Suchergebnisse

In the modern world, energetic base materials, and especially petroleum connections, with their hubs, streams and directions, are much closer than economic ties. The history of relationship between oil-producing countries and the leading powers of the West became especially vivid during the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973. The attempts of "petroleum weapon" employment in 1967, under the weight of radical Arab regimes and local population against the U.S. and West-European countries (Israel's allies), failed owing to a two-faced position of Saudi Arabia and other oil-producing Arab countries. During the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, the "petroleum weapon" had more serious consequences for the West. For once the Arabs were acting more in concert. Oil-importing countries realized their economic exposure. For the first time the Arab countries started to determine their oil output level and control its price assessment. In this way, the war of 1973 and its consequences created the new phenomenon: the oil prices dynamics came to be integrated with politics in the Middle East.

This article shows that Israel's success in wars against Arab states should not be attributed exclusively to its own military prowess & the relative incompetence of its enemies. Another important factor was great-power involvement in the Arab-Israeli wars. Despite Israel's early fears, such involvement in most cases either failed to deny Israel its military achievements or was an asset for two main reasons: lack of will or capability on the part of hostile great powers to intervene against Israel; & a friendly patron's support, without which Israel's own military skills might not have been sufficient to secure military success. Adapted from the source document.

This article shows that Israel's success in wars against Arab states should not be attributed exclusively to its own military prowess and the relative incompetence of its enemies. Another important factor was great-power involvement in the Arab-Israeli wars.Despite Israel's early fears, such involvement in most cases either failed to deny Israel its military achievements or was an asset for two main reasons: lack of will or capability on the part of hostile great powers to intervene against Israel; and a friendly patron's support, without which Israel's own military skills might not have been suf ficient to secure military success.