The paper explores the epistemic fruitfulness of the contemporary theories of modern relations for historical research about the relations between premodern polities. The author suggests to replace the concepts of "international system" and "international society" by the broader notions of "interpolity system" and that of "interpolity society". It is demonstrated that A. Wendt's thesis that in the premodern times international politics was dominated by the Hobbesian culture of anarchy disregards historical evidence about the "Lockean" realities of the dynastic politics in the medieval Europe and other places. The author also criticise H. Bull's concept of international society because of its assumption that Westphalian peace treaty of 1648 was the date of birth of the international law and international society as historical reality. Paper includes a case study about the changing roles and challenges of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (GDL) as the subject of interpolity relations in XIII-XV centuries. It focuses on the rise of GDL from the polity playing the role of the barrier (but not that of buffer) polity, separating Central European and Eastern European interpolity systems and belonging to both of them, to the regional empire and suzerain polity of the Eastern European interpolity system by the early XVth century. However, Lithuanian hegemony in Eastern Europe lasted only very few years. After 1430, the Eastern European interpolity system was about to transform itself from the suzerain polity system into a multipolar sovereign interpolity system of the type that consolidated in the Central and Western Europe after 1648 and survived for 300 years. However, the political leadership of GDL failed to meet the challenge to maintain an emerging multipolar balance of power in this system. Adapted from the source document.
There are three main geopolitical actors whose interests & specific actions may have impact on Ukraine's geopolitical drift towards the East or the West. From such actors Russia must be named first. Yet author of the article is more interested in two others -- the United States & the European Union. Although in the Huntington's scheme they represent supposedly united Western civilization their interests in Ukraine or towards Ukraine are rather different. For the United States Ukraine is quite an important country, especially for security reasons. Those reasons are related both to containment of Russia -- the USA seeks to contain not only enemies but partners as well -- and to the implementation of national security strategy which treats the Wider Middle East as likely the most important for the USA -- from security point of view -- region of the world. Ukraine borders with this region in which the USA has few reliable partners. Ukraine may became such a partner -- more reliable than Turkey. From the first view the EU is more close to Ukraine than the USA. Yet the EU is more close to Ukraine only from geographical point of view. The EU, especially its core states, so called "old" Europe, treats Ukraine as peripheral country & regards development of closer ties with it as unnecessary or even harmful. One of the many reasons -- Ukraine may become a new Trojan Horse of the USA inside the EU. Different EU countries look at EU neighborhood policy with different eyes. Most of the new members of the EU give priority to the eastern direction but many older -- rather to the southern one. Moreover, for most of the new members Ukraine is more natural candidate for EU membership than Turkey creating much less problems for the European identity of the EU. However, Ukraine's possible accession to EU & NATO will depend not only upon position of the major geopolitical players but on the will of Ukrainians themselves. Ukraine is extremely heterogeneous country. Religious, historical & cultural divides create political ones & at the moment it is not clear which way -- leading towards the East or the West -- the country may choose. In such situation an external encouragement & support is vitally needed -- development of relations with Ukraine must become a priority not only for the USA but for the EU also. Adapted from the source document.
The article discuses the problem that was recently raised in the Lithuanian historical literature & public discourse by G. Beresnevieius, A. Bumblauskas, S. C. Rowell: was the medieval Lithuanian state (Grand Duchy of Lithuania; GDL) an empire? Important reason for the emergence of this problem was the partial rehabilitation of the very concept of "empire" due to the dissolution of the the USSR (reputed as "last empire") & the search for common legacies by the historians of the countries involved in the construction of the European Union as a transnational political community. There were important reasons for the traditional historiography to abstain from the use of the concepts of "empire" & "imperialism" in the work on GDL. For Non-Marxist Russian historians, GDL was simply another Russian state, so there could not be Russian imperialism against Russians. For Marxist historians, imperialism was a phase in the "capitalist formation," immediately preceding the socialist revolution & bound to the specific period of world history, so the research on precapitalist empires & imperialism was suspect of anachronism. For the opposite reason, deriving from the hermeneutic methodology, the talk about medieval Lithuanian empire & imperialism was an anachronism for Non-Marxist Polish & German historians too, because they considered as Empires only polities that claimed to be successors to Roman Empire: the Holy Roman Empire of German Nation, Byzantine Empire, Moscow Empire. Lithuanian political elite never raised such claims, although theory of the Lithuanian descent from Romans (Legend of Palemon) could be used for this goal. Starting from path-breaking work by S. N. Eisenstadt "The Political Systems of Empires" (1963), comparative politics, history, sociology, anthropology & theory of international relations witnessed the emergence of the field of interdisciplinary studies that can be described as comparative studies of empires & imperialism. Second section of the paper provides the survey of the theoretical work in this field in search of the ideas useful for the analysis of the peculiarities of the medieval Lithuanian state. This survey includes into its scope the work of S. N. Eisenstadt, I. Wallerstein, A. Motyl, B. Buzan, R. Little, A. Watson, M. Beissinger, Ch.Tilly & M. Doyle, whose book "Empires" is considered as the most important contribution to the theorizing of empires & imperialism up to this date. Adapted from the source document.
