Suchergebnisse

Seit etlichen Jahren - genauer gesagt: seit den Terroranschlägem in New York von 2001 - erfährt die Bekämpfung der Geldwäsche und Terrorismusfinanzierung eine Renaissance in der öffentlichen Aufmerksamkeit. Die Gesetzesvorhaben und -umsetzungen überholen einander geradezu: genannt seien hier al massivere Eingriffe die Dritte EG-Geldwäscherichtlinie, die am 21. August 2008 durch das Geldwäschebekämpfungsgesetz (GwBekErgG) in nationales Recht umgesetzt wurde, das Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Zweiten E-Geld-Richtlinie (2011), das Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Bekämpfung der Geldwäsche und Steuerhinterziehung (Schwarzgeldbekämpfungsgesetz, ebenfalls 2011) sowie als vorläufig letzte nationale Novellierung das Gesetz zur Optimierung der Geldwäscheprävention (GwOptG, 2012). Und die nächste Überholung ist bereits in Sicht: Die sich derzeit noch im Vorschlagsstadium befindliche Vierte EG-Geldwäscherichtlinie wird im Sommer 2014 erwartet. Grund genug, den 16. Teil unseres Loseblattkommentars "Bankrecht und Bankpraxis", der die Fragen der Geldwäsche und Terrorismusfinanzierung bearbeitet und soeben komplett aktualisiert und neu bearbeitet wurde, als Sonderdruck anzubieten.

Dne 20. července 2021 Evropská komise představila ambiciózní balíček legislativních návrhů na posílení pravidel EU pro boj proti praní špinavých peněz a financování terorismu (AML/CFT). Součástí balíčku je nejen návrh na vytvoření nového orgánu EU pro boj proti praní špinavých peněz, ale především přijetí nové právní úpravy, která má současně obsahovat přímo použitelná pravidla, a to i v oblastech hloubkové kontroly klienta a skutečného vlastnictví. Součástí legislativního balíčku je současně návrh nové (šesté) směrnice, která nahradí dosavadní směrnici 2015/849/EU. Nově navrhovaná směrnice předkládá nové mechanismy, které mají členské státy zavést za účelem předcházení využívání finančního systému k praní peněz nebo financování terorismu. Mechanismům navrhované směrnice a jejich vlivu na bankovní obchody je věnován následující článek.

This paper assesses countries' compliance with the Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) international standard during the period 2004 to 2011. We find that overall compliance is low; there is an adverse impact on financial transparency created by the cumulative effects of poor implementation of standards on customer identification; and the current measurements of compliance do not take into account an analysis of ML/FT risk, thereby undermining their credibility and the relevance of some of the policy recommendations taken on their basis. Moreover, we also e

The thesis examines the intricacies of the global AML/CFT framework focusing largely on the three jurisdictions of United Kingdom, Uganda and South Africa. These jurisdictions were selected to test the hypothetical model on which this study was undertaken. While appreciating the importance for states to embrace global prohibition regimes to deal with overlapping interstate issues such as money laundering, these regimes often tend to overlook practical realities in member countries they are implemented. Since the global AML framework is implemented through the compliance of individual states, its efficacy would depend on the propensity of individual states to harness it. There is anecdotal evidence to corroborate the thesis that the current global AML/CFT framework is not compatible with the regulatory environment across the majority of LDCs. Thus, this presupposes that it cannot be applicable globally. LDCs are saddled by general systemic failure, lack of economic and social infrastructure; lack of physical and human resources, corruption and its corruptive effective on regulatory institutions and national governments. Even with the best intent, in the foregoing precarious environment, desired AML laws cannot effectively work as expected. Also, by design or default, soft law instruments (for example the FATF forty plus nine recommendations are not easy apply, let alone enforce globally. The study proposes the need for countries to undertake desired reform programmes before they can countenance the adoption of the global AML/CFT framework. Since money laundering crimes are jurisdictional problematic—not amenable within the realm of individual states, it is imperative to introduce a global AML court. It is also imperative for states to consider adopting hybrid measures such as mutual recognition paradigm in Europe to ease their co-existence on overlapping global regulatory challenges. States should also explore the possibility of harnessing norms of CIL as opposed to prescribing regulatory regimes every time there is a crisis. However, it needs to be noted that the envisaged global AML/CFT regimes cannot crystallize into norms of CIL, unless they are willingly embraced by countries and not imposed.

AbstractFor many years, banks have been spending billions of pounds to combat money laundering and terrorist-financing activity but are falling short of both local and global expectations, despite extensive regulatory guidance. The aim of this research was to examine what barriers there might be in conducting effective anti-money laundering (AML) investigations. There is little guidance to help banks consider the difficulties that might be faced when raising awkward questions with customers. The few studies that were identified accentuated poor internal practices and inadequate skills; however, there is little examination of the specific problems encountered. A mixed methods form of research was adopted using surveys and interviews, targeted at bank staff involved in AML investigations. The results indicated numerous difficulties when conducting enquiries, many of which centred around a fear of offending the customer. If bank staff are fearful of asking questions, it is clearly impossible to conduct satisfactory investigations.

This article deals with cryptocurrencies and its impact nowadays on the AML field at a European Union level . The article will be divided into an introduction, four chapters and a conclusion; it will define elementary information and defitions, will identify ways of practical use of cryptocurrencies, will introduce risks connected with the use of cryptocurrencies and will introduce legal regulation of cryptocurrencies by the V . AML Direction . In the conclusion the quality of communitary regulation will be evaluated and a few de lege ferenda tips will be devised to improve regulation for the future. ; This article deals with cryptocurrencies and its impact nowadays on the AML field at a European Union level . The article will be divided into an introduction, four chapters and a conclusion; it will define elementary information and defitions, will identify ways of practical use of cryptocurrencies, will introduce risks connected with the use of cryptocurrencies and will introduce legal regulation of cryptocurrencies by the V . AML Direction . In the conclusion the quality of communitary regulation will be evaluated and a few de lege ferenda tips will be devised to improve regulation for the future.

The Anti-Money Laundering regime has been important in harmonizing laws and institutions, and has received global political support. Yet there has been minimal effort at evaluation of how well any AML intervention does in achieving its goals. There are no credible estimates either of the total amount laundered (globally or nationally) nor of most of the specific serious harms that AML aims to avert. Consequently, reduction of these is not a plausible outcome measure. There have been few efforts by country evaluators in the FATF Mutual Evaluation Reports (MERs) to acquire qualitative data or seriously analyze either quantitative or qualitative data. We find that data are relatively unimportant in policy development and implementation. Moreover, the long gaps of about 8 years between evaluations mean that widely used 'country risk' models for AML are forced still to rely largely on the 3rd Round evaluations whose use of data was minimal and inconsistent. While the 4th round MERs (2014–2022) have made an effort to be more systematic in the collection and analysis of data, FATF has still not established procedures that provide sufficiently informative evaluations. Our analysis of five recent National Risk Assessments (a major component of the new evaluations) in major countries shows little use of data, though the UK is notably better than the others. In the absence of more consistent and systematic data analysis, claims that countries have less or more effective systems will be open to allegations of ad hoc, impressionistic or politicized judgments. This reduces their perceived legitimacy, though this does not mean that the AML efforts and the evaluation processes themselves have no effects.