 2005 to 2012. We compute the capital ratio threshold per year for each bank and each country and we rank them according to their level of fragility. Our results suggest to consider an alternative measure of systemic risk that requires minimal capital ratios that are bank-specic and time-varying.
BASE
National audience ; The post-crisis financial reforms address the need for systemic regulation, focused not only on individual banks but also on the whole financial system. The regulator principal objective is to set banks' capital requirements equal to international minimum standards in order to mimimise systemic risk. Indeed, Basel agreement is designed to guide a judgement about minimum universal levels of capital and remains mainly microprudential in its focus rather than being macroprudential. An alternative model to Basel framework is derived where systemic risk is taken into account in each bank's dynamic. This might be a new departure for prudential policy. It allows for the regulator to compute capital and risk requirements for controlling systemic risk. Moreover, bank regulation is considered in a two-scale level, either at the bank level or at the system-wide level. We test the adequacy of the model on a data set containing 19 banks of 5 major countries from 2005 to 2012. We compute the capital ratio threshold per year for each bank and each country and we rank them according to their level of fragility. Our results suggest to consider an alternative measure of systemic risk that requires minimal capital ratios that are bank-specic and time-varying.
BASE
SSRN
Working paper
In: Economic affairs: journal of the Institute of Economic Affairs, Band 28, Heft 3, S. 32-37
ISSN: 1468-0270
Is it inevitable that monopoly networks should continue to be regulated in their present form? Such regulation has limitations as well as advantages. In some countries, negotiated settlements between utilities and users including customer groups provide greater flexibility and innovation and better representation of consumer interests. There is scope for applying such alternative institutional arrangements in the UK.
Here, we determined the relative importance of different transcriptional mechanisms in the genome-reduced bacterium Mycoplasma pneumoniae, by employing an array of experimental techniques under multiple genetic and environmental perturbations. Of the 143 genes tested (21% of the bacterium's annotated proteins), only 55% showed an altered phenotype, highlighting the robustness of biological systems. We identified nine transcription factors (TFs) and their targets, representing 43% of the genome, and 16 regulators that indirectly affect transcription. Only 20% of transcriptional regulation is mediated by canonical TFs when responding to perturbations. Using a Random Forest, we quantified the non-redundant contribution of different mechanisms such as supercoiling, metabolic control, RNA degradation, and chromosome topology to transcriptional changes. Model-predicted gene changes correlate well with experimental data in 95% of the tested perturbations, explaining up to 70% of the total variance when also considering noise. This analysis highlights the importance of considering non-TF-mediated regulation when engineering bacteria. ; The project was supported by funds from the Fundación Marcelino Botín and the Spanish Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (BIO2007-61762). This project was financed by Instituto de Salud Carlos III and co-financed by Federación Española de Enfermedades Raras under grant agreement PI10/01702 and the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation program, under grant agreements no 634942 (MycoSynVac) and 670216 (MYCOCHASSIS). We acknowledge support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness to the EMBL partnership, Centro de Excelencia Severo Ochoa.
BASE
In: Policy studies journal: the journal of the Policy Studies Organization, Band 16, Heft 3, S. 602-614
ISSN: 1541-0072