The article analyzes the concept of national state & the meaning of national independence. Political independence has proven to be a much greater challenge to the nations of Eastern & Central Europe. The population of the region is not merely aware of the fact that political independence is difficult to gain; they believe that it is far more important to handle the tasks related to moral & cultural justification of independence. The said aspects do not vanish from the horizon of philosophical, moral & political reflections of the nations within the region. Links with the Western culture is one of the topical subjects in Eastern & Central Europe. However, from the vantage point of political independence the Western culture tends to undermine the spirit of the nations within the region rather than uplift it. The ailments of the Western culture, when brought to the region, are perceived as the factors destroying the meaning of independence. Adapted from the source document.
The article deals with the fundamentals of Lithuanian foreign policy. It is an attempt to evaluate its understructure, principles, advantages & shortcomings. The article proceeds to exploring a rather strenuous question: are the tensions between Lithuanian & Russia caused solely by the Russian misbehavior as Lithuanian politicians mostly claim or is the Lithuanian foreign policy also to blame. The crucial idea of the "new Lithuanian foreign policy," that of the center or leader of an unnamed & undefined region, presumably of the Eastern Europe or at least a part of it, is put under scrutiny. The author claims that (1) for a small country such a role is utterly unrealistic, (2) attempts to play that role have nothing to do with national interests the foreign policy has serve, (3) playing the chosen role complicates relations both with other EU countries & with Russia. The article ends with the conclusion that the foundation of the Lithuanian foreign policy must be its Western, not Eastern policy. Adapted from the source document.
The aim of this article is to review & evaluate the condition & the development perspectives of the relations between the EU & its Eastern neighbors. The problem is analyzed in the context of the recent discussion on the "Broader Europe" concept. The current dominant model of the relations between the EU & Eastern Europe countries is described in the article using the "circular discourse" & "circular interaction" terms. This article is aimed to reveal the initial theoretical & geo/political preconditions that helped this model to become the dominant theoretical & practical approach in the field of EU -- East Europe relations, to uncover the logics of its functioning & the implications of its realization to Lithuania & the other new EU member states. Adapted from the source document.
The article deals with the main preconditions for the application of the EU conditionality. It argues that the experience of the Western Balkan & the ENP countries could be used to assess the preconditions of the success of the Europeanization in Central & Eastern Europe. It also provides arguments for the critical assessment of the role of the EU membership perspective in the success of the domestic reforms. Three main conditions are identified & suggestions for further research are made. Adapted from the source document.
The main thesis of this article is that civic & political activity of older generations of Lithuanian population is based on "sense of duty" and traditional moral values (importance of family, patriotism, religion) while younger generation is characterized by secular-rational values (priority is given to measures of personal benefit, efficiency). It is argued in the article that this intergenerational difference in value orientations is more important than life cycle effect explaining differences of political & civic engagement between young & older people in Lithuanian society. Adapted from the source document.
