Suchergebnisse

This article explores the sweeping restructuring of the state in Latin America. Regulatory governance through autonomous agencies that was long confined to the United States (at the country level) and to central banking (at the sectoral level) is evolving from "best practice" to a hegemonic institution grounded in a new convention. Our dataset reveals an explosive growth of regulatory agencies across different sectors and nations in Latin America. We draw a major distinction between sectoral and national patterns of diffusion that challenges deeply entrenched research designs that treat the nation as the exclusive unit of analysis. Two particular insights exemplify the productivity of our approach. First, it allow us to move the discussion from the American origins of the regulatory state to sectoral origins, namely the centuries of central bank independence in Europe. Second, we found that while the first stages of the diffusion of regulatory authorities in the region display sectoral patterns, the later stages have significant national characteristics. This is a paradoxical result in an age which celebrates the demise of the nation-state.

This article explores the sweeping restructuring of the state in Latin America. Regulatory governance through autonomous agencies that was long confined to the United States (at the country level) and to central banking (at the sectoral level) is evolving from "best practice" to a hegemonic institution grounded in a new convention. Our dataset reveals an explosive growth of regulatory agencies across different sectors and nations in Latin America. We draw a major distinction between sectoral and national patterns of diffusion that challenges deeply entrenched research designs that treat the nation as the exclusive unit of analysis. Two particular insights exemplify the productivity of our approach. First, it allow us to move the discussion from the American origins of the regulatory state to sectoral origins, namely the centuries of central bank independence in Europe. Second, we found that while the first stages of the diffusion of regulatory authorities in the region display sectoral patterns, the later stages have significant national characteristics. This is a paradoxical result in an age which celebrates the demise of the nation-state.

AbstractThis article examines the autonomy of independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) in Turkey. It explores, first, the different factors that have led to the creation of IRAs and second, the legislative basis of their formal or de jure autonomy. Thereafter, the article assesses the extent to which this formal autonomy is really put in practice and how it is perceived by board members. The enquiry was conducted through a survey comprising interviews and a questionnaire applied to the same. It concludes that although formal autonomy is satisfactorily provided for by law, government tends to limit this autonomy through secondary legislation. Consequently, there are some constraints on the actual use of autonomy. Concerning de facto autonomy, survey findings show that boards are exposed to external and internal pressures and interference in their deliberations. Thus, the assumption that 'the greater the autonomy the more efficient the management' is questioned. The main sources of pressure on board members are from the regulated sectors themselves. These findings have an important bearing on democracy and the political–administrative interface, as it is confronted by market forces. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

A poster presentation regarding a comparison of approved indications between regulatory agencies. Introduction: Medicinal products are allowed on the market following approval by autonomous regulatory agencies which are tasked with their evaluation. Differences in evaluation practices during the registration of medicinal products are found in Europe and the United States of America which may lead to discrepancies in clinical guidelines, pricing policies, and drug use. Aims: To compare the differences in the indications of medicinal products authorised by the European Medicines Agency (EMA) and the US Food & Drug Administration using new molecular entity cardiology-related medicinal products as examples. ; N/A

The aim of this paper is to show that regulatory risk is due to the discretionary behaviour of regulatory agencies, caused by a too extensive regulatory mandate provided by the legislator. The normative point of reference and a behavioural model of regulatory agencies based on the positive theory of regulation are presented. Regulatory risk with regard to the future behaviour of regulatory agencies is modelled as the consequence of the ex ante uncertainty about the relative influence of interest groups in the regulatory process. The problem of regulatory risk is analysed separately in competitive network areas and in non-competitive network areas. For both cases a specific measure of regulatory risk is proposed. But measurement and compensation are different issues. The im-possibility of compensating for regulatory risk is demonstrated. Finally, the disaggregated regulatory mandate is presented as an institutional reform approach.

The aim of this paper is to show that regulatory risk is due to the discretionary behaviour of regulatory agencies, caused by a too extensive regulatory mandate provided by the legislator. The normative point of reference and a behavioural model of regulatory agencies based on the positive theory of regulation are presented. Regulatory risk with regard to the future behaviour of regulatory agencies is modelled as the consequence of the ex ante uncertainty about the relative influence of interest groups in the regulatory process. The problem of regulatory risk is analysed separately in competitive network areas and in non-competitive network areas. For both cases a specific measure of regulatory risk is proposed. But measurement and compensation are different issues. The im-possibility of compensating for regulatory risk is demonstrated. Finally, the disaggregated regulatory mandate is presented as an institutional reform approach.

This article describes the regulatory agencies in Norway as part of the population of state agencies by focusing on who controls and what is controlled and how. The authors analyze whether regulatory agencies are regulated and controlled to different degrees, by different external actors, and in different ways than other agencies, and on whether this control focuses on different aspects. They also examine whether the variation in regulation and control according to type of agency task is sustained if one controls for structural and cultural features. The empirical basis is a broad survey of Norwegian state agencies carried out in 2004, and the theoretical approaches embrace a task-specific, a structural-instrumental and a cultural-institutional perspective. The authors find that regulatory tasks represent a major activity for state agencies in Norway and that external control by both the executive and the legislative bodies of agencies is rather significant. Moreover, in contrast to what one would expect, given current regulatory orthodoxy, regulatory agencies are controlled to a larger extent than other agencies. Adapted from the source document.