2003 EU accession referenda results in the 8 East Central European countries (Slovenia, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia, Poland, Czech Republic, Estonia, & Latvia) have been analyzed examining regional dimension of their results. Two criteria, active euro-optimism (percentage of YES voters out of all the electorate in particular region), & active euro-skepticism (percentage of NO voters out of all the electorate in the region), have been used. Comparison with two other variables, economic (GDP per capita in the region) & ethnic (percentage of ethnic group other than title one, if remarkable) has been made; Pearson correlations have been calculated. Though there is common agreement on suppositional influence of regional factors (possibly, North-South, East-West, urban-rural, richer-poorer regional cleavages, exceptional case of the capital city, influence of densely inhabited ethnic groups etc.) in previous euro-integration referenda, there were no consistent analyses on it. Examining of 8 East Central European countries has showed both varieties from country to country as well as a number of general trends. In Slovenia, region of its capital city, Ljubljana, is more euro-optimistic compared with eastern Pomurska region (Maribor & Ptuj). Though regional economic irregularities not enough significant, as well as the number of examples too small for generalization, one can suppose West-East cleavage connected with the economic factor here. In Hungary, though voters' turnout was exceptionally low, both factor of higher euro-optimism in the capital city, Budapest, was evident, as well as strong relation between economic factor & voting behavior. However, Hungary has its own specifics: higher economic development of the region increases both active euro-optimism & active euro-skepticism, too. This, in turn, cannot exclude that factor of "passive euro-skepticism" is important here. In Lithuania, strong relations between size of ethnic minorities in the region & both active euro-optimism (negative) & active euro-skepticism (positive) were evident. More complications were, to evaluate influence of the economic factor: present statistics of GDP per capita in apskritys are far not enough to support supposition that voting results in particular Lithuania's territories are related with their economic development, too. In Slovakia, quite strong influence can be found of the size of Hungarian ethnic minority, but the opposite compared to Lithuania: increasing number of ethnic Hungarians do increase active euro-optimism & decrease active euro-skepticism. This is in good accordance with widely known believe of Hungarian ethnic group that EU membership will improve their status. Surprisingly, in Slovakia it was impossibly to evaluate the influence of another ethnic factor: though this country is widely known by the problems connected with Roma ethnic group, official statistics does not even show remarkable percentage of Roma in any region at all. Influence of economic factor, though number of examples is very small, is also present in Slovakia: the higher is GDP per capita, the higher is active euro-optimism, & at the same time the lower active euro-skepticism. In Poland, clear pattern of lower active euro-optimism was shown for its eastern regions, Podlaskie, Lubelskie, & Podkarpackie; they are economically poorest, at the same time, & characterized by specific political culture (bigger number of orthodox, smaller agricultural incomes, dependence on small trans-border trade, etc.). In the Czech Republic, regional economic pattern is also present: increase in regional GDP per capita also increases the active euro-optimism. Capital city, Prague, has exceptional position: it is most economically developed, & most euro-optimistic, too. For Estonia, complicated picture of inter-related influence of both ethnic & economic factors is typical. On one hand, there are no clear correlations between economic & voting variables. On the other, eastern Ida-Virumaa region, densely populated by ethnic Russians & the least economically developed, is described at the same time as mostly active euro-optimistic, & less euro-skeptical. The most reliable explanation would be, economic underdevelopment & ethnicity, complicated by stronger trans-border relations of individuals living near Russian border, may reinforce uncertainty in euro-integration perspective. For Latvia, the ethnic factor is very much evident: Pearson correlation between regional percentage of Russian population & active euro-skepticism is 0.906; reversely, it is connected with active euro-optimism. Eastern regions of Daugavpils & Rezekne affected also by economic underdevelopment were the most euro-skeptical among all 8 East European countries & became only regions where bigger part of inhabitants were actively opposed EU integration than supported. Thus, a number of cleavages can be generalized for majority of the acceding countries examined. "Center-periphery" cleavage is more or less evident for all countries except of Lithuania & Latvia: better socio-economic development seems to be overcomplicated by ethnic factors in two the latter. In Slovenia, Poland, and, especially, the Baltic States, the East-West cleavage is important. This can be explained by specifics of eastern regions: economic underdevelopment, personal & business ties beyond border, especially among Russian ethnic group in the East of the Baltic States, can lead to rational individual arguments against integration into European Union. With reversed relation, ethnic factor is typical for Hungarian ethnic group in Slovakia: support for euro-integration is predominant within it. The universal factor influencing electoral behavior in referenda is economic one, especially remarkable for Visegrad countries & Slovenia. Adapted from the source document.
In this article the main attention will be devoted for the state and its place in postcommunist society. The state is the main institutional ensemble in political arena that directs our both political and everyday life, yet it itself is usually resilient for any radical changes even if it largely does not suffice the expectations of its citizenry. Firstly, it is considered the phenomenon of transformation of postcommunist state, its internal logic and essential causes that determined clear divergence of developmental paths in the postcommunist space. In other two chapters the attention will be paid for the development of postcommunist states after their accession in to the EU and for evolution of different trajectories. In the second part of the article the attention is paid to the development of postcommunist states after their accession in to the EU and for evolution of different trajectories. The evidence shows that the divide between "semi-core" and "semi-peripheral" countries in Central and Eastern Europe has become quite stable and may have its implications for the future. Adapted from the source document.
It is a common perception that 20 years after the fall of communism, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CCEE), even though they have joined the EU, belong to the group of post-communist countries. This article analyses whether a clear distinction in the quality of democracy between the CCEE, which are new member states of the EU, and the old member states still could be made. The analysis has been performed by comparison of the democracy indicators of the countries of Southern Europe, Nordic countries and the CCEE. The research has revealed that the scores of democracy indicators of the countries of Southern Europe and the CCEE do not differ significantly, and in some cases, the scores of the group of the CCEE correspond to a better quality of democracy. The scores of democracy indicators of the individual countries of the two groups overlap in most cases. However, the analysis has exhibited a considerable difference of the democracy indicators between the countries of Southern Europe and Nordic countries, although these countries belong to the group of the old member states of the EU. Thus, the difference in the scores of democracy indicators inside the group of the old member states of the EU is bigger than the difference between the CCEE and the countries of Southern Europe. This means that the requirements for the quality of democracy, which are applied to mature Western democracies, have to be applied to the CCEE. Adapted from the source document.
Much academic writing about socialism & post-socialism in Eastern Europe is grounded on assumptions that socialism was "immoral," "imposed," "oppressive," etc., & was experienced as such by people subjected to socialist governments (c.f. Yurchak, 2003). The memories of Soviet times recorded in three village communities in present-day Lithuania constitute a paradox to such conceptualizations of socialism. Furthermore, memories comprise a contradiction to the rhetoric of the revolutions of 1989-1991 founded in the strong criticism of socialism. People in the village communities studied invoke the past as a space & time of security, social welfare, prosperity, a sensible way of life, as well as a moral & just order. Conversely, the present is narrated in terms of decline & regression. The memories are comments on the post-socialist changes & personal experiences of post-socialism. Dialectically, the past & the present are reproduced in all narratives. These narratives constitute subjectivities of the villagers significant in understanding some recent processes such as nostalgia of socialism & resentment towards the present. These processes increasingly define the post-1989 history of Eastern European countries (Minkenberg, 2002; Ramet, 1999). The rise of radical & populist politics in Eastern Europe gives reason to think that communication between politicians & people is carried out in a language incompletely understood in post-socialist studies. The inquiry into memories of Soviet times is a way to approach articulated subjectivities & social histories which may or have become embodied in recent political discourse. 14 References. Adapted from the source document.
From the end of the Cold war there is no shortage of academic analyses & political considerations on the possible directions of foreign & security policy of Ukraine. The researches usually stress the strategic location of the country. It is asserted that its foreign & security policy is conditioned not only by domestic (political, socio-economical) factors, but also by the position of the country between "overlapping integrational spaces." Ukraine is influenced by Western "neighborhood" which has extended to the Central Eastern Europe & is manifesting itself through the Eastern policies of the EU & NATO. From the other side, Ukraine is influenced by Russia & structures backed by Russia (Commonwealth of Independent States -- CIS, Common Economical Space -- CES). Thus, Ukraine becomes the special object of contest between East & West. Sometimes this contest creates the stability & cooperation, sometimes -- the conflict. Ukraine tries to use these situations to strengthen its state identity & crystallize the geopolitical functions. Using these insights the article analyses what & how the complex of domestic & external factors influenced the foreign & security policy of Ukraine during the transformation of political regime in 2004-2005 & after the "Orange revolution." It is asserted that Ukraine met the 2004 Presidential elections in very difficult situation: the efforts of the external actors to influence the geopolitical self-determination of the country intensified its domestic problems (fragmentation of the society & the state, crisis of the oligarchic political system etc). During this pressure the strategy of Yushchenko & Timoshenko alliance that relied on the fight with the corrupt political economical system & stressed the orientation to the West was more effective. Although the victory of the alliance created the premises of the pro-Western policy, the integration of Ukraine with the West is still very murky. This integration can create the conflicts with Moscow. Whereas the West is politically not prepared to propose the quicker integration plan. Hence a lot will depend on the capabilities of Kiev to sustain the consolidated Yushchenko-Timoshenko alliance, which won the presidential elections & declared the Western orientation, & to win the parliamentary elections in spring of 2006. The victory would be signal that Ukraine is prepared to continue the liberal reforms & pro-Western foreign policy. The article also proposes the guidelines for Lithuanian foreign policy towards the Ukraine. Adapted from the source document.
